Edited by Emily Clifford
and Xavier Buxton

The Imagination of the Mind in Classical Athens

Forms of Thought

IMAGE, TEXT, AND CULTURE
IN CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY

The Imagination of the Mind in Classical Athens

This book explores the imaginative processes at work in the artefacts of Classical Athens. When ancient Athenians strove to grasp 'justice' or 'war' or 'death', when they dreamt or deliberated, how did they do it? Did they think about what they were doing? Did they *imagine* an *imagining mind*?

European histories of the imagination have often begun with thinkers like Plato and Aristotle. By contrast, this volume is premised upon the idea that imaginative activity, and especially efforts to articulate it, can take place in the absence of technical terminology. In exploring an ancient culture of imagination mediated by art and literature, the book scopes out the roots of later, more explicit, theoretical enquiry. Chapters hone in on a range of visual and verbal artefacts from the Classical period. Approaching the topic from different angles – philosophical, historical, philological, literary, and art historical – they also investigate how these artefacts stimulate affective, sensory, meditative – in short, 'imaginative' – encounters between imagining bodies and their world.

The Imagination of the Mind in Classical Athens offers a ground-breaking reassessment of 'imagination' in ancient Greek culture and thought: it will be essential reading for those interested in not only philosophies of mind, but also ancient Greek image, text, and culture more broadly.

Emily Clifford is Junior Research Fellow in Greek Mythology at Christ Church College in Oxford, UK. Her research examines visual and verbal media from the Greek and Roman worlds to build a cultural history of thinking and idea-formation, currently focusing on death. She is completing a monograph on culturally-mediated reflections on death in Classical Athens.

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Image, Text, and Culture in Classical Antiquity

Series editor: Michael Squire,
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Forms of Thought
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Forms of Thought

Edited by
Emily Clifford and Xavier Buxton

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Introduction

Emily Clifford and Xavier Buxton

The Imagination of the Mind in Classical Athens explores the imaginative processes at work in Classical Athens. When ancient Athenians strove to grasp 'justice' or 'war' or 'death', when they had dreams or encountered ghosts, when they deliberated upon problems, how did they do it? Did they think about what they were doing? Did they worry about it? Did they *imagine* an *imagining mind*?

Our purpose in this volume is twofold. First, to build a diverse picture of culturally-mediated imaginative thought in Classical Athens: our claim is that bodies and artefacts from fifth- and fourth-century Athens played an integrated and integral part in imaginative activity.[1] Second, to explore the roots of European notions of the imagination in the period leading up to what are generally considered to be the earliest explicit theories in ancient Greece: our second claim, then, is that cultural artefacts in Classical Athens revealed and provoked efforts to grasp and articulate how imaginative processes work.[2] Visual and verbal crafted forms shape and are shaped by imaginative activity.[3] They also enable reflexivity: they make imaginative thought itself an object of cultural contemplation.

Fulfilling the first purpose would, on its own, comprise a productive collection of chapters – a multi-media cultural history of imaginative engagements with artefacts in Classical Athens. Such a volume would nestle comfortably alongside much recent work in Classics and further afield.[4] Indeed, the power of images and texts (and crossovers between the two) to mediate relations with the world is a recurring theme in this Routledge series on *Image, Text, and Culture in Classical Antiquity*.[5] To the existing monographs, which each examine a specific visual-verbal medium or genre (Philostratus' texts, religious inscriptions, shield ecphrases), we add an inter-medial volume that interrogates explicitly the generative power of interactions between bodies and artefacts (and, more generally, between bodies and the world they inhabit) in a specific time and place: Classical Athens. In doing this, our volume engages with a proliferation of work over the last few decades (at least) on bodies (including embodied cognition and work on the senses), matter, and objects, and on the generative potential of interactions between them to involve humans in processes of reflection and idea-formation. At the heart of the volume is a fascination with what cultural artefacts can do to stimulate affective, sensory, meditative – in short, 'imaginative' – encounters.

But the second strand to our volume is also key, and more provocative: we are interested in the mediating role played by visual and verbal media not just

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in processes of imagination, but in *reflection upon* those processes. This second phenomenon is contentious because it indicates that histories of thinking about the imagination would do well to look beyond explicit, self-confessedly philosophical, theories. It is a central tenet of this book that thinking, and especially thinking about thinking, takes place in the absence of 'technical terminology' or 'formal theory' – that we can recover an alternative form of philosophy by engaging with cultural artefacts: rhetoric, historiography, drinking cups, poetry, tragedy, and more.

In illustration of these points and of some approaches to ancient material that are pursued in this volume, consider the object that inspired the artist's impression on our book's front cover (Figure I.1). The image shows a stone slab, a 'stele', held in Athens.[6] A female figure is shown in relief; the combination of the Classical dress (a *peplos*) and helmet suggests that she is Athena. Her body is mostly in a frontal position (torso, legs, and arms), but her feet and head are in profile. She is at rest, but her toes and eyes (and the connecting line of the spear) invite motion, directing viewers' eyes down and across to the right towards a rectangular shape positioned upright upon the ground. This represented object is aniconic; it is suggestive rather than specific.[7] Various clues suggest that it is another (represented) stele shown in profile.[8] This must, however, remain a possibility as opposed to a certainty, a possibility invited and constructed by the real stone stele on which it is depicted, and the relationship between that real object and the real viewers it anticipates.[9] Indeed, if the shape does represent a stele in profile, that represented stele's face is turned to the side: its own representations (if any) are invisible.[10] The combination of presence and absence engages viewers' imaginations.

For our purposes, the visibility of the represented object is essential.[11] Without it, the female figure is a body in space; with it, she is a person in an environment.[12] By incorporating a surrounding with which the sculpted figure can and does (appear to) interact, the real stele encompasses both an internal and an external world, and represents an anthropomorphic subjectivity which perceives and responds to extraneous data.[13] This figure appears to be thinking – thinking with an object. And if thinking is the *subject* of the relief, it is the *object* of real viewers' attention:[14] the stele puts thinking on show and, by the relationships it shows and invites, generates a way of thinking about the process of thinking. Thinking (and thinking with objects) is made an object of contemplation.[15] The real stele both shows and interacts with imagining bodies.

We will return to the 'Thinking Athena' later in this introduction, delving deeper into how, when set in dialogue with the other chapters in this volume and the material that they discuss, it mediates imaginative encounters and reflection upon them. For the moment, however, we will outline two central and challenging discourses within which our claims must be set.

I. The Imagination of the Mind: A History?

As outlined above, our second collective claim is that we can understand the genesis of certain ideas about the imagination – ideas that have been central to a European tradition of understanding creativity – by probing relations between bodies and the world around them in Classical Athens.

Figure I.1 Attic marble relief of Athena. c. 460 BCE. Height 54 cm, Width 31–31.5 cm, Depth 5 cm. Acropolis Museum, Athens: Acr. 695.

Photograph: Peter Horree / Alamy Stock Photo.

The chapters gathered here cover a range of media from the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. Together, they paint a picture of culturally-mediated imaginative processes, and intense meditation upon them, in the century or so leading up to Aristotle. This thinking is not so much a process represented in words, as a process engaged in through interactions with diverse visual and verbal culture. The picture is, as it were, a 'pre-history' (or better a 'pre-philosophy', or 'pre-theory') of a multifarious concept, versions of which come to be known as *phantasia* and, ultimately, the 'imagination'.

European histories of theorizing the imagination have tended to begin with the thoughts of great men – Aristotle especially, and, to some extent, Plato.[16] After all, it is in Plato and Aristotle that we first find the word *phantasia*, which seems to be our closest ancient Greek proxy for 'the faculty of the imagination' (albeit a more restricted conception of that faculty than the affective and, crucially, inventive capabilities encompassed by ordinary use of the word 'imagination' today).[17] Reflections on creative thinking spread their wings, so the usual account goes, with Stoic thinking in the late Hellenistic period, and take flight in the Roman Imperial period when writers and rhetoricians treat and speak of *phantasia* (and *imaginatio* in the Latin tradition) as a creative force, not just a responsive process.[18]

The point in theory-based histories of this sort is not that ancient Greeks did not do any imagining before Aristotle wrote about *phantasia* in his treatise *On the Soul*.[19] Indeed, we anticipate that the founding premise of our volume (that ancient Greeks did engage in imaginative processes, regularly and in all sorts of different contexts) will be, in itself, uncontroversial.[20] Presumably, the point in such histories is also not that ancient Greeks never meditated upon what they were doing when they engaged in those processes. Rather, the rationale behind starting with the thoughts of a man such as Aristotle on *phantasia* is that there is little earlier evidence that writers who identified as intellectuals, as 'philosophers', attempted to articulate similar processes in explicit theories and with precise terminology.

But can we not explore imaginative processes and meditations upon them in the wild, as it were? This question galvanised our selection of the volume's sub-title, *Forms of Thought*, a phrase that we chose, in part, as a nod to the influential writings of Pierre Vidal-Naquet, collected and published as *Le Chasseur Noir: Formes de Pensée et Formes de Société dans le Monde Grec*. Our volume aspires to continue the holistic and interdisciplinary (albeit, in his case, more text-focused) approaches developed by the 'Paris School' to which he contributed.[21] The premise that real (for Vidal-Naquet, social) and imaginary (for Vidal-Naquet, literary and mythical) worlds of ancient Athens are intrinsically connected is at the heart of our study, which looks at the porosity between 'interior' and 'exterior' worlds, or how bodies and artefacts mediate thought.[22] More recent work on how Graeco-Roman culture can mediate thinking (by generating, not just reflecting, ideas) suggests that similar approaches should work for more metacognitive subjects.[23] This volume is premised upon that idea.

Our volume thus also finds itself in a close and complicated relationship with the most famous investigation of our theme, an investigation whose title we have

also appropriated and adapted. Bruno Snell's magnum opus, *The Discovery of the Mind in Ancient Greece*, stands as a totemic emblem of twentieth-century scholarship, but is properly understood as the culmination of almost two centuries of *Geistesgeschichte* going back to the German idealists.[24] Snell traced the emergence of 'the European notion of intellect and soul' from Homer to Aristotle, and its reception in the work of Callimachus and Virgil. This was an openly teleological project, a search for the origin of a preconceived idea. It was necessary for Snell's narrative that Homer's conceptions should be 'primitive' and Aristotle's recognizably 'modern' – an approximation, at any rate, of Cartesian dualism and Kantian subjectivity.

Such value judgements are no longer current in classical scholarship; even more sympathetic readers of Snell distance themselves from his critique of Homer.[25] Yet it is rarely observed how carefully Snell framed his narrative, not as an evolution of consciousness, but as an emerging consciousness of consciousness. The 'discovery' is a kind of self-recognition:

> The intellect was not 'invented', as a man would invent a tool to improve the operation of his physical functions, or a method to master a certain type of problem. … No objective, no aims were involved in the discovery of the intellect. In a certain sense it actually did exist before it was discovered, but in another form (*in anderer Form*), not qua intellect.[26]

The language in which Snell wrestles here and elsewhere with the notion of 'discovery' seems to grope around a point essential to this volume: awareness of one's own mental processes might precede explicit articulation of that awareness. Underneath its shifting forms, the activity of thought is constant: what Classical thinkers 'discover' is a 'correct' language to describe it.

Snell's project was one of intellectual history (albeit one heavily distorted by teleology) – a broad project that has been taken up, with more circumspection, by figures such as G. E. R. Lloyd.[27] Our collective inquiry in this volume is more narrow: we focus on the climactic period of Snell's narrative, and we emphasize that the 'forms' taken by imaginative thought are integral to its operation. But we are, in a sense, delving into what Snell articulated as *an alternative form of thought* (the self-aware mind *in anderer Form*).[28] And we are responding to the same phenomenon, but with emphasis upon the proliferation (rather than evolution) of 'forms of thought' in the Classical period, forms that anticipate the development of philosophical vocabulary. In this period, we argue, the mind is not discovered, or invented, or revealed, but intensely 'imagined'.

II. 'Imagination': A Productive Anachronism

Having distanced ourselves from terminologies and explicit theories (an approach pursued by historians of *phantasia* such as Gerald Watson and Anne Sheppard),[29] let us pause, for a moment, to reflect upon the language that we use in this volume.

What do we even mean (indeed, what could or should we mean) when we use modern words and phrases such as 'imagination', 'imaginative processes', and 'imaginative thought' in the pages that follow?

'Imagination' in this volume is widely construed, and different authors explore different aspects of it. Our claim is not that there was in Classical Athens a single, cohesive, and widely understood concept that covered all the encounters included in the following chapters; nor do we argue that all the Classical encounters discussed here fall neatly within the remits of Plato and Aristotle's *phantasia*.[30] We invited contributors to focus not on specific ancient or modern terms but on generative relations between bodies and the world, and to consider how different artefacts might mediate creative thought and reflection upon it. Essentially, the scope of this book is delineated by a set of processes and relationships, not by a list of words.[31] We use the word 'imagination' as an umbrella term because, for all its complexities, it is the only word that we *can* use to express the expansive, variegated phenomenon of responsive and creative thought that is explored in this volume.

Indeed, a more figurative approach to the imagination is not a controversial idea. Mental processes are often communicated through metaphor: in ancient Greek as in English, people 'follow' one another's arguments, 'see' the truth of an aphorism, and even 'record words on the tablets [of memory]' without any mental faculty being explicitly mentioned.[32] Ancient philosophers themselves hardly restrict their inquiries to the definition of terms: myth, metaphor, rhetoric, and *elenchos* are all employed in the elaboration of these mental faculties.[33] Conceptualizing the mind and its processes can take many forms. These forms are not mere vehicles for abstract ideas: all the chapters in this volume agree that forms produce, shape, even constitute the mind and its imaginations. We are, then, not trying to see 'through' or 'beyond' language to the nameless emergence of certain essential philosophical doctrines or psychological truths.[34] The questions about 'mind' and 'imagination' that this volume asks are not such as admit certain answers: they are speculative, ideological, aesthetic, rhetorical; a set of problems without solutions, which exercise and stimulate thinkers, writers, and artists, both ancient and modern.

More problematic (for our purposes) than the absence, in early Classical Athens, of the sorts of terminologies or explicit theories that might identify relevant material for study is the continuing controversy as to what the 'imagination' in fact is, and how it works. One issue here is the vexed question of the relationship between 'mental' faculties and the body. Contemporary views range from 'dualist' conceptions of the mind as a wholly 'immaterial' substance (Descartes' *res cogitans*), distinguished from the material substance of the body and the external world (*res extensa*), to 'reductivist' theories that identify the mind with the brain and central nervous system, denying any distinction between mental and physical processes.[35] Indeed, recent theories of an 'embodied', 'embedded', 'enactive', or 'extended' mind, encompass not just the neural network, but the whole body and its social, cultural, and material environment.[36] This 'supersized' conception of the mental defies not only the Cartesian opposition of mind to body, but that of subject to object, biology to culture, individual to community; the thinking 'mind' becomes

neither a source nor a product of the material world, but an integral part of that world.[37] The latter framing of the 'embodied mind' (or what we would think of as the 'embodied imagination' or 'imagining body') is the one that receives most emphasis (explicitly or otherwise) in this volume, but the debate shapes the concerns of several chapters.[38]

The mind-body debate is often seen as fundamental to a modern conception of the self. The concerns with which it grapples are, however, also manifest in extant material from ancient Greece. The spatial extent, separateness, and materiality of the soul were among the first and most enduring questions of Greek psychology: for Heraclitus, the *psychē* was so 'deep' that one might never trace its limits, while *phronēsis* was shared in common.[39] Anaxagoras proposed that the *nous* was 'unlimited' and 'self-ruling' yet at the same time 'mixed with no thing, [and] … alone itself by itself'.[40] The influence of these thinkers in Classical Athens is well documented; explicit references in Plato and Aristotle demonstrate an extensive critical engagement.[41] Other Classical texts and artefacts, however, also investigate the (un)mixed and (un)knowable properties of the mind and soul. In Aristophanes' *Clouds*, for instance, 'Socrates', arriving on a *mēchanē*, explains that he has suspended himself so high in order to 'mix' his 'thought' (*noēma, phrontis*) with its 'kindred air'.[42] Yet the *phrontistērion* or 'Reflectory' for 'wise souls' that dominates the play is a lower, lightless space, where pale-faced students are examining the earth.[43] It is *down* into this gloomy place of thought that Strepsiades must 'descend',[44] like Heraclitus' enquiry into the depths of the soul.[45] Thus the comedy offers not just a send-up of the 'thought-thinkers' (*merimnophrontistai*) but a sort of spatial mapping of presocratic psychology, in which the mind is 'extended' upwards and downwards at the same time.[46]

Our discussion here only skims the surface of these troubled philosophical waters. Indeed, introductions to the topic regularly nod to Leslie Stevenson's 'Twelve Conceptions of Imagination' as a demonstration of its overdetermined range,[47] or quote the ironic opening of Peter Strawson's famous discussion:

> The uses, and applications, of the terms 'image', 'imagine', 'imagination', and so forth make up a very diverse and scattered family. Even this image of a family seems too definite. It would be a matter of more than difficulty to identify and list the family's members, let alone their relations of parenthood and cousinhood.[48]

Without losing ourselves in this 'more than difficult' enterprise, however, we can isolate two contemporary conceptions of imagination that are particularly relevant for Athenian culture. The first is a close and complex relationship between 'imagination' and 'sensation', or 'perception', marked variously by analogy, opposition, and mutual dependence. To imagine is to perceive that which cannot be perceived directly. Some even assert that we cannot imagine an object without first having perceived it: 'imagination', says Thomas Hobbes, 'is nothing but decaying sense'.[49] Less obviously, perception is sometimes said to rely upon imagination: when, for example, we perceive a dog *as a dog*, rather than a random sequence

of sensory data, we exercise our imaginations.[50] The entanglement of imagination (*phantasia*) and perception (*aisthēsis*) is explicit in Plato,[51] and elaborated in Aristotle,[52] yet it is also apparent in the concern with vividness (*enargeia*) in rhetoric and historiography,[53] and the construction of an afterlife.[54]

A second central feature of modern 'imagination' is its relationship to art. Aesthetic philosophers (and ordinary usage) regularly credit the imagination with visual and literary invention, the voluntary generation of 'imaginary worlds'; our appreciation of and emotional engagement with these worlds demand 'imagination' in turn.[55] This more 'poetic' imagination is often thought to be a Romantic and post-Romantic concept, but already with Shakespeare imagination is an essential faculty not just of the madman, but of the poet; indeed, some scholars have identified a similar vision of artistic creation in Aristotle's prescription that the tragic poet should see the play before his eyes.[56]

More relevant for our purposes is the role of imagination in *engagement with* art. Key here is Ludwig Wittgenstein's theory, influentially reworked by Ernst Gombrich in *Art and Illusion*: representational art, or mimesis, requires viewers not just to *see* but to see *as*.[57] The principle that the relationship between viewers and art involves a *special sort of viewing* – an imaginative viewing, of sorts – is not so far from the famous observation about tragedy attributed to Gorgias, that 'the one who is deceived is more intelligent than the one who is not deceived'.[58] Spectatorship requires us to (mis)take this for that. Another seminal text, approaching the topic from the perspective of cognitive science, is Kendall Walton's *Mimesis as Make-Believe*, which argues that artworks (in any medium) function as 'props'; like the child in a game of make-believe, the viewer of the artwork becomes a participant in the world that they imagine, allowing certain fictional prescriptions to be true, while applying their own systems of moral and causal coherence.[59] Such divided authority can produce conflict; recent critics have explored the concept of 'imaginative resistance', first articulated by David Hume, and the limits it places upon our engagement with certain narratives.[60] These are new ideas in aesthetic philosophy, but, again, it is not difficult to find similar concerns in antiquity. Aristotle's requirement, for instance, that plots should be both 'surprising' and 'reasonable', that they should defy audience expectations and yet conform to fundamental ideas of probability,[61] fits with Walton's 'mechanics of generation' in fictional worlds,[62] while his suggestion that emotional engagement might be limited by 'repugnant' (*miaros*) features of plot and character articulates a species of imaginative resistance.[63] Earlier, too, epic and lyric poetry regularly anticipate the conditions of their appreciation, including the varieties of imaginative engagement.[64]

Both of these – the relationship between imagination and perception, and the role of the imagination in our relations with visual and verbal culture – are central to our approach to the 'imagination' in this volume: the 'imagination' here involves responsive and generative processes born of relations between objects, bodies, and, indeed, worlds (historical, cultural, fictional, and so on), spanning different places and times.

Indeed, in this respect, the 'imagination' can accommodate not just ancient processes, and reflections upon those processes, but our own processes of interacting

with antiquity and reflecting upon it.[65] This gives a particularly vigorous twist to the close-knit weave of present and past (and everything in between) that defines our relationship with antiquity.[66] In attributing 'imagination' to the artefacts of Classical Athens, all our contributors grapple with something culturally contingent, articulated in historical relations between subject and object. But that very process of grappling enters into those relations and is shaped by them. Furthermore, our very conception of how we might and do engage imaginatively with antiquity is framed by the thousands of years of reflection that have flowed from it. Thus though this *is* a historical study, it also offers the roots of and is rooted in our present. Like all cultural studies (not just of antiquity, but of the modern world), this brings challenges and responsibilities, but also rewards.[67]

This returns us, once more, to the wider concerns of the series in which our volume is presented: Routledge's *Image, Text, and Culture in Classical Antiquity*. The series seeks to explore the intersections between different media and different disciplines, and to probe ancient material not just for the historical picture that it provides, but for the hold that it has continued to exert on subsequent cultural and intellectual traditions. Each chapter here has its own point to make and, independently, furthers the interest of the series in visual-verbal mediation of thought. Together, they demonstrate how a multi-media approach can not only elucidate an ancient cultural-intellectual phenomenon, but contribute to a history of our contemporary fascination with and inherited ways of thinking about creative thought. In this volume, the 'imagination' is, for all its challenges, a productive anachronism.

III. Forms of Thought: A Dialogue

We now turn to the contributions made by each chapter. All chapters pursue the purposes of the volume, and so overlap with one another in various ways. Their arrangement and grouping are, therefore, somewhat artificial, but designed to assist in teasing out running threads, at least for the purposes of this introduction.

One essential point to make up front is that we have, in the conception and arrangement of this volume as a cohesive whole, drawn a loose connection between different uses of the word 'form': form as *matter* or *body* and form as *arrangement* or *shape* (the latter being the usual technical use in classical scholarship).[68] This is not just a neat felicity (or infelicitous mess) of slippery semantics. We emphasize 'form', for all its scholarly baggage, because we wish to highlight not just the imaginative interplay of bodies and objects, but of bodies and artefacts, and the interactive workings of multiple aspects of artefacts in relationship with humans (content too, in fact, not just form and matter). In doing this, we draw upon three topical and interconnected strands of scholarship that touch upon the workings of the mind in the world: work on the imagination; work on matter and embodiment (including embodied thought); and work that explores the links between artefacts and ideas.

The sequence of parts takes readers in a notional circle. We start with the body, with two chapters by Luuk Huitink and Pia Campeggiani that look at the role of bodily form in imaginative activity (The Form of the Imagination). Karolina Sekita

and Leah Lazar then take us outwards into the world of artefacts, artefacts that give ideas and imaginative processes substance (Imagination Takes Form). In the third part (Formative Processes of Imagination), Guy Westwood and Zacharoula Petraki delve into the reciprocity at play in the regenerative cycle of concept formation. The next chapters by Emily Clifford and David Fearn push this theme further by emphasizing the role played by cultural artefacts *as cultural artefacts* not just in processes of imagination but in staging and provoking reflections upon them (Form Defines Imagination). In our final part (Form Becomes Imagination), Tom Phillips and Xavier Buxton examine the manifestations of imagination that crystallize in and emerge out of literary forms. In their focus on the interactions between imagining minds and the cultural world of which they form a part, these last chapters, in some ways, return us to the body. To conclude, Jaś Elsner and Michael Squire offer some reflections in an epilogue. In setting this book's Classical concerns against the cultural backdrop of earlier art and poetry as well as the transformations in art and, conceivably, subjectivity apparent in the late sixth and fifth centuries, they put pressure on what might and might not be distinctive about the cultural imagination in the period upon which we focus here.

We interweave our discussion of the chapters with close analysis of an object: the Thinking Athena stele (introduced, briefly, above). This interweaving is designed to model the generative interaction between artefacts and ideas that we perceive as essential to Athenian creative thought. Moreover, by putting each chapter's contributions in dialogue with an object, we hope to demonstrate, in more concrete terms, what the individual contributions of the chapters can do for a wider picture presented by this volume and, especially, how we envisage that the different media they explore might interact with each other and, indeed, with other material not covered here.

a. The Form of the Imagination

Let us begin, then, with the Thinking Athena stele, and with the imagining body. The figure's pose is an important part of the story. Her unnatural posture (feet and head wrenched at a 90-degree angle to her body) insists that the relationship between her and the object is deliberate. Indeed, her bowed head and the gentle incline of her body to the right bring her visibly closer to the object. The spear that joins her hand and forehead to the object's foot appears to be a line of support for her tilted body. If she thinks, her thinking body is quite literally dependent on the physical world. Her pose brings to mind literary women such as Homer's Helen, Sophocles' Niobe or Euripides' Hecuba, who 'melt' as they weep.[69] In their grief, the substance of their bodies comes to the fore as they produce and flow with drops: affective state *takes bodily form*.[70] Perhaps a similar emphasis on the material stuff of the body is hinted here in the unnatural (lack of) fall of Athena's clothes; in their adherence to the angle of her tilted body rather than the call of gravity,[71] these provoke a visual affinity between fabric and flesh and so call attention to her body as matter. Intriguingly, the finger-to-forehead gesture also tempts a universal theory of meditational gesture and pose à la Rodin. But our point here is not the extent to

which we can translate body language.[72] Opinions differ on whether this Athena thinks, reads, mourns, admires;[73] no one doubts that the object provokes a response in her body and mind.[74]

This provocation filters through to viewers and their self-awareness of their bodies, minds, and relationships to the real stele. Let us assume that, before its re-use in the wall of a building, the stele was at some point positioned upright on a base on the Acropolis (like other votive stelai and inscribed decrees).[75] If so, to see any of the details discussed above, adult viewers must have stood still and looked down upon the face of the stone slab (which is a similar size relative to a real adult as the represented one is to the sculpted figure). In that case, the bodily pose struck by real viewers would have formed part of the information as to what Athena appears to be doing and how the process of thinking might work. Bodily response is bound up with mental response. This is the first form of thought, or perhaps form of thinking, in which our book is interested: bodily form is integral to the imagination.[76]

The 'bodily mind' is, then, loosely, the theme about which the first two chapters of this volume are grouped. Two genres, historiography and philosophy, each disclose sensitivity to the association between imaginative activity and bodily response. We open with a chapter by Luuk Huitink on the spectrum of roles played by the embodied imagination in and in response to ancient historiographies of war. Drawing upon work in cognitive science and narratology, and especially the turn towards embodiment, Huitink compares the different imaginative encounters with the Battle of Cunaxa that are provided by Xenophon, Diodorus Siculus, and Plutarch. This first chapter thus brings the interface between the world and the mind to the fore and, in particular, the contributions made by the body to that relationship. In this respect, his chapter sits in close partnership with the following one by Pia Campeggiani, which probes the embodied nature of that interface through a philosophical lens. But Huitink's contributions to this part of the volume, and to the volume as a whole, are also more provocative. In the first place, his comparative study turns attention upon the polymorphous nature of imaginative processes, in which the body might play a greater or lesser role. Still more challenging is the intellectual, aesthetic, and ethical polemic in which he sets this picture. When it comes to history, 'how far, how close' raises questions of objectivity, clarity, narrative, detail, complexity, emphasis, and so on. When it comes to history of war, such questions become urgent, emotive, and moral. What *should* a battle narrative look like? What is at stake in imagining war? Indeed, his concluding suggestion that, differences aside, ancient accounts of the Battle of Cunaxa, as a group, differ in framing from what we might expect from a modern account raises exactly this point. It also introduces another theme that will re-surface throughout the volume (see especially the chapters by Lazar, Petraki, Fearn, and Buxton): the role played in the imagination not just by bodies, but by artefacts. To what extent might a specifically ancient form of historiography crystallize a specifically ancient form of thought?

This brings us to our second chapter, in which Pia Campeggiani revisits the embodied imagination through the eyes of Aristotle. Campeggiani immerses us in Aristotelian thinking and the contemporary philosophical debates within which it

sits, and her chapter offers an ancient theoretical backdrop to the cultural studies in the rest of this volume. Focusing on Aristotle's *De anima* 3.3, she unpacks a conventional view that, for Aristotle, the imagination (or a version of the imaginative process that he calls *phantasia*) involves a response to pictures in the mind. The relationship between the Aristotelian phenomenon of *phantasia* and the diverse faculties encompassed by the term 'imagination' is complex, as noted above (pages 5–9). For our purposes here, what is important about Campeggiani's interpretation of Aristotelian imaginative experience is that it is much like real experience but characterized by absence. This includes temporal absence (anticipation or memory, for example) as well as substantial absence (in unreal or counterfactual experience such as a dream or fantasy). Imaginative ('off-line') activity (Aristotelian *phantasia*) is akin to real ('on-line') activity (Aristotelian *aisthēsis*), but the external stimuli necessary for real, or direct, experience need not be present during the process.[77] Campeggiani's model does not, therefore, stress the differences between Aristotelian imagination (*phantasia*) and Aristotelian sensory (phenomenal) experience (*aisthēsis*). Instead, she emphasizes *bodily motion* as an inextricable basis for both unreal and real experiences, because bodily motions enact and re-enact sensory experience. Her essential point is that, for Aristotle, the products of imagination (*phantasmata*) are simultaneously bodily motions and sensory experiences (they are 'embodied procedures that, when actualized, are tinged with phenomenality').

There are several ways in which Campeggiani's argument matters for this book. First, her emphasis on Aristotle's sensitivity to the embodied nature of what he calls *phantasia* ties in with ways in which processes that we might call imaginative are described and indicated in earlier work. Aeschylus' Pelasgus, for example, communicates the exploratory nature of his thinking, thinking in which he considers possibilities, probabilities, and contingencies, in physical terms, as bodily motion through liquid space.[78] In this respect, Aristotle's explicit articulation of a theory of *phantasia* (at the notional end of the 'Classical period' with which our book engages) scoops up ideas about how imaginative thought operates as a bodily process, ideas that are already circulating in Athenian cultural space.

Also consequential, however, is Campeggiani's accommodation of the idea that Aristotelian *phantasmata* are like 'pictures' within her embodied model for *phantasia*. The idea that *phantasmata* are pictures stems in part from Aristotle's use of pictorial imagery to describe the process of *phantasia*: 'when it comes to *phantasia* we are like spectators looking at dreadful or heartening things in art'.[79] However, it also taps into a long-standing, and as yet unresolved, debate within cognitive science as to the role played by mental images in the imagination.[80] Campeggiani does not deny that imaginative experience is akin to viewing a picture (the sort of language, in fact, that Aristotle uses himself), but does propose a move away from a conception of *phantasmata* (dreams, for example) as 'representations' (or as *only* representations). One unsatisfactory corollary of the proposition that mental pictures are representations is that the imagination then becomes largely reactive; it involves absorption of pre-existing information in a pictorial format. By contrast, though she does not make such a claim herself, Campeggiani's enactive theory of mental imagery might more easily accommodate creative ('lamp-like')

as well as responsive ('mirror-like') qualities of the imagination because imagining bodies have a role in creating their own imaginative experiences through bodily movements rather than simply absorbing them.[81] Imagining bodies *interact* with the world. Campeggiani's reading might, therefore, narrow a widely perceived gap between Aristotelian *phantasia* and the polymorphous phenomenon more colloquially known as 'imagination', which has been so heavily influenced by visions of creativity and genius in the Renaissance and Romantic periods.[82]

This all matters for Aristotelian *phantasia*. But it also matters for how the rest of the chapters in this volume think about the relationship between art and the imagination. Pictorial language for mental experience is only problematic if *images themselves* are defined (as they often are) by intentionality, as being representations or 'depicting something'.[83] Indeed, a narrow view of the ancient Greek word *mimēsis* as representational ('imitative') art has often shaped conceptions of what ancient art is and does.[84] Such definitions essentially look towards the cause of an image (for example, a model in the real world or the artist's head). But a painting may be simultaneously a likeness (a representation of something absent) *and* a painting (something present in its own right).[85] This is observed by Campeggiani in her discussion of Aristotle's distinction between the presence of a picture in its own right (καθ' αὑτό) and its status as a representation (an *eikōn*) of something else (ἄλλου). The same goes for a poem. Indeed, there has been a trend in the discipline of the history of classical art towards emphasizing art's impact on viewers rather than its representational qualities. Richard Neer, for example, has argued that emphasis on the connection between an image and its beholders is more in line with ancient Greek priorities and the emergence of a Classical style than emphasis on representational, or naturalistic, qualities.[86] Stephen Halliwell's broad conception of *mimēsis* (and, more generally, views of art that predate Plato and Aristotle's theorizations) as 'world-creating' as well as 'world-reflecting' is, therefore, instructive.[87] In ancient Athens, imagining bodies might have been understood as simultaneously 'world-reflecting' and 'world-creating', just like the artworks with which they came into contact. The implications of this are considerable: they affect not just philosophies of art and mind, but the epistemological frameworks within which we might analyse the processes of human imagination *as part of* the material universe in which they unfold.[88]

What does this do for the stele of Athena? The real stele emphasizes what is unseen and so notionally absent.[89] The rectangular object upon it may represent a stele, but, if so, that stele is shown in profile, its face turned away from real viewers. The represented stele is itself (visibly) non-representational. The blank spaces (real and represented) suggest that we are dealing with the realm of imagination as well as perception.[90] So, let us imagine, for a moment, that the face of the represented stele is inscribed with the names of Athenian war dead,[91] like the casualty-list stelai which have been found in the Athenian *dēmosion sēma*.[92] Details that might lead us to that conclusion derive not from literal representation of that content (a list of names), but rather from the representation of Athena's bodily disposition and sensory experience, her interaction with and response to the object. Whether she has the perceptual experience of visualizing in her head figures to go with inscribed

names, or a cavalryman in sculpted relief of the sort seen on the grave stele of Dexileos, is beside the point (and poses an impossible question!).[93] But as for the end of the spear on her index finger, the sensation of leaning upon it, or the weight of the helmet on her head, all these sensations *are* represented as felt by her. The natural interpretation is that this figure is really (within the world of the image) wearing a helmet. So, insofar as the image represents a figure's sensation of a helmet's weight, this is implicitly a real experience in response to external stimuli from an object that is represented as real (*aisthēmata*). But what if the image makes visible the memory, for example, of wearing a helmet (a *phantasma*) that is triggered by a war-related inscription, which then acts upon her senses and body *like the real thing*? If the latter, the stone helmet and spear materialize imagined objects as part of an imaginative experience, perhaps the bodily experience of remembering what it is like to fight in a battle. Indeed, the implied sensory experience could involve both real and imaginative experience, *aisthēmata* from a real helmet reinforced by *phantasmata* triggered by wearing a helmet and reading the names of Athenian war dead. We cannot *know* what is on the stele, or what the subjective experience of this relief figure might be like, but we can imagine it by extrapolating from her body. In fact, on a related point, some of the visible detail on the real stele is also non-specific, and so has a similarly expansive impact. The shaft in Athena's hand resembles a voting staff as well as a spear, and so may instantiate both war- and citizen-related *phantasmata*, both of which might be associated with an inscription relating to the Athenian war dead.[94]

These first two chapters by Huitink and Campeggiani carry important implications for the volume because the physical forms that are integral to the imaginative process within the body, the *bodily form* of imaginative thinking, find their counterpart in the generation and reception of artefacts in the world without. The latter phenomenon is the subject of the subsequent chapters, which delve further into how the thoughts themselves (the products of imaginative thinking), the thinking process, and reflections upon it *take form* in the artefacts of Classical Athens.[95]

b. Imagination Takes Form

By way of an introduction into this theme, let us return to the stele. Sculpted in relief on its face is an image of the goddess Athena alongside a rectangular object. What is interesting for the purposes of this book's second part is that the matter and composition of this sculpted figure, as part of a stele, express, propagate, and perpetuate ideas surrounding (at least) divinity and socio-political identity. This figure exists in a material world. She is a stone object, part of the stele slab into which she is moulded.[96] Moreover, within the sculpted world, her bare feet are placed solidly upon the same ground line upon which the rectangular object rests.[97] The implication is that this is a visible, physical manifestation of the goddess within the material world of the represented stele. Her matter and her composition thus emphasize material presence and substance. And, in fact, she is not just materialized as the stele and within its world. The position of her helmet crest *in front of* the border that traces the upper edge of the real stele also places her within the world of the real

viewer *who also stands in front of the real stele*. Indeed, the stele-on-stele theme further links the situation of the sculpted goddess with the situation of the real, human, viewer. The represented figure is, physically and notionally, in at least three places.[98] She is present as a shaped stone object in front of a viewer; she is present as a represented barefoot goddess, standing beside the represented stele; she is present in front of the real stele, alongside the real viewer. Furthermore, on the basis that her crest does not just superimpose but actually breaks through the line of the uppermost border, she is also immense, transcendent and *outside* the material world of stele and viewer (existing, perhaps, in a different ontological paradigm). With the horizontal line doubling as surface and substance (ornamental border and cosmic boundary), her divine body cannot be contained by artistic framing or by the stone world in which she appears.[99]

All this fits within a narrative of divine representation and epiphany (and movement between the two).[100] But it also fits within our story about cultural artefacts and human imagination. For, the figure is also implicitly an Athenian warrior and citizen and woman, as suggested by the helmet, spear-staff, and Classical dress (*peplos*). And, as discussed above, these identities have a role to play in other imaginative possibilities generated by the stele: they encompass some of the possible viewers of a stele in Athens, and so might manifest some embodied experiences of looking at a stele on the Acropolis. In this way, the figure of Athena can double (or multiply) as the represented and epiphanic divinity *and* as a personification of Athenian spectatorship itself. Athena's sculpted body is subjective experience given form.[101]

The use of a cultural artefact to articulate and explore a notion that is, in itself, imperceptible is a theme that Karolina Sekita discusses in her chapter on the afterdeath and the dead. Emphasizing the role played by the senses and perception in imagining the dead, her chapter offers a bridge from the body-oriented chapters of Huitink and Campeggiani to ones more focused on the role played by language and art. Her first point is that ideas about the dead are extrapolated from objects associated with them such as corpses or funerary monuments, which each, unlike the dead themselves, had a powerful sensory impact on the living (not just in terms of sight, but also touch and conceivably smell and sound). Perception is 'a trigger for imagination'. More germane to this second part of the volume, however, is her consideration of imagination as a trigger for perception. Hopes and expectations for the young (men and women alike) coloured perception of their death and ideas surrounding it, crystallizing in the formation of a metaphor: death as marriage. Pulling together examples from tragedy and funerary inscriptions, Sekita explores an imaginative mode of thought that is given form in language that associates one event (marriage) with another (death). The essence of her argument is that marriage in death to Hades (or Persephone) was not understood to be literal.[102] It was not based on eschatological belief. Instead, thinking about what happened to a man or woman in death was born out of cultural imaginings, ideas about the (ultimately unfulfilled) moment of departure from the *oikos* (usually, for a woman at least, on marriage). In probing the phenomenon by which cultural imaginings produce a metaphor (which, in turn, contributes to a perception of death and the dead),

Sekita's chapter offers a counterpart to the discussion in Clifford's chapter, which considers how artefacts and figurative viewing generate ideas and imaginings: reflection and creation are characteristics of cultural artefacts (such as metaphors) as well as the mind, a cyclicity that emerges more explicitly in the next part of this volume.[103]

Sekita emphasizes that the metaphor of death as marriage to Hades is *not mythological* in that it does not add to the body of myth associated with the figure Hades (he is not, it seems, accumulating brides in the underworld). Her figurative lens might, however, turn our attention upon the contribution that *is* made by mythological register, and indeed a mythological body, to the effectiveness of a metaphor as a form of thought.[104] This point (the role played by exemplary bodies and, indeed, the cultural body of mythology in processes of thinking and imagining) is explored further in David Fearn's chapter, discussed below. Here, the metaphor of marriage with Hades pulls together not just ideas surrounding a social experience of *oikos*-departure, but also those surrounding a mythological figure and the narratives in which he features. Like the figure of Athena on the Acropolis stele, the person of Hades multiplies as, at least, the man who tore a woman away from her mother, the divinity that rules the dead, and the concept of 'death' itself. The figure offers imaginative thought not just a neat name for a concept, but a body on which to hang ideas surrounding loss, departure, power, transition, imperceptibility, and so on.[105] Thinking and thoughts about death and the dead are materialized in an imaginative partnership of ideas and associations that draws on both real and mythological exemplary figures ('the marriageable girl', 'Hades').[106]

Similar ideas emerge in a chapter on Athenian public inscriptions by Leah Lazar. One contribution of Lazar's chapter is her investigation of the distinctive language with which public decrees are formulated in Classical Athens. Although it swiftly becomes formulaic, the way in which the Athenian *dēmos* chooses to express its decision making, 'it seemed good to the *dēmos*' (ἔδοχσεν τõι δέμοι), places linguistic emphasis not just on the decree that has come into being, but on the mental process by which that has occurred.[107] According to its own language, the decree results from perception, judgement, and approval by the *dēmos*, and so its inscribed presence purports to testify (in form and content) to the existence of the collective subjectivity from which it emerged. Lazar's chapter thus offers an example of how a cultural artefact can give form to a notion, in this case the notion of a group (or collective) mind, through language.[108] Moreover, the process of reaching a judgement and decision is expressed not with the *dēmos* as subject of the verb, but as dative of the entity affected by the object that appears to its senses (ἔδοχσεν τοῖ δέμοι); collective thought is born of perception. But the *dēmos*, as a collective body that can perceive and think and decide as one, is an imaginary entity (democracy is the rule not of everybody but of the majority). Erasing dissent (if any), the singular language (distinctively Athenian, numerically non-plural) puts visibly and physically into the cultural arena a claim that the third-person democratic source of the decree exists.[109] This is reinforced by the enmattered one-ness of the stone object into which the decree is inscribed: the stele itself has one body. Whereas the concept of the after-death found expression as a relationship with a cultural figure

with a body-image (Hades), the concept of the *dēmos* is articulated in a linguistic-material form that predicates the existence of a group with a single body and mind. In this respect, the thinking or imagining Athena on this stele can act as a personification and embodiment of not just a citizen but a citizenry, an imagining *dēmos*. The embodiment instantiates a cultural idea of a popular collective that is defined by its capacity to form judgements upon and in relation to the world.[110]

c. Formative Processes of Imagination

Another perspective is given by Guy Westwood in his chapter on imagining justice in the Athenian lawcourt. Common threads emerge in the importance of embodiment as well as personification (of the laws, of shame, etc.) for the purposes of concept formation (what is justice?).[111] Westwood discusses the role played by *enargeia* (clearness or vividness) and the 'high-visibility' qualities of a speech, putting his chapter into a provocative relationship with Campeggiani's chapter in this volume, which emphasizes the non-representational and embodied nature of the imagination (for Aristotle, at least). But there is no reason why rhetorical 'high visibility' should not provoke an embodied response.[112] In fact, Westwood emphasizes not just the visual impact of imaginary figures but their characters, physical positions (for example, taking a stand together to oppose Demosthenes on the speakers' platform), and the words they speak: the imagined figures he discusses are not purely vivid images (whatever that would be), but are virtual people with bodies, characters, motivations, and interactions.[113] Indeed, Ruth Webb has argued that ancient views of *enargeia* anticipate and recognize audiences' subjective contributions towards their imaginative experiences and the emotional and mental changes they undergo as part of a perception-like process (enactivists might call this 'quasi-visual' or 'quasi-perceptual'); ecphrasis involves an 'interaction' as opposed to a one-way movement of content.[114] The everyday language that we use to articulate processes of the imagination often makes use of visual and pictorial themes: 'the mind's eye', 'mental pictures', 'visualization', 'imag-ining', even the word 'imagery'.[115] All these words recur throughout the chapters in this volume. But what this picture-themed language ordinarily communicates is not a scientific or philosophical affinity with a 'mental imagery' model of imaginative thought, or an interest in mental format.[116] Instead, most authors here (apart from Campeggiani, who makes this issue her explicit subject) make shared use of what might be described as metaphorical, even figurative (!), expression, and are interested in imaginative experience which might have visual or other sensory qualities.

More significant for the purposes of the third part of this volume is Westwood's discussion of the combative nature of rhetorical *enargeia*. In the examples that he draws from Aeschines and Demosthenes, the audience's memory is a cultural product, built and shaped by, among other things (including, presumably, the past), lawcourt speeches and their re-presentation of events.[117] Particularly significant here is the militaristic and agonistic language with which memory re-shaping is accomplished. As Westwood notes, the battlefield-tomb-lawcourt-theatre space that Aeschines prompts his audience to visualize is in some ways *over*-populated;

concatenation superimposes locations rather than replacing one with another. This might lead us to wonder whether the superfluity of images is deliberately awkward, an impossible past built from rhetoric.[118] This all has two implications for the volume. First, the long-lasting impact of a crafted past on the imaginative processes of the jury reveals that the internal world, as much as the external world, has the characteristics of many cultural artefacts: durability, malleability, substance (something is there to be reworked, and continues to be there).[119] Second, as Westwood notes in his introduction, the process by which a concept such as 'justice' is formed is reciprocal in nature: a speech places into the public arena a vision of justice and this, in turn, once inculcated in the minds of an audience, becomes part of the body of understood and accepted values on which future speeches and decisions will be based.[120] As in English and Roman law, where statute and precedent work in tandem, cultural imaginations of justice are fluid; they are not reached by the *nous* alone but are embedded in the cultural world.[121]

This brings us to the chapter by Zacharoula Petraki. Petraki gives us another literary genre that is interested in concept formation and, specifically, in reaching a definition of justice: philosophy. Another common thread is the role played by the word-crafted figure in representing an idea ('justice', for example) by embodying it ('the wholly just person').[122] Where Demosthenes and Aeschines invite their audiences to visualize figures (whether representations of real characters or personifications) within the lawcourt environment, Plato's Socrates talks of forming the guardians of the *kallipolis*, the utopian city-state, like figure sculptures. Petraki dwells on the word *typos*, which, she argues, has (amongst other recognized meanings) the meaning of a 'mould' and 'cast', two important stages in the process of casting a bronze statue by the lost wax bronze casting process, and so two steps in the production of a body replica of the original model, the *paradeigma*. This language, drawn from the sphere of material art, communicates how crafting an idea produces not just an image, a representation, but an instantiation of the thing itself. 'The just person' is an ideal of which it is possible to have several identical examples, produced like casts from an educational mould. The core idea of 'the just person' (the 'Form' of the just person) is the model from which the mould, or pattern, and the cast are made. Both the educational process and the creation of a just replica thus involve another sort of embodiment.[123]

It might be tempting to interpret Plato's use of sculptural language as metaphorical in a purely explanatory (and engaging) way. And, indeed, language from the sphere of figure sculpture did give him the means to articulate his theory with familiar scaffolding and so to communicate it in intelligible terms to his audience. But the relationship between cultural artefacts such as sculpture and the imaginative process of philosophical thought is deeper and more significant. As Petraki emphasizes, for Plato, art is not just a metaphor (in *Republic* 3 at least). This is for multiple reasons. First, Plato lived in a city filled with figure sculpture, figure sculpture that, in the Classical period at least, represented not just historical personalities but cultural values.[124] In Classical Athens, a relief sculpture of Athena before a stele is not (or not only) a specific image of Athena reading, mourning, or thinking. It is also a visible expression of a cultural idea of citizenship, piety, mourning,

etc. Likewise, what might 'justice' *look like* other than a figure sculpture of 'a just man' (or woman, or god)?[125] Plato could not help but express his ideas in the way he did because of the material and cultural world in which he was embedded.[126]

Equally important for this volume, however, is the reciprocity at play between imagination, practice, and consumption.[127] This is a particularly important point for Plato because of his preoccupation in his works with *mimēsis* and truth.[128] Petraki's chapter picks up the non-representational thread that runs through several chapters in this volume by adopting a substantive (and positive) vision of *mimēsis*.[129] Both material sculpture (the Athena in relief upon this stele, for example) and mind sculpture (ideas about gods, citizens, warriors, the self) are not simply replicas, representations of a prior reality (or way of thinking). They also propose, in artistic form, an idea, an idea that has power to influence, for bad *or for good* according to its nature.[130] On the stele, for example, we do not only see 'Athena looking at a stele and thinking/mourning/reading'. We also see a model of imaginative thought, subjective experience involving sensory, bodily experience. We respond in kind, or become aware that we do not, cannot, or might not. And someone, at some point, produces another sculpture, or painting, or poem. The process is reciprocal, generative, and regenerative.

The emphasis in Westwood and Petraki's chapters on reciprocity (the continual feedback loop between imagination and art) binds them together. It also leads us to the fourth part of our volume, and to two chapters that take a deeper look at the relationship between cultural artefacts and cultural imagination.

d. Form Defines Imagination

Consider, again, the stele of Athena. There is an implied kinship between the real stele and the object represented upon it. This is partly a matter of content. The figure of Athena mimics with her pose that of a viewer: as Athena looks on the represented object, so we look on the real one, linking real and represented artefacts as visual objects of attention. It is also a matter of matter and form: both real and represented objects are rectangular, set upright upon the ground,[131] and made of stone. On that note, both objects also have features in common with the sculpted figure, whose upright body mimics the stele on which she appears and the stele at which she appears to stare. The regular folds of her peplos skirt continue the theme; the lower portion of her body, a series of straight-etched near-vertical lines graven in stone is columnar,[132] much like the represented stele (if it is a stele), which is shown from the side and so resembles a pillar. This has all sorts of implications. For one, though the correspondence between figure and object is subtle, it unpicks the differentiation between person and thing that is claimed at a representational level. The shifting ground between content and formed matter turns attention upon the imaginative experience of a picture (or 'seeing as') that renders stone vertical lines also a (representation of a) stele or a skirt.[133]

The parallels also turn attention upon the imaginative process at play in gap-filling.[134] All we see of the object represented on the right is a narrow, upright rectangle. In any other context, there is little to force the conclusion that it is in

fact a stele or, if so, what could be upon it. This has not prevented scholars from attempting to do so.[135] The real stele was found on the Acropolis, and so may, when first set up, have been surrounded by votive offerings, decrees of the sort discussed by Lazar, or lists of tribute quotas or assessments. Its immediate context was probably sacred, legal, fiscal, and socio-political. Its subject matter *could be* too. But its shape (an upright rectangular slab) and its fabric (stone, carved in relief with a figure in profile) are reminiscent not just of inscribed decrees and public records, but also of Archaic funerary reliefs such as the Attic marble stele of a youth and a little girl, held in New York (Figure I.2).[136]

Though the Acropolis findspot suggests that at least one context for the Athena stele was *not* funerary, upright stone figures sculpted into upright flat stone rectangles do carry connotations of death. The real stele, and the upright object upon it, cannot help but cite these cultural norms, which may or may not have been noticed by viewers. Perhaps it is (even if only subconsciously) the stele format, more than Athena's pose, that has led critics to suggest the represented pillar might be a list of the war dead. And this game of reading-into one upright stone image (the pillar) turns attention upon the instinctive reading of the other: the figure. The group of stone lines and surfaces comprising a female body, an Athenian peplos, some armour, is understood to stand for the goddess Athena. The 'armoured female' shorthand for the goddess, like staff for 'voting citizen', forms part of a cultural agreement; it is a normative construct. By inviting viewers to think about the imaginative implications of an unmarked stone box, the stele also puts pressure on the imaginative implications of what *is* shown.[137]

These sorts of ideas form the subject of chapters by Emily Clifford and David Fearn, who continue the themes of inextricable form and content and reciprocity, but delve further into the referential possibilities that form affords,[138] with Clifford focusing on crafted objects (painted pots) and Fearn on crafted words (Gorgias' prose).

In each chapter, reciprocity is expanded to encompass the wider setting of culturally structured and reinforced ideas in which artefacts exist and of which they become a part. Like Westwood and Petraki, Clifford's chapter favours a generative and regenerative loop from mind to matter, as it were, and vice versa.[139] It is an important part of her argument that cultural artefacts are suggestive and generative of multiple echoes and associations, not only as stand-alone entities but as components of a broader cultural domain. Her point is not to emphasize intentionality or the role of the artist in creative imagination, but rather to argue against specificity. To put it another way, painted pots are not (or not only) representations of a prior truth. Once in existence, they are influential upon cultural norms more extensively and mutably.[140] In a similar vein, Fearn emphasizes the 'rhetorical hermeticism' of Gorgias' *Helen*: the absence (or near absence) of Gorgias, or indeed the audience, from the *Helen*'s text allows the work to emerge as an independent entity. For both Clifford and Fearn, pot and text are participants in a cultural world as opposed to a channel of communication.[141] In this respect, the non-representational qualities of cultural artefacts, and the role these play in imaginative processes, mirror the non-representational qualities of the imagining mind (see Campeggiani's chapter

Figure I.2 Attic marble grave marker of a youth and a little girl. c. 530 BCE. Metropolitan Museum, New York: 11.185a–c, f, g.

Photograph: Artokoloro / Alamy Stock Photo.

and the discussion above). In each of these two chapters, form becomes meaning, whether through a play on pot and body, or ornamental border and existential boundary, or in the sheer stylistic gorgeousness – or gaudiness – of the *Helen*, which turns the lens back onto a cosmos built cosmetically, a *kosmos* that doubles as substantive and decorative arrangement (or, as Fearn puts it, 'deep world-structure and surface superficiality').[142]

But the risk, in Fearn's language, of 'estranged objecthood' (where the superfluity of stylistic features tips into superficiality and the work seems to hold no significance beyond its presence as a showy thing) takes us to a second thread that unites these chapters: referentiality. For Fearn, the possibility of the *Helen*'s estrangement (and so failure to persuade) by virtue of its own hyper-rhetorical formal properties directs attention to the status of the speech as a work of art and so the process by which ideas are built and communicated through the cultural world of artefacts.[143] Gorgias puts up for discussion not just the question of Helen's culpability, or the persuasiveness of his rhetoric, but the very medium of rhetorical writing as a form of cultural imagination. He makes thinking through artefacts (the artefact of writing) the object of discussion. Indeed, failure also runs as a fault-line through Clifford's chapter, which opens with the point that death, fundamentally unknown and mysterious, is a concept that the living must extrapolate by observation from the outside. For Clifford, painted pots generate reflection not just on 'what death is like' but on the necessarily imaginative process of addressing that question. For the purposes of this volume, though death's mystery is the chapter's focus, it can also operate as a case study for 'the absent', 'the unknown', 'the invisible', 'the future', 'the past' or any one of the many categories that might fall within the purview of the broad faculty that we call the imagination (and which do, in fact, fall within Aristotle's definition of *phantasia*).[144] To make humanity's struggle to define death the object of attention is to put processes and practices of imagination under the microscope. To do it with artefacts draws on and delves into what Susan Stewart calls the 'structure of desire' that underpins human attempts to describe something (experience, objects).[145]

These two chapters, then, contribute to the volume by digging deeper into the cultural and artistic dimension of ancient imaginative processes. And it is worth, at this stage, pointing out that *all* chapters in this book look at imaginative processes and products through the prism of human creations, literary and artistic. This is, partly, an almost inevitable consequence of focusing the book on Classical Athens: so much of the evidence that survives is comprised of cultural artefacts. In addition, for obvious reasons, direct insight into historical minds in relationship with their environment is not possible. In the language of Fearn and Rorty (whom he cites), nearly all *our* touchstones are *their* artefacts.

Nevertheless, it is an important claim in this volume, and especially in this part of it, that cultural artefacts play an important and distinctive role *as cultural artefacts* in imaginative processes. Given the relevance of new materialist, object-oriented, and thing theories for a volume on the relationships between mind and matter, how can we square this claim with post-humanist analysis?[146] There could be many variants of this book that might look at the role played by other bodies,

landscapes, or organic matter in imaginative processes, or at the imaginative life of objects. As Clifford, for example, observes from the outset, cultural ideas about death and cultural responses to death are embedded in sensory, embodied experience of the external world, and so heavily influenced by *aisthēmata*.[147] But, though her chapter focuses on the interface between the perceptible, material, external world and the world of concepts and imagination, it is not a chapter on imagination and materiality *per se* (though one could imagine a chapter orientated around natural objects such as bones or other bodily remains and the imaginative perspectives they offer on death).[148] Likewise, an important thread in Fearn's chapter is thinking and imagining through exemplary bodies (Helen or *Helen*). But Fearn's point is not that Gorgias' text is an object made of papyrus; his point is that it exists in and through language and mythology, which becomes, as it were, a cultural body. Like other authors in this volume, Clifford and Fearn discuss how the imagination is mediated by an external world that was fabricated by people for people. So, on the one hand, this is a book about human imagination (a traditionally anthropocentric topic with a difficult history, as discussed above). And it is also a book about art and artefacts in relationship with humans (in conception, or creation, or attention …).[149] On the other hand, none of this is incompatible with a model in which the imagination is mediated by active and responsive bodies and artefacts (a less anthropocentric model).[150] But the fabricated dimension puts a distinctive spin on post-humanist models for interaction between bodies and their cultural environment because it incorporates reflexivity. What this volume offers is a cohesive account of what ancient crafted media (visual, verbal) offered imaginative processes *and reflections upon them*.

e. Form Becomes Imagination

We conclude with two chapters by Tom Phillips and Xavier Buxton that in some ways bring the volume full circle. Phillips and Buxton examine the interactions (and permeabilities) between imagining minds and the cultural world of which they form a part: a world of artefacts and people, time and space. Both focus on tragedy and on words (and both look at Aeschylus), but they consider different aspects of dramatic form and explore the different manifestations of imagination that crystallize in and emerge from it.

Phillips' discussion of lyric vision takes us from the lyric 'built moment' to the 'experiential affordance' it offers.[151] The core thread is evanescence, with which poetic 'ground' enacts imaginative experience and so generates reflection on imaginative processes.[152] Lyric moments, such as Menelaus' dreaming imaginings of Helen in the *Agamemnon*, are mournfully present to the senses even as they are gone. Imaginations and imagining are physical and fleeting: visions entice hands, but cannot be grasped; their wings imply bodily substance, but also departure; they accompany dreamers on paths at a moment already lost in the instant it is described in a negative both retro- and prospective. The tension between perdurance, substance, presence, and possibility, and transience, space, absence, and impossibility is, for Phillips, characteristic of how lyric manifests itself. Awareness of the

process is invited by the affective power of imaginings that stir longing and deliberation, by gnomic language that makes a study of Menelaus' mental situation, and by unfamiliar words, which catch at attention and grasp at language with which to articulate a process for which terminology is not yet established.[153] The experiences presented in lyric appear preciously personal in their ephemerality and emotional qualities, 'vigilances' that border on 'magic' (in the words of Lavinia Greenlaw) in their affordance of idiosyncratic subjectivities. And this, perhaps, points back towards the body, and to an imagination born of unique mind-body experience, embodied imaginative thought.[154]

If we set Aeschylus' choral ode alongside the Athena stele, we can observe similar processes at play. Athena is visibly at rest, caught in an instant: hand on hip, left foot crossed over the right, leaning forwards over the shaft of her spear. The line of the spear doubles as the representation of an object and a solid line that connects the object of her vision to her body. But the oddity of the-peplos-folds-that-do-not-fall hints at impending motion and the (paradoxical) ephemerality of the graven scene.[155] The sculpted figure of Thinking Athena literally manifests itself as a built moment. Likewise, her presence, bodily absorption, and physical experience of the rectangular object mirror a viewer's position, pose, and experience. But it also turns the viewing experience on its head, because viewers stand apart from the stele (we are, at least, not built of stone). The line of connection between viewers and stele is tenuous and transitory: no spear, no columnar body. Indeed, attention to processes of viewing is tuned more closely by the 'gnomic' language, as it were, of the figure's identity: Athena, as well as a goddess, could be a generalizing figure for Athenian collective identity. As in the *Agamemnon*, the artefact calls attention to processes of imagination and to the fragility of imaginative experience. Thinking back to Campeggiani's chapter on Aristotelian *phantasia*, the imaginative experience that Phillips finds challenged on its own (Euripidean and Aeschylean) stage is physically and emotionally real, but characterized by absence.[156] Dream-visions of Helen are insubstantial, ephemeral, subtle, and the 'joy' they offer is all the more precious for being elusive.

Phillips' comparative juxtapositions are a timely reminder that the possibilities of poetry, processes of imagination, and reflections upon them have a transtemporal aspect. Nevertheless, the role played by artefacts in imaginative processes filters through into ways of thinking about the imagination that we *can* describe as both Athenian and Classical, even if not exclusively so.[157] As Fearn discusses, the *Helen* brings under scrutiny cultural forms of meaning, not just writing but also exemplary figures such as Helen and her beautiful body (and the 'body of knowledge' that surrounds her). Likewise, on this stele, the female figure does not just represent Athena but also exemplifies the Athenian cultural attention which frequents the Acropolis space and interacts with its collections of cultural artefacts. Classical Athens is a world that builds, shares, and develops ideas through exemplary figures, from comic caricatures to tragic mythological heroes, from personifications of victory on a temple, to word-sculptures in Plato's writing.

This brings us to Buxton's chapter, dedicated to Aeschylus' Pelasgus. This turns the (transtemporal) cultural question of how artefacts mediate the imagination into

a historical question of how a form such as Athenian tragedy might articulate the imagination at work. In analysing what is particular about representations and constitutions of a deliberating mind *in the theatre*, Buxton demonstrates the coincidence of form and content in the exploration of thought. His choice of subject, meanwhile – a scene from Aeschylus' *Suppliants* that was critical to Bruno Snell's history of 'the intellect' in *The Discovery of the Mind*,[158] points towards the Janus-like nature of saying something about Classical Athens as an inheritor of two-and-a-half-thousand-year history of thinking about thinking.

Negotiating such abstractions, Buxton's treatment has a corporeal and material emphasis. Aeschylus' description of the deliberating mind as a diving eye that scans the ocean bed places embodied, enmattered mind-eyes within an embodied, enmattered, interactive, and changeable sea. Buxton thus in some respects concludes the volume by emphasizing a dynamic reciprocity in the representation and generation of imaginative thought. Yet Buxton's final proposition, that 'the mind has no existence apart from the cultural forms that it takes', returns us resolutely to the theatrical form, fixed in the time and space of Classical Athens. His argument is not developmental, but it *is* historical to the extent that imagination is constituted by the artistic forms where it finds itself expressed.

Striking within the context of this introduction is his discussion of the relations between Pelasgus and the Danaid chorus. As Buxton observes, the king's deliberation is social and embodied, and has a dynamic interrelation with time and space. But the impact of the Danaid chorus and their bodies on Pelasgus' deliberations is not just a matter of interacting things (or people); it is a matter of art. The Danaids stage themselves, in the real and imaginary theatre of the present and future: whether arranging their bodies and suppliant props (on their father's instruction) physically about the altar or hanging them imaginatively upon the holy statues, part of their power lies in the artefact (a real or virtual tableau) that they make of their bodies.

On this note, let us return, one last time, to the Athena stele. Where Phillips' chapter pointed us towards the fragility of the sculpted moment, Buxton's directs us inwards to the space within the face of the stele's stone body and outwards to the community of stone and flesh bodies within which the stele might have stood, a multitude of votive reliefs and viewing citizen-pilgrims upon the Acropolis. As in the theatre, the spatial expanse of the relief accommodates a group of people and things that interact (unlike a three-dimensional individual figure such as a *kouros*). Unlike in the theatre, the stele's slab form seems to invite a play on looking at surfaces and seeing substances, and looking at profiles and seeing interactions, an interiority constructed by what Jaś Elsner has called 'the glance' as opposed to 'the gaze'.[159] As in the theatre, an imagining body in relationship with an object is set within a social community,[160] and within a fluctuating space of bodies and objects, a sea of people and things coming and going across the Acropolis. A viewer standing before this stele might easily look up and around at other persons before other stelai, their imaginative pursuits comprising and encompassing his or hers. Seeing and being seen, imagining and being imagined, are thematized on a rectangular

object that shows a person looking at a rectangular object. Especially when the person is a goddess, and even more so when the goddess embodies mental and artistic capabilities (wisdom and craft).[161] This stele-Athena *is* art and she *is* imagination, inasmuch as the goddess' hand acts behind sculpting and thinking, the figured goddess' body is produced by the hand of the sculptor, and her stone shape with its gravity-defying folds is a self-styled performance, an embodied artifice by an artificial body. The stele brings cultural objectivity *and* cultural subjectivity within the remit of human imagination.

IV. … all Greece – alas – | Of Now and Yesterday Entombed?[162]

To conclude this introductory chapter, we pivot not to the present, or to the past, but to somewhere and sometime in between, to another Athena stele or, rather, the Athena stele re-imagined in 'Της Αθηνάς ανάγλυφο' ('The Athena Relief') of Kostis Palamas. In his 1896 response to the object, disinterred from its resting place in 1888,[163] Palamas meditates on the death of worlds, or imagined worlds, past and present:[164]

Πῶς ἀκούμπησες ἄπραγα τὸ δόρυ;
Τὴ φοβερή σου περικεφαλαία
Βαριὰ πῶς γέρνεις πρὸς τὸ στῆθος, Κόρη;
Ποιὸς πόνος τόσο εἶναι τρανός, ὦ Ἰδέα,

Γιὰ νὰ σὲ φτάσῃ; Ὀχτροὶ κεραυνοφόροι
Δὲν εἶναι γιὰ δικά σου τρόπαια νέα;
Δὲν ὁδηγεῖ στὸ Βράχο σου τὴν πλώρη
Τοῦ καραβιοῦ σου πλέον πομπὴ ἀθηναία;

Σὲ ταφόπετρα Βλέπω νὰ τὴν ἔχῃ
Καρφωμένη μιὰ πίκρα τὴν Παλλάδα.
Ὤ! κάτι μέγα, ἀπίστευτο θὰ τρέχῃ…

Χαμένη κλαὶς τὴν ἱερή σου πόλη
Ἢ νεκρὴ μέσ' στὸ μνῆμα καὶ τὴν ὅλη
Τοῦ τότε καὶ τοῦ τώρα, ὠιμένα! Ἑλλάδα;

Why are you resting your spear in idleness?
Why do you bend your dreadful helmet
Heavy upon your breast, Kore?
What pain tugs so hard, o Thought,

That it reaches you? Are there not lightning-bearing enemies
Nearby, to make new trophies for you?
No more does an Athenian procession lead
The prow of your ship to your Rock?

I see some grief holds Pallas nailed
Upon a tombstone.
Oh! Something great, incredible is going on…

Do you weep for the loss of your sacred city,
Or, dead within her tomb, the whole of Greece –
Of then – alas! – and now.

Palamas' Athena – addressed as thought itself, 'O Thought' (ὦ Ἰδέα) – is tugged hard by pain; she is held fast, 'nailed' (Καρφωμένη: 'nailed', 'fixed', 'pinned') to a tombstone by grief: sorrow's affective impact upon the mind is sensory and physical. Pallas' thought – 'something great, incredible is going on' – is, it seems, at once seen and imagined (remembered, anticipated?) by the graven figure of Athena and by the poet. 'I see,' Palamas says, moving from the visibly absent (an Athenian procession) to the invisible present ('Some grief holds Pallas fixed | Upon a tombstone'): he sees her behaviour, and imputes her emotional state. She, too, sees. But, in question tumbling upon question, Palamas explores the possibility that Athena herself sees not just a tombstone, but the worlds that it might mark: an ancient world that is her 'now' and his 'then'; a modern world that is his 'now' (and now our 'then'); and, indeed, our modern world, our 'now' (his future). If so, these three worlds of 'now' become also 'thens': both 'now' and 'then' lie dead together in the tomb (νεκρὴ μέσ' στὸ μνῆμα); all worlds are buried in the vast temporal frame offered by a perspective that might be the god's and the poet's, and might now become the reader's.

Responding to imaginative processes that are represented in and generated by the relief, Palamas spins the process on into the nineteenth century, and beyond into a future where ancient and modern alike lie dead. Dead, but perhaps, like the Athena relief itself, waiting – at some future time to be at last disinterred, to reopen their relations with the world.[165] Indeed, Palamas, one of the founding poets of the New Athenian School, was celebrated and reviled for his novel relations with the past, the break with antiquity (and its continuing hold on Greek language) that he forged through lyric encounters with that very antiquity.[166] Standing at a literary crossroads between past, present, and future, he opened the collection of poems in which he published 'The Athena Relief' – *Η ασάλευτη ζωή*, or *Life Immovable* in Aristides Phoutrides' translation – with a poem that envisages Palamas' work as a 'statue' (ἄγαλμα) that he has formed, raised, and buried in a pit – there to wait, perhaps forever. Did he perhaps encounter in the Athena stele not just sorrow for the Greece of his past and present, but also the promise of poetic life that might, in the artefact, remain unshaken, undisturbed, awaiting only the future events upon which imaginative encounters might bloom, like marble lilies?[167]

Palamas' encounter with the Athena stele, steeped in the turmoil of a country in contentious relations with its own past, eloquently models the power of the visual and verbal artefacts that are considered in the pages that follow to mediate reflections not just upon the historical processes of Classical Athens, but on a tradition of processes of engaging with antiquity – processes in which more might be at stake

than the past. When we look, with Palamas, at an object in which Athena looks at an object, we position ourselves as spectators of a tradition of looking, remembering, and imagining a past that is also, in some ways, our present.[168]

Abbreviations

Abbreviations of ancient authors and texts, as well as scholarly reference works, generally follow those of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, fourth edition; abbreviations of journal titles follow those of *L'Année Philologique*. Exceptions are listed below.

DAGR = Daremberg, C., E. Saglio, E. Pottier & G. Lafaye (eds) 1899. *Dictionnaire des Antiquités Grecques et Romaines: d'après les Textes et les Monuments*, volume 3, part 2. Paris: Hachette.

Notes

1 This period (loosely speaking) is conventionally called 'Classical'; we capitalize in this context throughout the volume to distinguish the period from the broader use of 'classical' to describe the culture of Greek and Roman antiquity as whole, and from the academic discipline of 'classics'.

2 We refer throughout to 'art' and 'artefacts'. When we do so, we include crafted media appealing to any number of senses (i.e. we do not just allude to 'visual' art). In talking of artefacts, we emphasize the human hands at play in shaping physical and mental forms. But the 'artness' of most artefacts discussed is also important insofar as the works make a claim on viewers' attention. Further discussion and bibliography follow, but it is worth acknowledging here the lack of agreement today as to the ontology of these categories and the likelihood that these categories would not have been viewed and understood in the same, or even similar, ways in the classical period. Note, e.g., Mattusch (1996) on the craft and creativity (*technē*) and the repetition involved in the industry of classical bronze production, pieces that have since acquired the status of rare works of art in original or copied form. On the issues that surround the application of modern concepts such as 'art' and 'art history' to ancient material, see the contributions in Platt & Squire (2010), especially the introduction by Michael Squire. This special issue of *Arethusa* responded in part to Tanner (2006) and his sociological approach to Greek art, but also, ultimately, to the decades of debate inspired by the historicist approach of Kristeller (1980 – a combination and reprint of the essays he published in 1951 and 1952). See further pp. 4–5 on the traditions that frame contemporary meditations upon creative thought (including historical creative thought).

3 Compare the Kantian imagination with its productive and reproductive powers: see Matherne (2016: esp. 55–61).

4 We engage with the wider bibliographic backdrop further later in this introduction: see esp. nn. 76, 86, 95, 140, 145, 146, 148, 149, 154.

5 For example, in pursuing the defining interest of the series in intersections between visual and verbal media, Graeme Miles (2018), Sean Leatherbury (2020), and Karel Thein (2022) have each explored the role played by artefacts in negotiating responses, relations, and reflections.

6 See, among others, Gardner (1889: 267); Joubin (1901: 193–9 fig. 68); de Ridder (1912); Dickins (1912: 258–61); Picard (1939: 39–40, fig. 18); Richter (1950: 80, 169, fig. 206); Robertson (1975: 178, fig. 56d, with further bibliography at n. 35); Andronikos (1977: 44, fig. 35); Buitron-Oliver (1992: cat. 8); Hurwit (1999: 150, fig. 121); Servi (2011: 130–1).

7 On aniconism see Gaifman (2012).

8 As per de Ridder (1912: 525–7), who argues that Athena's line of sight falls on the top of the object, where one would find the title of an inscription.
9 Hurwit (1999: 150) and Servi (2011: 130) acknowledge multiple possibilities, including a boundary marker (*horos*), casualty list, list of sanctuary accounts, the Acropolis fortification wall, and an athletic *terma*. A *horos*, for example for the Acropolis (Athena's sanctuary): Bulle (1912: 578–9); Picard (1939: 40); Buitron-Oliver (1992: cat. 8). A documentary stele: Pottier & Reinach (1889: 82) (suggesting that the Athena stele itself was the header for a treaty or honorary decree); Graef (1890: 24); de Ridder (1912: 527–8). A funerary stele (a casualty list, for example, or a private grave): Fowler, Wheeler & Stevens (1909: 251); Kenner (1978: 382–406); Boardman (1985: caption to fig. 41). A goal-post or other pillar as a symbol for an athletic site: Fairbanks (1902: 413); Chamoux (1957; 1972); Jung (1995). Jung provides a synthesis and discussion of the most likely (in his view) alternative proposals, namely a boundary marker or a documentary or funerary stele, and argues that a pillar designating athletic space is more plausible because representation of any of those other options from the side would introduce an unacceptable loss of iconographical clarity.
10 For discussion of the varying invisibilities of monuments on the Acropolis (especially from the perspective of the public), see Neer (2019: 7–42).
11 'This mysterious slab is the key to the image': Hurwit (1999: 150).
12 de Ridder (1912: 524), following Joubin (1901: 199), comments on the similarity between Athena's pose and appearance on this stele, and her image on a *lekythos* in the National Museum of Athens, on which see Fairbanks (1902: 413–16, fig. 2). On that *lekythos*, the object (a column) is positioned on the left, behind Athena. Conceivably, then, it might have been possible to depict a figure in this pose facing empty space (though we have not seen the other side of the *lekythos*).
13 Crane (1992: 1): 'it is through perception that the world meets our minds'. The chapters in that volume explore the content and nature of perception. The idea (the imagination as a link between the sensory and intellectual, or non-sensible) is Kantian: see n. 3.
14 Subject and object relations (in Renaissance culture): de Grazia, Quilligan & Stallybrass (1996: esp. 2–3 on Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*).
15 Servi (2011: 130): 'Characteristic of the art of this era is the figure's inner world and the artist's attempt to portray emotions.'
16 Consider Watson (1988); Sheppard (2014). See further n. 56 and Elsner & Squire (this volume, n. 8).
17 See esp. Pl. *Soph*. 264a1–b3. For further references see Sheppard (2014: ch. 1); Elsner & Squire (this volume, n. 9). For Aristotle on *phantasia* see Campeggiani (this volume) with Elsner & Squire (this volume, n. 10). For a recent exploration of the affinity between *phantasia* and modern notions of the 'imagination', taking its start from Plato's *Philebus*, see Thein (2021).
18 See esp. Philostr. *V A* 6.19 on the contrast between *phantasia* and *mimēsis*, discussed by Elsner and Squire in their epilogue (p. 302, with n. 6). See, further, Watson (1994: esp. 4768–9); Webb (2016: esp. 216). Ruth Webb focuses on the Roman Imperial period but explores earlier appeals to the imagination in the speeches of Lysias (and Demosthenes) (212–13). For the Stoics, see Elsner & Squire (this volume, n. 11).
19 See, e.g., Watson (1994: 4770–1).
20 Note, e.g., the volume edited by Juliette Harrisson (2018), which explores products of imagination in the ancient world (though less so the processes themselves).
21 Others included Jean-Pierre Vernant, Marcel Detienne, and Nicole Loraux.
22 See esp. Vidal-Naquet (1986: xix–xx), with the foreword by Bernard Knox.
23 See pp. 19–23 and n. 95.
24 Snell (1953 – first published in German in 1946). For the intellectual and historical context of Snell's work, see Lohse (1997); for its current status in the discipline, see Holmes

(2020), as well as Buxton's discussion in this volume (pp. 273–5). On extra-European contributions to Snell's 'European' discovery, see Burkert (2004).

25 See, e.g., Long (2007: 165–6; 2015: 29–30). See further Buxton (this volume, p. 274).

26 Snell (1953: v). We have adapted Rosenmeyer's translation for clarity.

27 See esp. Lloyd (2007; 2020).

28 Snell (1953: v). See further pp. 24–5.

29 See nn. 16 and 56.

30 Indeed, any attempt to map our contemporary words and concepts of the 'imagination' onto ancient Greek ones is fraught with difficulties. This is partly because the purpose of this volume is to examine a period in which such words and associated theories were absent (at least in the surviving record), and partly because the Classical words that do seem to communicate 'mental' processes and faculties (e.g. *nous*/ *noeō*/ *dianoia*; *phrēn*/ *phroneō*/ *phronēsis*) fail, both individually and as a group, to capture all that the 'mind' and 'imagination' embrace and, at the same time, overlap and exceed the boundaries of the English terms. The history of the emergence and evolution of such language has its own fascination (on *nous*, for example, see Sullivan [1989; 1997; 1999; 2000], as well as Stella [2016]), but stands outside of our project. On the limits of nominalism, see Cairns (2008), discussed in n. 31.

31 This approach chimes with that advocated in Cairns (2008) on emotions in ancient Greek, especially his treatment of 'pride' (56–8): as Cairns argues, this English label has no lexical equivalent in Greek (so Konstan [2006: 100]), but its dramatic 'script' is easily recognizable in, for example, Agamemnon's pleasure at Odysseus' report of his son's heroism (Hom. *Od.* 11.506–40). Likewise, the absence of a particular term for the 'imagination' in Classical Greek is no reason not to investigate it.

32 E.g. Pl. *Symp*. 223d6; Soph. *El.* 945; Aesch. *Supp*. 179. For writing and *phantasia* in Plato's *Philebus*, see Thein (2021). On the 'metaphoricity' of the Greek mind in general, see Cairns (2014b; 2016). See further nn. 81 and 103 and Buxton (this volume, pp. 280–1).

33 See, e.g., Fearn and Petraki (this volume).

34 This is the (sometimes misunderstood) project of Bruno Snell, discussed on pp. 4–5 above.

35 Between these polar positions lie innumerable others, such as 'property dualists' (see Chalmers [1996; 2006]); 'behaviourists' (see Stout [2003]); and 'functionalists' (see Levin [2021]).

36 See esp. Clark (2008).

37 This distinction – between the mind as a source and the mind as a product – is what distinguishes Hegelian and Marxist views (see esp. Marx's afterword to the second [1873] edition of *Capital: Volume I* [1976: 102 – first published in 1867]). The contributions in this volume respond, inevitably, to a discipline that has been influenced by this theoretical opposition (and more); the collective claim is that we need not choose between them.

38 See Campeggiani and Buxton (this volume).

39 HER. D98 LM = 22 B 45 DK (discussed in Buxton [this volume, p. 283]); D2 LM = B 2 DK.

40 ANAXAG. D27 LM = 59 B 12 DK.

41 See, e.g., Pl. *Phd.* 97b–99d; Diog. Laert. 2.12; Arist. *De an*. 1.2 403b20–405b31 (on which see Carter [2019]). For Aristotle's view of the mind's separateness, juxtaposed with modern theories, see Magee (2003).

42 Ar. *Nub*. 228–30, a passage famous enough to be recalled in Plato's *Apology* (19c2–4). For the tradition, going back to Anaximenes (D31 LM = 13 B 2 DK), see Guthrie (1965: vol. ii. 362–81).

43 Ar. *Nub.* 94 (ψυχῶν σοφῶν … φροντιστήριον), 187–8.

44 Ar. *Nub.* 508 (καταβαίνων).
45 On the thematic significance of the stage-action in *Clouds*, see Revermann (2006: 179–235, esp. 187–97 on Socrates' 'air-walk'); on the potentially 'Pythagorean' nature of the *phrontistērion*, including the *katabasis*, see Morosi (2018).
46 Ar. *Nub.* 101. On the symbolism of spatial depth in Greek tragedy, see Bakola (2014; forthcoming) and esp. Padel (1990). Aristophanic 'space' is normally considered more literally (e.g. Bowie [2012]), but see Revermann (2006: 107–29) for a more imaginative approach.
47 Stevenson (2003), cited by, e.g., Kind (2013: 143), Langland-Hassan (2020: 2), and Liao & Gendler (2020) (in each case, alongside the passage from Strawson that we quote here).
48 Strawson (1970: 31). This seems to be a joke about Wittgenstein's influential argument (1953: 31–3 [I. §§66–69]) for 'family resemblances' (as opposed to 'essences') in the ordinary functioning of language; Strawson (1954: 76–7) highlighted this passage.
49 Hobbes, *Leviathan* §1.2 (1996: 15 – first published in 1651). For the 'decaying sense' tradition, and its limits, see Humphreys (2019).
50 See Strawson (1970), citing Kant and Hume for this 'technical' use of the term.
51 In Plato's *Theaetetus* (152c), Socrates rejects an identification of *aisthēsis* and *phantasia* (attributed to Protagoras) as producing a tedious relativism; in *Sophist* (264a–b) the Eleatic stranger argues that *phantasia* is a mixture of *aisthēsis* and *doxa*. For discussion, see Silverman (1991).
52 See Campeggiani (this volume). See further Nussbaum (1978). *Contra* Schofield (1995 – first published in 1978).
53 See Huitink and Westwood (this volume).
54 See Sekita (this volume).
55 See the *OED* s.v. imagination 5, and Scruton (2009). See further Huitink and Phillips (this volume).
56 Cf. *Midsummer Night's Dream*, 5.1.1–22, discussed by Murray in her introduction to Cocking (1991); Arist. *Poet.* 16.1455a22–5, as elaborated in Sheppard (2014: ch. 1). Goldhill (2015: 70) criticizes Sheppard's neglect of 'a cultural world beyond a self-selected elite of Greek philosophers'; this volume's range of cultural material offers some forays into that wider field.
57 'Seeing as': Wittgenstein (1953: 193–229, esp. 194 [II.xi]); Gombrich (1968: esp. 4–5 – first published in 1960). This was reformulated by Richard Wollheim as 'seeing in': Wollheim (1980: 137–51 – first published in 1968; 1998: 221–2; 2003). For a reinterpretation of Wollheim's theory of twofoldness in terms of a 'double content' theory of art rooted in cognitive science: Dilworth (2005; 2010) (amongst others). Wollheim, however, himself rejects more than an ancillary connection between seeing-in and imagination in Wollheim (1998: 224–5) and in Hopkins & Wollheim (2003:145–7). This is explicable in that Wollheim is specifically focused on *representational* theory (and one only of paintings) and 'appropriate experience' whereby the artist's intention imposes a standard of correctness. His approach conceivably brings what is represented 'online' (in that it is there to be found …). Note here Walton (1970), who opens up the aesthetic impact of a work to incorporate the context in which it is experienced, but still ascribes to a 'correct' way of perceiving art to which viewers must train themselves. To use the Thinking Athena stele as an example, if instead we encompass representation (or aesthetic meaning) within the 'experiential affordance' of art (see Phillips [this volume, esp. n. 6 on Payne {2018: 272}]), then (at risk of treating 'seeing-in' as a 'Trojan Horse': see Hopkins & Wollheim [2003: 133]) seeing a figure in stone or seeing stone as a figure would both fall within its 'imaginative domain'. This more open-ended approach accommodates both the 'self-standing' properties of an object (which transcend any given moment in time) and the inescapable influence of audience context, and is more fitting to

our study of the role played by artefacts in human imagination. See Neer (2010a: 159) on Wollheim and 'a circuitry of invitation and response'. Though the necessity of authorship (see Rohrbaugh [2005]) might matter for determining the 'correct' perception of a work, authorship only carries relevant implications within a spectrum of plausible imaginative experiences. On the relationship and tensions between Wittgenstein's seeing-as and Wollheim's seeing-in, see Kemp & Mras (2016). Note esp. Hills (2016) on integrating imagination into seeing-in (a defence of Kendall Walton's 'make-believe' theory of representation). For engagement with the arguments of Walton and Wollheim in the context of antiquity, as part of an enquiry into what he calls the 'as-if' of verbal and visual representation, see especially Grethlein (2017: esp. 18–34): crucially, Jonas Grethlein delves into how 'as-if' works differently for texts and pictures. On *mimēsis*, see n. 84.

58 GORG. D35 LM = 82 B 23 DK, discussed by Phillips (this volume, p. 265). For the importance of this *apatē* in the ethics and aesthetics of ancient illusion, see now Grethlein (2021: esp. ch. 1 on Gorgias).

59 Walton (1990) also discussed in n. 57; Walton (1991) offers a useful précis.

60 The problem is raised in Walton (1990: 154–5), citing Hume, but has since been developed by many others. For an overview, see Tuna (2020).

61 Surprising (*thaumastos*): *Poet.* 9.1452a4–6; 24.1460a12–18. Reasonable (*kata to eikos*): 7.1451a12, 8.1451a28, 9.1451a38, 1451b9, 1451b31, etc.

62 Walton (1990: 138–87).

63 13.1452b35–36; 14.1453b38–39, 1453a3–4. See Halliwell (1987) *ad loc.*

64 On Homer's poetics, see especially Halliwell (2011: 37–92); on the self-conscious 'allure' of lyric, see Fearn (2020). See further Fearn and Phillips (this volume).

65 The implications of these relations are not just methodological; they are also ethical. For this idea see especially Eagleton (2000: 47–51). Terry Eagleton focuses upon the 'liberal form of imperialism' that can be detected in the assumed privilege of Western 'civilization' and 'imagination' to understand, and enter into, the local and limited perspectives of others. A similar point might be made about the reception of antiquity and the imagination that scholars might bring to bear upon the 'unknown territory' of Classical Athens.

66 See esp. Goldhill (1994; 2017: esp. 259–62); Güthenke (2020).

67 See, especially, Butler (2016) and the work of the Postclassicisms Collective (2020).

68 See further pp. 19–26.

69 Hom. *Il.* 3.176; Soph. *Ant.* 828; Eur. *Hec.* 433–4. The verb is τήκω. Melting in tears: Dunham (2014: 28); Worman (2021: 135–6).

70 Matter and affect: see, e.g., Telò & Mueller (2018a: esp. 6–11).

71 Picard (1939: 40): 'l'on n'en est pas encore, certes, à parler de réalisme des plis, devant un artifice si volontaire'.

72 Though Robertson (1975: vol. 1, 178) finds real sadness in her face, perhaps in response to the Persian sack of the Acropolis.

73 'The Mourning Athena' is the 2011 museum catalogue title. A gently humanized moment of divine reflection: Picard (1939: 40). de Ridder (1912), criticizing 'melancholy' interpretations, argues that Athena reads an inscription in her capacity as guardian of Athens and its laws without evidence of emotion. Many are sceptical about her 'melancholy', partly because her expression is characteristic of the early Classical period. See, e.g., Joubin (1901: 193). Compare Kenner (1978: 382–3).

74 Hurwit (1999: 150): '… there is no question about her thoughtfulness and contemplative mood, and it is this that makes her quintessentially Classical'. Observing that Athena is the goddess of reason, thought, and knowledge: *DAGR* s.v. Minerva, 1916–17.

75 Dickins (1912: 258–61): the stele was found 20 cm beneath the surface in the wall of a building to the south of the Parthenon in 1888, though this may not have been its original location. He also notes 'a slight moulding above and a small plinth below'.

76 In the last few decades there has been a wealth of scholarship on the materiality of the body, the porosity between human and non-human matter, and the embodied nature of experience, cognition, and personhood. See, e.g., Meskell (1996; 2000); Joyce (2005); Barad (2008 – first published in 2003); Coole & Frost (2010); Cairns (2016). See further nn. 81, 139, 148, and 154.

77 On the *similarity* and *difference* of mental images and real perceptions: McGinn (2004: 2). The sensory nature of Aristotelian *phantasia* ('under conditions which are not conducive to veridical perception'): Modrak (2016).

78 See Buxton (this volume).

79 *De an.* 3.3 427b21–23.

80 The imagination has long been associated with imagery, mental images, and visualization. But the existence and nature of mental pictures, depictive representations, or something picture-like (quasi-images) in the brain is a contested topic in cognitive science and philosophy of mind, with some favouring a representational (or analogue) model, and others a description-based (propositional) approach: for examples, see n. 23 of Campeggiani (this volume). Different again is the 'perceptual activity' model advocated in Thomas (1999), which most accords with Campeggiani's approach here. An overview of the debate and its history is provided in Nanay (2021). For a wide-ranging study of the imagination that explores its kinship with vision ('Mindsight') see McGinn (2004). A study (and unpicking) of philosophies of the imagination and its relationship with images: White (1990).

81 Thomas (1999) was an early proponent of the perceptual activity theory of mental imagery and its suitability for folk/Romantic conceptions of the imagination. The reactive 'mirror' of eighteenth-century imagination (and, indeed, ancient *phantasia*) versus the inventive 'lamp' of the Romantic imagination (in each case, in the eyes of the representative contemporary critic): Abrams (1971). See further Meskell (1996; 2000) and Barad (2008) on the agency embedded in a realist, materialist, embodied, or phenomenal world view. Connected is the picture in Cairns (2016) of how embodied experience and expression are reflected in metaphor and so construct concepts of emotional experience. For some studies on the associations between metaphorical thought and embodied experience: Wilson & Gibbs (2007); Williams & Bargh (2008).

82 Note the discussion of the multifarious natures and uses of the imagination in Kind (2016), and pp. 5–9 above.

83 Indeed, Thomas (2021) observes that both representational and descriptive models are overshadowed by Wittgenstein. Approaches to mental imagery assume that images are depictions (they are 'of something'). For an introduction to contemporary philosophical views on the nature of depiction and the issues it raises, see Abell & Bantinaki (2010); Kulvicki (2014) (the latter espousing a structural view of representations). On the role played by aesthetics in art history and Vernant's history of the 'image': Neer (2010a: 14–19; 2010b). R. G. Collingwood's rejection of a representational (or craft-based) theory of art is instructive: see esp. Collingwood (1938: 42–56). Note, however, Elsner (2010) on the representation at play in art *and* art history.

84 The history of thought on *phantasia* is closely entwined with that on *mimēsis*. On *mimēsis* and its complex position within a history of aesthetics, see Halliwell (2002: 1–33). Perhaps we should take a broader view altogether of the word 'representation', one that accommodates both 'world-reflecting' and 'world-creating' models (terminology follows that discussed in Halliwell [2002: 23]) and which allows for multiple perspectives, including those of present and future audiences as well as the creator: see Clifford (this volume). Different viewers (including viewers from different times and places) see differently, and 'so-called representational art' may operate in tandem with (and inversely to) the imaginative powers (or 'inner mimetic effort') of a contemporary audience: on this phenomenon and late

antiquity, see Onians (1980), cited here; see further Elsner & Squire (this volume, p. 310 with n. 28).

85 Note especially Estrin (2016) on the power of this duality.

86 Neer (2010a: esp. 1–2, 20–69). See further Porter (2010) on the matter and aesthetic impact of ancient art (and traditions of aesthetic thought in antiquity); Gaifman (2012) on aniconism in Greek antiquity (some ancient visual culture was powerfully non-representational); Platt (2016b), esp. 74 on the contributions of visuality and materiality (and the history of classical art) to 'a rigorously historicizing study of the ancient world'. On ancient objects and affect, see n. 149. One effort to find a 'prior reality' for the stele in a statue, of which the stele relief (and other reliefs and pot paintings) would be a copy: Fairbanks (1902). See further Kenner (1978: 383–5).

87 See n. 84.

88 All this is indebted to emphasis on matter and materiality in, among others, feminist, queer, antiracist, social, and science studies. See, e.g., Alaimo & Hekman (2008b), especially the introduction by the editors (2008a), and also nn. 76, 81, 139, 148, and 154 of this Introduction.

89 Joubin (1901: 195) acknowledges the uncertainty as to whether Athena looks at a specific object.

90 The extent to which this is noticed will depend on whether blank space is understood to be a 'standard' or 'variable' feature of the category within which the stele is understood to fall (see Walton [1970]). But this will vary between viewers, conceivably viewers of the same time and place. Chamoux (1957: 141) enjoyed the freedom that the mysterious scene leaves to the imagination but regretted that the duty of the archaeologist was, first and foremost, to penetrate its meaning.

91 As do Fowler, Wheeler & Stevens (1909: 251).

92 Hurwit (1999: 150, n. 66) refers to IG I^3 1147. See further Meiggs & Lewis (1988: 73–6, no. 33), who note that this example is exceptional in featuring only one tribe.

93 The jury is out on mental images, though our point here is that the content of the image (if any) is unknown.

94 It is generally accepted that the long object is a reversed spear. This may have been more obvious with the addition of paint (Lechat [1896: 7], drawing upon the report of M. Cavvadias when the relief was discovered in 1888, notes that the represented pillar was painted, and particularly colourfully towards its top; Dickins [1912: 259] and Servi [2011: 130] note that the background was blue; Hurwit [1999: 150] notes also that the moulding was brightly painted). The long slender staff does, however, also resemble an Athenian citizen staff. Sticks and citizen iconography: Hollein (1988: 17–49); Fehr (2011: 84–91). Nevertheless, we might *imagine* that, insofar as this stele might represent how it is for Athena to look upon an object (to use Thomas Nagel's phrasing), a visualized spear would be more suitable than a staff: presumably, if it is like anything to read or view anything as Athena, that experience might involve awareness of wearing military attire. Though see n. 101.

95 This volume's interest in the relationship between artefacts and ideas taps into scholarship on art and thought, specifically religious thought. See especially the seminal article by Richard Gordon (1979); more recently, see, e.g., Gaifman (2006; 2017); Elsner (2007; 2017); Platt (2011; 2016a); Neer (2012). See further Squire (2018b: 135 n. 35). More generally on form in classical art, see recent volumes by Platt & Squire (2017) on frames and Dietrich & Squire (2018) on ornament, nn. 99 and 142 and Clifford and Fearn (this volume). On where all this fits alongside a (helpful?) Hegelian conception of Greek art (specifically sculpture) as a 'supreme expression of the Absolute', a coincidence of 'content' and 'form', and an (unhelpful?) Hegelian Protestant teleology: Squire (2018b). See further Squire (2018a: 36–7).

96 Compare Gaifman (2006: 267–8) on an image recalling the Athena 'Parthenos' on a document relief from the Acropolis. In referencing a renowned statue, that Athena

(the one on the document relief) is not just in fact a stone object, but cites a material object; she is (among other things: see n. 98) a material representation of a material representation.

97 Hurwit (1999: 150) observes, 'barefoot, as if on holy ground'.

98 The layering of this encounter is temporally and spatially plural, and the three figured Athenas continue to be there on the fifth-century Acropolis as in the museum today: see Nagel & Wood (2010) on the 'anachronic' power of art to 'fold time' and reflection upon that 'temporal instability' in the Renaissance. See further Fearn (forthcoming) on temporal layering in Pindar's *Olympian* 10 and relations between an object in the world (a terrain, for example) and an aesthetic object (a photograph, a landscape). See also n. 96 and Gaifman's discussion of the relationship between goddess, representation and artwork.

99 On frames and divinity see Gaifman (2017), esp. 404–8 on the transgression of a painted boundary by Athena's helmet. See further nn. 95 and 142 of this Introduction and Clifford (this volume).

100 See esp. Platt (2011; 2016a), and n. 95.

101 Though note Nagel (2012) on the impossibility of truly accessing another's subjective experience based on physical criteria: we must rely on our imagination, but even that is limited by our own point of view.

102 On a difference between sentence and utterance meaning as essential to metaphor, see, e.g., Searle (1993). Here, the sentence 'she is a bride of Hades' would be used with the meaning 'she has died'.

103 Much attention has been given to how metaphor not only reflects and presents ideas, but generates them. See especially Harman (2005: 102–10, 162–3) on Ortega's theory of metaphor: the metaphor is 'a new *thing* that has entered the world, and not just a private mental state of mind' (109). See further, among others, Black (1954/55: for an 'interaction view of metaphor'; 1993: esp. 35–9 on the creative and representative capabilities of metaphor); Ricoeur (1991: esp. 85) on how metaphor *creates* meaning and 'shatter[s] and [increases] our sense of reality by shattering and increasing our language'. On the continuum between figurative language and thought, see Lakoff (1993); Gibbs (1994; 2008); Lakoff & Johnson (2003). See further Pinker (2007: 235–78) on the extent to which metaphor and thought are, and are not, connected. On the make-believe (and imagination) implicated in metaphor, see Walton (1993). On the association between metaphor, imagination, and bodily simulation, see Gibbs & Matlock (2008): mapping this onto Sekita's discussion of the marriage-to-Hades metaphor, ideas about death might involve a bodily simulation of bidding farewell to a bride. For an overview of the historical and current debates surrounding metaphor (and the larger linguistic and philosophical discourses within which it sits), see Martin (2017). See further Buxton (this volume, pp. 280–1).

104 On myth and metaphor as 'two indispensable modes of expression for poetic imagination in its creating, modifying, and form-giving activity', see Karadas (2008: 9–63, citation at 63). Karadas focuses on myth and metaphor in Romantic poetry, but his ideas and discussion have a wider reach and point towards the interrelation of myth and metaphor here. See Cassirer (2020: esp. 1–34 – first published in German in 1925) on the function of the mythical and nn. 105 and 130. See further Morgan (2000) on the place of *muthos* in philosophy, its relationship with *logos*, and its value as a form of expression. On the emergence of an early Greek discourse on myth, and on myth as 'express[ing] a part of the lived experience' (as opposed to being, for example, a primitive or alternative mode of thought) see Detienne (1986: citation at 122). There seems to be some affinity between Detienne's emphasis on the 'lived experience' that is expressed, and remembered, in narrative mythology, embodied approaches to metaphor (see nn. 81 and 103) and, indeed, the appeal and power of narratives that embed and exemplify the emotional and ethical situations of others (see Cairns [2014a]).

105 See further Cassirer (2020: 44–6) on the coincidence, in myth, of 'image' and 'thing', esp. 46: 'Above all, [myth] lacks any fixed boundary between the merely "imagined" [*Vorgestellt*] and "actual" perception, between wish [*Wunsch*] and fulfillment, between image and thing [*Sache*].'

106 For work on the exemplarity of real (historical) and mythological figures in a different context (Roman culture), see Langlands (2015; 2018); Newby (2016: esp. 3–4, 320–47); Roller (2015; 2018: esp. 4–23); Rood, Atack & Phillips (2020: 145–68).

107 See Budelmann (2018) on literary representations of group thought in Classical Athens.

108 Relevant here is John Searle's realist account of social reality and its construction (especially its construction through language): Searle (1995). 'Institutional facts' (as he calls them) are cultural phenomena, money, marriage and lawcourts, and so on, that have been constructed and so exist by social agreement. In Classical Athens, institutional facts would include the *dēmos*, its ability to come to a decision, and recognition of that decision as meaningful. Compare Loraux (1986: esp. 328–38) on how funeral speeches constituted a civic ideality, or imaginary, an Athenian idea of Athens.

109 On the politics of the written form (specifically, the dialogue), see, e.g., the introduction in Goldhill (2008). See further Blondell (2002: 37–52) on the dialogue form in Plato, authority and openness.

110 Compare Lazar's argument that the 'monolithic whole' of the *dēmos* was defined against external groups (including the gods) to the model of imagination that Halliwell (2002: 54) finds in Plato's *Republic*: 'a dimension of the mind's capacity to explore the possibility of *difference* in its own life'. Note, too, Platt (2016b: 77) on how objects can '[invite] their viewers to think beyond the limits of the self'.

111 See further the discussion above of Sekita's chapter in this volume and the role played by a mythological person in the 'marriage to Hades' and Fearn's discussion of the exemplary bodies of Helen and the *Helen* (this volume).

112 For an overview of various approaches to the imagination, including enactive theories, see nn. 36 and 80. See further Huitink (this volume, pp. 61–2).

113 On character (in Athenian tragedy), see Buxton (this volume, pp. 271–2).

114 Webb (2009: 107–30). See Grethlein & Huitink (2017) for a 'quasi-perceptual' reading of a scene in Homer's *Iliad* 23 in which, they argue, readers 'enact' the narrated world and so 'undergo a quasi-perceptual experience' of it (rather than developing and then responding to pictures in their mind). The extent to which such cognitive experience is inflected by culture is debated: compare the problem of tragic 'minds' discussed by Buxton (this volume, p. 272).

115 This is also the sort of language that Webb finds in ancient theories of *enargeia* and *phantasia*, and that she uses herself to discuss ecphrastic experience (in terms of mental representation and images): n. 114. Her model is dynamic and perception/experience based.

116 Note White (1990: 83–5, 86–100, 184–93, esp. 192) on the *use* of the word 'imagination' (as opposed to asking 'what happens when one imagines anything'): 'To call imagination an image-forming faculty is only true if "image" is used in [a] wide, non-pictorial sense.' See n. 80.

117 On use of the past in Athenian oratory, see Westwood (2020). See further Webb (2009: 110–13) on memory and images in ancient thought. Note Knox's commentary on Vidal-Naquet's *Les crimes de l'armée française* as an *aide-mémoire*: Vidal-Naquet (1986: xii).

118 Compare Zeitlin's discussion of 'the shaping and cultivation of cultural memory' in the theatre, tragic 'interferences' between present time and ancient myths, and 'hyperviewing' (moments of ekphrastic discourse): Zeitlin (1994: esp. 144–5). A 'deliberately awkward' rhetorical past might point reflexively towards the role of the speech in concept formation: see p. 22 below.

119 See pp. 10–14 above. Also, complicating the boundary between people and objects (as part of an enquiry into the positive repercussions of treating 'the body as material culture' for archaeology): Sofaer (2006: esp. 64–88).
120 A 'body' of values need not just be a metaphor: see Barad (2008) on the physics and philosophy of Niels Bohr for the idea that concepts themselves are material and that their meaning arises from intra-actions that produce phenomena.
121 The impact of examples, models, and instances (the singular or particular) on the notions and operations of justice has been explored in work on exemplarity in Roman culture and beyond: see, e.g., Lowrie & Lüdermann (2015b), especially the introduction by the editors (2015a).
122 In the lawcourt too, the formation of a concept of justice involves movement from specific examples (the facts of a case) to general principles (ethical and legal). The legal process mediates this intellective activity, and rhetorical language draws attention to its material foundations: as Westwood discusses, collective decisions are built out of the individual memories of the jurors, principles of justice derived from the visible objects of inscribed laws, and the persons and events visualized in response to the words of the speech. On exemplarity and the law, see n. 121.
123 Compare Zeitlin (1994: 144) on art as a 'mode of learning'.
124 See, especially, Ma (2006) on replication and figure statues in fourth-century Greece and beyond (objects that are simultaneously historical and art historical, and which, through a process of replication, give form to multiple cultures with multiple values). Admittedly, in the Classical period, the 'shock of the new' should not be underestimated; significant effort was expended on making bronze (as well as marble) sculpture naturalistic, with close attention to colour and detail (eye lashes, nails, lips, teeth, pubic hair …). On the 'creative tension' between 'real-life forms' (statues as 'real functioning presences or substitutes') and 'powerful ideological styling': Smith (2007: 86–7). But Ma's discussion of the role played by visual culture in social ideas and ideals works alongside this (an honorific statue must be both specific and stereotypical).
125 One other option would be Dike, the divine personification of justice. On personifications in Classical Athens see: Stafford (2000: 1–44) on personification and the divine; various chapters in Stafford & Herrin (2005), for example those by Eva Parisinou (on personified images of brightness and light in ancient Greece, combining both abstract and anthropomorphic elements) and Diana Burton (on gendered personifications of death); Smith (2011).
126 In fact, the idea that the imagination might present a concept as a symbol (such as the morally good as the beautiful) is integral to Kant's philosophy, on which see Matherne (2016: 64–6). On statues as 'good to think with', see esp. Steiner (2001) on Archaic and Classical Greece; the chapters in this volume likewise analyze the cognitive significance of artefacts, but consider artefacts as *mediators* of, rather than food for, thought.
127 New materialist thinking is important here: see further discussion in and notes to section d (Form Defines Imagination).
128 See Halliwell (2002: 37–71, esp. 65) on Plato's conception of mimetic art as part of 'the relationship between human thought and (mind-independent) reality'.
129 See previous note, also including 1–33.
130 See Halliwell (2002: esp. 50 on the normative veracity of poetic *muthoi*). An 'idea in artistic form' is not so different from Collingwood's 'proper art' as an imaginative activity that (in the case of painting) is built out of and crystallized in the sensory act of painting: 'painting imaginatively': Collingwood (1938: esp. 139–44, 300–8). On the agency of matter or things: Barad (2008).
131 The findspot indicates re-use: see p. 11 and n. 75.
132 This effect is enhanced by the unnatural fall of the folds: see p. 10 and n. 71.

133 See n. 57. Wollheim's reformulation 'seeing-in' is attractive here, in that representation of folds can be observed at the same time as the stone lines (or, at least, at the same time as holding an awareness of the stone lines).
134 Another quality of imagination and images.
135 See n. 9. Compare Gardner (1889: 267): though positing, like Lechat, that paint would have made clear what the pillar represented, he recommends appreciating the real relief's beauty rather than attempting an interpretation. See further n. 90 on Chamoux (1957: 141).
136 See, e.g., Robinson (1913); Richter (1961: 27–9, no. 37, figs. 96–109 and 190; 1974); Picon *et al*. (2007: no. 71); Lazzarini & Marconi (2014: 125, 130, fig. 24).
137 On categories of the (ancient and modern) imagination and the 'nucleus of visual and textual representation' that gathers around them: Henderson (1994: esp. 85–7) on 'Amazons'.
138 For other work on ancient artefacts and reflexivity, see esp. Grethlein (2016); Elsner (2018).
139 We might also think of this in new materialist terms. See, e.g., Barad (2008) on 'agential intra-actions', the porosity of organism boundaries, the generativity and agency of matter and so, conceivably, a post-humanist approach to imagination and subjectivity (if subjectivity can, and should, be separated from objectivity). See pp. 22–3 and nn. 76, 81, 148, and 154.
140 See Davies (2003: 175–6) on 'culturally emergent' art as proposed in Margolis (1999). As Barad (2008) emphasizes, matter 'becomes'. Heidegger's principles of 'being and time' are also relevant, as is object-oriented philosophy (OOO), thing theory, and presence theory. The original context or single moment, a historicist fantasy, cannot reach the identity of an object. Cups, like hammers, are elusive: see Harman (2012). While authors in this volume do not aim to seek out the essence of artefacts, an appreciation of their mutability and elusiveness supports wide-ranging exploration of their relations with the world and their generative role in human processes of imagination (acknowledging the risk of 'overmining' them: see Harman [2012: 195–202] on the problems, from an OOO perspective, with New Criticism). See further Brown (2004) on thing theory (a theory that probes human/subject-object relations, the relations between things and ideas); Gumbrecht (2004) on the presence (not just the meaning) of things; Harman (2005: esp. 230–34) on relations between vacuum-sealed objects. An overview of Heidegger's 'single great thought': Harman (2007: 1–4). For some approaches to literature that draw on these theories, see Jacobus (2012: 1–6) (drawing on thing theory) and Morton (2012) (drawing on object-oriented ontology). See especially Morton's discussion at 214 of the relationship between objects and time (and poems and time). See further n. 151.
141 Compare the idea of architectural ornamentation as a visage, even a personality, that offers dialogue with passers-by, as discussed in Picon (2013: 60–2). Art not only expresses subjectivity (see Picon [2013: 85] on the house of Sir John Soane for an extreme example), and invites subjectivity but can constitute a new subjectivity. Thing theory is also relevant here: see n. 140.
142 As discussed above in n. 95 on art, thought, and Hegel, the relationship between artistic form and meaning has a rich and recent bibliography, especially with regard to visual ontologies. On decoration, ornament, beauty, and substance, see Clifford and Fearn (this volume) and, among others: Schapiro (1969) on the role played by non-mimetic elements of the image-sign; Osborne (1988: esp. 4); Cartledge (1998: 3–4) on social order in Classical Athens; Dognini (2002) on the distinct origins and meanings of Greek κόσμος versus Latin *mundus*; Schafter (2003); Marconi (2004); Hölscher (2009: esp. 62–3); Picon (2013: 9–16); Haug (2015). See further Neer (2005; 2010a: 6–11) on the stakes of style and connoisseurship. There is an important place here too,

alongside form, for matter and the aesthetic experience they together incite. See nn. 95 and 99 and esp. Porter (2010).

143 Compare to this the designs of Piranesi (a Gorgianic visual artist, as it were), whose fantasy engravings pushed the boundaries of what is conceptually and materially possible, and so turned attention upon the norms of the architectural canon. Architecture, ornament, subjectivity, and Piranesi: Picon (2013: 59–102, esp. 67 on Piranesi's 'unfettered imagination').

144 See Campeggiani (this volume) and pp. 5–9.

145 Stewart (1993: esp. ix–xiv – first published in 1984). Problems of inside and outside, human and object, narrative and experience return us to object-oriented ontology (see n. 140); bodies and pain (e.g. Scarry [1985: esp. 3–11]); phenomenology (note Socrates' anxiety in response to Protagoras' relativism [Pl. *Theaet.* 152a 2–4]); post-structuralist fascination with power, systems, and difference (see esp. Foucault [2002] on 'what it is impossible to think'); psychoanalytic study of symptoms (note, e.g., Rangell [1978] for a psychoanalytic theory of creativity); and ecphrasis (see, e.g., Mitchell [1994: 151–81]).

146 For some recent encounters between Graeco-Roman texts and post-humanist and new materialist thinking, see Bianchi, Brill & Holmes (2019). See further n. 149.

147 Compare Cairns (2016), cited with detail in n. 81.

148 Compare Meskell (1996), esp. 11–14 on accessing the individual through death archaeology and engagement with the lived body.

149 See especially the contributions within the Routledge series on the senses in antiquity edited by Mark Bradley & Shane Butler (2014–18); Gaifman, Platt & Squire (2018) on the 'entanglement' of persons and things in the classical world; Telò & Mueller (2018b) on encounters with objects in Greek tragedy. On ancient Greek art, the senses, and affect, see further, e.g., Neer (2010a); Porter (2010); Gaifman (2013); Estrin (2016); Arrington (2018: esp. 19–20). Approaches in this volume also build on object-oriented philosophy. However, whilst taking objects seriously (and, in particular, acknowledging that they also exist independently from and prior to human relations) involves appreciating their elusive nature, what we are interested in here are the interactions between objects and bodies as part of human imaginative processes (even if interactions are based on allusions).

150 This is acknowledged by some new materialists, who are often seeking to redress an imbalance, to add to rather than replace more word- or human-centred theories. See, e.g., de Grazia, Quilligan & Stallybrass (1996: esp. 5). Note esp. Hall (2018), though she makes a more socio-political point in her emphasis on labour and the continuing value of Marxist theory (under-explored in classical philology).

151 See further Morton (2012: esp. 215–17) for an object-oriented defence of poetry, and an exploration of poems as agents with an aesthetic causality. Compare Neer (2018) on excessively and inadequately embodied objects.

152 Compare Jacobus (2012: 1–6) on lyric poetry and thinking through (the resistance of) things, through the thing that is lyric and through the images in nature that become lyric objects and prompts for thought.

153 See n. 103 on the generative power of metaphor, another sort of poetic ground. See esp. Wohl (2018: 32): on 'metaphor materialized as corporeal affect'.

154 Over the last few decades there has been considerable interest in the lived body, including, notably, within the field of archaeology which has long studied real bodies and other matter, but now also emphasizes bodies as subjects and participants. See, especially, Meskell (1996; 2000), some early pieces on what attention to the body and non-dichotomous conceptions of mind and body might offer archaeological studies of agency, individuality, and subjectivity (as opposed to more Foucauldian emphasis on power and social constructionism). See further, Joyce (2005: 150–2) on archaeologies of the lived body and intersections between embodiment and subjectivity, and

Hamilakis (2014: esp. 143–54) on how sensuous and non-representational archaeology might correct a disciplinary preoccupation with personhood and individualism (revealing, instead, flows and interactions).

155 Compare here Chamoux (1957: 143) on Athena's unstable attitude and unlikely posture which, he thought, looked at once balanced, naïve, and spontaneous.

156 See Campeggiani (this volume) on on- and off-line experiences.

157 The fifth century, and revolutions in art, viewing and subjectivity: Elsner (2006). See further n. 159 below.

158 Snell (1953: 101–3). See pp. 4–5.

159 Jas' Elsner and Elsner (2006), the thinker and his artefact, have in many ways inspired this volume and the seminar series from which it emerged. For further discussion of the possible relationship between transformations in visual art and subjectivities see Elsner and Squire's epilogue (this volume, pp. 304–5 and 309–15, with n. 12).

160 This was also true, though in a funerary context, of *kouroi*. There is an interesting question here as to whether, as one of many stelai, the female figure stands as an individual mind within a collective, or whether she (as the patron goddess of Athens) forms a microcosm of a group mind. On group minds and collective cognition in the literature of Classical Athens: Budelmann (2018).

161 Compare Buitron-Oliver (1992: cat. 8) for another abstract interpretation of the stele: 'the stele might represent the power of the written word or the power of the decree of Athens, the state the goddess protects'.

162 From the 1919 translation by Aristides Phoutrides: Palamas (1919: 98).

163 See n. 75.

164 Greek text as printed in Palamas (1920: 15). The translation is our own.

165 On the importance of archaeology in the 'national imagination' of modern Greece, see Hamilakis (2007: 121): 'Antiquities come from the earth, the earth that contains the bones of the ancestors; antiquities are bones, they are the marble bones of the body of the nation. The marble statues can speak, cry, and mourn.' In the nineteenth century, such statues were thus 'instrumental in constructing a topos which was at the same time within history and outside it'.

166 See Phoutrides' personal account in the introduction to his 1919 translation of the vitriolic responses stirred by Palamas and his fellow 'Hairy Ones' (Μαλλιαροί), leaders of 'the literary renaissance of Modern Greece': Palamas (1919: 5–12). On Palamas and 'the struggle for demoticism', see also Fletcher (1984). For the importance of ancient sculpture in modern Greek poetry, see Giannakopoulou (2007), with Palamas discussed at 69–96.

167 A common image in Palamas' poetry: see Giannakopoulou (2007: 90–1).

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> The real war will never get in the books.
>
> W. Whitman, Specimen Days

I. Introduction

The Battle of Cunaxa was a pitched battle fought in 401 BCE – perhaps 'late in September … on a dusty plain, baked hard by the sun of a long summer'[1] – between King Artaxerxes II of Persia and his rebellious younger brother Cyrus, who had marched inland from his satrapy in Western Anatolia with a Greek mercenary army and other, non-Greek forces in order to usurp the throne. The Greeks, occupying the right wing of Cyrus' army, routed the troops opposite them, but in the centre Cyrus lost his life after a confrontation with Artaxerxes – so that the goal of the entire expedition evaporated into thin air. Cyrus' left wing, under the command of his Persian supporter Ariaeus (or Aridaeus), at some point collapsed, with the troops fleeing back to their camp. There ensued an uneasy stand-off between Artaxerxes' troops and the Greeks, which may or may not have involved further fighting, but which in any case lasted until the night, when the royal army withdrew and left the Greeks in possession of the battlefield (but in a disastrous position, given that they were in the heartlands of the Persian Empire without a plausible Persian leader to challenge the King again).

Our knowledge of the battle depends on three main sources. We possess running narratives by Xenophon (*Anabasis* 1.8–10), who was present at Cunaxa in Cyrus' army, and by the first-century BCE historian Diodorus Siculus (*Bibliotheca* 1.22–4), whose account is based on Xenophon in combination with other, independent sources, probably especially the no longer extant *History* of the fourth-century BCE historian Ephorus.[2] Plutarch includes a more selective account of the battle in his *Life of Artaxerxes* (7–13), which incorporates elements of the lost *Persica* of Ctesias, who like Xenophon had experienced the battle from up close as Artaxerxes' physician.[3] These sources have enough in common for historians to be able to distil the basic outline of events given above, but there are also many substantial differences between them, which have been pored over by scholars to see whether it is possible to determine the relative reliability of the accounts and to establish

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in greater detail 'what happened and why' – questions which are ultimately unanswerable.[4] Perhaps, in fact, we should be profoundly sceptical even concerning basic points; a recent interpreter casts doubt on the claim that Artaxerxes' troops were no match for the Greeks:

> In reality, the Greek heavy infantry proved to be a weak link in the rebel army, and the King and his generals exploited their relative lack of manoeuvrability on the open terrain near Cunaxa. That history has come to believe the opposite is a result of the literary skill of Xenophon of Athens.[5]

The present chapter moves beyond questions about the historical *reality* of Cunaxa and rather focuses on the *representation* of Cunaxa, and the processes of selection, abstraction, and schematization which any effort to translate an intense and confusing event like a full-scale battle into a compelling narrative inevitably – and also wilfully – involves. More specifically, I will explore how compositional and stylistic choices in the narrative representation of events lead readers to *imagine*, *feel*, *judge*, and *understand* what happened at Cunaxa in certain specific ways. I will focus mainly on salient elements of Xenophon's and Diodorus' in many respects radically different accounts, while I will adduce Plutarch more selectively, for Ctesias' version of the death of Cyrus, which Plutarch preserves, and for Plutarch's own stylistic comments on Xenophon and Ctesias, which prove to be illuminating. Features that the accounts have in common may perhaps allow us to say something about how battle was generally imagined in Greek historical writing (as opposed to other genres and periods), while differences between them may give an impression of the range of possibilities within the genre. It will be my contention that most of the differences have to do with the various ways in which Greek historians dealt with questions of 'historical distance'. Before turning to the accounts themselves, I will, therefore, first explain this concept and its particular relevance to battle narrative.

II. Historical Distance and Battle Narrative

From Classical Greece till today, historiography has always had to confront questions about the relationship between world and mind (the overarching theme of this volume), if by 'world' we mean the past events that form the object of historical inquiry (*res gestae*, τὰ γενόμενα, '*wie es eigentlich gewesen*'), and if by 'mind' we mean the complex mental operations that go into the representation of those events in a coherent and convincing narrative account (*historia rerum gestarum*, ἱστορίας ἀπόδεξις) – mental operations that R. G. Collingwood influentially referred to as the 'historical imagination'.[6] The historical imagination is first and foremost conditioned by 'distance', that is the inevitable fact that historians (as well as their audiences) are temporally removed from the past events which they seek to understand.[7] Distance is often valued positively, as bringing clarity and detachment: as time passes, we come to see events with greater accuracy and with an appreciation of their true importance in the grand scheme of things. At the same

time, however, distance can be seen as a problem, as being in the way of other, more intimate ways of relating to the past. For Collingwood, indeed, the historical imagination primarily serves a process called 're-enactment', whereby historians use primary sources related to an event in order to think themselves into that event and to rethink the thoughts of the people involved in it and their various possible ways of dealing with it. The task of a historian, according to Collingwood, is to arrive at an understanding of events from the 'inside', and it is clear that in trying to achieve that goal, distance is not so much a trump card as an obstacle that needs to be overcome as far as possible.[8]

Ancient Greek historians were already well aware that history could be approached with varying degrees of distance and proximity. Grethlein has shown how they variously negotiated the competing demands of what he calls *teleology* (~ distance) and *experience* (~ proximity). Some historians, such as Herodotus, tend to tell their story making full use of the benefits of hindsight, suggesting that distanced retrospection is the best way to arrive at a proper evaluation of people and events. Others, such as Thucydides, seek to encourage their readers to assume a more participatory stance and to relive some of the experiences of the historical actors, employing certain narrative and compositional strategies that 'restore presentness to the past', when the consequences of decisions and actions were not yet clear and everything was still to play for.[9] Allan has introduced a distinction between *distance* and *immersion*, which operates on more local levels of discourse.[10] In careful textual analyses, Allan shows that some episodes in ancient works of history are written in such a way as to encourage readers to keep the end of the story in mind and to maintain distance from the past, whereas other episodes are designed to draw readers in. In episodes of the latter kind, several textual features (descriptive detail, scenic narration, spatial language, focalization, and direct speech) combine to allow readers to immerse themselves in the world of the past and to experience that world (up to a point) as if it were a slice of real life, witnessing and reacting to events as they unfold. Finally, it is relevant to note that ancient rhetoric had a term at its disposal, *enargeia* (usually rendered as 'vividness'), which resonates in non-trivial ways with concepts like *experience* and *immersion*. It refers to narratives which, owing to certain stylistic qualities, manage almost to elide historical distance and make readers feel as if they can all but 'see' the storyworld in their imagination.[11] *Enargeia* was, as we shall see, a highly prized, but also occasionally problematized, quality of historiography.[12]

Meanwhile, historical distance has recently become the object of more extensive reflection in the philosophy of history, most notably in the work of Phillips.[13] Widening the scope of the term well beyond its temporal sense, Phillips notes how 'distance enters into all the ways a narrative works to bridge the then-and-now of history, including its formal structures, its affective and ideological demands, and its claims to truth or understanding'.[14] In other words, Phillips lays bare how ideas about distance and its counterpart, proximity, play a role in thinking about at least four dimensions of historical representation. Thus in reference to form or expository style, a narrative may be called (as in Allan's terminology) 'distant' or 'immersive', or 'sweeping' or 'detailed', and the like; in reference to emotional

tone, it may be seen as 'detached' or 'intimate', and in reference to ideological commitment as 'aloof' or 'involved', and so on; finally, in relation to knowledge or understanding, it may or may not privilege objectivity and abstraction over insights won at close range.[15] While it is good to be aware of the distinctions between these dimensions of distance (form, affect, ideology, and understanding), Phillips in fact argues that there is much to be gained from studying them together, so as to better appreciate 'the combinatory possibilities that give individual works – or perhaps whole schools and genres – some of their characteristic features'.[16] Furthermore, he argues that, on closer inspection, the binary opposition between 'distance' and 'proximity' dissolves into a gradation allowing for all positions from 'far' to 'near'. The remainder of Phillips' book is a sweeping study of varying regimes of distance that operate in selected works ranging from the Renaissance through the Enlightenment and the Romantic period till today. Phillips' work thus serves a double purpose: not only does it provide a differentiated view of historical distance, but also it historicizes the concept by charting evolving views of the ways in which historians from different periods positioned themselves in relation to the past.

Of all topics regularly covered by historians, few raise more acute questions about distance and proximity in all their dimensions than the representation of military combat. This is because, like few other types of event, battles look and feel very different from up close than from a distance. From up close, battles are disorienting and unpredictable affairs, at once too chaotic and too traumatic or even vulgar to be told as they happened. As one veteran of the Battle of Waterloo stated: 'I'll be damned if I know anything about the matter, for I was all day trodden in the mud and ridden over by every scoundrel who had a horse'.[17] From a distance, when the dust has settled and the outcome is known, things look much clearer, so that a modern historian of Waterloo feels that he can confidently assert that an assault of the corps of the Comte d'Erlon 'through muddy fields of breast-high rye' was launched at 'the correct place', but faltered because d'Erlon was 'violating all the established French models of manoeuvring in column'.[18] Both views have their merits – but it is clear that a story that incorporates the veteran's perspective has implications for the configuration of historical distance in all its dimensions. This becomes at once apparent when one thinks for a moment how a narrative that conjures up mental images of soldiers covered in mud and being knocked over by passing horses might qualify one's ideas about what a phrase like 'manoeuvring in column' actually means in the heat of battle, as well as one's feelings about, and judgement of, an apparent 'violation' of the proper execution of that manoeuvre.

Modern historians are engaged in a lively debate about the relative merits of different kinds of battle narrative.[19] The issue in part comes down to whether you think a description and explanation of the true nature of battle is best served by a focus on command decisions and principles guiding the movement of troops on the battlefield, as seen from a wide vantage point and evaluated with the benefit of hindsight, or by a focus on the particular actions of soldiers and their responses to an unfolding situation in a volatile physical and emotional environment. Keegan, who put the question on the agenda in his landmark book, *The Face of Battle*, felt that distant battle narratives unduly gave the impression that it is possible 'to

reduce the conduct of war to a set of rules and a system of procedures – and thereby to make orderly and rational what is essentially chaotic and instinctive'.[20] But the question also has affective and ideological dimensions. Thus some have expressed the hope that narratives centred on the limited perspective and intense experiences of common soldiers may make war itself seem a less attractive proposition, and no longer lure 'the toiling clerk in "city grey" to volunteer in anticipation of the grandeur of another Agincourt – "we few, we happy few" – and then to experience instead the reality of the Somme'.[21] Others, however, have warned that zooming in on mud, gore, and fear may be intended to elicit sympathy, but can just as easily turn narratives into 'a parody of violence' or even downright 'war porn'.[22]

With this in mind, it is now time to follow Xenophon, Diodorus, and Plutarch to the plain of Cunaxa.

III. Between Convention and Variation

A perusal of the various accounts of Cunaxa immediately gives rise to two observations. The first is that they have several elements in common. For instance, both Xenophon and Diodorus include a battle array, outlining with varying degrees of granularity the pre-battle dispositions of Cyrus' and Artaxerxes' armies. Furthermore, they both devote attention to the actual fighting done by the Greek troops on the right flank, and in so doing both focus in greater detail on the initial Greek charge than on the actual hand-to-hand combat with the Persians. Additionally, all three narratives include an account of what is arguably the decisive event in the entire battle, Cyrus' death. Finally, each author is at pains to explain the final, uneasy result with its double outcome: a victory for the Greeks, yet an overall defeat owing to Cyrus' demise. Such similarities are precisely what we should expect. After all, classical scholars have often pointed out that battle narratives in ancient historiography are on the whole highly conventionalized set pieces, full of stock motifs and genre elements – including the battle array, pre-battle speeches, an account of the actual fighting, an indication of the results, and a 'weighing' passage (providing a reason for the victory or defeat) – which together constitute something like a menu for battle narratives from which ancient historians could pick and choose.[23] Lendon has even gone so far as to suggest that ancient battle pieces were 'mummified by convention', with some motifs becoming 'so powerful and entrenched as to encourage authors to write accounts more true of battles in general (broadly true) than true of the particular battle described, or sometimes to write accounts that were, in part or all, not true'.[24] That may be so, but for our purposes it is more relevant to look at conventions as meaningful 'forms of thought', which project certain mental images of battle which may perhaps be called typically 'Greek'.

The second observation is that, for all their similarities, the three accounts are also clearly distinct in ways that have broadly to do with narrative texture and tone. Certainly, the three versions have impressed readers very differently. Xenophon's version has been called 'probably the most detailed eyewitness account we possess of any pitched battle fought by Greeks in the Classical period'.[25] The perceived authenticity of his story contrasts sharply with the perceived lack of that quality

in Diodorus' narrative, which has been thought to be full of 'stereotyped rhetorical phrases'.[26] Plutarch's account, meanwhile, belongs to the genre of biography rather than historiography proper, and this may help explain why he more often exchanges narrative for explicit evaluations of the behaviour of some of the protagonists; his inclusion of alternative accounts of several events has been thought to contribute to a deliberately fractured picture of Artaxerxes, who remains difficult to 'pin down' throughout the *Life*.[27] To be sure, scholars' assessment of the difference between Xenophon and Diodorus is informed by their knowledge that the former was, and the latter was not, present at Cunaxa. Yet it also has to do with the fact that ancient historians, whilst drawing on similar motifs, could articulate those motifs in different ways, which can be described as more 'distant' or more 'near'.[28] And here, as we shall see presently, Xenophon and Diodorus made very different choices.

The fact that ancient historians could envisage different ways of shaping battle narrative becomes clear, interestingly enough, from the start of Plutarch's account of Cunaxa, where he invites readers to contrast Xenophon's version with those of others:

> τὴν δὲ μάχην ἐκείνην πολλῶν μὲν ἀπηγγελκότων, Ξενοφῶντος δὲ μονονουχὶ δεικνύοντος ὄψει καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν ὡς οὐ γεγενημένοις, ἀλλὰ γινομένοις ἐφιστάντος ἀεὶ τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἐμπαθῆ καὶ συγκινδυνεύοντα διὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν, οὐκ ἔστι νοῦν ἔχοντος ἐπεξηγεῖσθαι, πλὴν ὅσα τῶν ἀξίων λόγου παρῆλθεν εἰπεῖν ἐκεῖνον. ὁ μὲν οὖν τόπος ἐν ᾧ παρετάξαντο Κούναξα καλεῖται καὶ Βαβυλῶνος ἀπέχει σταδίους πεντακοσίους.
>
> (Plut. *Vit. Artax.* 8.1–2)

> Since many writers have left reports of that battle, and since Xenophon brings it all but before our eyes and through his vividness all the time places the reader, much affected and sharing in the dangers, near to the action, as if it had not been concluded, but is going on, it is folly to narrate it in full, except so far as that man has passed over things worthy of mention. Now then, the place at which the armies were drawn up is called Cunaxa and is five hundred stades away from Babylon.[29]

Plutarch draws a basic distinction between 'telling' (cf. ἀπηγγελκότων) and 'showing' (cf. δεικνύοντος ὄψει), which is familiar from modern criticism as well.[30] We do not know whether he intends Diodorus to be included among the 'many' authors who did the former (it would not be inappropriate), but he explicitly states that Xenophon does the latter. What it means to 'show' the battle 'to the eyes' is further explicated with reference to *enargeia*: owing to its vivid style, Xenophon's narrative mentally transports readers to the plain of Cunaxa, puts them in the presence of the events *as* they happen, and enables them to share the emotions of the combatants (the understood complement of συν- in συγκινδυνεύοντα).[31] It appears that Plutarch prefers Xenophon's account and yet, as I have argued elsewhere, there is a sting in the tail of his effusive praise. For Plutarch's deadpan

continuation points up a problem with Xenophon's riveting narrative: the historian failed to mention that the Battle of Cunaxa took place at Cunaxa! Confining his perspective to that of the Greek soldiers at the time, who probably had little idea of where they were, Xenophon did not use hindsight (the privilege of the historian) to supply the name. Perhaps, Plutarch slyly suggests, his own, more distant account is not so superfluous after all.[32]

Plutarch's comment adumbrates some crucial distinctions between Xenophon's and Diodorus' accounts (as well as his own). To bring these into sharper relief in what follows, it is useful briefly to consider how the distinction between 'telling' and 'showing' has received subtle and differentiated interpretations in recent cognitively inflected studies of literary aesthetics and stylistics.[33] These studies follow classic reader-response theory in suggesting that readers' engagement with literature depends on how information given in the text about the storyworld and its happenings is linked to – or anchored in – what they already know; most famously, Iser's phenomenology of reading is about how readers 'fill in the blanks' by integrating textual information with extra-textual knowledge.[34] Now, marshalling insights from the so-called 'second-generation' or 'embodiment' turn in the broad field of cognitive science and philosophy of mind, more recent studies have argued that the prior knowledge which readers bring to bear on their imaginative engagement with literature is not only conceptual or propositional in nature but includes prior bodily, perceptual, and affective experiences as well.

Caracciolo has recently presented a powerful model of the various kinds of 'experiential background' to which literary language may appeal.[35] Conceiving of his model as a series of concentric circles, Caracciolo places bodily experience at the centre – the fact that readers have bodies with a specific physical make-up, sensorimotor capacities, and sensations (such as pain, proprioception, and kinaesthesia) profoundly shapes the ways in which they approach and come to grips with storyworlds. We then move outward through circles for perception and emotion (both highly embodied capacities as well, inasmuch as they depend on bodily movement and sensation), which are instrumental in imagining a storyworld and in imagining what it is like to inhabit it. The outer circles of the background comprise higher cognitive functions (including long-term memory, conceptual thought and language, and narrative scripts) and, finally, socio-cultural practices (a familiarity with social institutions and conventions, cultural history, and belief systems – and perhaps we may add intertextuality here, too).

To be sure, these various types of experience and knowledge cannot always be clearly separated. For instance, perception and emotion depend directly on our physical make-up and bodily experience but also interact with higher-order cognitive functions and social-cultural practices.[36] Furthermore, the reading experience as a whole probably depends on the real-time integration of all types of experiential background at once; we will see some examples below. Nonetheless, it does not seem absurd to suppose that some narratives, owing to their structure and style, elicit more conceptual, cerebral, or evaluative responses (such narratives 'tell'), while others aim more for more quasi-sensory, visceral, and affective responses (such narratives 'show'), as Plutarch suggests Xenophon's description of Cunaxa

does.[37] A further attraction of maintaining a differentiated view of the types of experience and knowledge which may guide readers' imagination is that they exhibit some obvious points of contact with the various dimensions of the concept of historical distance as envisaged by Phillips. With that in mind, we turn to a more detailed comparison of some salient elements of our accounts of Cunaxa. For the sake of the argument, in each of the following sections a different dimension of historical distance will take centre stage (though in due acknowledgement of the fact that all dimensions of distance in practice operate together). I will hone in on the battle array and formal aspects of distance, the Greek charge and affective aspects, the death of Cyrus and ideological aspects, and finally on the overall structure and coherence of Xenophon's and Diodorus' narratives and the sorts of understanding of battle they offer.

IV. The Battle Array

One of the standard motifs of ancient battle narratives is the battle array, that is, the disposition of the opposing armies.[38] One question that they raise is how they relate to the subsequent description of the action; I will return to that question in the section on overall structure. Here I confine myself to the distinct ways in which Xenophon and Diodorus articulate the motif. Since battle arrays provide an overview of the disposition of entire armies, they in principle invite a 'distant' view, and that is exactly what Diodorus delivers:

> When Cyrus saw the King's army advancing, he at once drew up his own force in battle order (εἰς τάξεις κατέστησε). The right wing (τὸ μὲν οὖν δεξιὸν κέρας), which rested on the Euphrates, was held by infantry composed of Lacedaemonians and some of the mercenaries, all under the command of Clearchus the Lacedaemonian, and helping him in the fight were the cavalry brought from Paphlagonia, more than a thousand. The other wing (τὸ δὲ θάτερον μέρος) was held by the troops from Phrygia and Lydia and about a thousand of the cavalry, under the command of Aridaeus. Cyrus himself had taken a station in the centre of the battle-line (ἐτέτακτο κατὰ μέσην τὴν φάλαγγα), together with the choicest troops gathered from Persians and the other barbarians, about ten thousand strong; and leading the van before him were the finest-equipped cavalry, a thousand, armed with Greek breastplates and swords. Artaxerxes stationed before the length of his battle-line scythe-bearing chariots (πρὸ μὲν τῆς φάλαγγος πάσης ἔστησεν ἅρματα δρεπανηφόρα) in no small number, and the wings (τῶν μὲν κεράτων) he had put under command of Persians, while he himself took his position in the centre (κατὰ δὲ τὸ μέσον) with no less than fifty thousand elite troops.
>
> (Diod. Sic. 14.22.5–7)

This is a 'distant' account in at least three respects. Firstly, while it is stated that Cyrus drew up his forces when he saw the King approach, the array itself is described statically and retrospectively, not as it is being devised by Cyrus, but as it

stood once everything was in place: narrative, that is, is temporally abandoned for description.[39] Secondly, moving from the treatment of time to that of space, the narrator focuses mostly on the armies themselves and has little to say on the physical features of the battlefield; apart from a reference to the River Euphrates, no further details are given on the basis of which the reader may form an impression of the terrain. For the description of the armies the narrator adopts a wide vantage point, overseeing the whole and moving the camera, as it were, from the one end of Cyrus' army to the other and then back to the centre, before turning it in the direction of Artaxerxes' army. While the first spatial indication is given relative to Cyrus' position (δεξιὸν κέρας 'the right wing' – that is, to the right of Cyrus as he faces the enemy), that relative frame of reference is at once exchanged for more objective indications, with the words 'other' (θάτερον) and 'middle' (μέσην).[40] Thirdly, in line with the wide vantage point, the description of the various people involved is conducted on a coarse level of granularity: the battle-line (φάλαγξ) and wings (κέρατα) are mentioned as well as different types of troops, divided according to mode of fighting (infantry, cavalry, and so on) or ethnicity (Lacedaemonians, Phrygians); some of the terms used have a technical ring to them.[41] The narrator selectively 'zooms in', as it were, only on individual commanders (mentioning Clearchus, Cyrus, Aridaeus, and Artaxerxes by name) and on unusual equipment and gear (the Greek breastplates and swords worn by Persian cavalry, and the scythe-bearing chariots). Of course, readers who have prior visual experience of, for instance, 'infantry' or 'Phrygian' soldiers or of the difference between Persian and Greek breastplates, may form visual mental images on the basis of Diodorus' description, but it would be difficult to maintain that this is the main point.

Diodorus' statement that 'Cyrus saw the King's army advancing' reads like a summary of a more elaborate and evocative scene in Xenophon, whose Cunaxa narrative starts as follows:

> It was now (ἤδη) mid-morning and the stopping-place where Cyrus was intending to halt was near (πλησίον ἦν), when Pategyas, a Persian, one of Cyrus' trusted advisors, comes into sight (προφαίνεται), riding at full speed, with his horse in a sweat, and at once shouted out to everyone he encountered, in Persian and in Greek, that the King was approaching with a large army, all ready for battle.
>
> (Xen. *An.* 1.8.1–2)

This passage, I contend, is highly immersive and is likely to elicit vivid (visual and auditive) mental images from readers, because its structure mirrors the way in which an embedded human observer present on the spot would experience the scene from up close.[42] One important factor here is that the deictic centre (the reference point vis-à-vis which temporal and spatial references are plotted) appears to be located *within* the storyworld. This is especially clear from the verb προφαίνεται ('comes into sight'): by virtue of its lexical meaning, it inscribes a story-internal vantage point into the text (as 'appearing' implies movement towards someone located there), and by virtue of its tense (the historical present), it presents the event

as if it is currently being observed. The temporal adverb ἤδη ('now') makes further reference to the story-*now* and πλησίον ἦν ('was near') to the story-*here* (because we mentally supply a spot to which the stopping-place 'was near'). In addition, the scene is scanned in a way that realistically mirrors an observer's shifting attention: the observer has hardly come to a halt and had a chance to take in the day's final destination when her attention is suddenly drawn to a rider hovering into view (one may imagine turning one's head), whom she then keeps track of as he moves towards and through the stopping-place (as implied by Pategyas shouting 'at everyone he encountered'). The passage makes manifest a three-dimensional spatial situation through familiar patterns of movement. Finally, in the situation described here, it is likely that one of the first details one would notice is the horse sweating (its flanks gleaming in the mid-morning sunlight) and then, when the rider is getting closer and you are craning to hear what the fuss is about, that he is shouting in two languages. The reader finds out *with* Cyrus and his army that the King is approaching.

Panic ensues (all the more understandable for the reader after this description), but Cyrus takes charge and draws up his forces. The following battle array (1.8.4–7), describing Cyrus' army, is fairly conventional in that it adopts a distant vantage point comparable to that of Diodorus' – perhaps attesting to the fact that battle arrays and distance naturally go together.[43] However, when Xenophon shifts to Artaxerxes' army, the story-internal vantage point is resumed and a truly remarkable passage follows:

> And now (ἤδη) it was midday, and the enemy (οἱ πολέμιοι) were not yet in sight (οὔπω καταφανεῖς ἦσαν); but when afternoon was coming on, there was seen a rising dust, which appeared at first like a white cloud (κονιορτὸς ὥσπερ νεφέλη λευκή), but some time later like a kind of blackness (μελανία τις) in the plain, extending over a great distance. As the enemy came nearer and nearer, presently (τάχα δὴ) a gleam of bronze was flashing out (ἤστραπτε), and then spears and the ranks were coming into sight (καταφανεῖς ἐγίγνοντο). There were horsemen in white cuirasses on the left wing of the enemy, under the command, it was reported (ἐλέγετο), of Tissaphernes; next to them (ἐχόμενοι δὲ) were troops with wicker shields and, next to them (ἐχόμενοι δὲ), hoplites with wooden shields which reached to their feet, these latter being Egyptians, people said (ἐλέγοντο); and then more horsemen and more bowmen (ἄλλοι δ' ἱππεῖς, ἄλλοι τοξόται). All these troops were marching in national divisions (κατὰ ἔθνη), each nation in a solid square. In front of them were the so-called scythe-bearing chariots, at some distance from one another; and the scythes they carried reached out sideways from the axles and were also set under the chariot bodies, pointing towards the ground, so as to cut to pieces whatever they met; the intention was that they should drive into the ranks of the Greeks (τῶν Ἑλλήνων) and split the opposing line. As for the statement, however, which Cyrus made when he called the Greeks together and urged them to hold out against the shouting of the barbarians, he proved to be mistaken in this point; for they came on, not with shouting, but

> in the utmost silence and quietness (οὐ γὰρ κραυγῇ ἀλλὰ σιγῇ ὡς ἀνυστὸν καὶ ἡσυχῇ), with equal step and slowly.
>
> (Xen. *An.* 1.8.8–11)

The contrast with Diodorus is great: instead of viewing Artaxerxes' army from high up, Xenophon's narrator seems to have taken up a position among Cyrus' troops as they slowly see the enemy come into view.[44] Even a commentator as level-headed as Lendle was impressed by this prose: 'Man spürt dem Bericht Xenophons die Spannung an, mit welcher er das eindrucksvolle Manöver beobachtet hat, und muß die Anschaulichkeit seiner Darstellung bewundern'.[45] Again, the story-internal deictic centre is crucial in creating the effect: the adverbial expressions ἤδη ('now') and τάχα δή ('presently') anchor the description in the story-*now* (rather than the narrator's *now*), and the deictic predicates denoting 'appearing' and 'moving closer' (καταφανεῖς ἦσαν, ἐφάνη, ἐγγύτερον ἐγίγνοντο, καταφανεῖς ἐγίγνοντο) make reference to the story-*here*; the imperfect tense in which the description is largely conducted presents events as they gradually unfolded. Movement is also once more of the essence: the details that the narrative provides about the army's appearance become ever more fine-grained as it approaches: realistically, attention is first drawn to the flashing bronze and horsemen with white cuirasses (both visible from afar), before different types of shield and other equipment can be discerned; the enemy's unexpected silence only becomes apparent when they come into hearing distance. A particularly deft touch is that, when the army gets too close to take in as a whole, the information is divided over increasingly brief anaphoric clauses (ἐχόμενοι δὲ … ἐχόμενοι δὲ … and then ἄλλοι δ' … ἄλλοι …): the clausal division conveys the impression that the scene is scanned by an observer who ever more quickly has to move her eyes and head from left to right in an effort to take it all in.

In addition, there are several subjective elements in the description, which encourage readers to imagine the scene from the point of view of Cyrus' soldiers. Thus points of which the soldiers cannot be sure are marked with the expression 'it was said' (ἐλέγετο, ἐλέγοντο): one can imagine some of them saying to each other, 'Is that Tissaphernes, do you think? Are those really Egyptians?' Xenophon's repurposing of the common historiographical λέγεται-statements shows just how far removed this passage is from the ostensible function of battle arrays to give the precise disposition of troops. Other subjective elements include the designation of the Persian army as 'the enemies' (οἱ πολέμιοι), the negations 'not yet' (οὔπω) in 'they were not yet in sight' and 'not' (οὐ) in 'not with shouting', which deny the soldiers' nervous expectations ('they should have been here already', 'didn't Cyrus say they would be shouting?'), and the remark about the scythe-bearing chariots ('the intention was that they should drive into the ranks of the Greeks'), which can be interpreted as a form of free indirect discourse, representing an apprehensive rumour passing through the ranks: 'They intend …'. At the same time, however, the designation 'of the Greeks (τῶν Ἑλλήνων)' in that phrase is suggestive of an outside narratorial perspective;[46] the brief flashback to Cyrus' earlier remark about Artaxerxes' troops shouting (which revolves around a generalizing Greeks/barbarians contrast) is also indicative of a gradual let-up of the immersive flow towards the end of the description.

For some readers, the imaginative immersive (embodied, quasi-perceptual) experience afforded by the array may be complemented by associations of a different, intertextual kind (located in the outer circles of Caracciolo's 'experiential background'): the description taps into Homeric imagery. Xenophon's comparison of the dust stirred up by Artaxerxes' army to a white cloud and then 'a certain blackness' (μελανία – a striking abstract noun, occurring here for the first time in extant Greek literature) may recall Homeric comparisons of troops to clouds and of their advance to storms.[47] A specific inspiration may have been the scene in which Achaean troops around the two Ajaxes moving into battle are compared to 'a cloud' (νέφος) seen by a shepherd, 'as it comes down over the face of the deep before the blast of the West Wind, and to him, being far off, it seems blacker (μελάντερον) than pitch as it passes over the face of the deep, and it drives a huge storm' (4.276–8).[48] Xenophon continues the image of the gathering storm by comparing the gleaming of the bronze weapons to lightning with the verb ἤστραπτε (the basic sense of ἀστράπτει is 'it lightens'). That comparison is itself again Iliadic (e.g. 11.65–6: 'all in bronze Hector flashed (χαλκῷ λάμφ') / like the lightning (ὥς τε στεροπὴ) of father Zeus'). Finally, the unexpected silence with which Artaxerxes' troops advance is reminiscent of two Homeric scenes in which the Greeks come out in silence. The Achaean advance across the Trojan Plain at the start of Book 3 (3.8: οἳ δ' ἄρ' ἴσαν σιγῇ, 'they came on in silence') is particularly close, as it also contains a comparison between the 'dense dust cloud rising up from beneath their feet as they went' (13–14: τῶν ὑπὸ ποσσὶ κονίσαλος ὄρνυτ' ἀελλὴς / ἐρχομένων) to a dark 'mist' (10: ὀμίχλην) over the peak of a mountain (though in the *Iliad* the dust cloud is a result of the Achaeans moving quickly, whereas the Persians in Xenophon advance slowly – perhaps a poignant rather than casual difference).[49]

It is difficult to assess whether, in the reading experience, there is necessarily a tension between immersion and intertextuality, in that the former encourages readers to be absorbed by the story and to 'go with the flow', while the latter invites forms of intellectual reflection which distances readers from the storyworld.[50] In my view, much depends on our answers to the questions how easily Homeric imagery came to ancient readers (probably quite easily to most, given Homer's dominant position in Greek culture) and how specific the intertextual references were thought to be by them. For some readers, who pick up on the general Homeric 'mood' of the passage, the imagery may actually *enhance* the immersive experience (with the grandeur and excitement of Homeric epic feeding into how one imagines the present scene), but for readers who actively ponder the implications of possibly specific intertextual references (such as the contrast between the slow Persians and the quick Achaeans) the immersive spell may be somewhat diminished. Still, I would argue that the most remarkable feature of Xenophon's style in the array remains its strongly immersive quality. It is interesting in this respect to return to Plutarch's comment on Xenophon's *enargeia*, cited in the previous section. In Plutarch's view, *enargeia* has a visual component, but also a temporal one (because it is as if events are not 'concluded' [γεγενημένοις], but 'going on' [γινομένοις]) and a spatial one (because Xenophon 'sets' readers 'near to the

events' [τοῖς πράγμασιν … ἐφιστάντος]), and finally an emotional one (as Xenophon allows them to 'share' the dangers of the soldiers). This is, I think, quite a precise description of the effect of Xenophon's handling of the opening of the Cunaxa scene and the Persian army's array. To a much greater extent than Diodorus, Xenophon elicits from readers a sense of 'what it is like' to be about to confront the enemy in battle, in sensory and emotional terms. Xenophon is even prepared to sacrifice the provision of factual information (naming Cunaxa, identifying commanders and troops with certainty) in order to do so. The next step in the story will allow us to elaborate on the effects of Diodorus' 'distant' and Xenophon's 'near' account further.

V. The Greek Charge

Xenophon's narrative ramps up the tension by postponing the start of the battle, inserting a dialogue about tactics between Cyrus and the Spartan commander Clearchus (1.8.12–13), which seems to imply that Clearchus made a mistake choosing the relatively safe right wing close to the river but far away from Cyrus,[51] and an encounter between Cyrus and Xenophon (the character in the story), who gives him the watchword 'Zeus the Saviour and Victory' (1.8.14–17), raising hopes that will soon be dashed; Xenophon reminds us (1.8.14) that all of this is supposed to take place *while* the enemy steadily keeps advancing. Then the Greeks charge and Xenophon's narrative runs parallel to Diodorus' once more, who passes from the array to the fighting without further ado. Here are both scenes:

> When the armies were about three stades apart, the Greeks struck up the paean and at first advanced at a slow pace, but as soon as they were within range of missiles they began to run at great speed. Clearchus the Lacedaemonian had given orders for them to do this, for by not running from a great distance he had in mind to keep the fighters fresh in body for the fray, while if they advanced on the run when at close quarters, this, it was thought, would cause the missiles shot by bows and other means to fly over their heads. When the troops with Cyrus approached the King's army, such a multitude of missiles was hurled upon them as one can expect to be discharged from a host of four hundred thousand. Nevertheless, they fought just a short time with javelins and then for the remainder of the battle closed hand to hand (ἐκ χειρὸς ἤδη τὴν μάχην συνίσταντο). The Lacedaemonians and the rest of the mercenaries at the very first contact struck terror (ἐξέπληξαν) into the opposing barbarians both by the splendour of their arms and by the skill they displayed (τῇ τε τῶν ὅπλων λαμπρότητι καὶ ταῖς εὐχειρίαις). For the barbarians were protected by small shields and their divisions were for the most part equipped with light arms; and, furthermore, they were without trial in the perils of war, whereas the Greeks had been in constant battle by reason of the length of the Peloponnesian War and were far superior in experience. Consequently they

> straightway put their opponents to flight, pushed after them in pursuit, and slew many of the barbarians (καὶ πολλοὺς τῶν βαρβάρων ἀνῄρουν).
>
> (Diod. Sic. 23.1–5)

> At length the opposing lines were not three or four stadia apart, and then the Greeks struck up the paean and began to advance against the enemy. And when, as they proceeded, a part of the phalanx billowed out (ἐξεκύμαινέ τι τῆς φάλαγγος), those who were left behind began to run; at the same moment they all set up the sort of war-cry which they raise to Enyalius, and then they were all running (καὶ πάντες δὲ ἔθεον). It is also reported that some of them clashed their shields against their spears, thereby frightening the enemy's horses. And before an arrow reached (ἐξικνεῖσθαι) them, the barbarians broke and fled (ἐγκλίνουσιν οἱ βάρβαροι καὶ φεύγουσι). And then (ἐνταῦθα δὴ) the Greeks pursued with all their might, but shouted meanwhile to one another not to run at a headlong pace, but to keep their ranks in the pursuit.
>
> (Xen. *An.* 1.8.17–19)

The accounts are not incompatible, except in so far as Xenophon suggests that it never came to a fight, because 'the barbarians broke and fled', while Diodorus claims that there were close-range altercations 'from hand to hand' and that during the pursuit the Greeks 'slew many of the barbarians'. It is questionable how much this matters: it is precisely when it comes to actual confrontations that Greek historians tend to resort to formulas and simple concepts ('rout', 'pursuit', 'killing of enemies', etc.),[52] a point to which I will return in the next section. Clearly, they are more interested in the maintenance or loss of discipline (the Greek words are τάξις and ἀταξία), which they generally identify as a major reason why one army gained the upper hand over another, and so they tend to focus more on the initial manoeuvring and the impression it makes than on the actual fighting.[53] In both passages, the disciplined Greeks strike terror into their opponents, who for that reason lose their nerve and break ranks.

Yet the two passages make for very different reading experiences. Diodorus, for whom the Greek charge is testimony to Clearchus' tactical insight and to Greek superiority over non-Greek forces, coolly evaluates the performance of both armies. At each turn, he interrupts the narrative proper to offer reasons for why the armies acted as they did. First, the Greeks all break into a run at exactly the right moment, predetermined by Clearchus to avoid the Persian arrows, as we are told in a brief but complex analepsis detailing his reasoning; the reverse order of execution/plan somehow makes it seem inevitable that the stratagem should work exactly as envisaged. Next, when the Greeks reach the opposing line, they apparently at once 'struck terror' (ἐξέπληξαν) into all their opponents. The reasons for the Persian 'terror' are given in considerable detail – the Greeks had better weapons, greater skill, and more experience – but none of those details make the 'terror' readily imaginable (or felt) to readers: that would involve a more close-up rendition of what exactly it means for a Spartan hoplite to use his superior weapons, skill, and experience on a hapless, light-armed Persian. All in all, Diodorus' version belongs

to a kind of battle narrative in which masses of warriors 'tend to behave like robot soldiers all performing the same martial deed at once', and all display exactly the same emotions (or indeed a lack of emotions) in distressing situations and, at least if they are winning, are disposed of by their commander as he sees fit.[54]

Xenophon's much shorter narrative is, once again, very different. Although the scene is not as consistently told from an embedded, story-internal vantage point as the battle array, it does closely follow the Greek charge as it unfolds in real time, and conveys something of what it is like to be involved in such an action.[55] Whereas for Diodorus discipline results from obeying orders, for Xenophon it is a hard-won achievement, the result of multiple people coordinating their intentions and movements in a situation that inherently promotes disintegration; Xenophon's soldiers have a will of their own. In his hands, the fact that the Greeks break into a run has nothing to do with a premeditated plan to avoid the Persians' arrows, but comes about spontaneously when the line is about to break and those lagging behind have to increase their speed to stay in formation: 'and then, everyone was running'.[56] He uses the striking image of a billowing wave to convey to readers unfamiliar with battle lines how fluid and changeable they can be. At the same time, the image recalls Iliadic similes comparing warriors attacking opponents to waves cresting and then crashing onto the shore – Xenophon's point is that the Greek attack almost 'crashed' too early.[57]

Although, in contrast to Diodorus, Xenophon does not explicitly *name* any emotion, the whole scene is suffused with emotion. Indeed, I should like to suggest that the scene only coheres *as* an emotional experience, which the reader must at least in part undergo (rather than merely think about) in order to fully grasp the collective behaviour of this group of soldiers. Readers may never have been in a *phalanx*, but they will nearly all have been in situations requiring coordinated action to achieve high-stake goals. They can relate, in an experiential way, to the odd mix of nervousness, elation, and competitiveness which makes it difficult for some people to control themselves in such situations. They are also familiar with how emotions are contagious and how, once a few people of a cohesive group start doing something, soon everybody does that same thing, seemingly spontaneously and without anyone being able to do anything about it: 'and then they were all running' – indeed.

Whereas Diodorus offers an 'eye of command' view of the Greek charge, explaining that it was a premeditated plan of Clearchus, Xenophon delivers a 'face of battle' narrative of that same charge, which passes on something of the emotions felt by the soldiers to the reader. It is important to emphasize, however, that Xenophon does not offer such a highly experiential narrative just for its own sake. In fact, it helps explain what is probably the biggest tactical blunder during the entire battle, namely the decision of the Greeks to pursue the Persians instead of turning round and assisting Cyrus.[58] In Xenophon's narrative, it is not so much a decision taken deliberately as a result of the elation and euphoria which the Greeks feel when their charge succeeds and the Persians at once give way: the narrative presents the whole action as a single sweeping movement, with the pursuit as the natural climax (note ἐνταῦθα δή).[59] It may still be a mistake, but readers who have

imaginatively been running along with the Greeks may at least find it a mistake that it was easy to make.

VI. Killing Cyrus

Different though they are, Diodorus and Xenophon both write about the Greek charge in terms of a collective experience: they do not single out individual soldiers. Furthermore, they describe the actual fighting, to the extent that there was any, in very general terms. Things change in the next step of the story, when they 'zoom in' on the duel between Cyrus and Artaxerxes in the middle of the battle-line and relate Cyrus' death. Since Plutarch includes two stories about Cyrus' death in the *Life of Artaxerxes* (10–11), attributing them to Dinon and Ctesias, we have no fewer than four versions. The many substantial contradictions between them have been expertly studied by Bassett, and relegated to competing traditions, emerging from the Persian court and the pro-Cyrus camp.[60] In this section, I will not replay Bassett's arguments, but focus only on the question of how Xenophon, Diodorus, and Ctesias (I will leave Dinon to one side) deal with the portrayal of violence in their descriptions of the duel. In particular, I wish to suggest that although alternation between wide shots from a 'high camera' and close-up shots from a 'low camera' was bequeathed to Greek historiography by Homer,[61] Greek historians display a certain reluctance to include the sort of vignettes of close-up violence that are so prominent in the *Iliad*.

It is once again convenient to start with Diodorus, who offers the most distant view of the duel:

> In the centre of the lines, it so happened (ἔτυχε), were stationed both the men who were contending for the kingship. Consequently, becoming aware of this fact, they made at each other, being eagerly desirous of deciding the issue of the battle by their own hands; for Fortune (ἡ τύχη), it appears (ὡς ἔοικεν), brought the rivalry of the brothers over the throne to culmination in a duel as if in imitation of that ancient rash combat of Eteocles and Polyneices so celebrated in tragedy (εἰς ἀπομίμημα τῆς παλαιᾶς ἐκείνης καὶ τραγῳδουμένης τῆς περὶ τὸν Ἐτεοκλέα καὶ Πολυνείκην τόλμης). Cyrus was the first to hurl his javelin from a distance, and striking the King, brought him to the ground (ἔσφηλεν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν); but the King's attendants speedily snatched him away and carried him out of the battle.
>
> (Diod. Sic. 14.23.5–6)

Diodorus is at pains to assimilate the duel to ordinary Greek cultural frames of reference in two respects. Firstly, Greek generals did not usually fight in the front ranks, so Diodorus feels that the fact that the two brothers meet each other in battle at all requires explanation: he suggests that τύχη ('chance' or 'fate') had a hand in it.[62] Secondly, to convey to his readers what is at stake, Diodorus compares the duel to that between Eteocles and Polyneices as represented in tragedies – most famously, for us, in Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes*, which contains a (restrained)

rendition of the duel in a messenger speech (792–821).[63] However, it appears that the description of such a tragic duel itself offends Diodorus' historiographical sensibilities: all we are told is that Cyrus threw his javelin ('from a distance' – Diodorus maintains a fairly wide vantage point) and 'brought the King to the ground', an almost euphemistic designation of the wound that Artaxerxes sustains. The reader is encouraged to think about the high stakes and the shocking idea of fratricide but not to vividly 'see' the unseemly duel in the mind's eye.

We can discern a similar reluctance in *Anabasis*. Xenophon certainly sets up the scene in a tragic way, including a clear *peripeteia*:[64] Cyrus is elated by the successful Greek charge and is already receiving *proskunēsis* as King from his attendants (1.8.21), but the consequence is that he becomes overconfident and seeks out his brother with only a small contingent of cavalry:

> While attended by these only, he caught sight of the King and the compact body around him; and on the instant he lost control of himself and, with the cry "I see the man", rushed upon him and struck him in the breast and wounded him through his breastplate (διὰ τοῦ θώρακος) – as Ctesias the physician says, adding also that he himself healed the wound. While Cyrus was delivering his stroke, however, someone hit him a hard blow under the eye with a javelin (ἀκοντίζει τις παλτῷ ὑπὸ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν βιαίως); and then followed a struggle between the King and Cyrus and the attendants who supported each of them. The number that fell on the King's side is stated by Ctesias, who was with him; on the other side, Cyrus himself was killed (Κῦρος δὲ αὐτός τε ἀπέθανε) and eight of the noblest of his attendants lay dead upon him.
>
> (Xen. *An*. 1.8.26–7)

Xenophon does zoom in on the duel, drawing attention to two moves in particular: Cyrus' wounding of the King 'through his breastplate', and the anonymous Persian's wounding of Cyrus 'under the eye with a javelin'. Such a focus on the vulnerable bodies of individual combatants is, of course, a staple of Homeric epic battle narratives, but it is very unusual in Greek historiography.[65] I suggest that Xenophon deliberately continues the Homeric flavour of the first part of his narrative and that he here elevates the duel – briefly and delicately – to a Homeric level, encouraging the audience to see Cyrus' death as heroic.[66] But it is important that Xenophon confines himself to a few Homeric touches and does not amplify the scene to a full-blown epic combat scene. At two crucial points, he withdraws, referring to Ctesias for (gory) details about Artaxerxes' wound, and eventually describing Cyrus' death using the most general verb possible: 'he died' (ἀπέθανε). Plutarch (*Vit. Artax.* 9.4) indeed states that Xenophon narrates Cyrus' death 'only simply and briefly, because he himself was not present' (ἁπλῶς καὶ συντόμως, ἅτε δὴ μὴ παρὼν αὐτός); Plutarch will have inferred Xenophon's absence from the references to Ctesias (why would Xenophon need those if he had seen it all himself?), but his comment also suggests that the narrative is lacking the eyewitness 'feel', brought about by *enargeia*, which characterizes so much of the rest of Xenophon's account.[67]

The full intent of both Plutarch's comment and Xenophon's references to Ctesias becomes clear only when we consider Ctesias' own version. Even in the abbreviated form in which Plutarch renders Ctesias' account from the *Persica*, it is too long to cite in its entirety, so I will confine myself to the 'highlights':

> But the narrative of Ctesias, to give it in a much abbreviated form, is something as follows. … But the turban of Cyrus fell from his head, and a young Persian, Mithridates by name, running to his side, smote him with his spear in the temple, near the eye, not knowing who he was. Much blood gushed from the wound, and Cyrus, stunned and giddy, fell to the ground. His horse escaped and wandered about the field, but the horse's saddle-cloth, which had slipped off, was captured by the attendant of the man who had struck Cyrus, and it was soaked with blood. Then, as Cyrus was slowly and with difficulty recovering from the blow, a few eunuchs who were at hand tried to put him upon another horse and bring him to a place of safety. … The vein in the ham of Cyrus was ruptured and he fell, and at the same time struck his wounded temple against a stone, and so died. Such is the story of Ctesias, in which, as with a blunt sword, he is long in killing Cyrus, but kills him at last.
>
> (Plut. *Vit. Artax.* 11.1–6 = Ctesias F20 Lenfant)

Ctesias' description of Cyrus' drawn-out death scene is highly detailed and embodied, with a strong focus on the prince's body and disoriented movements. It has been argued that the description of the effects of Cyrus' trauma to the temple matches the clinical signs listed in modern medical studies of such injuries, and that this increases the likelihood that his account is correct.[68] However that may be, Plutarch's cutting remark, that it is as if Ctesias has killed off Cyrus 'with a blunt sword', suggests that ancient readers may have been less concerned with the question whether an account is true than with the question whether the truth always needs to be told. Plutarch's remark about Xenophon's 'simple and brief' account is now revealed to be a comment on that historian's good taste, which is to be contrasted with Ctesias' overblown and unseemly narrative; in my view, Xenophon's own references to Ctesias may already have been intended to alert the reader to the contrasting tones of both narratives. To be sure, Ctesias writes in a style which can be called 'vivid' (*enargēs*), but according to Plutarch his close-up and graphic account does not lend Cyrus' death an epic or tragic dignity.[69] When *enargeia* is applied at the wrong moment, it does not draw the reader in, but puts her off, producing an account that is at best long-winded and at worst repellent.

Plutarch taps into a familiar debate in ancient criticism on the question whether there should be limits on the vivid evocation of violence in historiography.[70] In the most famous passage pertaining to that debate, Polybius (2.56.6–9) takes Phylarchus to task for vividly 'bringing horrors to the eyes' (πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τιθέναι τὰ δεινά), when he introduces, in his description of the sack of Mantinea, 'clinging women, with their hair dishevelled and their breasts bare, or crowds of men and women together with their children and aged parents weeping and lamenting as they are led away to slavery': Phylarchus may have been eager to rouse readers

'to pity' (εἰς ἔλεον) and to 'engage their emotions' (συμπαθεῖς ποιεῖν), but all he succeeded in doing is to produce something 'undignified and sentimental' (ἀγεννὲς καὶ γυναικῶδες). Polybius goes on largely to frame his criticism of *enargeia* in terms of Phylarchus' confusion between historiography and tragedy and between fact and fiction.[71] However, there is clearly an ethical dimension to the question, too, which may be suspected to have its ultimate origins in the civic ideology of the fifth-century BCE *polis*, which tended to project a relatively 'clean' and positive image of military *kleos*, while downplaying war's traumatic and gory aspects.[72] While more research is required here, it seems clear that it was deemed unseemly to go too 'near' to the suffering of individual soldiers.

VII. Overall Structure

According to Lendon, there is one stand-out difference between ancient and modern 'battle pieces'. Modern narratives, as Lendon states, are almost invariably conceived of backwards: using their knowledge of the outcome, historians reconstruct a logical chain of events from the result back to the supposedly decisive charges, dispositions, and plans that are thought to explain that outcome. Actual narratives of battle are, therefore, characterized by a strong teleological thrust and by the excision of all material (such as troops, actions, and features of the terrain) which upon reflection turned out to be irrelevant to establishing the logical chain. Ancient battle narratives, by contrast, are according to Lendon typically characterized by the fact that even though they are written with hindsight, 'the modern logical chain is lacking, or attenuated; the elements that make up the account are present for their own purposes and do not drive, or discipline, each other'.[73] Battle arrays are a pointed example, in that contingents are usually described only there and play no role in the subsequent action: 'There is a real sense that an array in an ancient battle description is an independent work of art, a passage of prose to be admired for itself, not to be put to work later'.[74] Diodorus' description is no exception: in the subsequent narrative, nothing is made, for example, of the distinction between infantry and cavalry or of the ten thousand 'choicest troops' with Cyrus. And if readers expect that Artaxerxes' 'scythe-bearing chariots' are like Chekhov's gun and will 'go off' in the subsequent narrative, they are mistaken: Diodorus never mentions them again. In Xenophon's account, they do briefly reappear after the array (1.8.20), though only to make clear just how ineffective they were.

For Lendon, the lack of a clear 'logical chain' in typical ancient battle narratives is a shortcoming, indicating how ancient historians sacrifice historical analysis to local rhetorical effects.[75] However, while there is something to this, other ways of interpreting the phenomenon are also possible. In general, modern battle narratives evince a confidence in the feasibility of reconstructing what 'really' happened and of deciding what manoeuvres and actions were 'decisive' that many have found to be too optimistic.[76] It has even been asked whether the structure that modern narratives tend to ascribe to battles is not really the structure of narrative itself.[77] The very act of framing battle as a story is to imbue it with a plot and is to imply that – like any good story – it can be described in terms of a trajectory of causally and

temporally linked events, with a clear beginning ('the first shot rang out') and end ('the cannons fell silent'), and that it offers the promise of a satisfactory resolution in the shape of hopes fulfilled (in the case of the victors) or dashed (in the case of the defeated). It is not too fanciful to suppose that at least some ancient historiographers and their audiences were less optimistic than their modern counterparts that battles, as objects of historical knowledge, could be understood in such terms.[78] Ironical interpretations of mismatches between, for example, battle arrays and the subsequent narrative cannot always be excluded. Readers may, for example, be intended to note that for all that Artaxerxes stationed scythed chariots along the front of his phalanx, Cyrus nonetheless managed to get to him.

Diodorus certainly projects an image of Cunaxa which suggests that a battle can perhaps be locally controlled (for instance, by Clearchus during the initial Greek charge), but also that its overall outcome is in the end highly uncertain: as we have seen, he attributes the central incident of Cunaxa, the death of Cyrus, to chance or fate (τύχη), following one common Greek strategy of explaining battle.[79] This image is reinforced by a loose narrative structure: Diodorus describes the actions of each part of Cyrus' army, but without establishing clear causal or temporal connections between them. He first focuses on Cyrus' right flank and the attack of the Greek contingent under Clearchus (14.23.1–4). Next, he turns his attention to the centre, where Cyrus first duels with Artaxerxes, and then is mortally wounded in the melee; after Cyrus' death, the King's troops gain the upper hand 'and in the end (καὶ τέλος), by virtue of numbers and daring, wore down their opponents' (14.23.7). Finally, Diodorus' focus shifts to the left wing under Aridaeus, which at first withstands the enemy, but then yields, before Clearchus comes to the rescue: 'The troops of Clearchus, when they had slain great numbers of the barbarians, since it was already night, returned to the battlefield and set up a trophy, and about the second watch got safe to their camp. Such was the outcome (τοιοῦτον τέλος) of the battle' (14.24.4–5). The spatially, rather than temporally, ordered narrative vitiates any strong sense of the battle as a coherent sequence of events forming a logical chain of cause and effect and as a story with a beginning, middle, and end. Thus it is only Clearchus' sudden presence on Aridaeus' flank in the third part (14.24.1) that makes it clear that the account has progressed temporally as well as spatially.[80] Furthermore, the narrative appears to come to an end not once but twice: Diodorus inserts a closing formula using the word τέλος after both the second and the third parts. Those who are bothered by such seeming incoherence would perhaps do well to note that actual battles also do not have clear endings or clearly end for everyone at the same time.[81]

Xenophon's Cunaxa narrative adopts a different strategy, but likewise gives short shrift to the idea that an 'objective' logical chain of decisive charges and manoeuvres decides battles. In contrast to Diodorus' account, that of Xenophon does display a fairly neat narrative arc, but it is tied together by Cyrus' perceptions and emotions.[82] We have seen how Xenophon first described the Greek charge and unwise pursuit in terms of an escalation of confidence. He connects this part to the second phase of the battle by stating explicitly that Cyrus 'saw that the Greeks were victorious over the division opposite them and were in pursuit' (1.8.21: ὁρῶν τοὺς Ἕλληνας νικῶντας τὸ καθ' αὑτοὺς καὶ διώκοντας). Emotions are contagious,

and Cyrus is doomed to repeat the Greeks' mistake: to be sure, although he was 'delighted' (1.8.21: ἡδόμενος) with the Greeks' success, at first he waited, but when he 'feared' (1.8.24: δείσας) that the King would get behind the Greeks and cut them to pieces, he charged. And as soon as he 'catches sight' (1.8.26: καθορᾷ) of Artaxerxes, he 'at once lost control of himself and, with the cry "I see the man", rushed upon him' (εὐθὺς οὐκ ἠνέσχετο, ἀλλ᾽ εἰπὼν τὸν ἄνδρα ὁρῶ ἴετο ἐπ᾽ αὐτόν). The suspenseful narrative arc is concluded with Cyrus' death, and the story effectively comes to an end there and then: Xenophon inserts a long obituary of the Persian prince (1.9); when he picks up the story of Ariaeus and the left flank (1.10.1), the narrative texture changes significantly, emphasizing the Greeks' uncertainty about the intentions and whereabouts of the Persians and so setting up the narrative of Book 2 and the start of Book 3. The drift of the entire account suggests that, rather than technical, numerical, or strategic factors, morale and emotions (in particular the ability to exercise self-control even in the heat of battle) are what matters.

VIII. Conclusion: How Far, How Close?

In this chapter, I have used the concept of 'historical distance' and its four dimensions (form, affect, ideology, and understanding) to explore how the various accounts of the Battle of Cunaxa guide readers to *imagine*, *feel*, *judge*, and *understand* what happened in certain ways. While I have presented only one case study, some conclusions which we may draw are perhaps valid for battle narratives in Greek historiography as a whole. On the one hand, we have seen that there is considerable variation between the different versions, with Xenophon offering an account that is in many ways less 'distant' than that of Diodorus. On the other hand, there appears to be a certain 'bandwidth' of distance *within* which Greek historians operate. For all that Xenophon at times offers an immersive narrative, Plutarch's claim that Xenophon does so 'all the time' (ἀεί) is rhetorical hyperbole: we are still quite far removed from, say, Stendhal's narrative of Waterloo in *The Charterhouse of Parma* (1839) or the battle narratives found in Tolstoy's *War and Peace* (1869), in which narrative cohesion is really taken to breaking point, not least owing to the relentless and uninterrupted adoption of the limited perspective of the protagonists, whose disorienting experiences are mirrored in the narrative.[83] Furthermore, with the controversial exception of Ctesias, none of the authors deemed it appropriate to try to elicit strongly imaginative and viscerally emotional responses describing deaths in battle. At the other end of the spectrum, we can note that for all the distancing devices in Diodorus' account, he never goes so far as to suggest that the Battle of Cunaxa can be fully understood with the benefit of hindsight, for example, preferring an explanation in terms of 'chance' or 'fate'. Further research will hopefully refine our understanding of the 'regime(s) of distance' which operate in Greek battle narratives.[84]

Abbreviations

Abbreviations of ancient authors and texts, as well as scholarly reference works, generally follow those of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, fourth edition;

abbreviations of journal titles follow those of *L'Année Philologique*. Exceptions are listed below.

CGCG = Emde Boas, E. van, A. Rijksbaron, L. Huitink & M. de Bakker (2019) *The Cambridge Grammar of Classical Greek*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Notes

1 Waterfield (2006: 1), an engaging modern evocation of the battle containing this sort of detail, which ancient accounts lack (even though it is not easy precisely to pin down why phrases such as the 'dusty plain' and 'the sun of a long summer' have a distinctly modern ring to them). For the problematic chronology (the battle may have taken place in August, September, or even November), see Wylie (1992: 122–3); Brennan (2021). Thomas (2021) offers a brief tactical and strategic analysis.
2 Bigwood (1983). For a conflicting opinion on Diodorus' sources, see Westlake (1987).
3 Plutarch also tells us briefly about yet another version, that of the fourth-century BCE historian Dinon of Colophon. Phot. *Bibl.* cod. 72, 43b34–9 = Ctesias F16.64 Lenfant is another, very brief, summary of Ctesias' account.
4 Thomas (2021: 359); cf. Bigwood (1983); Westlake (1987); Wylie (1992); Tuplin (2011: 467–80); Rop (2019: 30–63).
5 Rop (2019: 30). For a sobering discussion of the (im)possibility of reconstructing ancient battles at all, see Whatley (1964).
6 Collingwood (1994 – first published in 1946).
7 Phillips (2004: 124): 'temporal distance is a defining condition of all forms of historical representation'.
8 Collingwood (1994: 213–5).
9 Grethlein (2013: quotation from 15).
10 Allan (2018; 2020), basing himself on Ryan (2001).
11 For good accounts of *enargeia* as a rhetorical concept, see Webb (2009: 87–106; 2016). For its relation to *experience*, see Grethlein (2013: 16–19), and for its relation to *immersion*, Allan, De Jong & De Jonge (2017). Grethlein & Huitink (2017: 85–8) and Huitink (2018; 2020) offer accounts of *enargeia* in terms of embodied, enactivist theories of cognition.
12 For *enargeia*'s importance to historiography, see Walker (1993); Hau (2020); Feldherr (2021). In addition, on *enargeia* in the Athenian lawcourt and its role in mediating ideas of justice, see Westwood's chapter (this volume).
13 See Phillips (2004; 2013). Den Hollander, Paul & Peters (2011), the introduction to a theme issue of *History and Theory* on 'Historical Distance', is also useful. For an appraisal of Collingwood's understanding of the historical imagination in relation to distance and proximity, see Taylor (2004).
14 Phillips (2013: 6).
15 See Phillips (2004: 134; 2013: 6–7).
16 Phillips (2004: 128).
17 Cited from Runia (1995: 28).
18 Roberts (2015: 764).
19 A wide-ranging study of varying literary representations of war is McLoughlin (2014).
20 Keegan (1976: 18).
21 Faust (2011: 8), recalling the clerk from Herbert Asquith's famous World War I poem, *The Volunteer*.
22 Baudrillard (2006: 85).
23 See the magisterial study of Lendon (2017), with ample bibliography. A particularly important influence is Woodman (1988), who controversially argues for a decisive

influence of rhetoric on ancient historiography to the detriment of its veridicality, presenting battle narrative as a case in point (18–23). To Lendon's bibliography, add Hau's (2014) chapter on 'stock situations' and *topoi* in Greek historiography, many of which pertain to military campaigns.

24 Lendon (2017: 41).
25 Thomas (2021: 359).
26 Westlake (1987: 245, n. 14). See also Bigwood (1983: 353).
27 Mossman (2010: 151–3). I disagree with the thesis of Soares (2007) that Plutarch's account is marked by a high degree of *enargeia*: Plutarch invites constant critical reflection, which seems to a large extent incompatible with 'drawing in' the reader.
28 See especially Kagan (2006), contrasting Ammianus Marcellinus' (near) 'face of battle' approach to war narrative with Caesar's (distant) 'eye of command' approach. Pelling's (2013) contrastive analysis of Xenophon and Caesar in part revolves around a similar distinction. Some of the textual strategies in ancient war narratives explored in Van Gils, De Jong & Kroon (2018) can also be categorized as 'distant' or 'near/immersive'.
29 Translations throughout follow those of the *Loeb Classical Library* (Brownson & Dillery (1995) for Xenophon, Oldfather (1954) for Diodorus, and Perrin (1926) for Plutarch), with modifications (considerable ones in the case of the present passage).
30 Lubbock (1921) is particularly influential.
31 See Huitink (2019: 209–10; 2020: 189). Though absent from Allan, De Jong & De Jonge's (2017) study of the relationship between *enargeia* and Ryan's (2001: 120–62) concept of immersion, no other ancient definition of *enargeia* is as close to Ryan's explication of immersion: it, too, has spatial, temporal, and emotional components and at times heavily relies on character focalization. See further the end of the next section.
32 Huitink (2019: 213). Plutarch is correct: the name Cunaxa does not occur in *Anabasis*. Plutarch probably found it in Ctesias, who after all was a member of the Persian court.
33 Especially useful introductions are Caracciolo (2014: 45–71) and Stockwell (2020: 1–11). See Cave (2016) for a sweeping and engaging introduction to the cognitively inflected study of literature.
34 Iser (1978).
35 Caracciolo (2014: 56–63). Cf. Stockwell (2020: 10), suggesting that readers integrate sensory, neurological, aesthetic, social, and cultural experiences and knowledge in engaging with literature to arrive 'at a sense and feeling of the text that is personally acceptable'.
36 See Caracciolo (2014: 61–2).
37 In the end, responses are the product of an interaction between textual features and the experiential history of individual readers. That does not mean, however, that cognitively inflected criticism is pointless because it is all simply too subjective. No literary theory can wholly avoid positing a 'model' reader (and it is not absurd to look for common denominators when talking about the cognitive abilities of healthy human adults), and even theories which ostensibly focus on objective features of the text (like narratology) are on closer inspection informed by implicit views of how and why people read. It is one of the strengths of cognitive criticism to make such views explicit and to accommodate socio-culturally specific circumstances of recipients.
38 Lendon (2017: 58–62).
39 One may compare and contrast the (epic) ecphrastic technique of following an object as it is being made, as happens most famously in the case of the shield of Achilles in Hom. *Il.* 18.468–613; cf. Koopman (2018: 74–8).
40 The term 'right' requires a viewpoint vis-à-vis which something is right; while there are no contextual clues about whose viewpoint readers are to supply, in ancient historiography the 'left' and 'right' wings are conventionally charted from the point of view of the described army as it faces forward; see Van Gils (2018: 263). It is, therefore, all the

more remarkable that Diodorus abandons the usual system of reference with 'the other wing' (instead of 'the left wing').

41 That 'technical ring', which goes some way to representing battle as 'a set of rules and a system of procedures' (to recall Keegan's formulation), in fact dates from the time of Xenophon in the fourth century BCE, when a growing professionalization and specialization of warfare (not least because of the increasing role played by mercenary armies, of which the Greeks who fought at Cunaxa are of course a prime example) went hand in hand with the development of technical ways of talking and writing about war. To give just one revealing indication of this development: although the beginning of the hoplite *phalanx* is dated to the start of the eighth century BCE, the word φάλαγξ in the apposite sense is not used by either Herodotus or Thucydides, but is first found in Xenophon (who uses it very frequently) and the tactical manual of Aeneas Tacticus (29.9). Although Thucydides describes the formation in detail (5.71), he eschews the word. See further Echeverría (2012) and Huitink & Rood (2019: 32, 137).

42 Cf. Huitink & Rood (2019: 38). This paragraph combines insights from Allan's (2018: 133–5; 2020: 18–20) treatment of 'immersion' (especially the internal deictic centre) with insights gained from 'enactivist' approaches to the readerly imagination (emphasizing the importance of movement and the judicious selection of details) by Caracciolo (2014: 93–109) and Troscianko (2014: 120–59); see Grethlein & Huitink (2017) for an application of the enactivist framework to Homer. In narratological terms, one could speak about 'embedded focalization', for which see De Jong (2014: 50–6). However, embedded focalization is usually associated with specific characters, through whose eyes the reader is invited to 'look'. In the present case, no specific character is mentioned: the reader is 'merely' invited to read the text as if it is tied to the sensory systems of a human observer on the spot.

43 In general, ancient authors are less committed to maintaining a single (embedded) viewpoint throughout than, say, many modern novelists (Hilary Mantel's series of novels about Thomas Cromwell, whose perspective she adopts and never abandons, springs to mind). See also, for instance, the mention of the name 'Pategyas' in the passage just discussed: that looks like a narratorial intervention, because an observer on the spot is perhaps unlikely to recognize the distant rider at once. I will return to this point below and in the Conclusion, and cf. Rood (2017: 275–6). But we should not let that stand in the way of an appreciation of the novelty of Xenophon's handling of traditional motifs: the remarkable thing is that he should even partially turn a battle array into an immersive experience; cf. Huitink (2019: 201–7).

44 For analyses of the passage in these terms, see Buijs (2005: 108); Grethlein (2013: 54–6); Huitink (2019: 211–12).

45 Lendle (1995: 67) ('One senses in Xenophon's report the tension with which he observed the impressive manoeuvre, and one has to admire the graphic vividness of his presentation', my translation).

46 As Tim Rood (p.c.) points out to me; the Greeks themselves would have said 'our ranks', which would have been more naturally represented in reported speech by 'their ranks', if the Greeks' perspective had been maintained.

47 Clouds: cf. e.g. *Il.* 16.66, 23.133; storms: cf. e.g. *Il.* 11.795 (οἳ δ' ἴσαν ἀργαλέων ἀνέμων ἀτάλαντοι ἀέλλῃ, 'they came on like the blast of dire winds'), 13.334. It is typical of Xenophon the historiographer that he should attenuate the poetic force of the simile somewhat by – realistically – comparing the *dust* stirred up by the troops to a cloud.

48 Note also the positing of the shepherd as an embedded observer, in whose direction the storm moves. Also relevant may be 2.455–8, a comparison of the 'dazzling gleam' of the Greeks' bronze weapons to a forest fire, 'of which the glare can be seen from afar' (457: ἔκαθεν δέ τε φαίνεται αὐγή). That is the first of seven similes marking the initial Greek advance. Chris Pelling (p.c.) suggests that their combined effect is very much that of 'picking out things more clearly and recreating the eyewitness effect as the enemy

comes closer', and that they may have been in the back of Xenophon's mind. Thus, in the fourth simile the warriors are compared to 'many tribes' (469: ἔθνεα πολλά) of swarming flies, in the fifth divisions come into play, and in the sixth and seventh an individual commander, Agamemnon, becomes conspicuous and stands out among the many (481: μεταπρέπει; 483: ἐκπρεπέ' ἐν πολλοῖσι).

49 The other scene is the Achaean advance in Book 4, which is likewise marked by silence (4.429: ἀκὴν ἴσαν), and compared (somewhat paradoxically) to wave after wave crashing on the sand 'before the driving of the West Wind' (4.423: Ζεφύρου ὕπο κινήσαντος). I thank Gregory Hutchinson for putting me on the trail of these passages.

50 On the complex relationships between experiential and reflective reader responses, see, e.g., Fearn (2020: 38–9); Grethlein (2020: 146–7).

51 Plutarch (*Vit. Artax.* 8.2–6) includes a long disquisition to that effect. Modern scholars generally agree; cf. Rop (2019: 31).

52 Cf. Hau (2014: 247).

53 See Lendon (2017: 55–6).

54 Lendon (2017: 51). One of Keegan's (1976: 36–9) main objections to standard 'battle pieces' is the focus on leadership and the implied uniformity of emotional responses among the soldiers.

55 The phrase 'before an arrow reached them', with the deictic verb ἐξικνεῖσθαι, implies a Greek perspective. But Xenophon also twice interrupts the narrative flow by inserting present-tense narratorial comments, noting that the Greeks '(always) sing' the war cry to Enyalius and stating that 'it is said' that some soldiers found a way to frighten the horses. Some editors suspect that these comments are later insertions, but they do contribute to the overall vivid mental image combining sights and sounds. Cf. n. 43 above.

56 For the semantic value of the 'immediative' imperfect ἔθεον, which pulls the reader straight into an action in process, see Rijksbaron (2007: 17–18); *CGCG* 33.52.

57 Hom. *Il.* 4.422–9, partly cited in n. 49 above, may again be particularly relevant; cf. also, e.g., 11.304–9, 13.795–801, 15.381–5. Xenophon's verb ἐκκυμαίνω itself is a *hapax* in Classical Greek literature. Pseudo-Demetrius (*Eloc.* 84) comments on the metaphor.

58 Cf. Thomas (2021: 360).

59 The particle δή in this common climactic phrase marks information as evident, understandable, or naturally following from what preceded; see *CGCG* 59.44.

60 Bassett (1999).

61 See Lendon (2017: 50–2).

62 Cf. Green (2010) *ad loc.* Xenophon (*An.* 1.8.22), feeling a similar need for explanation, says that it was a well-established Persian tradition for generals to lead from the centre.

63 For further discussion of the role played by mythological exemplification in fifth-century Athens, see Fearn's chapter in this volume on the reflections that Gorgias' writing prompts on the cultural frameworks that mediate imaginative concept formation (pp. 235–9).

64 See Tuplin (2011: 479). See also the next section.

65 See now Fragoulaki (2021), a contrastive analysis of bloody deaths in Homer and Herodotus.

66 As Grethlein (2013: 58) suggests, Cyrus' wound also has a symbolical function: 'Thus, just as Cyrus' gaze expressed his control, his death is brought about by a missile that destroys his eyesight' – though, strictly speaking, Xenophon does not state that the blow to the eye is fatal.

67 *Pace* Flower (2012: 82), who, after adducing Plutarch's comment on Xenophon's *enargeia*, singles out Cyrus' attack on his brother as 'especially vivid and crisp' and Cyrus' death as 'a powerfully terse description'. As I have argued above, it seems much more likely to me that Plutarch especially had the start of the Cunaxa narrative in view when he praised Xenophon's *enargeia*; terseness and *enargeia* are largely incompatible.

68 Bassett (1999: 483). However, as Bassett herself notes, Ctesias was a doctor, after all, and could easily have observed such a wound elsewhere.
69 Note that Pseudo-Demetrius (*Eloc.* 216) discusses under the heading of *enargeia* a similarly drawn-out scene from Ctesias, in which Cyrus' mother gradually comes to the realization that her son has died (F24 Lenfant). That scene is reminiscent of dialogues at the start of tragic messenger scenes as the passage about Cyrus' death is reminiscent of messenger speeches themselves.
70 See especially D'Huys (1987); he also briefly touches upon Plutarch's verdict of Ctesias (244). For Ctesias' role in this debate and his widely perceived infelicitous attempts to raise his story to a tragic register, see Lenfant (2004: CXXX–CXXXIII).
71 For discussion, see D'Huys (1987: 224–31); Marincola (2003); Grethlein (2013: 246–52); Hau (2020).
72 Cf. Fragoulaki (2021), also noting (112–15) how Greek historiographers appear to be *more* reluctant to describe soldiers' gruesome deaths in battle than deaths caused by different calamities; the most 'gory' passages in Thucydides, for example, are not those dealing directly with battle, but those dealing with the physical and psychological symptoms of the plague or with the *aftermath* of the Athenian defeat at Syracuse. Polybius' criticism of Phylarchus also does not concern a battle scene, but violence perpetrated against 'civilians' during a siege.
73 Lendon (2017: 43).
74 Lendon (2017: 43–4).
75 Cf. also Lendon (2017: 46), on ancient historians' 'strong literary preference for single combats and depiction of small-scale episodes in the battle that allow for *enargeia* ("vividness", "immediacy"), excitement, fine writing, reversals, paradox, and, where possible, elephants'.
76 Wellington, for one, rejected all attempts to write a history of the Battle of Waterloo on the grounds that '[s]ome individuals may recall all the little events of which the great result is the battle won or lost; but no individual can recollect the order in which, or the exact moment at which they occurred, which makes all the difference as to their value or importance' (from a letter to John Wilson Croker, cited in Keegan (1987: 158)).
77 See especially Faust (2011: 7–8).
78 See Levene (2010: 261–75), on what the borderline incoherent narrative structure of Livy's battle narratives might tell us about that historian's view of battle and its outcome.
79 See Hau (2011) for an important study of the role of τύχη in Greek historiography, with emphasis on Polybius.
80 Clearchus came to the rescue 'when he observed (θεωρῶν) that both the centre of his allies and the other parts as well had been routed' – but how he could see this, given that he himself originally occupied the opposite wing from Aridaeus, is not made clear.
81 In Plutarch (*Vit. Artax.* 12.2) Artaxerxes, despairing of his cause, needs to be told that Cyrus is dead and he has won. For a similar realistic touch, one may compare Shakespeare's version of Agincourt, where the King, still planning to take on a fresh division of French cavalry, is told by a French herald that the battle is already over and 'the day is yours' (*Henry V* 4.7.78).
82 For the tragic quality of the plot, see n. 64 above.
83 For an excellent study of Tolstoy, see Runia (1995).
84 This chapter is part of the 'Anchoring Innovation' research programme of the Netherlands National Research School in Classical Studies (OIKOS), which is supported by a 2017 Gravitation Grant (Ministry of Education of the Netherlands, NWO); see https://www.anchoringinnovation.nl/. I thank the editors of this volume, an audience at a seminar on *Style in Historiography* in Oxford (where suggestions by Rhiannon Ash, Gregory Hutchinson, and Tim Rood proved especially helpful) and Chris Pelling for their helpful comments on an earlier version. I thank Suzanne Adema for fruitful exchanges on the implications of Caracciolo's reader-response model. The responsibility for what I wrote rests with me alone.

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2 The Realms of Fantasy

Aristotle on the Phenomenality of Mental Imagery

Pia Campeggiani

This volume explores processes of the imagination in Classical Athens, conceived as a wide set of relations between the mind, the body, and the world; these relations, and reflections upon them, are mediated by texts and images before the emergence of a scientific vocabulary. My own chapter takes a different, but complementary, approach, examining the sensorimotor dimension and experiential character of the cognitive power of *phantasia* in Aristotle's psychology. My analysis resonates with the more cultural concerns of other chapters,[1] and it suggests connections between the embodied psychology of Classical Athens and contemporary cognitive science.

In the first section (Psychophysiology), I offer an analysis of *phantasia* in embodied and phenomenal terms. The main claim I put forward is that *phantasia* may profitably be understood as a capacity for experiential (re)-enactment and *phantasmata*, *qua* instances of actualization of the power of *phantasia*, as (phenomenally) *off-line sensory experiences* that (physically) consist in *patterns of bodily activation*. More specifically, I argue that insofar as they are bodily changes, *phantasmata* are *sensorimotor instructions* for re-enacting past experiences (e.g. when we remember) or enacting possible, fictitious, or oneiric ones (e.g. in anticipation, imagination, and dreams). Experiencing a *phantasma* can, therefore, be described as enacting given patterns of motor behaviour and receiving the corresponding sensory feedback. Depending on the cognitive activity one is engaged in (whether one is remembering, dreaming, imagining, and so on) and even though sensory character is what all instances of *phantasia* have in common, there are major phenomenal differences in attention, volition, and action potential that distinguish each of the experiences by which *phantasia* is involved. In the second section (Content), I take issue with the representationalist interpretation of the relation between the physical and the phenomenal dimension of *phantasmata*. My main claim here is that, in interpreting Aristotle's *phantasmata*, any distinction between format and content falls victim to the problem of naturalizing content. One way to get round the obstacle, the one I suggest, is to give up the idea of *phantasmata* as content-bearing structures and understand them as dispositional embodied procedures that, when actualized, are tinged with phenomenality.

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I. Introduction

'Imagination' as speakers of English typically understand it, that is, as the creative capacity to invent images, similitudes, analogies, and so on,[2] is only one of the many functions of the cognitive power that Aristotle calls *phantasia*.[3] Aristotle has creative imagination in mind when, at *De anima* 427b17–24, he distinguishes *phantasia* from belief (*doxa*) on the basis that the former is 'up to us, whenever we wish' (ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστιν, ὅταν βουλώμεθα). Belief is subject to truth constraints (that is, it is either true or false) and, as a consequence of this, one cannot believe what one believes to be false, just as one cannot disbelieve what one believes to be true. On the other hand, when one voluntarily engages in an act of imagination, truth constraints do not apply. They do not apply objectively, because there is no requirement for imagined content to correctly correspond to any state of affairs; and they do not apply subjectively, because imagination does not require the subject to be convinced that the imagined content is true. Aristotle explicitly refers to this subjective aspect later in the text, where he claims that belief involves *pistis* while *phantasia* does not (*De an.* 428a18–23). In this context, he is thinking of *phantasia* in its broad sense, as the ability to conceive entities, situations, and narratives that are not physically present or even real, as proved by his reference to nonhuman animals (who are capable of *phantasia* even if incapable of *logos* and *pistis*).[4] As for creative imagination, however, he indirectly makes the same point by means of the observation that one's emotional reactions to what one believes differ from those that one has to what one imagines: in the first case, one reacts immediately; in the second case, one reacts in the same way as when one looks at something in a picture (thus, presumably, less intensely).[5] Such difference seems to depend on one's serious commitment to one's beliefs ('believing *x*' entails 'believing that *x* is true') as opposed to a non-committal attitude in the activity of imagination.

In what follows, however, I shall not focus on the power of creative imagination, but rather on the multiple ways *phantasia* is discharged in dreams, memories, anticipations, and so on. Aristotle is relatively clear as regards what *phantasia* is for: it is required by or involved in cognitive activities as numerous and as diverse as experiencing emotional reactions,[6] having desires,[7] moving through space and performing actions,[8] having memories,[9] forming expectations,[10] thinking abstractly,[11] imagining,[12] dreaming,[13] having a perceptual impression that is reasonably trustworthy, but which one has not thought through,[14] supposing what an imprecisely perceived object might be,[15] and forming or being under perceptual impressions that contradict true beliefs.[16]

But what exactly is *phantasia*? And what are its products, the experiential instances of its exercise and actualization that Aristotle calls *phantasmata*?[17] Aristotle's comments on this are scattered throughout the corpus. The only explicit treatment he offers is to be found, as one would expect, in the *De anima*, but here, as opposed to what he does for the other activities of the soul, he defines *phantasia* mainly *ex negativo*, by emphasizing what it is not and how it differs from *aisthēsis*, *hypolēpsis*, and other cognitive processes. The ongoing debate shows that it has not been possible to reach a consensus on a number of crucial issues regarding the power of *phantasia* and how it is actualized. Even the few points on which scholars agree are interpreted

in different and often incompatible ways. For example, everybody agrees that *phantasia* is very closely connected with *aisthēsis*, but its role in perceptual activity has been widely debated, leading to diverse interpretations ranging from the equation of *phantasia* with perceptual awareness[18] to its illustration as only concerned with non-paradigmatic sensory experiences.[19] Scholars also generally agree that *phantasia* is best understood in representationalist terms.[20] However, while some interpreters explain the format of fantastic representations in terms of images,[21] others acknowledge that Aristotle's understanding of *phantasmata* is not limited to visual imagery but encompasses all sense modalities.[22] Various non-imagistic interpretations have also been developed, ranging from positions more similar to contemporary propositionalism to views that echo analogue theory and isomorphism.[23]

A full reconstruction of Aristotle's theory of *phantasia* cannot be attempted here, nor is it possible to provide readers with a complete account of the current scholarly debate on the subject.[24] Instead, some specific questions about *phantasia* and *phantasmata* will lead us through the exploration of one aspect in particular, that is, their sensorimotor dimension and experiential character. These questions can be grouped under two main headings:

- PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY: What are *phantasmata* in embodied terms? And how do they feature in our subjective experience? To answer this question, we shall read closely Aristotle's discussion of the relation between *phantasia* and *aisthēsis* in *De an.* 3.3 and unpack his definitions of *phantasmata* by means of reference to *aisthēmata* (e.g. *De an.* 431a15, 432a9; *Somn*. 456a26; *Insomn.* 461a19, 30).
- CONTENT: What is the relation between the physical and the phenomenal dimension of *phantasmata*? Is a representationalist reading of the relation between fantastic format and fantastic content the only game in town?

In an attempt to answer these questions, I shall briefly illustrate Aristotle's arguments as they appear in some of the crucial passages dedicated to *phantasia* or to the activities that involve it, and I shall discuss the most relevant representationalist readings that have been offered so far. I shall conclude with the suggestion that *phantasia* may profitably be understood as a capacity for experiential (re)-enactment and *phantasmata*, *qua* instances of actualization of the power of *phantasia*, as (phenomenally) *off-line sensory experiences* that (physically) consist in *patterns of bodily activation*. More specifically, I shall argue that insofar as they are bodily changes, *phantasmata* are *sensorimotor instructions* for re-enacting past experiences (e.g. when we remember) or enacting possible, fictitious, or oneiric ones (e.g. in anticipation, imagination, and dreams).

II. Psychophysiology

From a physical viewpoint, *phantasia* is a kind of motion (κίνησίς τις: *De an.* 428b11; *Ph.* 254a29). More specifically, it is a motion effected by actual *aisthēsis* (κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν γιγνομένη: *De an.* 429a1–2; ἔστι δὲ φαντασία ἡ ὑπὸ τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν αἰσθήσεως γινομένη κίνησις: *Insomn.*

459a17–18) and its products or instantiations – *phantasmata* – are residuary movements based on *aisthēmata* (ὑπόλοιποι κινήσεις … συμβαίνουσαι ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθημάτων: *Insomn.* 461a17–18) and situated in the sensory organs (κινήσεις φανταστικαὶ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις: *Insomn.* 462a8–9). The embodied nature of *phantasia* is explicitly indicated at *De an.* 403a5–10: here, when discussing affections of the soul as not 'without the body' (ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος), Aristotle wonders whether reasoning (τὸ νοεῖν) is also embodied and tells us that if it is a sort of *phantasia*, or not without *phantasia* (φαντασία τις ἢ μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας: *De an.* 403a9), then it must be. Aristotle's references to the experiential character of *phantasia* (that is, the fact that it goes with feelings) also provide an illustration of its corporeal nature. At *Rh.* 1370a27–32, for example, he defines pleasure as the feeling of a certain affection and describes *phantasia* as a weakened form of *aisthēsis*. He goes on to say that since memory and expectation require *phantasia*, they are also accompanied by *aisthēsis* and, therefore, possibly, by the feeling of pleasure:

> ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν τὸ ἥδεσθαι ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαί τινος πάθους, ἡ δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶν αἴσθησίς τις ἀσθενής, ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ μεμνημένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐλπίζοντι ἀκολουθοῖ ἂν φαντασία τις οὗ μέμνηται ἢ ἐλπίζει· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡδοναὶ ἅμα μεμνημένοις καὶ ἐλπίζουσιν, ἐπείπερ καὶ αἴσθησις.
>
> Since pleasure is the sensation of a certain *pathos* and *phantasia* is a weakened kind of *aisthēsis*, one who remembers and expects will always be attended by the *phantasia* of what one remembers and expects: if this is so, it is clear that because *aisthēsis* belongs to those who remember and expect, these may feel pleasure at the same time.

Accordingly, the *phantasia* of superiority that one enjoys in victory is pleasant (*Rh*. 1370b32–4) and the same is true of the *phantasia* of being excellent that is produced in one when one is honoured (*Rh.* 1371a8–10), the *phantasia* that one possesses goodness when one is loved (*Rh.* 1371a17–21) and that of revenge in anger (*Rh.* 1378b7–10). On the other hand, the *phantasia* of impending evil that is entailed by fear is painful (*Rh.* 1382a20–2). Similarly, in the *De motu animalium*, Aristotle illustrates the corporeal alterations that come with *phantasia* in terms of pleasant or fearful bodily feelings and acknowledges the important role they play in motivating animals to act by producing appetites, repulsions, and desires (e.g. *De motu an.* 701b17–21, 701b33–702a10).

The embodiment and phenomenal qualities of *phantasia* depend on its close connection with *aisthēsis* – a topic that Aristotle discusses at length in *De an.* 3.3, and to which we shall now turn.

a. De an. *3.3*

Not everybody agrees on taking *De an.* 3.3 (427a17–429a9) as the starting point for an enquiry into Aristotle's notion of *phantasia*. Nussbaum, for example, prefers to approach the problem of *phantasia* through the account of the cognitive activities

that involve it (especially action and movement as they are discussed later in *De anima* and in *De motu animalium*).[25] Be that as it may, it is true that *De an.* 3.3 is 'Aristotle's one concentrated, extended theoretical discussion of *phantasia*'[26] and quite a lot of information can be gathered by closely reading this text.

Here, Aristotle sets off by establishing distinctions and relations of dependency between a number of cognitive activities: *phantasia* is different from *aisthēsis*, from *dianoia*, and from *hypolēpsis*; it depends on *aisthēsis* and, in turn, *hypolēpsis* depends on *phantasia* (*De an.* 427b14–16). As specified later in the text, *epistēmē*, *doxa*, *phronēsis*, and their opposites all count as varieties of *hypolēpsis* (*De an.* 427b24–6): this means they all entail *phantasia*. Aristotle's worries about distinguishing *phantasia* from other cognitive processes stem from his consideration, at *De an.* 427b27–428a5, that since *phantasia* is that in virtue of which we say that a *phantasma* comes to us, if we do not speak of it metaphorically,[27] it is to be defined as a capacity (*dynamis*) or a state (*hexis*) in virtue of which we discriminate (*krinomen*) and issue truths or falsehoods.[28] But *aisthēsis*, *doxa*, *epistēmē*, and *nous* are also critical capacities in virtue of which we issue truths or falsehoods. Will *phantasia* be one of these? Hence the importance of investigating their similarities and differences.

While an identity between *phantasia* and *epistēmē*, on one hand, and *phantasia* and *nous*, on the other, is easily ruled out, since *epistēmē* and *nous* are always true, whereas *phantasia* may also be false (*De an.* 428a17–18), the analysis of the relation between *phantasia* and *aisthēsis* is definitely more challenging. In the *De insomniis*, making reference to his own treatment of the subject in the *De anima*, Aristotle claims that the faculty of *phantasia* is the same as the faculty of *aisthēsis*, but that they differ in essence (ἔστι μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ τὸ φανταστικόν, τὸ δ' εἶναι φανταστικῷ καὶ αἰσθητικῷ ἕτερον, *Insomn.* 459a15–16). This claim appears as the first premise of an argument about the nature of dreaming: since the *phantastikon* is the same as the *aisthētikon*, *phantasia* is a movement effected by actual *aisthēsis*, and a dream is a *phantasma*, it follows that dreaming belongs to the *aisthētikon qua phantastikon* (*Insomn.* 459a17–21). As Nussbaum remarks, the link between the *aisthētikon* and the *phantastikon* that is established here can be interpreted more or less tightly.[29] On a weaker interpretation, Aristotle might mean that there is a general cognitive power that carries out two different activities – some perceptual and some fantastic. On a stronger interpretation, Aristotle's suggestion that the *aisthētikon* is the same as the *phantastikon* would entail that the difference between perceptual and fantastic activities ultimately depends on how one looks at them – much in the same way as one and the same road can be either a road up or a road down depending on one's viewpoint (*Metaph.* 1066a33). This is the reading that Nussbaum favours, based on her understanding of *phantasia* as the interpretative aspect of *aisthēsis* (that is, as what makes *aisthēsis* a process of active perception rather than of passive reception).[30]

Assuredly, Aristotle thinks *phantasia* depends on *aisthēsis* in a very strong sense: as clearly stated on various occasions in the *De anima*, *phantasia* cannot occur without *aisthēsis* (e.g. *De an.* 427b14–16, 428b10, 428b15). On the other hand, he remains cautious regarding whether all living beings that are capable of *aisthēsis*

are also capable of *phantasia*: even if at *De an.* 413b16–24 he seems to be thinking of *aisthēsis* and *phantasia* as co-extensive (εἰ δ' αἴσθησιν, καὶ φαντασίαν), he is in doubt and allows for exceptions elsewhere.[31] That the activity of *phantasia* and that of *aisthēsis* are not identical is illustrated at *De an.* 428a5–16, where Aristotle provides us with four reasons why the equation of the two should be rejected:[32] first, there are occasions when *phantasia* is active and *aisthēsis* is not (e.g. when we are sleeping); second, *aisthēsis* belongs to all animals, but *phantasia* does not;[33] third, *aisthēseis* are always true, whereas *phantasiai* are for the most part false;[34] and fourth, language of 'appearances'[35] is not appropriate to cases of accurate *aisthēsis*: when one is certain that one is seeing a man, one does not say that this appears (φαίνεται) to be a man. However, there is an important connection between the two: *phantasia* cannot occur without *aisthēsis* because it is 'of those things of which *aisthēsis* is' (ἡ δὲ φαντασία … ὧν αἴσθησις ἔστιν, *De an.* 428b11). This means that they are both directed towards the same objects: *aisthēsis* provides *phantasia* with 'content', so to speak. This explains both why *phantasia* may be true or false,[36] and why its *kinēsis* is so similar to sense perception (*De an.* 428b14–17).

b. Similar Movements

In order to discover more about the embodied nature and the phenomenal qualities of *phantasia*, we must further inquire into the similarity between instances of *phantasia* and *aisthēsis*. In the *De anima*, Aristotle illustrates it in motivational terms: it is by virtue of this similarity that living beings often act and behave according to *phantasia* (*De an.* 42816–17, 429a4–8).[37] It is in the context of Aristotle's account of action in the *De motu animalium*, though, that the corporeal and the phenomenal similarity between fantastic and perceptual processes is especially emphasized. Here, the main feature of animal movement emerges from a comparison with the way puppets move. While the movement of puppets does not entail any change in their parts, since they are made of cables, strings, wheels, and other such components, when animals move something special goes on. Animals undergo physiological alterations: their parts become larger or smaller, change shape, expand, or contract. It is because of these ἀλλοιώσεις that animal movement occurs. But how do these alterations come about?

> ἀλλοιοῦσι δ' αἱ φαντασίαι καὶ αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ ἔννοιαι. αἱ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθήσεις εὐθὺς ὑπάρχουσιν ἀλλοιώσεις τινὲς οὖσαι, ἡ δὲ φαντασία καὶ ἡ νόησις τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων ἔχουσι δύναμιν· τρόπον γάρ τινα τὸ εἶδος τὸ νοούμενον τὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ ἢ ψυχροῦ ἢ ἡδέος ἢ φοβεροῦ τοιοῦτον τυγχάνει ὂν οἷόν περ καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἕκαστον, διὸ καὶ φρίττουσι καὶ φοβοῦνται νοήσαντες μόνον. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα πάθη καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις εἰσίν. ἀλλοιουμένων δ'ἐν τῷ σώματι τὰ μὲν μείζω τὰ δ' ἐλάττω γίνεται.
>
> (*De motu an.* 701b16–24)

> *Phantasiai*, *aisthēseis*, and ideas produce alterations. *Aisthēseis* are at once alterations of a sort and *phantasia* and thinking have the power of the actual

> things. In a certain way the form conceived of the warm and the cold or the pleasant or the fearful is like the actual thing itself. For this reason, people shudder and are frightened just thinking of something. All these are *pathē* and alterations. And of the bodily parts that undergo alteration some become larger and some smaller.

The alterations causing movement are not presented as results or consequences of perceptual, fantastic, or thinking processes; rather, these *pathē* are described as physiological alterations themselves. In fact, the relation between *pathē* and physiological alterations is one of *necessity* (*De motu an.* 701b33–702a1) and *simultaneity* (*De motu an.* 702a15–16; 702a20–21). This is consistent with Aristotle's teleological explanation of the structure of the living body: inner regions are fashioned as they are for the sake of changing from soft to hard, solid to liquid, and so on. The reason why, on the physical level, *pathē* consist in physiological alterations (and therefore, on the phenomenal level, usually *feel* in a certain way) is, therefore, explained by reference to their biological function of preparing the organic parts for movement. What Aristotle is telling us here is that both *aisthēmata* and *phantasmata* enable animals to act. Both consist in physiological alterations, and those of *phantasmata* are sufficiently similar to those of *aisthēmata* as to make it possible for *phantasmata* to exert 'the power of the actual things' (τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων δύναμιν). Therefore, fantastic processes consist in bodily changes as much as perceptual processes do. These patterns of bodily activation are alike because *phantasia* depends on *aisthēsis* and its *kinēseis* on the 'material' that is provided by *aisthēsis*.[38] Phenomenally, they are also alike: they go with sensations that are similar enough to motivate the animal towards the same goals and behaviour.[39]

c. The Power of the Actual Things

At *De an.* 432a9–10, Aristotle defines *phantasmata* as being just like *aisthēmata* but without the matter (τὰ γὰρ φαντάσματα ὥσπερ αἰσθήματά ἐστι, πλὴν ἄνευ ὕλης). *Aisthēmata* are the bodily changes and corresponding sensations arising from the organism's perceptual encounters with the external environment. They emerge in the presence of external stimuli; on occasion, they might persist for a while after the external stimulus has ceased to exist, as argued in *Insomn.* 2 (459a23–460b27), by means of the analogy of projectiles and the discussion of the phenomenon of after-images. As projectiles continue to move even when the moving agent is no longer in contact with them, because each portion of air imparts movement to the proximate one, so it happens that *aisthēmata* continue to be felt and experienced even after the external stimulus has departed (καὶ ἀπελθόντος τοῦ θύραθεν αἰσθητοῦ ἐμμένει τὰ αἰσθήματα αἰσθητὰ ὄντα, *Insomn.* 460b2–3). This is the case, for example, when we remain temporarily blind after looking at an intense source of light; when we keep our gaze fixed on a colour and continue to see it even when we look away; or when we hear a very loud sound and we cannot hear anything else for a while afterwards. That it is possible for perceptual sensations to persist even after their originating stimulus has disappeared is part of Aristotle's

explanation of what happens when we dream and, more specifically, of the similarity between real-life perceptual sensations (*aisthēmata*) and those we experience in oneiric episodes during sleep, when we are not actively perceiving anything (*phantasmata*). In fact, *phantasia* and *phantasmata* constitute our way of interacting with the environment when we cannot perceive it. Therefore, since we can only perceive what is here and now, *phantasia* and *phantasmata* are what makes it possible for us to relate to the past and to the future by forming memories and anticipations. Since our faculty of sense perception is temporarily inactive when we are asleep, it is thanks to *phantasia* and *phantasmata* that we have dreams. Besides, since the objects of reason also take perceptible forms (ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά ἐστι, *De an.* 432a4–5; cf. *Mem*. 449b30–450a14), we could not even think without a *phantasma* (οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ ψυχή, *De an.* 431a17).

Aristotle extensively illustrates the physiology of *phantasmata* and their relation with *aisthēmata* in the *Parva Naturalia*. In the *De Memoria*, for example, he invites us to think of the *phantasma* whose *hexis* is memory as if it were a sort of impression (*typos*) of the *aisthēma* – an impression stamped in by the movement of sense perception in the same way as one would make an impression with a seal. By virtue of this analogy, he continues, it is easy to explain the importance of one's bodily constitution, metabolism (bodily flux: ῥέος),[40] and corporeal states in the formation and in the retention of *phantasmata*: for a *phantasma* to take hold in one's memory, one must be sufficiently calm, otherwise it will leave no trace, just as a seal forms no impression on running water; similarly, the excessive moisture of quick people hinders their capacity to retain the *phantasma*, while the excessive hardness of slow people makes it difficult for it to be imprinted in the first place (*Mem.* 450a25–b10). The same is true of *phantasmata* in one's dreaming experiences: by means of yet another analogy, that of reflections that either do not appear or look deformed if the water surface is turbulent, Aristotle insists that the residual movements derived from *aisthēmata* remain unattended to or turn into something disfigured and grotesque if the sleeper's body is disturbed (e.g. if one has eaten too much and is, therefore, agitated by the heat coming up from the food, or if one suffers from melancholia or other conditions that cause pneumatic agitation: *Insomn.* 461a12–26).

Phantasmata (αἱ κινήσεις αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθημάτων γινόμεναι, *Insomn.* 460b29–30) occur both when we are awake and when we are asleep. Aristotle believes that we experience *phantasmata* only when they reach the starting point of *aisthēsis* (which he thinks is the heart) and that they do so by moving through the blood. However, in the waking state not all perceptual *kinēseis* make it to the heart: some remain unattended to because more relevant stimuli call for attention, forcing the less significant ones into the background. But during sleep, when *aisthēsis* is dormant and the heat reverses its flow towards the inside of the body, these *phantasmata* also reach the heart and become manifest. In animals that have blood, once the blood has become quiet, the persisting movement arising from the *aisthēmata* derived from each sensory organ (σωζομένη τῶν αἰσθημάτων ἡ κίνησις ἀφ' ἑκάστου τῶν αἰσθητηρίων) is what causes the dream and what makes the dreamer think that he is having a real-life experience (*Insomn.* 461a25–30). During sleep

the judging faculty (τὸ ἐπικρῖνον) is either restrained or not properly exercised (*Insomn.* 461b6): just as people affected by different *pathē*, such as strong emotions or fever, can be perceptually deceived, so the *pathos* of sleep can also deceive and make things look real and dreaming experiences phenomenally indistinguishable from those occurring in waking life (ὥσπερ δ' εἴπομεν ὅτι ἄλλοι δι' ἄλλο πάθος εὐαπάτητοι, οὕτως ὁ καθεύδων διὰ τὸν ὕπνον καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τὰ αἰσθητήρια καὶ τἆλλα τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὥστε τὸ μικρὰν ἔχον ὁμοιότητα φαίνεται ἐκεῖνο, *Insomn.* 461b8–11; cf. *Insomn.* 461b29–462a8).

Since *phantasmata* are *aisthēmata* in the absence of external stimuli, they still consist in bodily changes and corresponding sensations: they are physical states but also phenomenal states. For us to become phenomenally aware of *phantasmata*, they need to be actualized (*Insomn.* 461b15–20): at the physical level, this means that they can freely move, via the blood which remains in the sensory organs, towards the heart; at the level of subjective experience, it means that we live through the *phantasma*, that is, we perceive and feel something that is qualitatively similar to what we would feel and perceive if we were awake (or to what we have felt and perceived in the past, in the case of memory; what it would be possible for us to feel and perceive, in the case of imagination, etc.). Once again, *phantasmata* have 'the power of the actual things': they affect us in a similar way as *aisthēmata*, both on the physical level of the bodily patterns of activation they consist in and, when they reach the heart, on the phenomenal level of the sensations that we experience.

III. Content

Talk of *phantasmata* as 'reaching the heart' and 'becoming manifest' or, in Aristotle's parlance, as something we contemplate (e.g. *De an.* 432a: φάντασμά τι θεωρεῖν) as if we were looking at them (e.g. *De an.* 431b7: ὥσπερ ὁρῶν), something that our soul perceives (e.g. *Mem.* 450b28: αἰσθάνηται ἡ ψυχὴ) and that is 'in us' (e.g. *Insomn.* 450b24: ἐν ἡμῖν), might suggest that they are inner objects that we feel and perceive (mainly, visually). Undoubtedly, Aristotle's lexical choices and analogies often rely on the ontological metaphor *PHANTASMATA* ARE PICTURES – a metaphor that allows him to talk about *phantasmata* as entities or substances.[41] The imprint analogy and the parallel between *phantasmata* and reflections on the water surface have already been mentioned above. To take another famous example, consider Aristotle's definition of memory (*Mem.* 451a15–17) and his inquiry into how it is possible to remember something that is not present (*Mem.* 450b11–451a2). *Mnēmē* is the *hexis* of having a *phantasma* taken as an *eikōn* of that of which it is a *phantasma* (ὡς εἰκόνος οὗ φάντασμα). The *phantasma* is somehow similar to an impression or a painting inside us (τύπος ἢ γραφὴ ἐν ἡμιν) that we perceive when we remember. Aristotle further develops this analogy in order to explain the problem of presence in absence: if, when one remembers, it is the affection produced by the object (the *phantasma*) that one perceives (since it is impossible to perceive something that is not present, as Aristotle has established elsewhere), is there any way that the perception of the *phantasma* can be perception of something else, viz., the thing, now absent, which one has perceived in the

past? What follows is an elaborate development of the representationalist implications of the metaphor *PHANTASMATA* ARE PICTURES: a painting is at the same time just a painting and an *eikōn*. Similarly, a *phantasma* is both something in itself (καθ' αὑτό) and of something else (ἄλλου). *Qua* καθ' αὑτό, it is something we think of (*theōrēma*) or a *phantasma*; *qua* ἄλλου, it is like an *eikōn* and something remembered (*mnēmoneuma*). When the movement is actualized, if the soul perceives it καθ' αὑτό, then it seems to occur as a *noēma* or a *phantasma*; but if the soul perceives it ἄλλου and in the way one looks at a picture *qua eikōn* (ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ὡς εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ), like an *eikōn* of Coriscus without having Coriscus in sight, then the *pathos* of this way of looking at it (τὸ πάθος τῆς θεωρίας ταύτης) is different from the *pathos* of when you look at it as a picture: in the soul, one arises simply as a *noēma*, whereas the other, because it is an *eikōn*, arises as something that is remembered (μνημόνευμα). In a similar way, in the *De insomniis*, Aristotle talks of *phantasmata* as *eidōla* appearing during sleep (*Insomn.* 462a11) and compares them to the clouds, whose changing shape may be taken to represent different figures (*Insomn.* 461b19–20).

In a paper tellingly titled 'Aristotle and the Cartesian theater', Victor Caston claims that many interpreters, by translating *phantasmata* as 'mental images', implicitly take them to be internal objects of awareness, something we look at with our mind's eye.[42] This is wrong, he argues. And it is wrong for the same reasons that Stephen Kosslyn's theory of mental imagery, to which Daniel Dennett has provocatively referred as the 'Cartesian theater' view of the mind,[43] is wrong: the inner-picture theory of imagery is victim to the homunculus fallacy.[44] Caston argues that *phantasmata* are rather that *by means of which* we feel and perceive: 'when Aristotle speaks of "placing things before the eyes" in connection with *phantasia* and *phantasmata*, he needn't think that the resulting visualization consists in our viewing *them*. Visualization may simply be an effect they produce'.[45] 'They [*phantasmata*] are states of our body, bearing representational content'.[46] But 'content' is of course another metaphor: while it is natural and to some extent inevitable to resort to conceptual metaphor in order to talk about abstract phenomena, we need to recognize metaphor for what it is.[47] If we describe *phantasmata* as 'bodily states bearing content', for example, we need not commit ourselves to the implications of the container metaphor, viz. to the assumption that the container (or the format: here, the bodily states) and the content (here, the subjective experience) are two different things. Still, Caston affirms that 'the change (κίνησις) that constitutes *phantasia* is distinct from both the experience of visualization and the objects that seem to appear in such experiences' and that 'they [*phantasmata*] can *produce* such experiences and account for their content. But they are not *themselves* images'.[48]

It is of course true that *phantasmata* are not images we look at (both because they encompass all sensory modalities and because they are not inner objects); however, on the assumption that *phantasmata* bear content, how they give rise to the subjective experience of that content (when they do, that is, when they reach the heart) remains somewhat mysterious. In fact, when discussing the intentionality of *phantasmata* and the way *phantasia* allows for error, Caston also offers a solution to the problem of the experience of content. This solution is based on the fact

that *phantasmata* and *aisthēmata* have the same causal powers: 'the phantasma is produced in a way that ensures it will be a similar [to the *aisthēma*] sort of change and so, importantly, *can have similar sorts of effects*: in particular, it can travel to the central organ and affect it in similar ways. A phantasma will thus have similar *causal powers* to the stimulation from which it derives, including the ability to produce an experience *phenomenally like* a sensation'.[49] Note that this explanation still assumes a distinction between format and content. One of the reasons why Caston settles on the distinction is that it allows him to account for the fact that we do not always consciously experience our *phantasmata*.[50] But an objectified account of content as a commodity we can access and that is carried by the physical vehicle of our bodily states is not our only option. In fact, a dispositional reading of *phantasmata* as sensory-motor patterns that, when recalled or otherwise re-activated, allow us experientially to (re-)enact possible, fictitious, oneiric, or past experiences may prove to be a good alternative. On this reading, experiencing a *phantasma* does not mean accessing some piece of content that has been stored on the occasion of previous on-line interactions and that is transported above our threshold of awareness by means of *kinēseis* travelling through the blood. Neither Aristotle nor we have a naturalistic, explanatory account of what such content would be, of how it would be stored and eventually retrieved. Instead, experiencing a *phantasma* can be described as enacting given patterns of motor behaviour and receiving the corresponding sensory feedback (that sometimes is weaker than in active perception, as Aristotle knows).[51] Depending on the cognitive activity one is engaged in (whether one is remembering, dreaming, imagining, and so on) and even though sensory character is what all instances of *phantasia* have in common, the phenomenal quality of the *phantasmata* involved differs. For example, one lives through one's memory-*phantasmata* by re-enacting them *as past*. Recall Aristotle's claim that a *phantasma* is both something in itself (καθ' αὑτό) and of something else (ἄλλου): only when a *phantasma* is experienced *as having occurred* does it count as something remembered.[52] Similarly, imagination-*phantasmata* are enacted *as unreal*, expectation-*phantasmata as possible*, and so on. There are major phenomenal differences in attention, volition, and action potential that distinguish each of these experiences. Of course, there might be times when one is not aware of these phenomenal differences, as for example, in dreams, hallucinations, or when we cannot say for sure whether something we are experiencing as a memory has really ever occurred. But otherwise, Aristotle thinks, subjective experience is all that one needs, and one should not even worry about how to tell experiences apart, because one just does (*Metaph.* 1010b3–4, b8–11):

> εἶτ' ἄξιον θαυμάσαι εἰ τοῦτ' ἀποροῦσι … καὶ ἀληθῆ πότερον ἃ τοῖς καθεύδουσιν ἢ ἃ τοῖς ἐγρηγορόσιν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ οἴονταί γε, φανερόν· οὐθεὶς γοῦν, ἐὰν ὑπολάβῃ νύκτωρ Ἀθήνῃσιν εἶναι ὢν ἐν Λιβύῃ, πορεύεται εἰς τὸ ᾠδεῖον.
>
> It is surprising that they are uncertain about this …: whether what appears to sleepers is truer than what appears to those who are awake. It is clear that

> not even they think so. Nobody who, being in Libya, during the night took himself to be in Athens, would walk to the Odeon.

In conclusion, on-line perceiving (*aisthēmata*) and off-line experiences (*phantasmata*) have a similar phenomenality because they share the same causal powers. All kinds of *phantasmata* have a common sensory character, but they also display phenomenal features that are characteristic of the different cognitive activity they are involved in. When interpreting Aristotle's *phantasmata*, any distinction between format and content falls victim to the problem of naturalizing content – a problem that Aristotle does not even raise, precisely because he never draws a sharp line between the two. One way to get round the obstacle, the one I have suggested here, is to give up the idea of *phantasmata* as content-bearing structures and understand them as dispositional embodied procedures that, when actualized, are tinged with phenomenality.[53]

Abbreviations

Abbreviations of ancient authors and texts, as well as scholarly reference works, generally follow those of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, fourth edition; abbreviations of journal titles follow those of *L'Année Philologique*. Exceptions are listed below.

Arist. *Insomn*. = Aristotle, *De insomniis*. This is 453b–458a of the *Parva naturalia* (*OCD*: *Parv. nat.*).

Arist. *Somn*. = Aristotle, *De somno*. This is 458a–462b of the *Parva naturalia* (*OCD*: *Parv. nat.*).

Notes

1 See especially the previous chapter, in which Luuk Huitink investigates Collingwood's 'historical imagination' and 're-enactment' in the light of contemporary cognitive science; his comparison of battle reports explores the way some writers depart from conventional 'distanced' representation, to be viewed impassively from a distance, and instead actively engage the body and subjectivity of the reader. Such *enargeia* relies on the kind of sensorimotor *phantasia* that I discuss below. Xavier Buxton, in his chapter on deliberation in Aeschylus, calls upon Aristotle's *phantasia bouleutikē* and a similarly embodied enactment of possible experience.

2 Cf. *OED* s.v. 5: 'The mind's creativity and resourcefulness in using and inventing images, analogies, etc.; poetic or artistic genius or talent. Also: an individual's poetic or artistic genius or talent'.

3 By 'cognitive power' I refer to cognition broadly construed, including perceptual and affective processes as well as intellectual and theoretical ones. In Aristotle's philosophy, mind and life are continuous: where there is biological life (at least, sentience), there is cognition too. One of the main implications of the principle of continuity is that cognition is bodily through and through. It is within this framework that *phantasia* must be investigated.

4 The link that Aristotle emphasizes here between *pistis*, *peithō*, and *logos*, together with the crucial role he elsewhere attributes to *phantasia* as a source of agency (esp. in *De motu animalium*), suggests that the *pistis* that he denies is required by *phantasia* broadly

construed must consist in a reflexive act of commitment; since humans and nonhuman animals often act on *phantasia*, they must be – pragmatically – committed to it.

5 *De an.* 427b21–23: ἔτι δὲ ὅταν μὲν δοξάσωμεν δεινόν τι ἢ φοβερόν, εὐθὺς συμπάσχομεν, ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν θαρραλέον· κατὰ δὲ τὴν φαντασίαν ὡσαύτως ἔχομεν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ θεώμενοι ἐν γραφῇ τὰ δεινὰ ἢ θαρραλέα.

6 E.g. *Rh.* 1382a20–2, 1383a16–19, 1384a22.

7 E.g. *De an.* 433a9–30, 433b11–12, 433b27–30; *De motu an.* 702a17–21.

8 E.g. *De an.* 429a4–8, 431b4–5, 432b13–17, 433a9–30, 433b27–30; *De motu an.* 700b17–23; 701a2–6, 34–6.

9 E.g. *Mem.* 450a10–13, 23–5, 451a14–17; *Rh.* 1370a27–35.

10 E.g. *Rh.* 1370a27–35.

11 *Hypolēpsis*: *De an.* 427b15–16; *noein,* including planning: 431a14–20, b2–10, *Mem.* 449b30; *theōrein*: 432a7–14; calculating and choosing: 434a6–11.

12 In the sense of visualizing: εἰδωλοποιῶν, *De an.* 427b19–21.

13 E.g. *Insomn.* 459a14–21, 462a15–31.

14 E.g. *Ph.* 211b29–212a2; *De an.* 402b23–5.

15 E.g. *De an.* 428a12–15.

16 E.g. *De an.* 428b2–10; *Insomn.* 460b16–27.

17 Sometimes Aristotle calls them *phantasiai*: e.g. *De an.* 425b25, 428a12, 433a11, 27.

18 E.g. Nussbaum (1978).

19 E.g. Schofield (1995 – first published in 1978). By 'non-paradigmatic sensory experiences' Schofield means 'experiences so diverse as dreams and the interpreting of indistinct or puzzling sense-data, which may be held to resemble the paradigm of successful sense-perception in one way or another, yet patently lack one or more of its central features, and so give rise to the sceptical, cautious, or non-committal *phainetai*': Schofield (1995: 253).

20 For extensive discussion, cf. Wedin (1988); Caston (1998; 2006; 2021); King (2009).

21 E.g. Bloch (2007: 64–70, esp. 67).

22 E.g. *Insomn.* 458b31: ὁρᾶν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαί τι, 459a1: ὁρᾶν…ἀκούειν…ὅλως αἰσθάνεσθαι, 459a3: ὄψιν…καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις, 461a29–30: διὰ μὲν τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως καταφερόμενα ὁρᾶν, διὰ δὲ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀκοῆς ἀκούειν). Cf., among others, Nussbaum (1978); Caston (1998; 2021); Labarrière (2002); Osborne (2007); King (2009); Schofield (2011).

23 Respectively, King (2009) and Caston (2021). King does not classify his own view as propositionalist; Caston more explicitly engages with the debate on mental imagery, but he also refrains from adhering to any specific contemporary position. As for propositionalism (its contemporary formulations within the analogue-propositional debate and the view I attribute to King), the label can be misleading: imagery (*phantasmata*) is structured in descriptive sentences, even if the language of these sentences is not natural language. So, e.g., King (2009: 56): 'the representation … has certain structural similarities with saying that such and such is the case, while of course not involving an assertion'. On the other hand, Caston's explanation of how *phantasmata* come to have their content and his comments on *Mem.* 452b9–16 somehow echo Kosslyn's views on the resemblance between representations and their objects (e.g. Kosslyn (1994: 5): 'each part of an object is represented by a pattern of points, and the spatial relation among these patterns in the functional space correspond to the spatial relations among the parts themselves'): 'the subject thinks of objects *by undergoing the change* that exhibits this proportional relation structure (τῇ ἀνάλογον κινήσει, b11–12). Such a model is no doubt a *phantasma*. But it has the content it does merely in virtue of possessing these features and embodying this relation structure, which in turn enables it to underwrite the content of thoughts based on it' (Caston [2021: 189]).

24 Nussbaum (1978); Modrak (1986); Watson (1988); Wedin (1988); Frede (1995 – first published in 1992); Schofield (1995; 2011); Caston (1996; 2009; 2021); Labarrière

(1997; 2002); Rapp (2001); Osborne (2007: esp. 79–97); King (2009: esp. 40–62; 2018) are some of the most influential accounts.

25 Nussbaum (1978).

26 Schofield (1995: 255).

27 The meaning of Aristotle's reference to the transferred sense of *phantasia* is an object of debate. Schofield thinks that 'Aristotle is concerned with the employment of "appears" peculiarly appropriate to imagination or non-paradigmatic sensory experience, and treats its applications in ordinary perceptual reports or in statements of belief ("that seems to me a dangerous course of action") as extensions of that usage': Schofield (1995: 266 n. 41). Nussbaum (1978: 254) follows Freudenthal (1863) in taking '(mere) show, pomp, ostentatiousness' as the metaphorical use.

28 Ross's emendation at 428a3 turns the statement that *phantasia* is a critical faculty into a question, but this creates unnecessary interpretative problems. *Phantasia* is described as a critical capacity also at *De motu an.* 700b20.

29 Nussbaum (1978: 235).

30 Nussbaum believes that *aisthēsis* by itself is the passive reception of external stimuli; *phantasia* is the process of becoming aware of these stimuli by perceiving them *as* something – i.e., of experiencing perceptions (Nussbaum [1978]). *Contra* Schofield (1995).

31 E.g. *De an.* 414b14–16, 415a8–12 and 428a8–11; at *De an.* 433b31–434a11, where he contemplates the possibility that in imperfectly developed animals whose *aisthēsis* is limited to touch *phantasia* might be present only in an indeterminate way; also cf. *De an.* 433b27–30. Reasons to believe that Aristotle is in fact committed to strict coextension are provided by Caston (1996: 23 n. 9).

32 I believe the differences between *phantasia* and *aisthēsis* listed in this passage are four because I take the claim that visions (*oramata*) appear to us also when our eyes are closed (*De an.* 428a16) as a qualification of the statement that there are occasions when *phantasia* is active and *aisthēsis* is dormant.

33 Here *aei* means 'always' in a non-temporal sense, that is, with no exception (*contra* Nussbaum [1978: 256]). In this passage, Aristotle claims that *phantasia* belongs to the ant and to the bee, but not to the grub (*skōlēx*). Aristotle's denial of *phantasia* to some animals is controversial: see above, n. 31.

34 This statement needs to be qualified, because only *aisthēsis* of special objects (e.g. colour for sight, sound for hearing, flavour for taste, etc.) is always true. As for *phantasiai* being false for the most part, Schofield suggests that Aristotle might be thinking of some of the main sorts of *phantasiai*, such as fantasies, dreams, and after-images (Schofield [1995: 262]).

35 *Phantasia* is connected with appearances because of its etymological connection with the verb *phainesthai*; cf. Aristotle's invented etymology at *De an.* 429a2–4.

36 The truth criterion for instances of *phantasia* is related to the kind of perceptual processes they result from: when the fantastic *kinēsis* is simultaneous with *aisthēsis* of special objects it is always true, whereas when it derives from the *aisthēseis* of incidentals or of common objects it can also be false, independently of whether it occurs simultaneously with *aisthēsis* or not, and most often when the object of perception is far away (*De an.* 428b18–30).

37 For the role of *phantasia* in Aristotle's account of action cf. *De an.* 3.9–11 (432a15–434a21) and *De motu an.* 6–11 (700b4–704b3).

38 For a historical illustration of such a theory in practice, see Sekita (this volume).

39 For a discussion of the likeness between *phantasmata* and *aisthēmata* in terms of the similarity of their causal powers cf. Caston (1996: 48–51; 1998: 272–81).

40 Cf. King (2009: 73–4).

41 Cf. Lakoff & Johnson (1980) on conceptual metaphor theory, also discussed by Buxton (this volume, p. 280).

42 Caston (2021). Cf. also Caston (1998: 279–81).

43 Dennett (1991).
44 That is, it relies on the assumption that there is a little man inside who looks at the images.
45 Caston (2021 174–5).
46 Caston (2021: 170).
47 Caston also makes use of the classical computer metaphor (with a vintage twist when it comes to vinyl records): 'The image files on your computer can, in conjunction with the right software, produce visible representations of objects on a monitor screen. But you would look in vain to find anything inside the computer, in the circuits and storage devices where the files reside, that *looked like* those objects. These image files, moreover, consist of information that can be accessed and further manipulated, even when nothing is projected on the monitor screen. The image files thus possess representational content without themselves looking like external objects or needing to be viewed at all; and their ability to produce images on the screen is to be explained in terms of this content. The underlying idea here does not depend on the fact that computer data is digital and symbolic either. Consider a slightly older example, which is analog. Vinyl records encode information in their grooves that, when a phonograph needle runs through them and sends them through an amplifier system, can produce sounds through speakers. The physical features of the grooves don't sound like music, of course, because they don't emit sound themselves. We don't hear them or direct any other intentional attitude towards them. When we listen to the music they contain, it is the sounds they produce from the speakers. *Phantasmata*, I would argue, are like this' (Caston [2021: 175]).
48 Caston (2021: 175–6).
49 Caston (1998: 274).
50 In the *De insomniis*, Aristotle illustrates the way *phantasmata* become active during sleep. *Phantasmata* actualize themselves under specific bodily conditions; until these obtain, *phantasmata* are only potential (αἱ δυνάμει, *Insomn.* 461b12–13) or present potentially (ἔνεισι δυνάμει, *Insomn*. 461b17).
51 At *Rh.* 1370a 27–32. See above (p. 88).
52 Thus, as opposed to what Aristotle's picture metaphor might suggest if taken *au pied de la lettre*, when remembering we do not take ourselves to be looking at, imagining, or otherwise experiencing something that looks like what has occurred; rather, we experience it *as it occurred*.
53 I am grateful to Douglas Cairns for inspiring comments on this paper.

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Imagination Takes Form

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3 Morbid Phantasies

The 'After-Death' and the Dead between Imagination and Perception

Karolina Sekita

Death is one of the most common themes permeating ancient Greek literature, as may be inferred from its frequent presence on its pages, and from the vivid descriptions of the seemingly unknown, yet paradoxically familiar, beyond. The sources of this *imaginarium* and of the ways in which the ancient Greeks conceptualized and conceived of their dead and of what I here call the 'after-death' are many and various, but they seem to have a common denominator in terms of *perception*. In the previous chapter, Pia Campeggiani emphasized that, in Aristotle's view, imaginary experiences are much like real experiences (involving similar bodily responses) but are characterized by absence. In this chapter, I shall explore the two most characteristic conceptualizations of the dead and their 'world' (both of which are, in real terms, absent), and their origins in perception (connected with the actual experience of death and dying) and imagination (phantasies about the 'after-death'), which, as I shall show, could fuel each other.

I shall first focus on emotional responses generated by the dead, and then, in the two subsequent sections, explore the perceptual filters that produced specific images of the dead and of their world as well as the reciprocal process where imagination feeds back into perception.

I. Nightmares and Nasties?

Contrary to the representation in modern fiction and film, where the dead in their corporeal (as, for instance, in the film *Dawn of the Dead* of 1978 by George A. Romero) or immaterial (as ghosts, for example) form act as triggers of horror, in ancient Greece the dead do not seem to trouble the living, at least in the extant literary testimonies.[1] Even ghosts, which are fairly well explored in literature from Homer to tragedy and beyond, appear as messengers and sources of information rather than of fear.[2] In other words, the Greeks, surprising as it may seem, did not ascribe to the dead, or to their world, any characteristics of what we would now call 'art horror', which, according to the definition formulated by Nöel Carroll, refers to something that brings fear and disgust but which we nevertheless enjoy from the position of the viewer.[3] The dead simply represent an ontological state for the ancient Greeks, and horror as a variation on the theme of the dead was not perceived by them as seductive in the sense of providing aesthetic stimulation.

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Abhorrence and horror are, rather, brought about in Greece by mutilation, deformation, damaging, or laceration of the body or the corpse.[4] Hence, when Poseidon in Book 20 of the *Iliad* is raging, Hades jumps off his throne and shouts lest he should break the surface of the earth and show to immortals and mortals alike what is hidden within,[5] and what, as we may guess, should not be seen. The realm of the dead is terrible to perceive (σμερδαλέος encompasses visual and acoustic sensations),[6] because it is the realm of decay, which is highlighted in the passage by the adjective εὐρώεις (mouldy, dank, slimy), in all early contexts used as an epithet of the Underworld or a tomb.[7] Even the gods hold the Underworld in abhorrence for exactly this reason.[8] They keep away from decay: whenever they deal with corpses in the epic, they anoint them with ambrosia to prevent decomposition.[9]

Decomposition in turn brings anxiety in the living, because when dead bodies begin their 'after-life', they not only generate miasma[10] but also stop resembling what they were, and, given that the body was considered to be the bearer of the identity of the deceased,[11] they threaten its preservation in the memory of the living with humiliation.[12] In addition, if Aristotle is to be trusted, looking at the disgraced remains of animals or corpses puts the living in an uncomfortable situation and brings pain,[13] even though the ancient Greeks must have been accustomed to such views.[14]

Hence, in order to restore harmony (to obliterate the miasmatic properties of the dead and preserve their 'identity' intact), the corpse must disappear from the world of the living. For this reason, the Greeks paid special attention to burial rites,[15] through which the dead became literally invisible (ἀφανεῖς) to the world of the living, as confirmed by an Attic funerary inscription that reads: 'so now, having perished, we are lying underground unseen' (νυνὶ δὲ ⟨φ⟩θ⟨ί⟩μενοι κείμεθα γῆς ἀφανεῖς).[16]

Here we arrive at the important point: the desired and necessary invisibility of the dead and, consequently, their world,[17] as they are both terrible to look at and generate pollution. Sight, thus, lends the first, and possibly the most prevailing, perceptual frame for imagining the dead in Greek written sources, given that the invisibility of the dead finds its ultimate expression also in the name of their lord, Hades, 'the invisible'.[18] Invisibility, however, seems to have various forms of expression and 'visualization' in Greek culture and is also highly perceptual, as we shall see.[19] In what follows, I shall first explore how the invisibility of the dead is understood and perceived and then show that all the other senses, although to varying degrees, were involved in how the dead and their world were conceptualized.

II. Perception as Trigger for Imagination

Invisibility of the dead does not seem to be understood by the Greeks as 'transparency' in the modern sense; even the εἴδωλα of the dead are deceptively corporeal and 'fleshed-out'. Odysseus remarks that the approaching *psychai* of the dead bear fresh wounds and their garments are stained with blood;[20] he tries to embrace his mother Anticlea much as Achilles rushes to embrace Patroclus' shade – both fail to fulfil their desire,[21] but would they attempt such a futile task if

the shades of their beloved ones did not look deceptively alive, if they could see through them? It is true that dramatic effect cannot be disregarded here, but it seems to me that it lies exactly in the impossibility of embracing the shades rather than in the heroes' knowledge of this impossibility but desperate derring-do nevertheless.[22] Furthermore, Homer knows the word (διαφαίνω) commonly used to express the idea of 'seeing through', even if he uses it only once to refer to an object that allows the light through – the glowing log with which Odysseus blinds Polyphemus (*Od*. 9.379). It would be inappropriate to deny him the knowledge of the concept itself, given the commonly shared experiences of water, glass, garments, and precious stones for which the derivative adjective (διαφανής) is commonly used in ancient texts.[23] The dead in turn appear as insubstantial in Homer, yet material enough to deceive perception. It would seem, thus, that the invisibility of the dead is true only from the perspective of the living, who cannot see them anymore in their daily life, rather than deriving from the fact that the dead are considered to be insubstantial.

Some help in understanding how invisibility was imagined by the Greeks is lent by its representation in vase painting. It could manifest itself in two different ways: either (a) in the division of the pictorial field into two spheres – usually the upper register is reserved for gods (so the 'invisible') and the lower one for the visible world (Figure 3.1)[24]; or (b) in the so-called *regard aphanès*, which could denote



Figure 3.1 Apulian red-figure volute *kratēr*. c. 330 BCE. National Archaeological Museum (MArTA), Taranto: 19.M325-1.10.

Photograph: Su concessione del Museo Archeologico Nazionale di Taranto (MArTA).

Figure 3.2 Detail of an Attic black-figure volute *kratēr* (the François *kratēr*), showing Automedon, indicated by inscription, hidden behind the horses of Diomedes. c. 570–565 BCE. Height: 66cm. National Archaeological Museum, Florence: 4209.

Photograph: Su concessione del Museo Archeologico Nazionale di Firenze (Direzione regionale Musei della Toscana).

either a figure not directly visible in the painting but whose presence is suggested in some other way to the spectator (for instance, by an inscription; Figure 3.2),[25] or a face hidden behind other objects (for instance, hair, or a horse; Figure 3.3)[26] so that it is impossible for the spectator to have visual contact with the painted figure.[27]

Conceptually, invisibility in ancient thought seems, thus, to reflect the idea of 'impossibility to see' or 'impossibility to be seen (due to being concealed)', which in the case of the dead is realized both in the active and passive senses: the dead are sightless (ἀνόμματοι)[28] and they are 'made invisible' (ἀφανεῖς) by the fact that they are 'lying under the earth', as the funerary inscription mentioned above indicates.[29] In other words, the dead cannot see and cannot be seen at the same time because they are covered by something: usually by the nether darkness of their realm,[30] or by the earth or the tomb,[31] which are coextensive with the realm of the dead.[32]

The moment of death is usually announced by darkness covering the eyes of those who die.[33] One very interesting manifestation of death, also often occurring in formulas signalling it, is ἀχλύς ('mist'),[34] famously personified in the *Shield*, which presents it as standing next to the dying individual.[35] Its overwhelming power is best illustrated by Hyginus in his description of a cuttlefish's self-defence technique which involves releasing black mud (θολὸς κυάνεος), a fluid of mist (ἀχλύος ὑγρῆς), from the ink-bag in the moment of perceived danger; the misty juice (ἰχὼρ ἀχλυόεις) obscures and conceals visibility.[36] Thanatos himself bears inscribed darkness in its meaning, if Hesychius is to be trusted, and apparently so does Hades himself in a conceptual sense.[37]

Apart from black and its hues, colour seemed to play a less significant role in imagining the dead, perhaps because of the 'dense darkness' (ζόφος ἠερόεις)[38] of the



Figure 3.3 Detail of an Attic black-figure *amphora* by Exekias, showing Athena, with Hermes' head hidden behind the horse's head. c. 540–530 BCE. Etruscan Museum 'Claudio Faina', Orvieto: 2747.

Photograph: Su concessione del Museo Etrusco 'Claudio Faina' di Orvieto.

Underworld and the impossibility of seeing through it. However, a sense of 'blueness', conveyed in the representation of demons in the Etruscan tomb of the Blue Demons in Tarquinia (Figure 3.4) and in Hades' beard on a fourth-century terracotta statue head (Figure 3.5), might have had its origin in the way the dead body manifested itself: *livor mortis* causes a bluish-purple discoloration of the skin after death.[39]

Similarly, the adjective χλωρός, commonly translated as 'pale' and used in the contexts of fear, sudden shock, or fainting especially,[40] but in reality rendering greenish or yellowish undertones, might have originated from the observation of the corpse. According to forensic terminology, prior to *livor mortis*, which appears in full two to four hours after death, occurs *pallor mortis*, a whitening of the skin: χλωρός might thus render the colour that the Mediterranean complexion assumes when the blood is drained from the skin.[41] Notably, Hesiod's personified Ἀχλύς (mist) is also imagined as pallid (χλωρή).[42] Its further description as dried-up or parched (ἀυσταλέη) brings yet another perceptual property which finds its expression in reference to the dead through the association with their corpses.

Plato calls the dead ἀλίβαντες (dry), and Plutarch explains that the adjective ἀλίβας refers to their extreme dryness.[43] Very possibly, through semantic drift, as

Figure 3.4 Detail of the fresco from the Tomb of the Blue Demons in Tarquinia. Second half of the fifth century BCE. Etruscan Necropolis, Tarquinia.

Photograph: Su concessione del Parco Archeologico di Cerveteri e Tarquinia.

the lack of moisture is embedded in its meaning, it became associated with liquids of acrid sharp flavour, such as wine when it goes off, for which it is frequently used.[44] Styx also has it as its epithet,[45] but given the fragmentary context, it is impossible to say whether this reference was to the taste of its waters, the fact that there is no life in them (Polygnotus' depiction of Acheron in the Lesche of the Cnidians apparently contained dead fish),[46] or the fact that the river was regarded as poisonous. The only reference providing us with any information about Styx's waters is in Pausanias, who says that those waters were believed to dissolve everything except gold,[47] which may indirectly support the last hypothesis on the poisonous character of the water.

Interestingly, *psychē*, the form of existence assumed by the living after death, is also imagined through the corpse. The *psychai* on the so-called Orphic gold leaves say that they are parched with thirst, and one can imagine that this is also the reason why fresh blood draws them near in Odysseus' Nekyia episode.[48] The thirst seems to be projected from the experience of the living onto the dead (and specifically on their *psychai*), who are perceived as dry, lacking liquid. This particular dry property of the dead is also recalled in a noun associated with the dead in funerary epigrams, but more often referring to soil, its dryness and bareness – κόνις (dust,



Figure 3.5 Terracotta statue head of Hades from Morgantina with polychromy. Fourth century BCE. Height 27.3 cm, Width 20.5 cm, Depth 18.5 cm. Archaeological Museum, Aidone.

Photograph: Su concessione del Parco Archeologico di Morgantina e della Villa Romana del Casale di Piazza Armerina.

ashes),[49] and again reflected in one of the names of their lord (Zeus Konios).[50] The dead (corpses) are seen as belonging to earth, which is subtly highlighted by the words used to denote them: χθόνιοι, γηγενεῖς or even Δημήτρειοι (those of Demeter).[51] Funerary inscriptions confirm the diffusion of this conception: 'grown from the earth, I have become earth again'.[52]

Haptic sensations bring us to another two perceptible properties of corpses which can be discerned in Greek imaginary representations of the dead and their world: *algor mortis*, a cooling of the body which occurs after *pallor mortis*, and *rigor mortis*, a stiffening of the muscles, which is the last of the processes the body undergoes after death. The adjective κρυερός (icy, cold, chilling) is frequently applied to the Underworld and tomb, but also Hades himself is a cold lord.[53] The chorus in Sophocles' *Philoctetes* also assure us that the one who rests with Hades (Ἅΐδᾳ παρακείμενος) lies stretched in the darkness (ἐκτέταται νύχιος).[54] A unique artistic representation on an Athenian white-ground *lekythos*, attributed to the Near the Inscription Painter and dated to around 460 BCE (Figure 3.6), seems to confirm this.[55] The corpse of a boy is realistically stiff and rigid with eyes open, which, as

Figure 3.6 Athenian white-ground *lekythos*, attributed to Near the Inscription Painter. c. 460 BCE. Antikensammlung, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, Berlin: F2447.

Photograph: ©ANTIKENSAMMLUNG, STAATLICHE MUSEEN ZU BERLIN – PREUSSISCHER KULTURBESITZ, Johannes Laurentius, F2447.

John Oakley observes, suggests that the scene represents a moment before *prothesis*, when the eyes of the deceased were closed.[56] These symbolic associations of stiffness and rigidness are easy to understand when one thinks of the transformation of the living body – supple, animated, warm – into a stiff and icy corpse.

A number of references show that death was perceived as a petrification of living beings and this perception lent its characteristics to imagining death. Pindar, for instance, uses the expression λίθινος θάνατος (stony death)[57] to describe the deadly power of Medusa's gaze. Here, the head of Gorgo also comes to mind, of which Odysseus, who wanted to see more of the Underworld, was afraid.[58] Gorgo, like Medusa, could be understood to some extent as an instrument or power of death, as she changed anyone who looked upon her into stone, and, as we have seen above, death comes through the eyes.[59] One could wonder whether the stone at the confluence of the two rivers, where Odysseus was ordered by Circe to perform the ritual for summoning the dead,[60] might perhaps embody a remnant of a too curious visitor or perhaps a marker of the world of the dead via a *double entendre*.

Stones were used by the Greeks as grave markers and it seems that their characteristics of stillness, sightlessness, and in an indirect way their 'resemblance'

to a state of being dead, could have been associated with corpses and projected on the dead and their world, as the dead body is cold but also stiff, like the tombs which cover them. Admetus in Euripides' *Alcestis* calls images of the deceased a 'cold pleasure' (ψυχρὰν τέρψιν).[61] Benveniste suggested that funerary stelai actually originated from stone *eidōla*/*kolossoi* either put into the grave as an imaginary double, a substitute, when the body of the deceased was impossible to recover, or above the grave to mark it.[62]

Acoustic sensations found their reflection in the *imaginarium* of death only to a more limited extent. We know that Hades is accompanied by silence (ἡ Σιωπή) and oblivion (ἡ Λήθη),[63] and the muteness of corpses must have influenced this association. Only in Homer do the shades utter any sound, but its point of reference, although perceptual, is not related to the corpses. Odysseus tells us that the swarms of the dead appeared out of Erebos with an unhuman shriek (θεσπεσίῃ ἰαχῇ); then this sound is compared to a sharp noise (κλαγγή) made by birds of prey, and finally, to the noise made by bats.[64] These are, however, isolated examples, and assimilation of the *psychai* to birds might allude to antecedents in Near Eastern poetry.[65] It is impossible to tell whether the shrieking or wailing encoded in the name of one of the Underworld rivers, Kokytos, has its origin in the sound of its water or the echo of wailing which it was supposed to carry, and whether the sound was imagined as imitating the utterances of the shades (as in the *Odyssey*) or perhaps the mourning wail (στοναχή) of the living that Hades obtains,[66] and with which, perhaps, his houses echo (ἠχήεντες).[67]

Smell and taste do not feature as perceptual frames in the imaginary representations of the dead and their world, even though smell at least must have had strong resonances in this context, given Herodotus' remark that the corpses of the Ethiopians do not produce an unpleasant smell ([ὁ νέκυς] ὀδμὴν οὐδεμίαν ἄχαριν παρεχόμενος),[68] and Cassandra's observation that Agamemnon's palace smells as if it were a tomb (ὅμοιος ἀτμὸς ὥσπερ ἐκ τάφου πρέπει).[69]

By now we can see that the world of the dead, imperceptible as it seems, is yet rendered highly perceptual through the language in which it comes to be imagined: most of the metaphors reflect the experience of the world of the living while encountering death and what remains afterwards. The realm of death involves especially haptic, acoustic, and visual sensations, even if only in a negative or privative sense, as the realm of death is in particular cold, immovable like a stone, sightless, dark, and silent. These are all the properties that corpses lend to Greek imaginary projections of the other world.

III. Imagination as Trigger for Perception

The previous section shows that the *imaginarium* of death is rooted in the perception of the dying and the dead body by the living. It seems, however, that the reverse process can be observed too: imaginary projections regarding the dead, based on cultural or social norms, can also shape how the dead are perceived. The most interesting case here is marriage, which, according to Artemidorus, resembles death and is signified by it.[70] Some parallels between marriage and funeral rites

resulted,[71] as it seems, in quite a sophisticated metaphor, detectable in Greek tragedy and funerary epigraphy, where dying is presented as an act of 'engagement to', or 'marrying', the lord of the dead by a young woman. In what follows, I explore the association between marriage and death in order to show that it was figurative, based on similar elements and the imagined transition rather than reflecting the mythical abduction of Kore-Persephone or any perception that the unmarried dead woman was in any way modelled on Persephone's figure, as scholarship usually explains the association, especially in relation to funerary epigraphy.[72]

In the funerary epigram of Kleanassa we read that to her *thalamos* there came not Hymenaeus, the preparer of weddings, or Hera with torches, but Hades, rushing in mourning garments with a bloody Erinys;[73] in another epigram, that Hades overtook Krokale's maidenhood;[74] and in an epigram for Klearista we hear that she received not marriage but bridal (ἐπινυμφίδιον) Hades, as the knot of her maidenhood was loosed.[75] These and many other similar motifs, conflating the two rituals, are common in grave epigrams. The earliest attestation of the 'marriage–death' metaphor comes from a funerary inscription from Kos, dated to the end of the sixth century BCE, which says that Empedokrate is a bride of destructive Hades (νύμφ' ὀλοῦ Ἄϊδαο).[76]

The symbolic conflation of funeral and wedding also found expression in funerary rituals, as is testified by the preserved parts of bridal outfits found in the tombs of young girls in Patras (Figures 3.7a and 3.7b), dated to the end of the fourth and early third centuries BCE.[77] Although explicit archaeological evidence is scarce,[78] it seems that burying young and unmarried females in wedding attire was customary. This hypothesis is supported by funerary epigrams in which the dead young woman explicitly says that in *these* garments she goes to the Underworld and that instead of the bridechamber she received a grave.[79]

Hades in these contexts is a poetical metaphor,[80] personified death. It derives from the fact that marriage, exactly like death, consists in the forceful uprooting of the woman from the safety to which she has become accustomed. An unmarried woman on her way to the 'houses of Hades' may also be seen as if she were going to marry him in the sense that marriage was women's natural and usual reason for moving *oikos*;[81] perhaps all these metaphors, that is the 'house of Hades' and the '*thalamos* or chamber of Persephone',[82] stem conceptually from the cultural importance of the *oikos* in general. The death–marriage association, however, does not have its origins in the perception of death and dying, as in the case of the *imaginarium* of death discussed above. It depends on the necessity for women to move from one *oikos* to another, which, on an emotional level, can be seen (like death) as separation; both these events connote a similar emotional experience. This imaginary association is then translated into reality, as the grave goods from Patras and elsewhere and the funerary epitaphs discussed above seem to confirm, and thus inevitably perceived: the transition fulfilled by marriage, that is the transition from the *oikos* of the father to the *oikos* of the bridegroom, is mapped onto the imaginary one fulfilled in death, that is moving from the *oikos* of the father in this world to the *oikos* of death in the beyond. This imaginary transition allows the funeral of an unmarried woman to be perceived necessarily as her *Ersatz* wedding ceremony.

Figure 3.7a Skull of a deceased young female, decorated with a wreath made of bronze or lead to which flowers and fruit have been attached with copper wire. Hellenistic. Archaeological Museum of Patras.

Photograph: ©Karolina Sekita; reproduced with the kind permission of the Archaeological Museum of Patras/Hellenic Ministry of Culture and Sports/Ephorate of Antiquities of Achaea.

Figure 3.7b Skull of a deceased young female, decorated with a wreath made of gold and lead with small copper-gilded clay balls imitating myrtle fruits. Fourth/third century BCE. Found in the Necropolis of Patras, Tomb 20. Archaeological Museum of Patras.

Photograph: ©Karolina Sekita; reproduced with the kind permission of the Archaeological Museum of Patras/Hellenic Ministry of Culture and Sports/Ephorate of Antiquities of Achaea.

The figure of Kore-Persephone cannot serve, as is usually but wrongly assumed in scholarship,[83] as an explicit parallel for the concept discussed above (even if seeing her as a prefiguration of a maiden taken by death when young is tempting) because such a notion is not attested in the ancient sources; we are rather dealing here with a literary or cultural convention, not religious thought.[84] Furthermore, ordinary mortals do not marry gods in Greek religion.[85] There is only one bride of Hades, as is subtly highlighted in the words of the chorus from Euripides' *Alcestis* directed to Alcestis: 'if good people have any advantage there too, may you have a share in it and sit as attendant beside Hades' bride' (εἰ δέ τι κἀκεῖ | πλέον ἔστ' ἀγαθοῖς, τούτων μετέχουσ' | Ἄιδου νύμφῃ παρεδρεύοις).[86] Alcestis was literally abducted by Hades[87] but not to marry him. Additional support for the interpretation of the metaphorical abduction by, or espousal of, death, as related to the cultural tradition of moving *oikos*, is provided by the fact that at times also a young man is said to be married to Persephone.[88] Especially interesting are the later developments of this poetics, where we find that Hades was jealous and that this was why he abducted a child or wife (here the metaphor is not limited to unmarried women),[89] or even that Persephone was angry because somebody was more beautiful than her.[90]

Although Persephone met Hades literally (was taken by him and married to him, according to the Eleusinian myth), the metaphor of a young woman's death and Hades' espousal of her does not seem to be modelled on this myth. The metaphor consists simply in the conflation of similar elements and acts inherent in both the events.[91] The parallels between these rituals are striking, indeed, but contrary to the myth (where Hades is a real bridegroom), here the lord of the dead acts in the narrative descriptions of weddings as death incarnate and is experienced as death, not as the god. The exact meaning of his name in this context is clearly detectable in tragedy. In Euripides' *Orestes*, Pylades tells Orestes that Helen, when faced with death, will be married to Hades (ἀλλ' οὐκέθ', Ἅιδην νυμφίον κεκτημένη),[92] obviously in the sense 'destined to die'. Similarly, Creon declares that he looks to Hades to break off his son's marriage (Ἅιδης ὁ παύσων τούσδε τοὺς γάμους ἐμοί)[93] and Antigone herself says that Hades, who puts all to sleep, is dragging her to the banks of Acheron (ἀλλά μ' ὁ παγ|κοίτας Ἅιδας ζῶσαν ἄγει | τὰν Ἀχέροντος | ἀκτάν),[94] to whom she will be married (ἀλλ' Ἀχέροντι νυμφεύσω).[95]

The symbolic conflation of the funeral and wedding rites finds expression outside funerary inscriptions only in tragedy, and it seems that tragic poets used the familiar customary tradition to their own ends. A special application of this motif may be found in Euripides' *Iphigenia in Tauris*. We learn from Iphigenia's speech that she was deceived by her father, who wanted her to marry Hades, not Achilles (as she had expected): Ἅιδης Ἀχιλλεὺς ἦν ἄρ', οὐχ ὁ Πηλέως, | ὅν μοι προσείσας πόσιν (369–70). The wedding rite is associated, but not conflated, with those of funeral and sacrifice (and it is in sacrifice that the play reaches its culmination) – note that usually sacrifice precedes both the wedding and the funeral: all, come what may, imply death. The construction of the metaphor is thus three-dimensional, as it were: there are wedding preparations and celebrations (365–8: μήτηρ δ' ἐμὲ | σέθεν κατακτείνοντος Ἀργεῖαί τε νῦν | ὑμνοῦσιν ὑμεναίοισιν, αὐλεῖται δὲ πᾶν | μέλαθρον) and the picture starts unfolding the macabre details as Iphigenia is brought in a

chariot to the 'bloody wedding' (371–2: ἐν ἁρμάτων ὄχοις | ἐς αἱματηρὸν γάμον), which is meant to be bloody indeed (like the sacrificial feast). The groom is Hades,[96] and Agamemnon takes on the role of Charon, as may be assumed on the basis of the word ἐπόρθμευσας.[97] As a result, the trip to Aulis looks like a passage to the Underworld. But the whole event was a trick (371: δόλῳ) and the metaphor consists in the anticipation of the expected (not experienced) death, evoked only by means of words, which serves the general dramatization of the plot; above all, the speech itself is framed additionally by νυμφεύματ' αἰσχρά and αἱματηρὸν γάμον.[98] What remains hidden until the very end is the real aim of the treachery: the sacrifice. Iphigenia's sacrifice takes the place of the ordinary *proteleia*, usually expected before either of the events (marriage or funeral). We can easily see in this play a skilful combination of the elements of the mythical plot (the suppositious marriage of Iphigenia to Achilles and her necessary sacrifice if the fleet is to sail to Troy) and the customary tradition familiar to the audience (as I have argued) of burying a young unmarried woman in the bridal attire, used to enhance the tragic event. In reality, it could be expected that the funeral of an unmarried girl would be strongly reminiscent of a wedding. In Euripides' play, it is the other way round: the trip to Aulis, where the wedding was supposed to take place, is stained with death and its realm, and, finally, the bride is forced to take the place of the preliminary sacrifice for her 'wedding/funeral'.

The motif of the 'deadly' marital rite is recalled also in the sacrificial imagery surrounding the deaths of Polyxena in Euripides' *Hecuba* and Cassandra in Euripides' *Trojan Women* and Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*. Polyxena confesses to Odysseus that she wishes to dedicate her body to Hades (Ἅιδῃ προστιθεῖσ' ἐμὸν δέμας) rather than to be a slave or a concubine.[99] Moreover, she compares herself to a calf being torn from its mother[100] – an image used also to denote a bride,[101] but here certainly enhancing the idea of a sacrificial design (e.g. 208: λαιμότομόν τ' Ἀίδᾳ). Cassandra also says that she will give herself in marriage to a bridegroom in the house of Hades (ἐς Ἅιδου νυμφίῳ γημώμεθα).[102] Indeed, in both the plays (Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* and Euripides' *Troades*), marriage, sacrifice, and death exist in a subtle interrelation, with a conversion of wedding motifs into their sacrificial and funerary counterparts; they accumulate as Cassandra's fate reaches its bitter and grim irony in the climax of the play. Euripides' Cassandra calls herself and her husband-*in-spe* 'blessed',[103] which in the story's context has an obvious *double entendre*,[104] as the 'real' bridegroom is Hades. In Aeschylus, Clytemnestra acts as his 'raging mother' (according to Cassandra's description: θύουσαν Ἅιδου μητέρ');[105] the mother of the bridegroom was traditionally in charge of welcoming the newlywed couple in their new home.[106] She expresses her delight at 'opening wide the gates' to welcome Agamemnon home,[107] and symbolically leads Cassandra through these gates. These are the gates of Hades in Cassandra's eyes (*Ag*. 1291: Ἅιδου πύλας) – according to her, as we have noticed before, the palace smells as if it were a tomb.[108] The chorus of Erinyes could be seen as the celebrants in the wedding procession, who traditionally sang the hymn outside the bridal chamber,[109] with a sympotic hue (the Erinyes-komasts drink human blood),[110] but these celebrants never leave the palace.[111] Cassandra sees herself as a kind of sacrificial victim, a

preliminary offering that precedes Agamemnon's burial.[112] The hellish metaphor, or rather the ritual perversion in this instance, serves (as in both the above-mentioned cases) to enhance the unbearable irony of the tragic events, which is emphasized in the words of Hecuba, who (preparing the corpse of Polyxena for washing) calls her daughter 'a wedding-less bride and a married virgin' (νύμφην τ' ἄνυμφον παρθένον τ' ἀπάρθενον), lying in a 'marriage bower of Hades' (Ἅιδα θαλάμους).[113]

The conversion of grave into bridal chamber, meanwhile, known from epitaphs, finds its most explicit manifestation in the story of Antigone, who is, as it were, cursed by Creon to marry somebody in 'the house of Hades':[114] the caverned rock which becomes her grave is called 'the bridal chamber of the maid and Hades' (λιθόστρωτον κόρης | νυμφεῖον Ἅιδου κοῖλον).[115] As is revealed later on, two corpses are lying in the chamber and the marriage is consummated in the Underworld (κεῖται δὲ νεκρὸς περὶ νεκρῷ, τὰ νυμφικὰ | τέλη λαχὼν δείλαιος εἰν Ἅιδου δόμοις).[116]

One more funerary theme is picked up by tragedy, namely that the marriage–death metaphor is not exclusively confined to young females but applies also to young unmarried males.[117] In Euripides' *Heracles*, Megara laments the upcoming death of her sons, and says that they will have Keres as their brides (νύμφας μὲν ὑμῖν Κῆρας), and that she will bring them tears instead of a customary wedding bath (ἐμοὶ δὲ δάκρυα λουτρὰ δυστήνῳ φέρειν).[118] Furthermore, she imagines that Amphitryon will give this wedding feast (πατὴρ δὲ πατρὸς ἑστιᾷ γάμους ὅδε), and acknowledge Hades as his father-in-law (Ἅιδην νομίζων πενθερόν).[119] The boys are dressed like the dead (τούσδε φθιμένων | ἔνδυτ' ἔχοντας), but the garments are not described.[120] The whole event has again a touch of sacrificial design, as in Megara's eyes Heracles' family resembles sacrificial victims to be led to the Underworld.[121]

The theme of sacrifice woven into the marriage–death metaphor is very common in tragedy, contrary to what we find in funerary epigraphy, and it can be seen as a particular development of the tradition visible on tombstones. The motif of sacrifice is not unexpected in this context, since the sacrifice, as we have said, preceded both weddings and funerals, and the stress on it surely further dramatized the tragic plot by introduction of sacrificial vocabulary and related metaphors. Another innovation in the funerary narrative is the inclusion of other beings or entities associated with the realm of the dead, such as the Keres and Acheron, who could serve as spouses in the beyond. Tragedy had a specific and unique take on the customary tradition, discernible in epitaphs and grave goods, in which, thanks to the imaginary conflation of the funeral and wedding rites, the young dead were perceived as brides and bridegrooms. The tragic plots that employed this metaphor, a metaphor familiar to the audience and encoded in the customary tradition, must have had a lasting effect.

IV. Conclusions

Clearly, imagination and perception played an important and mutually dynamic role in Greek conceptualizations of the dead, their world, and the 'after-death' in general. The language used in these contexts displays particularly naturalistic

tendencies, which have their origins in perception of the dead bodies and the observation of the changes they undergo,[122] especially visible in the attention given to the 'verisimilitude' of the images of the dead in their underworldly visualizations (fresh wounds, etc.). Thus, we find projections of haptic, acoustic, and other sensual experiences related to corpses onto language and metaphors related to the dead, the world of the dead, and the beyond. These are, specifically, sightless, cold, still, and stiff. Nevertheless, even though the perceptual properties and ideas remain constant, it is clear that the imagination of death and dying also impacted its perception. This is particularly discernible in grave goods of young unmarried women, which confirm that the visualization of the death of young people as their marriage in funerary epigraphy was indeed perceived in the context of the reality of ritual, where funeral and wedding characteristics were merged. The basis for imagining the young dead as brides should be seen in the fact of transition of young girls from one 'household' to another, and separation from their families, implied by both marriage and death, rather than in the conscious mythicization of the deceased as a figure similar to Kore-Persephone. Furthermore, this particular conceptualization of the deceased, given that its characteristics point to the general importance of the *oikos*, may have influenced, if not changed to some extent, the notion of the Underworld: not only is the grave in funerary epigraphy and tragedy often designated as a '*thalamos* or chamber of Persephone', but so is the Underworld itself.[123]

The customary tradition of seeing the young dead individual as bride or bridegroom in epitaphs and grave goods formed a marriage–death metaphor, which was uniquely employed by tragic poets in the mythical plots which featured death of young people. We can observe a further development of this theme in tragedy, which transplanted the customary element of sacrifice preceding both the wedding and the funeral onto a context in which the death–marriage metaphor unfolds the tragic events.

Some cultural parity can be found in Near Eastern and Semitic sources, which also refer to perceptual properties of the world of the dead understood as a tomb and a world without return, covered with darkness, dryness, and silence.[124] The cultural tradition reflected in the perceived status of the deceased, which is imagined as subject to change in the 'after-death' through conflation of funerary and marital rituals, seems, however, to have no such Near Eastern parallel, and may perhaps be regarded as a quite sophisticated development of Greek reflection on deathly matters.

The metaphors related to the dead and their world, discussed in this chapter through their perceptual frames, teem with emotional disappointment and despair, in attempts to concretize and understand something that does not respond, but at the same time stubbornly demands acknowledgement. Constant references to a lack of something which will never be replaced, detectable in their fabric, underscore it, and paradoxically revive the presence of those who are absent.[125]

Abbreviations

Abbreviations of ancient authors and texts, as well as scholarly reference works, follow those of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, fourth edition; abbreviations of journal titles follow those of *L'Année Philologique*. Exceptions are listed below.

Bernabé, PEG II = Bernabé, A. (ed.) 2004. *Poetae epici Graeci: testimonia et fragmenta: Pars II, Orphicorum et Orphicis similium testimonia et fragmenta*. Munich and Leipzig: K. G. Saur.
CEG = Hansen, P. A. (ed.) 1983–1989. *Carmina epigraphica Graeca*. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Opp. *Hal*. = Oppian, *Haleutica*.
Plut. *De E* = Plutarch, *De E apud Delphos* = *Moralia* 384a–394c.
SGO = Merkelbach, R. & J. Stauber 1998–2004. *Steinepigramme aus dem griechischen Osten*. Munich and Leipzig: B. G. Teubner.
RVAp = Trendall, A. D. & A. Cambitoglou 1978–1982. *The Red-Figured Vases of Apulia*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Notes

1 'Unusual' burials, however, studied by Bosnakis (2020: 43–69 [categories], 93–185 [particular types of 'deviant' burial]), may suggest otherwise, even though further studies are needed to establish the meaning behind these finds, and Bosnakis expresses cautionary thoughts regarding quick and easy interpretations.
2 On Plato's *Phaedo* as a ghost story about ghost stories, see: McNeill (2019: 145–70); on ghosts in tragedy: Whitmore (1915); in Euripides' tragedies: Klotsche (1918); on ghost stories in classical antiquity: Felton (1999); in other ancient and modern cultures: Poo (2009).
3 Carroll (1990: 27–42); he also believes that horror is a modern genre which begins to appear in the eighteenth century with its immediate source in the English Gothic novel, German *Schauer-roman*, and French *roman noir* (4).
4 Hom. *Il*. 19.24–8 (Achilles' preoccupation with the possibility that Patroclus' corpse may start rotting and turning into a feast for worms). On corpse mutilation in Homer, see Segal (1971), and for contrast with the views of the Classical period, and further bibliography, see Kucewicz (2016: 425–36).
5 Hom. *Il*. 20.61–5. On revelation and concealment of the dead (and the idea that things should not be seen), see further Clifford (this volume, p. 204).
6 Chantraine (1968–1980) s.v. σμερδαλέος; cf. Beekes (2010) s.v. σμερδαλέος.
7 Cf. LSJ s.v. εὐρώεις; for tomb see Soph. *Aj*. 1167 (τάφον εὐρώεντα); for references confirming the co-extensiveness of the Underworld, earth and tomb, see n. 31; see also Sekita (2022).
8 Hom. *Il*. 20.65. The same is true for all unusual treatments of the body – cf. Athena turning her head away with disgust and taking her favour away from Tydeus when she saw him gobbling up the brain of an enemy, according to ΣD *Il*. 5.126. The event is represented, however, in full detail in the terracotta group from a *tympanon* of temple A at Pyrgi (*LIMC* s.v. Septem no. 47, mid-fifth century BCE, Museo Nazionale Etrusco di Villa Giulia, Rome). It also seems that Italy was much less restrained concerning the visibility of internal parts of the body, which is reflected in the anatomical ex-votos found in Italic sanctuaries, whereas internal organs are hardly ever represented in mainland Greece (cf. Ożarowska [2019: 417–27]). Vase paintings, however, seem to be less restrained, as testified to by the famous drinking cup with the representation of Pentheus being torn apart by Agaue and her sisters, where his guts are clearly visible (*LIMC* VII s.v. Pentheus no. 43, cf. no. 39).
9 Hom. *Il*. 16.668–70 (Sarpedon), 23.184–91 (Hector).
10 Cf. Heraclitus' comment (DK 22 B 96) that νέκυες γὰρ κοπρίων ἐκβλητότεροι (corpses are more fit to be cast out than dung). On miasmatic aspects of corpses: Parker (1983: 32–48, esp. 44, 46–7) and Garland (1985: 41–3).

11 Sekita (2021: 47–8).
12 Aeschines (2.181–2) powerfully remarks that it is not death that one should fear but the humiliation by others which it may bring. Although he refers here to verbal insults, the physical maltreatment of the body up to its utter disfigurement is voiced many times in Greek sources as a means of humiliation: note, for instance, Achilles promising Hector the shameful treatment of his body (Hom. *Il*. 22.395); cf. n. 4 above. See further Clifford (this volume, n. 30).
13 Arist. *Poet*. 1448b10–12.
14 In the *Athenian Constitution* (50.2.10), [Aristotle] mentions public officials (*astynomoi*) in charge of the removal by public slaves of the bodies of those who died on streets. A story in Plato's *Republic* (439e7–440a3), about a certain Leontius who felt ashamed because of his desire (which prevailed in the end) to look at the corpses of those publicly executed by the city walls, is ambiguous as to whether Leontius' reaction points to (a) a natural reaction to such a view being repulsion and disgust (cf. Moss [2005: 153]), even though publicly executed criminals were normally exposed to public view (cf. Allen [2000: 136]); or (b) his desire to pity the criminals and grieve for them, even though they do not deserve either, as a cause of his disgust (Liebert [2013: 179–201]).
15 Cf. Hom. *Il*. 22.338–43; Eur. *Hec*. 47–50. Burial has also both customary and religious dimensions: Hom. *Il*. 22.358; *Od*. 11.73; Soph. *Ant*. 519; Ar. *Lys*. 2.7 (cf. *Il*. 16.457, 675: τὸ γὰρ γέρας ἐστὶ θανόντων). Bremmer (1983: 89–108); Garland (1985: 21–37); on Greek sumptuary laws regarding funerals, see Engels (1998).
16 *CEG* 520 (c. 370–360 BCE, Attica). Cf. Sappho fr. 55 LP: ἀφάνης κὰν Ἄΐδα δόμῳ φοιτάσῃς (invisible you will go to and fro in the house of Hades).
17 The Underworld is frequently referred to with the epithet ἀφανής: Pind. fr. 207 (Snell-Maehler): Ταρτάρου ἀφανοῦς; Aesch. *Sept*. 860: πάνδοκον εἰς ἀφανῆ τε χέρσον; *SGO* 06/03/01 (Stratonikeia, imperial): τὰς ἀ[φ]ανεῖς ἀτραποὺς εἰς Ἀΐδ[ην κ]ατέβην. The epithet is also given to Kore/Persephone: Soph. *OC* 1556: τὰν ἀφανῆ θεόν.
18 For the analysis of the name *Hades* and his cult, see Sekita (forthcoming).
19 Though compare Turner (2016) on the visuality of death: see further Clifford (this volume, pp. 203–4).
20 Hom. *Od*. 11.42. For *psychē* as a 'snap-shot' at the moment of death, see Sekita (2021: 48–9).
21 *Od*. 11. 206–8 and *Il*. 23.99–107 (respectively).
22 Compare Phillips (this volume, pp. 261–5).
23 See LSJ s.v. διαφανής.
24 *RVAp* 496, 18/41, c. 330 BCE, Taranto Museo Archeologico Nazionale Inv. 194763.
25 *ABV* 76, 1, Attic black-figure volute *kratēr* (*kratēr* François), c. 570 BCE, Florence V4209.
26 *ABV* 144, 10, Attic black-figure *amphora* by Exekias, c. 540–530 BCE, Orvieto 2747.
27 Chazalon (2008: 25–39); Lissarrague (2008: 19–24). For deities' invisibility suggested by the depiction of their statues in vase painting, see Bettini (2017: 27–9).
28 Soph. *Phil*. 856.
29 See n. 16 above.
30 Note that Hades received by lot the nether darkness: Hom. *Il*. 15.187–93; Hes. *Th*. 881–5.
31 *CEG* 543.8–9 (c. 350 BCE, Attica): με χθὼν ἥδε καλύπτει | ἡ πᾶσιν κοινὴ τοῖς ἀπογιγνομένοις; Cf. frequent references to the dead or their gods as 'those under the earth': Soph. *Ant*. 65 (τοὺς ὑπὸ χθονός), *El*. 1419 (οἱ γᾶς ὑπαὶ κείμενοι); Eur. *Alc*. 896 (τῶν ὑπὸ γαῖαν). See also Soph. *Aj*. 1167: τάφον εὐρώεντα with n. 7 above.
32 Note, for instance, a very popular metaphor for the tomb as a *thalamos* of Persephone: Eur. *Supp*. 1022; *CEG* (fourth century BCE, Attica) 489, 510, 513, 592, 593, 575; *Anth. Pal.* 7.182–3, 185, 188, 492, 547; see also n. 123 below. Sekita (2021: 47).

33 σκότος ὅσσε κάλυψεν: Hom. *Il*. 4.461, 503, 526; 6.11, 13, 575; 14.519; 15.578; 16.316; 20.393, 471; 23.181; cf. Hsch. σ 1134.
34 Hom. *Il*. 5.696, 13.344, 20.421.
35 [Hes]. *Sc*. 264–5.
36 Opp. *Hal*. 3.157. On substances of 'invisibility', see Bettini (2017: 31–5, and, further, 38–40 on ἀχλύς).
37 Hsch. ε 5685, σ 1133; cf. Hom. *Il*. 16.350; *GVI* 632; *Anth. Pal*. 7.251 (κυάνεον θανάτου ἀμφεβάλοντο νέφος). On Hades and darkness, see Sekita (forthcoming).
38 Cf. Hom. *Il*. 15.191.
39 Steingräber (2006: 182) thinks that the blue demon in this representation could be the famous Eurynomos described by Pausanias as part of Polygnotus' Nekyia at the Lesche of the Cnidians at Delphi (10.28.7).
40 LSJ s.v. χλωρός.
41 The corpses of people with fair complexion turn white and black hues turn ash grey: Stanford (1961) *ad* Hom. *Od*. 11.43.
42 See n. 35 above.
43 Pl. *Resp*. 387c; Plut. *Quaest. conv.* 736a; Hsch. α 2986.
44 LSJ s.v. ἀλίβας.
45 Soph. fr. 790 *TrGF*; cf. fr. 940.
46 Paus. 10.28.1.
47 Paus. 8.18.6.
48 474–6, 478–80, 482–3 Bernabé, *PEG II*; Hom. *Od*. 11.34–43.
49 Ashes of the dead: *Anth. Pal*. 7.28, 476, 489, 589; κόνις that covers corpses: *CEG* 576, 657, 709; *Anth. Pal*. 7.49, 467. Frequent juxtaposition of κόνις with χέρσος (Pind. *Nem*. 4.70: ἐν κονίᾳ χέρσῳ, 9.43: ἐν κονίᾳ χέρσῳ), which refers to barren soils (Theophr. *Hist. Pl*. 8.6.4: ἐν ταῖς χέρσοις) and to the realm of Hades (Aesch. *Sept*. 860: πάνδοκον εἰς ἀφανῆ τε χέρσον); metaphorically, it also indicates the barrenness of women (Soph. *OT* 1502: χέρσους φθαρῆναι κἀγάμους).
50 On Zeus Konios and Demeter Konia see Sekita (forthcoming).
51 χθόνιοι: Eur. fr. 912.8 *TrGF*; γηγενεῖς: Pl. *Leg*. 727d–e, Suda γ 226; Δημήτρειοι: Plut. *De fac*. 943b. On the meaning and contexts of these words, see Sekita (2022); on the concept of earth reflected in the names of the lord of the dead (as Zeus Chthonios, Zeus Damatrios, Zeus Konios, Gaos), see Sekita (forthcoming).
52 *CEG* 482 (c. fourth century BCE, Attica): ἐκ γαίας βλαστών πάλιν γέγονα; cf. *CEG* 485 (c. fourth century BCE, Attica): θρεφθὲς δ'ἐν χθονὶ τηιδ' ἔθανεν ('turned into the earth he died in'). The idea seems to appear first with Xenophanes: DK 21 A29, B29, B33, A36, B27. Earth and the dead are also paired in libations: Aesch. *Pers*. 220, 523.
53 Cf. [Hes]. *Sc*. 255 (Τάρταρον ἐς κρυόενθ'); *GVI* 701.4 (κρυερὸς θάλαμος); Hes. *Op*. 153 (κρυεροῦ Ἀίδαο).
54 Soph. *Phil*. 855–61.
55 Antikensammlung Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, F 2247. Fairbanks (1907: 200, no. 16). He suggests (n. 2) that the 'nearest parallel to this scene' is represented on a much later *lekythos* showing a woman carrying a child on a flat tray; for this representation, see Gardner (1895: 328, fig. 2).
56 Oakley (2004: 86, fig. 55; 2020: 214). The scene, however, is damaged and very bare, which complicates the interpretation, but there are no elements that could suggest anything other than a domestic setting.
57 Pind. *Pyth*. 10.75; interestingly, stones are also sometimes referred to as the bones of earth – Ov. *Met*. 1.38.3; Schol. Apollonius Rhodius 3.1086; Paus. 9.16.7.
58 Hom. *Od* 11.633–5. See further Clifford (this volume, n. 15).
59 See n. 33.
60 *Od*. 10.513–15.

61 Eur. *Alc*. 353; cf. 348–54.
62 Benveniste (1931: 118–35). See further Clifford (this volume, n. 15).
63 Plut. *De E* 394a.
64 Hom. *Od*. 11.43, 605, 24.5–9, respectively.
65 Cp. *Descent of Ištar* 10: they are clothed like birds with feathers as garments (*labšū-ma kīma issūri subāt gap[pi]*); transcription after Borger (2006).
66 Stesichorus fr. 55 *PMG*; Aesch. *Sept*. 866–70; Soph. *OT* 30; Phrynichus fr. 69 Kassel-Austin, *PCG*.
67 Hes. *Th*. 767–8.
68 Hdt. 3.24.
69 Aesch. *Ag*. 1311.
70 Artem. 2.65 Hercher.
71 For an analysis of the conflation of marriage and funeral rituals in Greek tragedy, see Rehm (1994: 11–42).
72 Rose (1925: 242); Redfield (1982: 190); Foley (1989: 87); Alexiou (2002: 195); Mackin Roberts (2020: 86); Walker (2020: 100–18). Svenbro (1993: 19) dismisses the possibility that *korē* in a funerary inscription for Phrasikleia alludes to Kore-Persephone but without explanation.
73 *Anth. Pal.* 7.188.
74 *Anth. Pal.* 7.183.
75 *Anth. Pal.* 7.182.
76 *SEG* 57.799.
77 Petropoulos (2005: 68, fig. 9); Kolonas & Stavropoulou-Gatsi (2017: 158, fig. 169).
78 It is worth noting that pre-marital status might also have been marked in different ways, for instance, by grave goods. *Loutrophoroi*, used in pre-wedding preparations but found both as grave goods and tomb markers, both in clay and stone, in Attica and elsewhere, are a good example: Kurtz and Boardman (1971: 241); on Thera, there were also found *lebētes gamikoi* (marriage vases), dated to the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, as grave markers (*ibidem*). Joan Reilly (1989: 411–44, esp. 431 for conclusions), in her study of the so-called 'mistress and maid' iconography of the funerary Athenian white-ground *lekythoi*, concluded that these scenes represent various stages of wedding preparations and that they might have been a fitting image for a young woman who died unmarried. At Patras, one of the common goods found in young females' graves (including those of poorer social strata) were eggs, which might have served as markers of their unmarried status: Petropoulos (2005: 68).
79 Peek (1955) nos. 683 (οἵ‹ς› γὰρ ἔμελλον | κοσμεῖσθαι νύμφα τοῖσδ᾽Ἀίδαν | ἔμολον), 1238 (νυμφοκόμοις στολίδεσσι σὺν εὔκοσ|μοις γὰρ ἄωρος νυμφῶνος στυ|γεροῦ τοῦδε λέλογχα τάφου). For modern parallels, e.g., among the Romanians, dressing an unmarried dead girl in a bridal costume and conducting a marriage procession to the tomb, see Rose (1925: 238 and n. 5); for Thracian customs and other Indo-European peoples, see Janakieva (2005: 14–23).
80 On Hades as death, see Sekita (forthcoming).
81 Note that a mock abduction might have also been part of wedding ceremonies. For the Spartan abduction rite, see Lupi (2000: 86–90), Scott (2011: 413–24); contrast Kulesza (2008: 135–66). The motif of abduction in the Athenian marital ritual is still debated: Jenkins (1983); Oakley and Sinos (1993: 12–13).
82 For references, see n. 32.
83 See n. 72.
84 Compare Fearn (this volume, pp. 235–9).
85 But note the ritual during the Anthesteria: Dem. 59.73, 76.
86 Eur. *Alc*. 744–6.
87 Eur. *Alc*. 259–64.

88 *Anth. Pal*. 7.507–8.
89 *SGO* 16/43/03–04, 16/45/08, 16/45/11.
90 *SGO* 03/06/07.
91 For reference, see n. 71.
92 Eur. *Or*. 1109.
93 Soph. *Ant*. 575.
94 Soph. *Ant*. 810–13.
95 Soph. *Ant*. 816.
96 Confirmed also in another play by Euripides, *Iphigenia in Aulis*, by Agamemnon himself in 461 (Ἅιδης νιν, ὡς ἔοικε, νυμφεύσει τάχα) and 540 (πρὶν Ἅιδῃ παῖδ' ἐμὴν προσθῶ λαβών), and by Klytemnestra in 1278 (φεύγει σε πατὴρ Ἅιδῃ παραδούς).
97 Cf. Eur. *IT* 266 with Kyriakou (2006) comm. *ad loc*., *Tro*. 568–76, *Alc*. 253.
98 Eur. *IT* 365 and 372, respectively.
99 Eur. *Hec*. 368; cf. 351–67.
100 Eur. *Hec*. 205–10.
101 Cf. Eur. *HF* 529–30 and Rehm (1994: 74–5).
102 Eur. *Tro*. 445.
103 Eur. *Tro*. 310–13.
104 Rehm (1994: 14); Vermeule (1979: 72–4).
105 Aesch. *Ag*. 1235.
106 Cf. Rehm (1994: 14–17 with fig. 6, 48–9).
107 Aesch. *Ag*. 600–10.
108 See n. 69.
109 Aesch. *Ag*. 1191–2 (ὑμνοῦσι δ' ὕμνον δώμασιν προσήμεναι | πρώταρχον ἄτης).
110 Aesch. *Ag*. 1188–9 (καὶ μὴν πεπωκώς γ', ὡς θρασύνεσθαι πλέον, | βρότειον αἷμα κῶμος ἐν δόμοις μένει).
111 Aesch. *Ag*. 1186 (τὴν γὰρ στέγην τήνδ' οὔποτ' ἐκλείπει χορός); cf. n. 109.
112 Aesch. *Ag*. 1277–8.
113 Eur. *Hec*. 612 and 483, respectively.
114 Soph. *Ant*. 654.
115 Soph. *Ant*. 1204–5.
116 Soph. *Ant*. 241–2.
117 See n. 88.
118 Eur. *HF* 481–2.
119 Eur. *HF* 483–4.
120 Eur. *HF* 542–3; cf. 329. Lycus, in reply to Megara's plea to dress her sons for death, says that he would not begrudge the children *peploi* (333: οὐ φθονῶ πέπλων), but no other detail of the funerary garments is mentioned.
121 Eur. *HF* 453 (ἕτοιμ' ἄγειν τὰ θύματ' εἰς Ἅιδου τάδε); cf. 451.
122 On perception of images of the dead as source for imagination, compare Clifford (this volume).
123 Aesch. *Pers*. 624 (θαλάμους ὑπὸ γῆς); Eur. *Hec*. 483 (Ἅιδα θαλάμους); *CEG* 563 (*koinotaphēs* [in which all are buried] *thalamos*). The tomb is also called the guardian and home of the deceased: *CEG* 487 (c. fourth century BCE, Attica), 641 (c. 350–300 BCE, Thessaly), respectively. Cf. the parallel Sumerian notion in Lisman (2013: 47ff.) (*Enki's Journey to the Underworld*, lines 301–3).
124 Johnston (2002); Katz (2003).
125 Various ideas discussed in this chapter were presented at seminars in Oxford, Bryn Mawr College, and Tel Aviv. I thank the audiences of these events for their stimulating discussion. I am also grateful to the editors of this volume for their comments. For help with obtaining images 3.4 and 3.5 I am grateful to Stefania Peterlini and the British School at Rome. All mistakes remain my own.

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4 An Imagined and Imagining *dēmos* in Athenian Public Inscription

Leah Lazar

In the final decade of the sixth century BCE, the Athenians began to inscribe decrees – decisions made by their assembly of citizens – on stone and display them in their public space.[1] The earliest surviving example is already introduced with the declaration of the *dēmos*' agency that would later become formulaic and ubiquitous: ἔδοχσεν τõι δέμοι.[2] This phrase is often translated as 'the *dēmos* decided'. But the lexical range of the verb δοκέω is broader and is difficult to render in translation: it implies supposing, expecting, and thinking. The Athenians were using public inscription to assert a particular construction of their *dēmos*, and this *dēmos* was explicitly capable of, even defined by, collective thought. To turn around Benedict Anderson's famous conception of the imagined community, the inscribed decrees not only crafted an imagined *dēmos* but an *imagining* one.[3]

In this chapter, I will explore how this epigraphic construction of self-identity through thinking was articulated in the fifth century BCE. In my first section, I will set out how it was not just the *dēmos* that was crafted in Athenian stones and minds, but specifically a thinking *dēmos*. The inscriptions invited viewers to imagine this thinking *dēmos,* and to imagine themselves as part of it. They were monuments that resulted from thought, represented thought, and perhaps even attempted to impact on the thinking of the individuals who viewed them, especially their thinking about the self, just as Karolina Sekita's funerary epitaphs both embodied and promoted a visualization of death as marriage (see Chapter 3).

I will then turn from the act of thinking to the thoughts themselves. After situating the initial emergence of inscribed decrees in the context of late Archaic Athenian expansion, I will argue that Athenian public inscription asserted a *dēmos* whose thoughts were directed to external groups, a monolithic whole defined through contrast. Finally, I will explore how the unified *dēmos* presented in the inscribed decrees began to turn its thoughts more towards individual Athenian citizens and their behaviour as the fifth century progressed. As internal instability grew, public inscription was used as a medium to counter this instability, and the epigraphic *dēmos* was pushed towards greater introspection.

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I. An Imagining *dēmos*

Although Archaic Attica has provided varied and extensive evidence of individuals writing,[4] including inscribed dedications by Athenian officials in the public space of the Acropolis,[5] the Athenians were slower than other Greek communities to inscribe and display documents as a collective. A law from Dreros on Crete identified as a decision of the *polis* is dated as early as the mid-seventh century BCE,[6] and a number of other communities also erected public inscriptions in the seventh and sixth centuries.[7] The earliest known inscribed Athenian decree, mentioned above, is usually dated only to the final decade of the sixth century,[8] and there was a trickle of further decrees in the following years. But by the middle of the fifth century, and even more so by its end, the Athenians were employing this practice on an unprecedented scale. They inscribed decrees, recording time-specific assembly business, as well as other genres of public document such as financial records, much more prolifically than any other community.[9]

In an attempt to explain this prolific culture of fifth-century Athenian inscription, Benjamin Meritt made the influential argument that inscribed decrees were inherently tied to the democracy and were public records of decisions made in the assembly, allowing for transparency and accountability.[10] Other scholars have since complicated this interpretation.[11] Of course, the decrees did result from the workings of democratic institutions. It has been noted, however, that only certain decisions with a limited range of subjects were selected for inscription on stone,[12] so the inscriptions were by no means representative of all assembly business. Further, the sanitized, apolitical accounts of assembly proceedings provided by the inscribed decrees, with few traces of controversy or debate, were not accurate representations of the actual democratic process.[13] Other decrees would have been recorded on less permanent materials or in archives.[14] There has also been an increased focus in epigraphic studies more broadly on the materiality of inscriptions, bolstering the argument that Athenian decrees were not simply archives, but physical monuments created for purposes other than the faithful record of Athenian democratic mechanisms.[15]

In recent years, scholars have variously suggested that Athenian inscribed decrees asserted state authority, bestowed honour on gods and men, and contributed to the formation of collective memory.[16] Such approaches emphasizing the symbolism and self-representation inherent in Athenian inscriptions are now generally accepted. As Polly Low observes, 'the claim that the inscribed decrees of Classical Athens have some sort of commemorative function is, these days, probably not so much uncontroversial as positively mundane'.[17]

For my purposes, then, it is not novel to argue that Athenian inscribed decrees were monuments that both reflected and actively contributed to a construction of communal self-identity. The decrees channelled a conception of the *dēmos* constructed by the *dēmos* itself, or at least by some of its citizens. As physical monuments created at the behest of the *dēmos* itself and erected in Athenian public space, they also made this particular mode of self-representation visible and permanent.

But the Athenians made a noteworthy choice in their construction of the epigraphic *dēmos*, a choice that has seldom been explored.[18] The decrees, with their ubiquitous introductory formula, ἔδοξεν τῶι δήμωι or ἔδοξεν τῆι βολῆι καὶ τῶι δήμωι, were presented as the result of *collective cognition*.[19] Liddell and Scott define δοκέω in the first instance as 'to think, suppose, imagine, expect', with a second meaning of 'to seem to one'. The second sense of δοκέω emerges from the first: it implies that thinking has happened because of perception, internal cognition triggered by external stimuli. Liddell and Scott, however, despite categorizing the introductory formula under a subset of this second definition ('to seem good to one'), still choose to translate the formula found in the decrees as *placuit senatui*, 'decreed' or 'resolved'. Common translations of decrees mostly follow this precedent: 'the council and the people decided'[20] or 'it was resolved by the council and the people'.[21] These translations convey only the results of the cognitive process, but not the process itself, and thus do not represent the full force of thinking implied by the verb. The decrees are not presenting what happened, what will happen, or what should happen. They are explicitly representations of how the world *seemed* to the *dēmos*, or to the *dēmos* and the *boulē*; the Athenians were thinking about identity through thinking.

This was a distinctively Athenian epigraphic conception. To the best of my knowledge, no direct comparison can be provided by the numerous public inscriptions erected by other Greek communities in the Archaic period.[22] Nine laws from Crete contain an explicit verb of decision, specifically forms of the verb ἀνδάνω ('please'),[23] including the early law from Dreros with its declaration of enactment: ἃδ' ἔFαδε πόλι ('these things pleased the *polis*').[24] This phrase is itself striking and perhaps implies a process of collective feeling, rather than of collective thinking (as does the Latin phrase *placuit senatui*);[25] it no doubt merits more analysis in another context. More commonly, there is no such introductory statement at all, even when a communal body capable of decision-making is present in the document: an early fifth-century BCE Thasian document regulating behaviour in the streets, for example, has no heading but repeatedly refers to the *polis* (mostly as the recipient of fines),[26] while an inscription from sixth-century BCE Chios names a popular decision-making body, a 'council of the *dēmos*' (βολὴν τὴν δημ|οσίην) but shows no explicit evidence of its workings.[27] The formula is also absent from early examples of inscribed deme decisions: this epigraphic conception was confined to the Athenian centre and the *dēmos* as a whole.[28] By the end of the fifth century, the formula began to be used by other communities, perhaps as a result of Athenian influence,[29] and is regularly found elsewhere from the fourth century onwards.

In Athens itself the idea of an imagining *dēmos* was not limited to the inscribed decrees. Literary texts sometimes show direct interaction with the language of the introductory formula. In the 460s, Aeschylus emphatically uses it in *Suppliants*, when the Argives, a mythical analogue for the Athenians, make the ethically significant decision to protect the suppliant women: Danaus reports that 'it seemed good to the Argives without any doubt' (δοξεν Ἀργείοισιν οὐ διχορρόπως, 605), with 'the *dēmos* as a whole' making the decision (πανδημίᾳ, 607).[30] Later, rhetorical constructions of Athenian identity recognize group cognition as a particularly Athenian trait. Thucydides' Pericles notes the Athenian capacity for deliberation

(*logismos*) in his Funeral Oration,[31] while fourth-century orators eulogize Athenian *homonoia* ('unanimity of thought').[32] Evidently, the inscribed decrees were not the only medium in which collective thinking and Athenian self-identity were explored, but they do provide early evidence for this association. The later rhetorical emphasis on qualities such as *logismos* and *homonoia* perhaps shows an abstraction of the decrees' more tangible collective thought.

Moreover, the particular formula under consideration here – ἔδοξεν τῆι βολῆι καὶ τῶι δήμωι – is only found in the inscribed decrees and in direct quotations of decrees in literary texts.[33] This way of denoting collective Athenian cognitive activity appears to have been restricted to decrees, which would have been disseminated through other oral and written processes, but most permanently and visibly through public inscription. The language also had a specific place and function in the decrees themselves. In Athenian decrees of the sixth and fifth centuries BCE, the aorist indicative form of the verb (ἔδοξεν) is never used outside of the introductory formula; the tense is appropriate for a monument asserting a permanent, unchanging and therefore complete cognitive process.[34] The *dēmos* does feature in the main body of the decrees, but the formula is by far the most common context for its appearance. More regularly, the Athenian collective is referred to as 'the Athenians'. The *dēmos* of the decrees was thus largely defined through its thinking capacity, and this particular kind of thinking was restricted to the *dēmos*.

The emphasis on the thinking *dēmos* was an important part of how the inscribed decrees asserted communal identity in the monumental landscape of Athens. The Athenians, or at least the subset of citizens in control of Athenian civic institutions, deliberately chose in their decrees to present a community not just united in action but in cognition, and then to make this presentation visible and permanent through public inscription. Regardless of their level of literacy, a viewer may have noted the repetition of the introductory phrase at the top of every stone, forming a visual as well as lexical pattern; they may have associated it with their memory of the decrees being read out in the assembly.[35] The inscribed decrees invited the viewer to imagine the *dēmos* as a body capable of thought and, if the viewer was an Athenian citizen, to imagine themselves as part of that thinking collective. They perhaps even actively contributed to the creation of the collective thought they monumentalized, as unchanging and external material objects situated in the shared space of the individual citizens whose individual thinking had to come together to form this collective thought. Indeed, scholars have argued that the Athenians attempted to achieve real consensus in their decision-making,[36] and it is possible that the inscribed decrees played a part.

But what was the epigraphic *dēmos* actually thinking about? If Athenian inscribed decrees promoted the construction of a thinking *dēmos*, then the thoughts themselves, not just the act of thinking, must be considered.

II. The *dēmos* and Others

Only decrees concerning certain subject matter were chosen for inscription, so the potential thinking of the *dēmos* as represented in these monuments was limited.

In fact, almost all the earliest inscribed Athenian documents, from the end of the sixth century and through most of the fifth century up to its final decades,[37] can be divided into two broad categories on the basis of their content: those concerning other communities and those concerning the gods (of course there is overlap).[38] In this section, I will argue that both these categories entailed a construction of the thinking *dēmos* through contrast with groups perceived as other and external to itself.[39] The viewer of these decrees was invited to imagine a collective unified in thought, and defined against an exterior world.

First, many of the decrees concern other communities, whether cities as collectives or foreign individuals, both subject allies and parties beyond the empire. Rosalind Thomas, observing the prominence of decrees concerning Athenian relations with others, particularly their subjects, tied the city's culture of public inscription to the growth of its empire.[40] Undoubtedly, inscribed documents of a number of genres would have been an effective means of asserting Athenian authority to external, or indeed internal, audiences. Ron Stroud provides an evocative description of the so-called *lapis primus*, the enormous 'first stone' displaying the financial record of the portions of imperial tribute dedicated to Athena: when the first tribute quota list was inscribed and erected on the Acropolis in 454/3 BCE, there would have been an expanse of uninscribed marble, implying all the tribute contributions and years of empire to come.[41] Decrees concerning allies similarly monumentalized the imperial power dynamic.

But this explanation, while surely part of the picture, does not fully take into account the primarily *Athenian* audience of Athenian public inscriptions. The majority of decrees were displayed on the Athenian Acropolis, and their development was intrinsically tied to that of the sanctuary.[42] Until the commencement of the building programme there in the 440s BCE, public inscriptions, such as the tribute quota lists, may have been among the most visible monuments in the sanctuary, left undeveloped for decades after the Persian sack.[43] The subsequent monumental development of the sanctuary then would have provided an impetus for the explosion in public inscription in the second half of the century.[44] Certainly, some foreign individuals would have visited the sanctuary and viewed the inscriptions. Copies of some Athenian decrees were also displayed in the public spaces of subject communities; some decrees contain clauses ordering this,[45] and in a few cases the stones themselves have turned up in non-Athenian contexts.[46] For the most part, however, Athenian citizens would have been the primary viewers interacting with these monuments, preeminent in their own preeminent public space. So how to explain the maintained preoccupation with the inscription of documents concerning external relations? Why were these decrees, these records of collective thought, selected for display?

Monuments, including inscriptions, in Greg Woolf's view, can be seen as 'responses to perceptions of insecurity', with their permanency operating 'to deny change'.[47] Although Woolf's discussion concerns Roman Imperial funerary epigraphy, this is an approach which can be usefully extended to Athenian decrees, as their initial emergence, before the arrival of the Persians and the redevelopment of the Acropolis, coincided with a period of significant change in the late Archaic

period; not only was the wider Aegean world confronted by Athens for the first time, but Athens was also confronted by the wider world. Unlike other Greek communities, Athens had not been concerned with overseas mobility or settlement for much of the Archaic period, expanding instead into the unusually large territory of Attica. But by the second half of the sixth century, the Athenians began to look beyond Attica, with strategic 'corridors' of exploitation established by elite families in various directions in the Aegean, as described by Herodotus.[48] This new outlook emerged under the tyrants, especially after Peisistratus gained power in Attica aided by foreign support and finances, and it was furthered after the Cleisthenic reforms in 508/7 BCE.[49] One of the first acts of the newly empowered *dēmos* was to set up a cleruchy (a particularly Athenian type of overseas settlement which proliferated in the fifth and fourth centuries) at Chalcis on Euboea in 506 BCE, with a victory commemorated by an inscribed bronze chariot on the Acropolis.[50] These archaic interests set the precedent for the growth of the Athenian empire in the same areas after the Graeco-Persian Wars, just as the first known inscribed decree provided a blueprint for the public inscriptions which would regulate this empire.[51]

The subject of this earliest known decree is fiscal and military organization on Salamis, an island beyond Attic territory, and it was likely inscribed in the final decade of the sixth century, in the context of late Archaic Athenian expansion as just described.[52] Salamis had an ambiguous status vis-à-vis Athens: it was not incorporated into the Cleisthenic deme system, but it appears to have hosted some kind of Athenian population external to the Athenian *dēmos*. Some scholars have identified this group as an early cleruchy, resulting in a contested restoration referring to the supposed 'cleruchs' in the first line of the document ([κλερόχ]ος).[53] What is important for this discussion is that the thoughts of the *dēmos* concern a community *external* to Attica.

The fifth century BCE, and the expansion of Athenian power after the Graeco-Persian Wars, saw the inscription of documents which took up the preoccupations of this first known decree, but in various ways created a stronger opposition between the Athenian *dēmos* and external groups. By the middle of the century, for example, some decrees recorded the treaties and oaths which regulated the reintegration of their subjects into the empire after revolt.[54] The very layout of the text on these inscriptions reinforced the juxtaposition between Athenians and others, as they inscribed the oaths made by representatives of both groups in turn.

The thinking *dēmos* is also contrasted with external groups in the decrees concerning more amicable relations with loyal allies. The decrees, dated between c. 430 and 424/3 BCE, in which the thoughts of the *dēmos* concern the awarding of privileges to the city of Methone, are inscribed on one stone topped by one of the earliest examples of a document relief sculpture (Figure 4.1).[55] The fragmentary relief depicts a seated Athena, clasping hands with a standing figure in a short robe accompanied by a dog. This latter figure is usually identified as Artemis, the tutelary deity of Methone. Although the complex relationship of document reliefs like this to their paired inscribed texts has been debated, two deities can likely be understood as in some way representing the two communities engaged in the business of the decrees, perhaps through personification or metonymy.[56] On this

Figure 4.1 Stele with document relief, displaying decrees for Methone. c. 430–424/3 BCE. Height 104 cm, Length 55 cm, Width 12 cm. Acropolis Museum, Athens: EM 6596.

Photograph: © Acropolis Museum/Yiannis Koulelis.

interpretation, the relief invites an imaginative exercise, whereby the viewer, even a casual or illiterate one, is to see the *dēmos* not just as a community capable of thinking in the same way but as a single corporeal entity with the thoughts of an individual, like the 'Thinking Athena' that provides the focal point of Emily Clifford and Xavier Buxton's introduction. Given that the relief is generic, conveying little of the meaning of the text, the specific thoughts are inconsequential, but the potential for thought on the part of Athena, and thus the *dēmos*, is clear.

As the century drew on, decrees awarding privileges to subject communities and individuals became increasingly standardized, with increased use of formulaic honorific language.[57] Callipus of Thessaly, in a decree dated to 422/1 BCE, is 'judged to be a good man with regard to the city of the Athenians' (δοκεῖ ἓναι ἀν|ὴρ ἀγαθὸς περὶ τὴμ πόλιν τὴν Ἀθ|ηναίων, 7–9) and is thus to be praised and made '*proxenos* and benefactor of the Athenians' (πρόξενογ καὶ εὐ|εργέτην Ἀθηναίων, 10–11).[58] John Ma's description of Hellenistic honorific decrees is applicable here: 'the city thinks in categories, both when considering the individual's actions, and when turning to requital'.[59] This kind of standardized reciprocal diplomacy put the Athenian *dēmos* and its increasingly homogeneous thoughts on one side of

the equation, and the community or individual being honoured, and their ethically generalized behaviour, on the other. As with the introductory formula, it is possible that this repetitive language formed visual patterns which might be quickly recognized by the viewer, bolstered by their memory of these homogenous decrees being passed in the assembly.

To tie these threads together, the Athenians' world and their place in it changed rapidly towards the end of the sixth century BCE. Athenian horizons continued to expand in the fifth century with their adoption of power in the Aegean after the Graeco-Persian Wars. Inscribed decrees concerning external relations are the earliest kind of decree attested and dominate the fifth-century epigraphic record, a phenomenon that should be seen as a response to this geopolitical change. Foreign individuals and Athenian citizens viewing these inscriptions would have of course encountered a clear assertion of Athenian power. But for the Athenian audience, this would also have been the first time that their *dēmos* and its thoughts were represented through inscription in their own public space. There would have been more of a need, and an opportunity, to define a distinct Athenian identity in Athenian eyes from the end of the sixth century, and even more so in the fifth, when the Athenians were confronted by a bigger, more various, more densely peopled exterior world. The new epigraphic *dēmos* was thus a united collective, not just acting but even thinking as one, and defined through contrast.

When the *dēmos* was not thinking about other communities, it had its mind on the gods. Almost all surviving decrees dated before the final decades of the fifth century which do not concern external affairs relate to sacred matters, my second category of decrees. Indeed, the earliest known inscribed decrees, apart from the decree for Salamis, concern religious matters, and seem to have been erected in the sanctuary of the deity with which they were concerned.[60] Many decrees followed this precedent; they concern sanctuaries and festivals, detailing expected behaviour and dedications or sacrifices. As the fifth century progressed, decrees increasingly regulated sacred finances, particularly in relation to building; one decree, for instance, appoints a priestess of Athena Nike and arranges for the building of a temple.[61] There were good reasons for the Athenians, like others, to inscribe documents with sacred content. The act of inscribing a text and displaying it in a sanctuary was likely intended to give important decisions permanence, to invite divine protection, and to show accountability in the eyes of the gods.[62]

These groupings of Athenian inscriptions based on their content, external and divine interactions, are porous, with significant overlap between the two categories. Fifth-century Athenian decrees, regardless of their content, were usually erected in the sacred space of the Acropolis (or in other sanctuaries);[63] some were even displayed under the explicit heading 'gods' (ΘΕΟΙ) or, like the Methone decrees, with reliefs depicting deities.[64] For Elizabeth Meyer, all inscriptions erected on the Acropolis, regardless of their content, were effectively dedications to Athena.[65]

For the purposes of this discussion, there is also another important similarity between the two groups of documents. The gods, like other cities or foreign individuals, were perceived as external to the Athenian *dēmos*. Of course, sacred and secular are not wholly useful concepts in this analysis, given how deeply religion

was 'embedded' in all aspects of Athenian public life,[66] and decisions concerning the Athenians' gods evidently concerned the Athenians themselves. Still, for much of the fifth century, it was those decrees that pertained to the sacred in Athenian eyes that were inscribed, not those that only concerned purely domestic, non-sacred matters. The Thasians, by contrast, legislated in the fifth century about the cleanliness of their streets and the buying and selling of wine, and inscribed their laws on buildings in the non-sacred space of their agora.[67]

The Athenians, then, were choosing to inscribe the thoughts of their *dēmos* that concerned others, whether human or divine, rather than itself. The viewer of the decrees was invited to imagine a monolithic, thinking *dēmos*, defined in contrast to others. For an Athenian citizen, it was presumably not hard to imagine himself contributing to this emphatically Athenian thought. The inscribed decrees triggered viewers to think about their self-identity through multiple levels of externality. First, the Athenians used monuments external to themselves to both reflect and reinforce the construction of their thinking *dēmos*. In these external monuments, the introductory formula emphasized collective cognition triggered by perception, and specifically perception of an emphatically external world, populated by foreigners and gods.

III. The *dēmos* and Itself

In the fifth century BCE, I have argued, the Athenians used the medium of public inscription to construct and assert a *dēmos* that was a unified whole, defined through its thinking about other groups. As the century advanced, however, there is evidence to suggest that the epigraphic *dēmos* also began to direct its thoughts towards *Athenian* individuals who were in tension with the collective. Public inscription was increasingly used to address anxieties not just about the *dēmos*' place in the wider world, but about itself; faced with increasing internal instability, the *dēmos* could no longer be imagined solely through its thinking about others. At the culmination of this process, with the enormous upheavals of the late fifth-century oligarchic revolutions, public inscription became more ideologically charged and the epigraphic *dēmos* necessarily became more introspective.

This development in the use of public inscription began around the 430s BCE. Public inscriptions from across the Greek world sometimes contain phrases, labelled 'entrenchment-clauses' by David Lewis, which attempted to give the documents greater permanence and to prevent contravention of their terms.[68] Such clauses emerge more routinely in the Athenian epigraphic record in the run-up to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (although some doubt must remain around exact dating). For example, the decree which regulates aspects of the foundation of the Athenian colony of Brea in coastal Thrace, probably dated to the 430s when the Athenians were significantly expanding their interests in the region,[69] contains a lengthy clause ensuring that anyone who tried to go against the decree would be deprived of his rights and have his property confiscated.[70]

The trend becomes even more apparent in the 420s BCE, when a new kind of decree was inscribed in response to the financial pressures of the Peloponnesian



Figure 4.2 Document relief atop a stele displaying a financial decree proposed by Cleonymus. 426/5 BCE. Epigraphical Museum, Athens: EM 6595.

Photograph: © Deutsches Archäologisches Institut, D-DAI-ATH-2001/676F/Hans Rupprecht Goette, printed with the kind permission of the Epigraphical Museum.

War. The War both damaged revenues and increased expenditure; the decades-old tribute system was no longer working well enough.[71] For the first time, the Athenians erected financial decrees not dealing with sacred finance in Attica, nor directed at individual subject cities, but which had efficacy for the whole empire.[72] Anxiety about revenues could not be more blatantly conveyed than in the document relief (Figure 4.2) topping the first of these decrees, which was proposed by Cleonymus, probably in 426/5 BCE, and concerned the collection of tribute: the surviving fragments depict bags of money.[73] The *dēmos* thought about how to acquire more money; the inscription made the textual declaration of this thinking permanent, while the relief sculpture worked in conjunction to fix the thinking in pictorial terms. Any viewer would immediately think of Athenian revenues when confronted with this simple image encapsulating the thoughts of the *dēmos*.

Among other measures, Cleonymus' decree aimed to ensure the proper collection of tribute in subject communities. Subsequent decrees proposed by Thudippus and Cleinias went further, specifying penalties for *Athenian* officials who did not carry out their duties regarding tribute assessment and collection.[74] The potential penalties for Athenian citizens were escalated in the decree laying down the use of Athenian coinage, weights, and measures throughout the empire; among other proposed punishments, it threatens to put to death any Athenian who proposed a vote contrary to its terms.[75] Faced by the pressures of the Peloponnesian War, then, the epigraphic *dēmos* was no longer just thinking about how allies should be regulated or rewarded, but how to prevent individual Athenians from transgression. These sanitized records of political proceedings devoid of debate or controversy still constructed a collective with unanimous thought – this was arguably more necessary

than ever – but the thoughts themselves betrayed the threat posed by dissenting individuals. It was no longer assumed by those producing the decrees that the Athenian viewer's thinking would simply align with the thinking of the *dēmos*, without the inscribed decree actively working towards this end. The increased introspection in the *dēmos*' thoughts as represented in the decrees matched the perceived increased complexity and variety in the potential viewer's thinking.

The controversial decision to send a force to Sicily in the following decade, and the associated political turbulence in Athens, narrated in vivid detail in Thucydides' sixth book, resulted in further epigraphic innovations impacting on the construction of the thinking *dēmos*. A series of decrees survive, albeit in fragmentary condition, which can be connected with the preparations for the expedition.[76] Once again, there are clauses enforcing penalties on Athenian individuals who did not comply.[77] But the very decision to inscribe these decrees is significant, as this kind of assembly business, the decision to go to war or to make military preparations, did not usually result in inscription, at least judging by the surviving epigraphic record.[78] In this case, as we know from Thucydides' famous debate, the matter was controversial:[79] it was presumably felt necessary to monumentalize visibly and permanently the unified thoughts of the *dēmos*, in an attempt to change the thinking of those who might think differently.

Just before the expedition to Sicily departed, Thucydides memorably describes the desecration of the city's herms (monuments Robin Osborne argues were significant for Athenian civic identity), and the mocking of the sacred Mystery rites (part of a civic cult) by a group of unknown men.[80] According to Thucydides, the *dēmos* suspected this group of taking part in 'an oligarchic and tyrannical plot'.[81] Certain men, including the controversial Alcibiades, were found guilty of these crimes, sentenced to death,[82] and their property taken by the state. This confiscation of property resulted in the inscription of the lists detailing the sale of the possessions and lands taken.[83] There was a religious aspect to the inscription of these documents, as they were displayed in the City Eleusinium, in the sacred space of the goddesses whose rites had been violated, perhaps as proof that punishment had been enacted. However, a human audience was no doubt intended too: this was the first time that the penalties imposed on Athenian citizens who threatened the *dēmos* were monumentalized in such a way. These inscriptions were not decrees, introduced by the thinking formula, but they can be viewed as a kind of epigraphic extension of the entrenchment clauses demanding such punishment in the decrees described above. The dissenters had physically attacked monuments associated with Athenian civic identity, and the *dēmos* fought back in the material world with the erection of a competing monument. Inscription was now being used to assert what *actually happened* when an individual thought differently to the *dēmos*.

It was the oligarchic revolutions of 411 and 404 BCE which brought about the biggest transformation in how the thinking *dēmos* was constructed through public inscription, although this shift was anticipated by the earlier changes outlined above.[84] In the aftermath of the first revolution of 411 BCE, in which the oligarchs claimed precedent for their form of government in the Archaic laws and law-givers,[85] the newly reinstalled democrats decided to reorganize the city's laws and reassert

their own claims to the city's legal past.[86] For the first time, older laws, with broader remit than the decrees known from the earlier epigraphic record, were inscribed on stone.[87] The inscription of these documents was not just about access, as some of them may have been displayed in other, less permanent media and would have been recorded elsewhere. Rather, as Julia Shear describes, they represented 'the recreation of the democratic city and the (re)appropriation of the city's past'.[88] For Polly Low, Athenian public inscriptions had always played a role in shaping a distinctively collective version of the city's past,[89] and this role was all the more important now that the *dēmos*' past thinking, its memory, was contested and threatened.

Notably, the thinking *dēmos* was emphatically present in the inscription of some of these laws. The law on homicide attributed to the Archaic law-giver Draco was inscribed under the decree which ordered the inscription: the ancient regulation, supposedly from a pre- or proto-democratic context, was still framed by the declaration of collective thought on the part of the *dēmos*.[90] Even if the cognition of the *dēmos* was not the origin of this important law, it was very much presented as the authority for its continued significance. Also inscribed was a law about the duties of the *boulē*, and its relationship to the *dēmos*, possibly originating later in the sixth century after the Cleisthenic reforms.[91] In this case, no framing decree was required to emphasize the authority of the thinking *dēmos*. The contents of the law are the thoughts of the *dēmos* alone, from a gathering in an unusual location, the Lyceum sanctuary (τάδε ἔδοχσεν ἐλ Λυκείο ̣τοῖ δ[έμοι], 34). The law emphasizes again and again how actions can only be taken 'with the *dēmos* of the Athenians gathered together' (τõ δέμο τõ Ἀθεναίον πλεθύοντος).[92] The thoughts of the *dēmos* at one particular historical moment ensured the transhistorical primacy of its thinking over that of the *boulē*.

A new kind of honour for loyal foreigners was also recorded in inscribed decrees for the first time in 409 BCE, in the aftermath of the restoration of the democracy. A decree, granting honours to the assassins of the oligarch Phrynichus, gave one of their number, Thrasybulus, a golden crown,[93] an announcement of his honours at the Dionysia festival,[94] and, in an amendment, Athenian citizenship. Contrast Lysippus, mentioned above, who was praised and made a *proxenos* and benefactor, but not incorporated in any way into the actual citizen body.[95] None of these honours is attested earlier in the epigraphic record; even though the inscription was occasioned in this first instance by extraordinary circumstances,[96] all these honours became more common in inscribed honorific decrees of the fourth century. These honours actively integrated the honorand into the body of the *dēmos* and its rituals; thus, this decree, although recording relations between the Athenians and foreign individuals, constructed a conception of the *dēmos* which was less static and monolithic, capable of expansion and inclusion of others. Previously, inscribed decrees would have impressed on non-Athenian viewers that their identity was predicated on their *not* being part of the thinking *dēmos*. Now, for the first time, foreigners could have interacted with a monument representing the thoughts of the *dēmos*, and imagined themselves as potentially part of this thought.

Similar strategies of public inscription were used again by the democrats to reassert their conception of the thinking *dēmos* after the second oligarchical revolution of

the so-called Thirty Tyrants in 404 BCE, with some new innovations. The democrats reinstituted the project of reorganizing the Athenian laws;[97] they inscribed the lists of sale for the property confiscated from the Thirty, as they had for the property of those implicated in the Herms and Mysteries affairs;[98] and they reinscribed the decrees, the thoughts of the *dēmos,* where the original stones had been destroyed by the oligarchs.[99] As with the desecration of the herms and the *dēmos*' response, this was a battle played out through rival monuments in the material world. Further, decrees connected to the return of the democratic exiles who fortified the stronghold of Phyle in Attica were inscribed:[100] one surviving decree honoured the foreigners who helped these Athenians,[101] while another (preserved only in scanty fragments but described by Aeschines) honoured the Athenians from Phyle themselves.[102] The *dēmos* would have been visually prominent in the inscription of this latter document, both in the heading and in an emphatic placement at the beginning of the second line of the epigram.[103]

Significantly, this was the first known example of an inscribed honorific decree for Athenian citizens, rather than foreigners. Although there would be further exceptional examples of this epigraphic practice in the first half of the fourth century, honorific decrees for Athenian citizens would only be routinely inscribed from the 340s onwards.[104] Aeschines' reference to the decree in 330 BCE, however, shows that this late fifth-century monument, occasioned by exceptional circumstances, had prominence in the Athenian landscape. The inscription was now used to assert how Athenian citizens, constituent members of the *dēmos, should* think in relation to the collective; there were now epigraphic carrots to encourage civic virtue, not just sticks to punish civic transgression. The Athenian viewer was not only invited to imagine himself as part of a thinking collective, but was shown what his participation in this thinking could provide. What did it mean to be a good Athenian and to think as part of the *dēmos*? Now, for the first time, the increasingly introspective epigraphic *dēmos* was supplying some kind of positive answer.

Over the course of the final decades of the century, then, greater complexity was assumed in the thinking of the individual viewer, and greater complexity was consequently presented in the collective thinking of the *dēmos*, as monumentalized in the inscribed decrees. Viewers of the inscribed decrees were no longer expected to imagine themselves solely either as part of the thinking *dēmos* or as part of the world external to it, but to have a variety of thoughts about how their own identity related to these groups. These monuments consequently worked harder to stimulate individual thinking in line with the thoughts of the *dēmos*. Other media associated with the Athenian *dēmos* explored this tension between individual and collective thought earlier; the very structure of tragedy, with interaction between individual actors and chorus, lent itself to such exploration, after all, as Xavier Buxton discusses in his chapter in his volume. But now public inscription also began to acknowledge this complex relationship.

IV. Conclusion: Towards Introspection

I began this chapter by describing how the Athenians chose to use the medium of public inscription to reflect and assert a conception of their *dēmos* defined not just through coordinated action, but by unified collective cognition. In the inscribed

decrees, the Athenian *dēmos* was not only imagined, but imagining, and they invited the Athenian viewer to imagine themselves as part of this collective thought. These external monuments were used to represent an Athenian collective imagination, which in some way reflected, but also interacted with the imagination of their audience.

But what did this epigraphic *dēmos* think about? What thoughts were chosen for inscription on stone, and what do they reveal about this construction of self-identity? I argue that Athenian public inscription, from the late sixth century BCE and for much of the fifth, addressed external change, presenting a *dēmos* that not only thought as a collective, but thought almost entirely about other groups, whether human or divine. The thinking *dēmos* was, in the first instance, defined through contrast. Any Athenian viewer would be confronted by two discrete entities in these monuments, a thinking Athenian *dēmos* and an external world, and would no doubt imagine himself as part of the former. The Athenian viewer's thinking about himself would thus be triggered through multiple levels of externality, first through interaction with an external monument which represented collective thought, and then through this collective thinking being concerned with groups external to the Athenian *dēmos*.

Increasingly, however, the Athenians also faced instability at home, culminating in the oligarchic revolutions of the late fifth century BCE. Public inscription began to address potential domestic opposition through the assertion of a unified, thinking *dēmos*. The *dēmos* began to think about what it meant to be Athenian, first through prohibition of transgressive behaviour and the advertisement of punishment, then through expansion and inclusion of non-Athenians, and finally through the honouring of exemplary Athenians. These monuments now directly addressed the possibility that viewers might have a variety of thoughts about the relationship of their own identity to that of the collective; they assumed increased individual thinking about the self and thus represented more collective thinking about the self.[105] Athenian inscribed decrees of the fifth century, then, imply an Athenian recognition that self-identity was tied to thinking, and increasingly, to thinking about self-identity.[106]

Abbreviations

Abbreviations of ancient authors and texts, as well as scholarly reference works, generally follow those of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, fourth edition; abbreviations of journal titles follow those of *L'Année Philologique*. Exceptions are listed below.

OR = Osborne, R. & P. J. Rhodes 2017. *Greek Historical Inscriptions, 478–404 BC*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Notes

1 For the definitive study and catalogue of Greek decrees, see Rhodes (1997); see Rhodes (1972: 52–87) for discussion of Athenian decrees, the democratic mechanisms underlying them and the evolution of the various formulae.

2 *IG* I³ 1 = ML 14. By the fifth century, the formula would also include the council: ἔδοξεν τῆι βολῆι καὶ τῶι δήμωι (note that Ionic orthography, including the letters

ω and η, was not formally adopted in Attic public epigraphy until the end of the century).

3 Anderson (1983: 15) is concerned with nationalism and the nation-state but notes that all communities larger than a small village are by necessity in some way 'imagined'; Ober (1989: 33) identifies Athens as one of Anderson's imagined communities; Loraux (1986) argues that the Athenians invented an imaginary Athens through the genre of funeral oration.

4 Whitley (1997: 641–5) provides a helpful summary of the preoccupations of Archaic Attic epigraphic culture.

5 *IG* I^3 507–9.

6 *SEG* 27.620 = ML 2 = Gagarin & Perlman (2016) Dr1.

7 Collected by Koerner & Hallof (1993); Effenterre & Ruzé (1994).

8 *IG* I^3 1 = ML 14.

9 Sickinger (1999b: 245 n. 45) counts 240 Athenian decrees or laws on stone before 403/2 BCE. Compare Crete, which was unusually epigraphically productive in the Archaic period: Gagarin & Perlman (2016) identify about 200 inscribed public documents, from ten cities, dating between c. 650 and 400 BCE. Thasos, the most epigraphically productive Athenian subject city, produced 13 surviving public documents in the fifth century; see Liddel (2010: 108).

10 Meritt (1940: 89).

11 Hedrick (1999), in a nuanced analysis, supports Meritt's essential position; see Sickinger (2009) for a counter-argument.

12 Lambert (2018: ch. 2).

13 Osborne (1999).

14 For records of documents and archives in Classical Athens, see Sickinger (1999a: ch. 3).

15 See, for example, the 2019 volume on materiality and epigraphic texts edited by Petrovic, Petrovic & Thomas (2019), with a contribution by Rhodes on erasures in Greek texts (including examples from Athens).

16 The symbolic role of public inscription in the Archaic and Classical periods, in Athens and elsewhere, including the use of inscription to assert power, has been explored extensively by Rosalind Thomas: e.g. Thomas (1992: ch. 7; 1994); Meyer (2013) argues that all inscriptions erected on the Acropolis honoured Athena; Lambert (2018: 26) contends that all inscriptions, including Athenian decrees, had their own 'agency', and were actual embodiments of the actions which their texts recorded; Low (2020) explores how Athenian public inscriptions contributed to the creation of collective memory.

17 Low (2020: 235).

18 A notable exception is Budelmann (2018), who compares the decrees to the collective cognition of tragic choruses.

19 See Rhodes (1972: 64) for the development of the formula over time.

20 Attic Inscriptions Online (www.atticinscriptions.com).

21 Osborne & Rhodes (2017), hereafter abbreviated to OR.

22 The earliest example of which I am aware from outside Attica, an Argive proxeny decree introduced by εδοξξε, dates to the middle of the fifth century, so could have followed an Athenian precedent (*SEG* 13.239).

23 Gagarin & Perlman (2016: 543).

24 *SEG* 27.620 = ML 2 = Gagarin & Perlman (2016) Dr1.

25 Used in a technical sense, e.g. by Cicero (*Phil*. 14.14.38).

26 OR 104.

27 ML 8.

28 E.g. *IG* I^3 244 = OR 107, the religious regulations from the deme Scambonidae, dated to the 460s BCE, are probably identified as 'laws' or 'customs' (line 1: [θέσ]μια).

29 See Lewis (1997a). Athenian influence on non-Athenian documents is flagged as an area requiring more analysis by Liddel (2020: 187); see Lazar (forthcoming).

30 The studies of Grethlein (2003) and Tzanetou (2012) have different emphases, but both explore how the motif of supplication in tragic plays contributed to constructions of Athenian identity. See further Buxton (this volume) on theatrical deliberation in Aeschylus' *Suppliants*.
31 Thuc. 2.40.
32 E.g. Lys. 2.65; Isoc. 6.67; Dem. 9.38 with Ober (1989: 297) and Budelmann (2017: 194). Note, however, Westwood (this volume) on how speakers appealed to judges both in their individual and collective capacities.
33 E.g. Thuc. 4.118.11: ἔδοξεν τῷ δήμῳ.
34 The present form δοκεῖ is sometimes used in fifth-century texts with greater flexibility; by the end of the fifth century, the perfect passive infinitive δεδόχθαι is found in conjunction with the *dēmos* as a 'motion-formula' (a phrase used to record a motion made in the assembly); see Rhodes (1972: 65).
35 Levels and types of literacy in the Greek world have been much debated; I follow Thomas (1992) in assuming that there were multiple kinds of literacy, that some Athenian viewers would have had some reading literacy, and that written and oral modes of communication interacted. See Liddel (2020: ch. 3) for discussion of the dissemination of decrees.
36 E.g. Canevaro (2018).
37 The dating of Athenian inscriptions of the fifth century is infamously difficult. Since the use of certain letter forms as dating criteria has been disproved, the dates of many texts are now contested: see Rhodes (2008); Papazarkadas (2009). For my part, I am resigned to a significant degree of uncertainty, but believe fruitful historical analysis can still be conducted: when discussing particular texts, I will indicate if certain dates can be suggested.
38 Sickinger (1999b: 242 n. 45), in his quantification of Athenian decrees and laws dated before 403/2 BCE, counts 68 honorary decrees (of which almost all concern foreign individuals and communities), 54 concerning foreign affairs, 33 decrees concerning religious matters, 13 sacred laws or calendars, 63 fragmentary decrees with unidentifiable content, and 9 decrees concerning non-sacred, domestic matters.
39 The formation of Greek self-identity in contrast to other groups has been envisaged by scholars in various contexts: Malkin (2011: ch. 2) argues for a 'back-ripple effect' from overseas experience and colonizing activities contributing to the formation of a pan-island Rhodian identity in the Archaic period; Osborne (2009) suggests that fifth-century BCE public epigraphy on Thasos was a result of its particularly dense connections with the Aegean world and was intended for external and internal audiences; Hall (1991) contends that Greek writing about barbarians (particularly Attic tragedy) was essentially an exercise in Greek ethnic self-definition. Perhaps we might also compare the use of a mythological register (another 'other') to think and to explore ideas about the self: see Clifford & Buxton (this volume, p. 16); Clifford (this volume, p. 206); Fearn (this volume, pp. 235–9).
40 Thomas (1994: 43–5); noted also by Hedrick (1999: 408); statistical analysis provided by Liddel (2010).
41 Stroud (2006: 10–18). See *IG* I^3 259–72 for the first 14 years of lists inscribed on the *lapis primus* (454/3–440/39 BCE); OR 119.
42 See Liddel (2003) for the contexts of display of decrees in Athens.
43 Some minor building was carried out in the years 480–450 BCE (Hurwit [2004: 53–4]). It is also possible that the great bronze statue of Athena by Pheidias was erected in the second half of the 460s, and thus would have been the major landmark on the Acropolis at this time, but there is no firm evidence: see Foley & Stroud (2019: 141–6). Trampedach (2022) situates the inscription of the tribute quota lists in the context of the statue. The building of the Parthenon began in 447/6 BCE; see *IG* I^3 436–51 = OR 145 for the inscribed building accounts.
44 Lambert (2018: 29).
45 E.g. the agreement made with Chalcis (*IG* I^3 40 = OR 131 lines 61–3); see Low (2005: 100–9).

46 E.g. *IG* I³ 1453 = OR 155, the decree concerning the use of Athenian coinage, weights and measures, fragments of which have been found in a number of locations. See Liddel (2020: ch. 4) for the non-Athenian audiences of Athenian decrees.
47 Woolf (1996: 31).
48 A term used by Davies (2013). E.g. Hdt. 1.62–4 for Peisistratus' exile in Eretria and successful establishment of tyranny in Athens with foreign support, and control of Naxos and Delos; 5.65 for the Peisistratids' withdrawal from Athens to Sigeum in the Troad; 6. 34–41 for the tyrannies of Miltiades the Elder and Miltiades the Younger (from the rival Kypselid family) in the Thracian Chersonese, across the Hellespont from Sigeion; 6.140 for Miltiades the Younger's capture of Lemnos; [Arist.] *Ath. pol.* 15.2 for Peisistratus' foundation of Rhaikelos on the Thermaic Gulf in Northern Greece (Hdt. 1.64.1 refers to Peisistratus' use of revenues from this resource-rich region).
49 Hdt. 6.131.
50 Hdt. 5.77.
51 For the sixth-century precedents for Athenian power in the North Aegean, see Kallet (2013).
52 *IG* I³ 1 = ML 14; see Attic Inscriptions Online no. 1672 for a more recent version of the text.
53 A new fragment was published by Matthaiou (1993) with the final two letters of the line; Taylor (1997), in an extensive study of Salamis, argues that the evidence for the cleruchy is slim.
54 *IG* I³ 14 (Erythrae), 21 (Miletus), 37 (Colophon), 39 (Eretria?), 40 (Chalkis), and 48 (Samos).
55 *IG* I³ 61 = OR 150 with Lawton (1995: no. 2) for the relief.
56 Blanshard (2006); Elsner (2015); Mack (2018).
57 For this increased use of honorific language, see Liddel (2010); Papazarkadas (2014).
58 *IG* I³ 92 = OR 162.
59 Ma (2013: 58).
60 *IG* I³ 2–8.
61 *IG* I³ 35 = OR 137 (date contested). The many examples of inscribed records concerned with sacred finances, such as the tribute quota lists mentioned on p. 130 above, were a conceptual extension of such decrees.
62 Thomas (1995: 73).
63 Osborne (1999: 347) and Lambert (2018: 22–5) argue for the theological importance of this display context.
64 Mack (2018) convincingly contends that the ΘEOI headings and the document reliefs had real theological resonance.
65 Meyer (2013). See further Clifford & Buxton's discussion of the 'Thinking Athena' stele in the introduction to this volume, esp. pp. 11 and 14–15 on the image of Athena, who embodies not just a divinity responding to the represented rectangular object (a decree, perhaps) but also the Athenian citizen as a viewer of the real stele on which she is depicted.
66 A term used by Sourvinou-Inwood (1990) in her explanation of her 'polis religion' model.
67 OR 103, 104.
68 Lewis (1997b), with a useful catalogue of the fifth-century Attic examples. Other recent examinations of Athenian entrenchment clauses have tended to focus on the legal aspect: for example, see Scaruro (2014); Canevaro (2015).
69 Note, for example, the Athenian foundation of Amphipolis in Thrace in 438/7 BCE (Thuc. 4.102).
70 *IG* I³ 46 = OR 142 lines 24–9. See also the entrenchment clauses in the second decree proposed by Callias in the mid- to late 430s BCE, which reorganized finances in anticipation of the War (*IG* I³ 42 = OR 144 B lines 17–19).
71 Thucydides at 3.19 describes how the Athenians levied a property tax on their own citizens for the first time in 428/7 BCE, and how they sent out 'money-collecting ships' (ἀργυρολόγους ναῦς) to raise funds in south-eastern Asia Minor; we hear of these

'money-collecting ships' elsewhere at 4.50 and 4.75. By 413 BCE, the Athenians made the radical decision to abolish tribute in favour of a 5-percent tax on imports and exports in harbours in the empire (Thuc. 7.28).

72 There is only one other known empire-wide decree, which can be dated earlier, the decree concerning first-fruit dedications at Eleusis, probably from the mid-430s BCE (*IG* I^3 78 = OR 141).

73 *IG* I^3 68 = OR 152; Matthaiou (2009: 108–9) provides the revised text taken over by Osborne & Rhodes; see Lawton (1995: no. 1) for the document relief.

74 *IG* I^3 71 = OR 153 (Thudippus' decrees, 425/4 BCE); this text contains the highest number of entrenchment clauses of any Athenian decree from the fifth century. *IG* I^3 34 = OR 154 (Cleinias' decree); Matthaiou (2009: 84–8) suggests a date shortly after Thudippus' decrees and provides the revised text used by Osborne & Rhodes; see lines 31–42 for the full description of the penalties.

75 *IG* I^3 1453 = OR 155 line 6 (dated either to the 420s or to c. 415 BCE).

76 *IG* I^3 93 = OR 171 (probably 415 BCE).

77 Lines 41–8.

78 Lambert (2018: ch. 2).

79 Thuc. 6.9–24.

80 Thuc. 6.27–9, 6.53–61; Osborne (1985).

81 Thuc. 6.60.1. See the summary of the extensive scholarship on this incident provided by Hornblower (2008: 367–71).

82 Thuc. 6.60.4; more details of the trials are provided by Andoc. 1.

83 *IG* I^3 421–30 = OR 172 (414 BCE).

84 Shear (in particular in her 2011 monograph; see also Shear [2007]) has extensively discussed how the public spaces of Athens, with their monuments and inscriptions, were contested and reconfigured by the competing oligarchs and democrats.

85 Memorably described by Finley (1975).

86 Many details of the process are provided by Lysias 30.

87 The formal hierarchical distinction between *nomos* (law) and *psēphisma* (decree) clear in fourth-century Athens would only emerge after the oligarchic revolutions; see, e.g., Hansen (1978). Inscriptions which can be associated with this process of reorganisation include *IG* I^3 104 (Draco's law on homicide); 105 (law about the *boulē*); 236 (law about the trierarchy); 237 (law about taxation); Attic Inscriptions Online no. 1185, based on Lambert (2002) (multiple fragments of the reinscribed sacrificial calendar).

88 Shear (2011: 86).

89 Low (2020). Compare Westwood (this volume, pp. 156–66) on rhetorical strategies to re-shape collective memories in the lawcourts. As he observes on p. 152, physical laws would also sometimes have been displayed in the court.

90 *IG* I^3 104 = OR 183 A (410/9 BCE).

91 *IG* I^3 105 = OR 183 B (exact date unknown).

92 The phrase is repeated in lines 25, 35, 36, 37, 40–1, 42, 43, 45–6.

93 *IG* I^3 102 = OR 182 (409 BCE) line 10.

94 Line 13.

95 Lines 15–17.

96 Wilson (2009).

97 See again Lysias 30; Andoc. 1.82–4 records a decree moved by Teisamenus related to this process; some fragments of the reinscribed sacrificial calendar can be associated with this second phase of reorganization (*IG* II^2 1357; see Attic Inscriptions Online no. 1189 for updated text).

98 *SEG* 32.161 (402/1 BCE).

99 This is explicitly stated in the well-preserved *IG* II^2 6 = OR 177B (a proxeny decree for Thasian individuals dated shortly after 403 BCE); see also the more fragmentary *IG* I^3 229 and *IG* II^2 13; re-inscription can be deduced in other cases, such as *IG* I^3 127

and *IG* II^2 1 = OR 191 and Rhodes & Osborne (2003: no. 2) (decrees honouring the Samians).

100 Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.2 for the fortification of Phyle; Rhodes & Osborne (2003: 24–5) lay out the honours awarded to different groups who fought for the democracy, as recorded in various literary and epigraphic sources.

101 Rhodes & Osborne (2003: no. 4) (401/0 BCE).

102 *SEG* 28.45 (date unknown, likely to be around the end of the century) with Aeschin. *In Ctes.* 187 (330 BCE). For the *enargeia* of justice in this speech, see Westwood in this volume, pp. 157–9.

103 Shear (2011: 248).

104 Lambert (2004: 86).

105 In the next chapter in this volume, Guy Westwood explores how the tension between individual and collective identities was negotiated in a different context: he argues that speakers in the lawcourts catered both for judges' identities as individuals and their adoption of communal values.

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Formative Processes of Imagination

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5 Imagining Justice in the Athenian Lawcourt

Aeschines and Others

Guy Westwood

I. Introduction

This chapter explores how speakers in Athenian trials shaped and engaged the imaginations of the listening judges to forge a unity of response from them which would be favourable to their own cause. It examines how opposing litigants fashion competing understandings both of justice itself and of the specific elements of the case and its context which should be thought relevant to a just verdict. Litigants harness the capacity of judges' imaginations to act as flexible and dynamic interfaces between the conceptualization of justice and just verdicts in the abstract on the one hand, and the lived material realities of the Athenian lawcourt environment and judges' individual backgrounds and experiences as democratic citizens (and decision-makers) on the other.

Such entanglement of the ideal with the real, the social with the private, and the mental with the material speaks to many of the studies gathered in this volume; my concerns are especially close, however, to those explored by Zacharoula Petraki in the next chapter. Both of us investigate the concept of justice, as constructed by fourth-century prose texts from Classical Athens, and both of us are concerned with the cultural and rhetorical mechanisms of that construction. Also pertinent is the previous chapter, in which Leah Lazar investigates the citizen community's collective thinking from an epigraphic perspective, tracing public inscriptions' negotiation of individual and collective identities. In the present chapter, we will see that the imaginative constructs that lawcourt speakers shape for the listening judges tend to resolve any tension between individual and collective by assuming *both* that the judges will process those constructs individually *and* that they will apply accepted communal values and ethical standards to that processing.

The way speakers cater to both of the judges' identities in tandem – i.e. to their group identity and their individual identities – reflects the way Athenian trials themselves operated. Reaching a verdict involved very large, socially diverse panels of male citizen judges aged over 30 – up to 2,501 of them, or (rarely) more[1] – coming to individual decisions which they then expressed via a secret final individual vote, with no formal conferring and with only the vocal and gestural reactions of fellow judges and of informal audience members to guide them on how other listeners felt about the case as it unfolded.[2] Before being empanelled, the judges swore the

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'dicastic' oath. This required them to vote according to the laws, to listen to both sides equally, to vote on the matters in the prosecution's plaint, and to vote using their 'most just judgment' (or 'opinion') (γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ: e.g. Dem. 20.118) when considering matters not covered by any laws.[3] The oath's clauses therefore not only emphasized the primacy of the city's laws for the judges' decision-making but also invoked abstract standards of justice which each judge was meant to recognize and apply individually based on his civic experience (including of previous trials, whether as judge, informal spectator, or participant). Accordingly, in addressing the judges, opposing litigants had to seek to frame what a just verdict would look like in ways both advantageous to their own case and simultaneously responsive to and manipulative of the judges' likely understandings of norms of social behaviour in general and of Athenian civic values, customs, and traditions in particular. Front and centre (sometimes literally, written on boards displayed in the court) were the laws relevant to the present legal action.[4] Each litigant would ask the court secretary to read out some of these, or excerpts from them, during the trial as part of the evidence presented. Speakers (especially prosecutors) sometimes represent these legal texts as expressive of justice in the abstract; elsewhere they appeal to abstract principles of justice or to culturally central entities who could embody justice.[5]

One important medium for the persuasive delivery of such arguments across surviving lawcourt speeches is *enargeia*, the visualization of aspects of the case in order to appeal to judges' imaginations and thus shape their view of the issues at stake.[6] It could, for example, involve imagining the presence of absent individuals living or dead, sometimes speaking; the terms *ethopoeia*, *prosopopoeia*, and *eidolopoeia* are used for such instances in later critical texts.[7] This family of techniques should be understood as part of Classical Athenian speakers' broader discourse and manipulation of sight, seeing, and not-seeing (explored recently by Peter O'Connell).[8] Sustained passages of *enargeia* would be 'high-visibility' parts of a given speech because of the care and control the orator needed to exercise in performance to ensure that such passages carried conviction and did not strike judges as unsuitable, overdone, or irrelevant. If successful, such set-pieces would raise the agonistic temperature and the oratorical stakes, and opposing speakers might well want to challenge them in their own speeches, whether by attempting to criticize or mock them retrospectively or by upstaging them with even more compelling passages of sustained *enargeia* on related themes – or both.

To probe the appeals made to judges' imaginations in a lawcourt setting, and the impact that those appeals had on the formation of ideas of justice, I look first at the forms taken by *enargeia* across the surviving speeches. I then focus on two late fourth-century texts which represent the prosecution and main defence speeches from Aeschines' prosecution of Ctesiphon in 330 BCE for proposing an honorific crown for Demosthenes in 336 (Aeschines 3, *Against Ctesiphon*, and Demosthenes 18, *On the Crown*).[9] *On the Crown* features a renowned passage of *enargeia* (18. 169–79) where Demosthenes reminds his audience of the alarm at Athens on the arrival of the news of Philip of Macedon's seizing of Elatea in late 339 and of the subsequent Assembly meeting where Demosthenes himself successfully proposed

an embassy to Thebes to secure an alliance (which endured until Philip's victory over it at Chaeronea in 338). I show that in dramatizing an outstanding moment in his own career,[10] one of Demosthenes' aims is to counteract the likely persuasive effects of an extremely vivid passage of *enargeia* in *Against Ctesiphon* (3.152–7) where Aeschines invokes the judges' imaginations to make them experience something they had not witnessed.[11] This was Alexander's sack of Thebes after its revolt in 335, a disaster Aeschines blames on Demosthenes' personal retention of funds received from Persia to support the Thebans.[12] Aeschines seeks to make the concentrated emotional impact of this passage determinative for the question of Demosthenes' reputation and Ctesiphon's guilt or innocence. Demosthenes' response engages with Aeschines' use of *enargeia* but refocuses the judges' imaginations on the circumstances of the making of the alliance with Thebes in 339,[13] which could be spun much more positively than Athens' failure to support Thebes in 335.[14] Demosthenes accordingly seeks to efface Aeschines' versions of 339 and 335 alike and to highlight his own notable (and well-remembered) public achievements, thus assuring the judges that Ctesiphon had been right to propose the award of the crown, and that acquitting him would therefore be a just verdict. This case study seeks to highlight the dynamic interaction between real and imaginary in lawcourt speeches, where litigants craft arguments in such a way as to build creatively upon – and reconfigure – both the judges' immediate grasp of the details of the case and wider aspects of their civic experience (in this case their cultural memory). The ultimate aim was to fashion a conception of justice which stood the best chance of securing a positive outcome for the speaker.

II. Imagining Justice across Lawcourt Speeches

Athenian lawcourt speakers often use metaphor to shape the judges' conceptualizations of law and justice,[15] inviting them to apply one or more aspects of their familiar, lived experience as citizens to the evaluation of a specific legal case. In Lysias 1, for example, Euphiletus prefaces his murder of the adulterous Eratosthenes with the claim that 'it is not I who will kill you, but the law of the city'[16] (1.26) – a moment embedded in an absorbing narrative which constantly engages the judges' individual imaginations while appealing to their collective awareness of the legality of killing an adulterer caught in the act.[17] But in some important cases the judges' cognitive faculties are recruited by the orator's explicit invitation. In the *epilogos* (concluding passage) of the pseudo-Demosthenic *Against Macartatus*, for example, an emotive metaphor and a claim about what would constitute a just verdict in the case concerned are combined with an invitation to the judges to re-conceptualize what they see in front of them. The speaker asks the judges to think of (νομίζετε)[18] the boy Eubulides before them 'as the olive branch of a suppliant set before you' on behalf of his deceased older relatives – on whose collective behalf the judges should 'come to the aid of the laws and show concern for the dead… If you do this, you will give a verdict that conforms to justice, to your oath, and to your own best interests' ([Dem.] 43.83–4). Like appeals to pity in general (including the displaying of family members),[19] these appeals to the judges to

imagine the space in front of them differently – and so render a just verdict – cluster in *epilogoi*,[20] and they share this with other techniques that put pressure on the judges to make the 'right' decision.[21] One example is provided by Andocides' *On the Mysteries*, which ends with a plea to the judges to remember the services of his aristocratic forebears: 'imagine you can see them in person (νομίσατε τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν ὁρᾶν), asking you to save me' (1.148).[22] The judges are to perform the imaginative task of mentally projecting into the court space the material, bodily presence (σώματα) of Andocides' ancestors. Likewise, νομίσατε ὁρᾶν ('imagine you can see') is used by Aeschines to introduce his set-piece visualization sequences in *Against Ctesiphon*. The shared usage may indicate that this was a mainstream formulation.

Several surviving speeches – all for the prosecution – give *enargeia* an even more significant role as a means of conceptualizing justice and of impressing on the judges what would constitute a just verdict. In the *epilogos* of his early prosecution speech *Against Leptines*, Demosthenes appeals to judges and informal spectators alike as follows (165–6):

> None of those attending the trial nor anyone else is unaware that although Leptines is our opponent in court, in the mind of each of you seated here (ἐν δὲ τῇ τῶν καθημένων ὑμῶν ἑνὸς ἑκάστου γνώμῃ), generosity is set against (ἀντιτάττεται) envy, justice against evil, and noble sentiments against the worst. [166] If you are influenced by the better of these, if you follow our advice when voting, you will appear to have come to the right decision and to have voted what is best for the city.

The judges are therefore asked to conceive of a just verdict as a resolution of a war of moral abstracts conducted in their individual minds as much as a resolution of a contest between physical litigants in the material court environment.[23] The judges' mental efforts matter because these are moral standards that should govern the resolution of *every* trial, not just this one: only the judges – those 'seated' (καθημένων) – are spoken of as actually hosting these warring abstracts, even though the informal spectators are described as aware of them too. Demosthenes therefore constructs the imagination (signposted by the non-technical γνώμῃ here) as a source of normative decision-making which, if accessed appropriately by the judges, will deliver the right verdict (and serve as a model for future decision-making). This vivid essentialization of the legal contest is paralleled in Apollodorus' *Against Neaera*, where, in a section leading up to the *epilogos*, Apollodorus seeks to recalibrate the judges' perceptions in a way that combines the techniques exemplified above in *Against Macartatus* and *On the Murder of Eratosthenes* with the involvement of abstracts just seen in *Against Leptines*: 'do not suppose (ἡγεῖσθε) it is I, Apollodorus,[24] who am speaking, nor the citizens who will speak to defend and support [Neaera], but imagine that the laws are actually in litigation with Neaera here' ([Dem.] 59.115). Apollodorus combines the familiar material realities of Athenian judicial process – the laws as documents and as agreed cultural standards – with the assertion that there is another, invisible dispute going on

concurrently which judges can (and should) conceptualize: an exercise which will make the wider civic significance of their eventual decision clear to them.

Important parallels appear in the latter part of Demosthenes' *Against Meidias*, a speech particularly invested in visualization techniques. Demosthenes' prosecution had arisen from a physical attack on him by Meidias two years earlier in front of a large theatre gathering, and ideas both of spectacle and of the special mental impact of witnessing or experiencing a crime in person remain fundamental to Demosthenes' strategy in the speech.[25] In its *epilogos*, he briefly entertains the possibility that the personified laws of Athens might be able to run up and help an ordinary citizen who is being harmed – 'one of you' (τις ὑμῶν), he stresses – before admitting the physical reality ('the laws are only written letters, and they could not do this': 224). Instead, he entreats the judges to act as the laws' agents and allies ('defend[ing] them just as the victim of injustice defends himself': 225), just as the laws in turn are the judges' primary means of preserving civic order. This centring of the laws' inability to act alone – and of the reciprocal relationship they need to have with the judges – ties down Demosthenes' preferred conception, as prosecutor, of what is at stake in the trial. So does the singularizing of the imagined victim: Demosthenes intimates that the judges will make their final decision not only as a collective with whom the enacting of community justice resides but as individuals who (by voting) will demonstrate their sensitivity to the wider implications for civic order of a hypothetical crime which could have happened to any of them. That crime, in turn, is given specificity by the very real injury Demosthenes himself sustained in the theatre in full view of an audience which included some of those listening and judging now.

In a similar move earlier in the speech, Demosthenes makes the visible space of the lawcourt crucial to his anticipation of an emotional self-defence by Meidias (186–8). First, he points out that his own childlessness means he cannot stand his own children by him (παραστησάμενος: 187) to arouse the judges' pity for the injury he suffered; Meidias, on the other hand, *can* do so (in order to arouse the judges' pity for him as defendant).[26] Demosthenes then frames the decision the judges must ultimately make as follows (187–8):

> For this reason, therefore, will I, the victim, come out worse than the guilty party in your court? No, do not let this happen. [188] But when this man takes his children (ἔχων τὰ παιδία) and asks you to vote for them, then imagine (ἡγεῖσθε) that I have taken the laws and the oath that you swore and stand nearby (τοὺς νόμους ἔχοντά με πλησίον … παρεστάναι καὶ τὸν ὅρκον ὃν ὀμωμόκατε), asking and pleading (ἀξιοῦντα καὶ ἀντιβολοῦνθ') with each of you (ἕκαστον ὑμῶν) to vote for them. There are many reasons why it is more just for you to take their side rather than this man's. Men of Athens, you have sworn to obey the laws, and you enjoy equal rights because of the laws, and all the benefits that you enjoy exist because of the laws, not because of Meidias nor because of Meidias' children.

The passage combines many of the techniques I have noted so far: the (partial) personification of non-human entities, in this case not only the laws but also the

dicastic oath;[27] the creation of pathos through the visualization of a child or children and of a figure supplicating (ἀντιβολοῦντα here; cf. ἀντιβολῶ in [Dem.] 43.84 above); and the identification of the speaker as the guardian of – and therefore associable with – the laws and lawcourt procedure themselves. However, Demosthenes' emphasis throughout *Against Meidias* on his status as the injured party in the dispute – a status that is, in some senses, analogous to that of a defendant – enables an ambitious manoeuvre which diverges from all the passages previously mentioned: Demosthenes imagines himself invading the defence's space and time, visualizing what the judges should imagine not only now (during Demosthenes' prosecution speech) but also much later, during Meidias' own defence. At that point, the judges – considered here not just as a collective but as thinking *individuals* (ἕκαστον) – should look at the speaker's platform and imagine Demosthenes standing holding (texts of) the laws and the oath near (πλησίον) Meidias and his children in order to remind the judges of their duty and to act as a visual counterweight to Meidias' attempts to secure the judges' pity. Although Demosthenes is the only person actually envisaged as present (παρεστάναι: 188) on the platform at this stage apart from Meidias and his children (i.e. the laws and the oath are not fully personified),[28] the word παρεστάναι still acts as a structural mirror for the notion (pivoted on παραστησάμενος) that Demosthenes would stand his (human) children by him if he had any. This then informs the *epilogos*' brief image of the laws as unable to help anyone on their own (224); it gestures back to the dependent state at §188 both of Meidias' children, who must be 'held' by their father (an aspect mentioned three times: ἔχων: 186, 188; ἔχοιμι: 187) and of Demosthenes' own proxy 'children', the laws and the oath themselves, who he correspondingly 'holds' too (ἔχοντά: 188). Both §188 and the *epilogos* therefore foster a precisely visualized and personalized sense of the precariousness of justice – in effect, that the laws are orphans unless 'adopted' by each individual judge when he votes.

In asking the judges to use their imaginations to jump to the end of the main part of the trial, Demosthenes executes a counterfactual visualization that reflects, in its complexity, the usage of Aeschines, the surviving orator who demonstrates the most consistently perceptive and creative command of visualization techniques as prompts to imagining. He also deploys them well beyond *epilogoi*, especially in his two surviving prosecution speeches, *Against Timarchus* and *Against Ctesiphon*.[29] His earlier career as an actor probably made him particularly aware of how to design persuasive scenarios that would draw productively on judges' experience of the power of theatrical spectacle,[30] and allow him to capitalize on his performance skills, especially his impressive voice.[31] These abilities would also have served him well in another previous career, that of public secretary, which involved the frequent recitation of official documents to large audiences.[32] The experience derived from these two 'previous lives' makes it plausible that he was more systematically attuned to the performative and structural parallels between lawcourt, theatre, and decision-making contexts like the Boule and Assembly than many of his rivals, and so to the performative possibilities available across those venues.[33]

Aeschines' distinctiveness also extends to the precise way he shapes his appeals to the judges' imaginations, paying close attention to the cognitive process and

using appropriate (and perhaps intellectually inflected) vocabulary. Importantly for us, he is the only surviving lawcourt orator to use the word *dianoia* ('thought', 'thought process', 'mind', 'intellect') to signify mental activity that the judges are to perform *in the moment*, rather than attitudes or views they are to adopt for the duration of the trial.[34] Applying *dianoia* to the thought processes of the judges at all is not in fact common; we saw above that Demosthenes used γνώμη in *Against Leptines* 165, and there the implication was that the battle of moral abstracts in the judges' minds had been raging throughout the trial, even if Demosthenes only identifies it now, in the *epilogos*, at the point where he particularly wants them to have their oath in mind (and the 'most just γνώμη' the oath required judges to apply).[35]

Aeschines uses *dianoia* in this temporally pinpointed way on four occasions, all embedded in rich visualizing contexts.[36] In *Against Timarchus* 49, for example, he takes care to explain to the judges that the youthful looks of Timarchus' older former lover Misgolas (who has been called to testify) are deceptive 'so that when you suddenly (ἐξαίφνης) see him you will not be surprised and mentally respond (τῇ διανοίᾳ ὑπολάβητε): "Heracles! He is not much older than Timarchus!"' In this passage and elsewhere, Aeschines shows himself distinctively alert to the likely impression on a judge's mind of a particular *sudden* new piece of information (cf. 1.17, 3.59), pointing both to a sophisticated command of how cognitive and persuasive processes might interact and probably also to a shrewd grasp of how to encourage judges to apply their experiences of surprises and urgent decision-making in drama to what they heard in court. Aeschines also uses *dianoia* as part of his introductions to two set-piece *enargeia* passages (3.153 and 186; see below); elsewhere, he tends to choose the phrase νομίσατε ὁρᾶν ('imagine you can see'), like Andocides above, or the closely related ὑπολαμβάνετε/ὑπολάβετε ὁρᾶν. Later in *Against Timarchus*, for example, he constructs two imaginary scenarios (161–4 and 175) where he invites the judges (respectively) to 'see' a parallel, fictive trial happening rather than simply hearing about it (ἀλλὰ γιγνόμενον τὸ πρᾶγμα νομίσαθ' ὁρᾶν: 161) and to imagine they can see (ὑπολάβετε ὁρᾶν: 175) a victorious Demosthenes bragging to his young 'pupils' after helping Timarchus escape justice. Aeschines' appeal to the judges' imaginations is therefore typically very overt: other orators almost uniformly prefer more oblique transitions. As we will see, Demosthenes in the 'news from Elatea' sequence appeals to a combination of the judges' memories and their senses to generate a competing imaginative effect.

Aeschines' *Against Ctesiphon* is still more ambitious. Fiona Hobden and Ruth Webb have discussed Aeschines' harnessing of *enargeia* and related techniques to impress relevant facets of the Athenian past on the judges in this speech, especially the moment where he asks them to imagine (τῇ διανοίᾳ: 3.186) that they are in the Stoa Poikile, examining the details of the painting of the battle of Marathon there.[37] Aeschines' aim here is to demonstrate that Demosthenes cannot possibly deserve the crown proposed for him, and the immediacy of the switch of venue helps force that conclusion. Another historically pivoted passage, the first part of the *epilogos* (257–9), goes further.[38] It resembles Demosthenes' *Against Meidias* in its construction of an alternative image of the point in the defence's time where the defendant will appeal to external support: in Meidias' case, his

children; in Ctesiphon's case, Demosthenes and possibly other supporting speakers (συνηγόρους: 257). But Aeschines' passage pushes the judges' imaginations further than *Against Meidias* had. Where Demosthenes had asked them to imagine him standing holding the laws and the dicastic oath and voicing an appeal to each listener, thus (ideally) drowning out the emotive pleas of Meidias, Aeschines instead builds on an appropriation of the laws as his supporting speakers that he had made earlier in *Against Ctesiphon* (συνηγόρους: 3.37). He asks the judges to imagine the temporary resurrection in court – and the forceful counter-appeals – of two historical individuals whom he could be confident the judges would understand as *embodying* justice not just championing it. These are Solon (described here as a 'philosopher and a worthy legislator': ἄνδρα φιλόσοφον καὶ νομοθέτην ἀγαθόν: 257) and Aristides ('expressing his anger at the insult to justice': ἐπὶ τῷ τῆς δικαιοσύνης προπηλακισμῷ: 258). Judges would naturally view Solon as almost interchangeable with the laws, and his appeal to them 'under no circumstances (μηδενὶ τρόπῳ) to set more value on Demosthenes' arguments than on [their] oaths and the laws (τῶν ὅρκων καὶ τῶν νόμων)' (257) cements the identification.[39] As for Aristides, Aeschines had prepared for this moment by featuring him earlier on in such a way as to remind listeners of his defining traditional attribute: his reputation for just behaviour (ὁ δίκαιος ἐπικαλούμενος: 'known as "the Just"'), contrasted with the perfidy of Demosthenes (181), as here.

Both Solon and Aristides are now to be imagined standing on the speaker's platform exactly where Aeschines is speaking now (οὗ νῦν ἑστηκὼς ἐγὼ λέγω),[40] thus encouraging judges to view him as in some sense their material analogue in the immediate present.[41] Importantly, Aeschines does not use the word *dianoia* here, but the more general ὑπολαμβάνετε ὁρᾶν formula: he wants the judges not only to form the image now but also to retain it in their minds and apply it to their thinking as the defence team speak. By asking the judges to imagine this symbolic takeover of the platform by Solon and Aristides at the point where Ctesiphon has almost finished his own defence and is calling his supporting speakers, Aeschines ensures that the figure whose speech Solon and Aristides will be drowning out as they make their counter-appeals will be Demosthenes himself. Rather than flanking Demosthenes (to shout him down more effectively), Solon and Aristides are to be imagined standing *together* to oppose him (ἀντιπαρατεταγμένους) – and also Ctesiphon if he has not yet left the platform – in a way that echoes Demosthenes' own vision of the opposition of moral virtues and vices in the *epilogos* of *Against Leptines* (ἀντιτάττεται: 20.165). Meanwhile, the striking compound ἀντιπαρατεταγμένους participates in the repeated use of military imagery (especially that of the battle-line: *taxis*) in both *Against Ctesiphon* and *On the Crown*,[42] prompted by Aeschines' sustained allegation that Demosthenes' 'desertion' at Chaeronea should be a major reason to convict Ctesiphon and deny Demosthenes his crown. It therefore effectively clinches Aeschines' co-opting of these great men of the past to his own side.

Aeschines' depiction of a Demosthenes opposed by two unassailable cornerstones of the history of Athenian justice therefore seeks to imprint vividly on the judges' minds that conviction would be the just verdict, and functions as a highly economical way of drawing together (at this critical stage, the *epilogos*)

two essential threads of the prosecution case. First, the figure of Aristides reminds the judges of how their ancestors outlawed Arthmius of Zelea, who brought Persian bribe money to Greece (258–9), and this connects to Aeschines' earlier accusation that Demosthenes had simply pocketed the Persian money he received to help Thebes in its revolt against Alexander in 335 BCE. Aristides' bitter complaint (σχετλιάζοντα) and the imagined and vocal horror of the victorious dead of Marathon and Plataea, who Aeschines adds to the background in §259, seem jointly set up to recall an earlier moment of *enargeia* (244) where Aeschines had specifically asked the judges to imagine (νομίσαθ' ὁρᾶν) the dead of Chaeronea complaining (σχετλιάζοντας) should the judges allow the crowning of Demosthenes. Second, in inviting the judges to envisage the material, bodily presence of Solon and Aristides (rather than, for example, personified laws or moral abstracts), Aeschines reinforces the relevance of active comparison between the conduct of great past leaders and Demosthenes' own disastrous leadership, something that has occupied him throughout the speech (e.g. 3.177–90). In *On the Crown*, to which I now turn, Demosthenes appeals to the judges' imaginations by reminding them of his achievements both before and after Chaeronea, emphasizing those achievements' fidelity to Athens' traditional identity and rebutting Aeschines' claims;[43] his 'news from Elatea' sequence forms an important part of this rhetorical self-vindication project. Both orators' appeals, then, operate on the assumption that the judges' imaginations can serve as interfaces between the real court environment and its wider civic setting on the one hand, and justice-led decision-making in the abstract on the other.

III. Aeschines versus Demosthenes: Lawcourt, Theatre, and Assembly

Ctesiphon's proposed decree stated that Demosthenes was to be crowned 'for his virtue and integrity (ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ ἀνδραγαθίας) … [and] because he consistently speaks and acts in the best interests of the people' (Aeschin. 3.49). The Crown trial in 330 BCE gave both Aeschines and Demosthenes creative flexibility because both accepted that the most important of Aeschines' three charges was the one not tied to specific laws: his straightforward contention that Ctesiphon's honorific claims about Demosthenes were false.[44] Accordingly, each orator shapes his material in such a way as to identify a just verdict as a matter, first and foremost, of the judges endorsing or rejecting Ctesiphon's claims about Demosthenes' reputation. We have already seen (with Andocides, for example) that the link between memory and the imagining of justice can be strong, and this becomes instrumental in the case of Aeschines' and Demosthenes' competing imagined versions of Athens' relationship with Thebes (and Demosthenes' role in shaping this) at the critical points of 339 and 335 BCE. Both orators' attempts to get the judges to imagine these depended on establishing a connection with their memories of the physical experience of marching out, voting, and so on. Unlike Aeschines in *Against Ctesiphon*, though, Demosthenes recognized that success would mean invoking the judges' *preferred* memories: the judges would enter into the reciprocal process of imagining more readily if they were given positive memories to access and not negative ones. That

meant recalling the making of Athens' alliance with Thebes in 339 and not Athens' failure to support Thebes in 335. In *On the Crown*, Demosthenes makes this insight essential to his strategy of upstaging the lengthy *enargeia* passage of Aeschines' speech (3.152–7) which culminates in the horrors of Alexander's sack of Thebes, and which I now turn to examine.[45]

Aeschines' passage is preceded by an extended advance rebuttal of Demosthenes' claims to have been personally responsible for the Theban alliance, complete with an account of Demosthenes' 'real' (venal) motives at the time, which serves to link 339 with 335 (3.137–51). Aeschines then (152–6) stakes out an imagined space which he populates with no fewer than four real ones. These are: (i) the battlefield of Chaeronea (where those who died did so thanks to Demosthenes: 152); (ii) the public tomb of the dead (which Demosthenes disgraced by standing on it to give the funeral oration, despite his earlier battlefield desertion: 152); (iii) the lawcourt environment now; and (iv) the theatre: 'please imagine yourselves for a moment (γένεσθε δή μοι μικρὸν χρόνον τὴν διάνοιαν) not in the court but in the theatre, and suppose that you see (νομίσαθ' ὁρᾶν) the herald coming forward, the announcement in the decree about to take place'. Demosthenes' crown was due to be proclaimed at the presentation of the new tragedies during the next City Dionysia festival (cf. Aeschin. 3.34), and this gives Aeschines a chance to connect the pathos the tragedies will induce in the dead men's relatives with their negative emotions about the crowning of Demosthenes (153). To increase this pathos, Aeschines adds a temporal dimension to the spatial one. The judges are already being required to imagine the theatre during the next Dionysia, and Demosthenes' crowning, superimposed on the lawcourt situation before their eyes, but now Aeschines also asks them to imagine the further superimposition of a parallel moment in the theatre during Dionysia festivals past. He recalls the long-discontinued ceremony at which the herald used to present (παραστησάμενος: 154) the orphaned sons of Athens' war dead to the festival audience to announce the state's provision for them up to this point: a fine proclamation 'most calculated to inspire courage (ἀρετήν)' according to Aeschines.[46] Now he associates these orphans with the sons of the dead of Chaeronea in the recent past, underscoring the full horror of what will happen at the next Dionysia, where the herald will present Demosthenes instead:

> [155] This was the proclamation in those days, but not now. No, with the man responsible for the children's orphan state beside him (παραστησάμενος), what announcement will the herald make? What will he say? For if he goes through the actual announcement ordered by the decree, shame prompted by the truth will not stay silent but will seem to proclaim in opposition to the herald's voice that this man, if man he really is, is being crowned by the Athenian people for his virtue when he is utterly base (ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα τὸν κάκιστον), and for his manly excellence when he is a coward who has deserted his post (ἀνδραγαθίας ἕνεκα τὸν ἄνανδρον καὶ λελοιπότα τὴν τάξιν). [156] No, in the name of Zeus and the gods, I beg you (ἱκετεύω), men of Athens, do not set up a trophy to your own defeat in the orchestra of the theatre of Dionysus. Do not convict the Athenian people of madness in the presence

> of all of Greece. Do not remind the wretched Thebans, who were exiled because of him and have been given refuge in our city, of their incurable and irreparable sufferings, when their temples and children and tombs have been destroyed by Demosthenes' corruption and the King's gold. [157] But since you were not there in person (τοῖς σώμασιν οὐ παρεγένεσθε), witness their disasters with your mind's eye (ταῖς γε διανοίαις ἀποβλέψατ[ε]) and imagine that you can see (νομίσαθ' ὁρᾶν) their city being captured, the demolition of the walls, the burning of the houses, the women and children being led away to slavery, old men (πρεσβύτας ἀνθρώπους), old women (πρεσβύτιδας γυναῖκας) learning late in life to forget their freedom, weeping, begging you (ἱκετεύοντας), angry not at the people who were taking revenge on them but at the men responsible for these events, solemnly instructing you under no circumstances (μηδενὶ τρόπῳ) to crown the curse of Greece.

As we saw earlier with the *epilogos*, this passage allows Aeschines to crystallize the speech's case so far. It lets him connect parts of the argument which could otherwise easily be thought disparate, and it establishes the basis for a just verdict before the judges' eyes by urging emotive parallels between a multiplicity of venues (adding a fifth at §157: the spectacle of the burning Thebes of 335, on which the judges are to concentrate: ἀποβλέψατ[ε]).[47] Aeschines reveals that these various situations are cognate if viewed through a specific lens: Demosthenes' responsibility for the destruction or corruption involved. He also makes some overt connections between some of them: for example, the figurative trophy in the theatre in §156 ties down the alignment between battlefield and theatre begun in §153. But it is important to understand how else the judges might be able to process the complex and indeed perhaps *over*-populated space Aeschines asks them to visualize here.[48] Even though Aeschines accepts that the judges were not present at the fall of Thebes, using the language of formal lawcourt witnessing to say so (οὐ παρεγένεσθε),[49] this in fact draws attention to the dramatic economy of his own presentation: the judges are treated to an impressive illusion of access to multiple spaces and times at once. However, rationalizing how these variously occupied spaces actually connect with one another remains a task left up to them.

One device that might help them to make sense of Aeschines' construct is the role of the herald. Heralds were naturally able to move between a variety of spaces, both military contexts (even battlefields) and purely civic ones like the theatre and the annual public burial;[50] their official function also allowed the easy mapping between temporal contexts that Aeschines needs here in his contrast between Dionysia practices in different periods. Aeschines' present-day herald (and his olden-days counterpart) is given a good deal of agency: the judges are to imagine the olden-days herald physically placing the orphans where they need to be, and the word-choice (παραστησάμενος: 154) recalls Demosthenes' hypothetical lining-up of his non-existent children in *Against Meidias*, as we saw earlier. Aeschines' pathetic image of the present-day herald doing the same thing with Demosthenes so that he can receive his crown (155), as though he too were a young orphan, invites judges

to tap into some of the emotions of anger (against Demosthenes) and pity (for past and present war-orphans) that they would expect to feel during an *epilogos*.

Furthermore, the herald's role guarantees that the envisaged scenario can (like Aeschines' own *epilogos*) impress itself as much through imagined *speech* – and imagined *speakers* – as imagined sight. This extends beyond the herald's own words too: the dispossessed Thebans' supplication of the judges (ἱκετεύοντας: 157) parallels Aeschines' own here in the court (ἱκετεύω: 156) in issuing from a speaking, material entity. The *epilogos* then seems calculated to recall this sequence, with the use there (in the imagined Solon's appeal) of the phrase μηδενὶ τρόπῳ (257), which echoes that of the Thebans here (157). But the versatility and interspatial and intertemporal mobility of the herald – and his visibility as a symbol of ordinary civic life – allows Aeschines to achieve a striking effect with the personification of 'Shame prompted by the truth' (τό γ' ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας αἰσχρόν) interrupting the herald's recitation of the decree's terms in §155. Though only performance would have made this clear, 'Shame' is presumably to be imagined shouting 'τὸν κάκιστον!' ('he's a villain!') when the herald mentions ἀρετή ('virtue') and 'τὸν ἄνανδρον καὶ λελοιπότα τὴν τάξιν!' ('he's a coward who deserted his post!') when the herald mentions ἀνδραγαθία ('manly excellence'), in order to make a nonsense of the herald's proclamation (just as Demosthenes imagined himself drowning Meidias out in *Against Meidias* and Aeschines' own *epilogos* imagines Solon and Aristides drowning Demosthenes out). The judges are probably meant to find this disruption of a herald doing his official duty disorientating[51] and will therefore remember these key terms of Aeschines' prosecution: that Demosthenes' bad moral character and especially his cowardice mean that Ctesiphon must be convicted.

Aeschines' decision to dwell on the plight of the Thebans may have been overtly competitive. The first-century CE rhetorician Aelius Theon cites both §157 and Demosthenes' evocation of the plight of the defeated Phocians in *On the False Embassy* (19.65) as imitations of *Iliad* 9.593–4, implying in the process that Aeschines' passage is also a remodelling of Demosthenes'.[52] In *On the False Embassy* – the prosecution speech in a previous legal clash with Aeschines, in the year 343 – Demosthenes had not specifically invited his audience to *imagine* the Phocians' plight. He had simply described it as a 'terrible and piteous sight' (θέαμα δεινόν … καὶ ἐλεινόν) that he and others could witness (ἦν ὁρᾶν ἡμῖν) as they travelled through Phocis. But he had populated the scene with some of the same dispossessed social groups as Aeschines' imagined Thebes (including πρεσβύτας ἀνθρώπους, 'old people', just like Aeschines in 3.157, who adds 'πρεσβύτιδας γυναῖκας', 'old women'). If we take account of the similarity between Aeschines' earlier claim that the sack of Thebes was a disaster for Greece on an unprecedented scale (3.132–3) and Demosthenes' very similar claim prefacing the Phocis passage in *On the False Embassy*, then Theon's juxtaposition begins to look significant. Webb's suggestion that Aeschines may intend his 'fall of Thebes' as some sort of response to Demosthenes' Phocis passage looks correspondingly plausible.[53] It makes it likely that in *On the Crown* Demosthenes might want to respond to Aeschines' *enargeia* sequence by giving the judges clearly competing images to concentrate on,[54] and making their decision between these sets of images easier

by giving them a more palatable set than Aeschines had. *On the Crown* 41 shows that Aeschines' Thebes passage certainly caught Demosthenes' attention: he calls Aeschines '[the man who] now bewails the anguish of the Thebans and proclaims their misery' (ὁ τὰ Θηβαίων ὀδυρόμενος νῦν πάθη καὶ διεξιὼν ὡς οἰκτρά). In the next clause, he mentions Aeschines' responsibility 'for what the Phocians suffered', indicating that he might have spotted Aeschines' attempt at an ironic revision of the emotive passage about Phocis in *On the False Embassy*.

Demosthenes' answering strategy in *On the Crown* therefore entails inviting the judges to fill their imaginations with memories of the making of the alliance with Thebes in 339 – and Demosthenes' role in securing it – in order to erase Aeschines' negative coverage of the latter and his criticism of Demosthenes' alleged responsibility for Athens' failure to support Thebes in 335. Something that helps Demosthenes here is Aeschines' own inconsistent attitude to the Thebans in *Against Ctesiphon*. He half-justifies their destruction in §133 and implies that they were not fit to lead the alliance in §§143–5 – and then laments their fate in §§156–7, as we just saw. Demosthenes targets this in *On the Crown* 41, dismissing Aeschines' professed pity for the Thebans as a sham. Instead, he seeks to communicate a simpler, more positive message, reminding the judges of his own indispensable role in what happened in the aftermath of the news from Elatea (169–79), including a compressed version (174–8) of the speech he made in the Assembly the next morning:

> [169] It was evening, and a messenger reached the Presiding Officers with the news that Elatea had been taken. Immediately they got up from dinner, some to clear the stalls in the marketplace and set the scaffolding alight, others to summon the generals and call out the trumpeter. The city was full of turmoil. At break of dawn the next day, the Presiding Officers called the Council to the Council-house while you proceeded to the Assembly, and before the Council could deliberate and endorse a proposal, the entire citizen body was seated up there. [170] After this, the Council entered and the Presiding Officers announced the news they had received, and they produced the messenger to give his report. Then the herald asked, "Who wishes to speak?" but no one came forward. The herald asked many times but to no avail. No one rose, though all the generals were present and all the politicians too, and the {common voice of the}[55] country was calling (καλούσης δὲ τῆς {κοινῆς} πατρίδος {φωνῆς}) for a speaker to save it. For the voice of the herald lawfully discharging his task is rightly considered the common voice of the country (ἦν γὰρ ὁ κῆρυξ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους φωνὴν ἀφίησι, ταύτην κοινὴν τῆς πατρίδος δίκαιον ἐστιν ἡγεῖσθαι). … [173] The one who emerged as the right man on that day was I. I stepped forward and addressed you.

Demosthenes' account of the lead-up to the Assembly meeting contrasts with Aeschines' burning Thebes of 335: Athens is on the brink in 339, but Demosthenes' action will save it from the fate Thebes later experienced: the only parts of Athens that will ever burn are the wooden frames of the agora's market-stalls, set alight to spread the news across Attica. The engagement of the judges' imaginations

here remains implicit (with no 'imagine' formula). Instead, as also in Aeschines' sequence, Demosthenes concentrates his imaginative 'pitch' to the judges on multisensory immersion for now, drawing on their familiarity with the material surroundings of the city centre and its official emergency procedures, captured here with a wide range of sights and sounds.

The initial sequential organization of the passage is very important. Where Aeschines had ambitiously brought battlefield, monument, theatre, and lawcourt into the same space and had mobilized the herald as a way of slipping between them, Demosthenes initially seeks to keep the judges' cognitive processing strain-free by adopting a narrative movement which is basically linear and only acquires a second layer – i.e. a layer superimposed on the trial situation, like Aeschines' – once we enter the Assembly. The judges' individual memories, appropriately curated and heightened by the synaesthetic experience of §169, become a way of unifying, validating, and personalizing Demosthenes' sequence and enabling them to visualize it easily. Demosthenes had already reminded them that they 'all know' (ἴστε μὲν ἅπαντες: 168) about these events (and that he will cover only the most significant moments: τἀναγκαιότατα). His invitation to them is to recall their feelings at the time if they were in Athens, or to imagine how they might have felt had they been. The claim that the 'entire citizen body' was assembled on the Pnyx (169) ensures that nobody listening to the speech is left out, as does the spectacle of the news cascading through the city. The narrative is also carefully punctuated by pronouns which embrace all hearers in prompting recollection: 'you (ὑμεῖς) proceeded' (169); 'all of you' (πάντες … ὑμεῖς) (171) (with πάντες repeated); 'I … addressed you' (ὑμᾶς) (173). All this means that by the time we reach the more complex visualization of the all-important Assembly meeting, the audience has the context for the emergency fully established and will not need the kind of language we saw Aeschines use to provide immediate access to the scenarios to be imagined. Demosthenes has given the judges that access already.

The Assembly meeting (from 170) sustains the encouragement to the judges to remember and so to imagine, but specifically contests *Against Ctesiphon* 152–7 by mapping a cognate but distinct material realm of *dēmos* decision-making familiar to the judges onto the space occupied by the present trial. Two elements are crucial to the double exercise of importing the 339 Assembly meeting into the lawcourt space and allowing the judges to imagine it visually. The first is the image of Demosthenes standing on the speaker's platform, exactly as he is now, in court; the second is the imagined presence and role of the herald, whose embedded speech adds an aural dimension to the judges' mental apprehension of the scene. This herald seems highly likely to function as a direct challenge to Aeschines' herald from *Against Ctesiphon* 152–7. Rather than depicting the personified 'Shame' trying to drown out a herald simply performing his duty, Demosthenes identifies his herald with the voice of the fatherland (*patris*) itself – but he seems to signal his divergence from something like Aeschines' 'Shame' personification by referring to the herald and the *patris* separately before spelling the connection out. The fact that nobody initially responds to the herald contrasts strongly with the clash of voices in Aeschines, as does the sense of order Demosthenes sustains throughout

the Assembly scene: the citizens are already in their place despite their anxiety, the usual opening business is transacted, and the messenger reports. Then, at the herald's traditional invitation ('Who wishes to speak?') – and after an awkward pause (showing Demosthenes' restraint), in which the herald continues to call – the one speaker with the right set of qualities to address the issue at hand (172) eventually answers, and all present will endorse his advice to seek an alliance with Thebes ('everyone approved, and no one said a word in opposition': 179). Accordingly, the following of orderly and respectful process, and the identification of the herald's voice as 'the common voice of the country' further revises Aeschines' scene between Demosthenes and the herald by communicating that it will be the *patris* – and all those listening – who will in due course confer Demosthenes' crown on him via the herald's proclamation if Ctesiphon is acquitted.

Demosthenes' Assembly sequence therefore imitates Aeschines' enterprising accumulation of mutually-responsive layered scenes, but draws the whole within more cognitively digestible limits by keeping the number of scenarios involved to just two and by anchoring the resulting construct in the judges' personal memories of the time in question, as well as by building up to it gradually and immersively. Another factor gives it decisive persuasive force: the widely known reality of Demosthenes' tireless efforts on the city's behalf in the run-up to war with Philip.[56] His reminders of his many diplomatic journeys to different states in that cause (18.211–14, 244, 311) confront the exciting layering of multiple imagined venues offered by Aeschines with the solidity of Demosthenes' actual achievements (ones the judges remember: 179, 221), above all the embassy to Thebes. But he leaves coverage of that until later: rather than follow Aeschines' lead and transport the judges off to Thebes at this point as well as asking them to construct a composite picture of four other venues, Demosthenes' Assembly narrative keeps them focused on the familiar material surroundings of the central Athenian cityscape: the lawcourt now and the nearby Pnyx for the Assembly (ἄνω, 'up there', perhaps accompanied by a gesture: 169).

Demosthenes' Assembly scene also gains force from being cleverly generated out of a gap in Aeschines' own coverage of the same events. Aeschines claims that the Thebans appealed to Athens when Philip took Elatea and that the Athenians marched out in full force 'before Demosthenes had drafted a single syllable about alliance' (140). In *On the Crown* 215, this only occurs *after* Demosthenes' own embassy to Thebes. Neither version is likely to be entirely accurate,[57] but the essential point for us is that Aeschines' version still leaves the moment of initial Athenian response to Philip's seizing of Elatea unaccounted for. Demosthenes therefore fills the gap. We cannot be confident that his Assembly meeting scene accurately portrays its real-life counterpart: there may have been Theban envoys at the meeting whose presence Demosthenes is suppressing in order to aggrandize his own achievement and/or to suppress inconvenient memories of the Theban appeal for aid in 335. What matters is that his version intersects persuasively with how most judges would have *wished* to remember their relationship with, and past assistance to, the now-destroyed Thebes, in the period before Macedonian hegemony – under which they still lived in 330 – became a hard reality. What Demosthenes asks the

judges to imagine therefore rejects the material circumstances of the present and comforts Demosthenes' listeners with a better past which is reconstructed from their individual memories of 339 (and earlier) and which draws on ideas of Athens' tradition of altruistic aid to the oppressed. By harnessing the upbeat emotions of the period of the 339 alliance through an exercise in persuasive (even nostalgic) imagining, Demosthenes is therefore able to channel memories of his relentless activity in Athens' interests, and so to substantiate his right to the crown and with it Ctesiphon's innocence.

IV. Conclusion

Ultimately, no orator could be sure of *controlling* the imagination of an Athenian judge. Even the stirring *epilogos* of *Against Ctesiphon* failed to influence listeners sufficiently; the judges went on to acquit Ctesiphon by a large margin. What I have tried to do in this chapter is to examine the competitive aims which motivated, and the creative enterprise which characterized, the attempts of Athenian lawcourt orators to reshape the material court environment before the judges' eyes in order to convince them of their version of what a just verdict would look like and to confront the parallel constructions of their opponents. Beyond its capacity to showcase the orator's performance talents, an appeal to the judges' imaginations was worth making because it could bring much-needed unity to disparate content (as its frequent use in speeches' conclusions shows). The stimulating of judges' imaginations also played to their understandings of their deliberative function and democratic role, because it constructed relationships (often with the aid of metaphor) between *collective* aspects and impulses – their duties as judges; their accountability to the bystanders and absent citizens they represented; the familiar public spaces of the democracy; and their civic experience – and their own *individual* cognitive faculties, views, and interests. Like other aspects of democratic discourse,[58] it works to resolve the tension that existed between collective and individual thinking by acknowledging its functional dependence on the latter while constantly assuming the primacy of the former in setting standards judges would apply when voting.

This dynamic is captured in a striking image offered by Demosthenes in *On the Crown*. Asserting his past policy's adherence to ancestral tradition with a bold claim that this criterion ought in fact to weigh with judges in public cases just as much as the laws do in private ones, he then says: 'each of you must realize (νομίζειν) that when you come into court to decide a case of public import (τὰ δημόσια), you bear along with the staff and token of your office the aspirations (φρόνημα) of the city' (210). This comes at the end of an intense imaginative sequence in which Demosthenes has sworn an impressive oath by the Athenians who fought and died in the Persian Wars (208) in order to show that Athens was right to resist Philip. The image therefore serves to anchor this elaborate argument in two simple material objects – the staff and token – which each judge would have with him to contemplate at this moment[59] – and Demosthenes does appeal to *each individual* judge: ἕκαστον ὑμῶν (cf. 20.165–6 and 21.188 above). Orators' appeals to judges' imaginations, if carefully integrated with the overall strategy and complemented by

sufficient performance skills, allowed such conventional sights to take on dramatically enhanced meaning and to give judges the fleeting but empowering illusion that the responsibility for the court's decision, and for the future safeguarding of Athenian justice, resided in them – and them alone.

Abbreviations

Abbreviations of ancient authors and texts, as well as scholarly reference works, follow those of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, fourth edition; abbreviations of journal titles follow those of *L'Année Philologique*.

Notes

1 Sizes of panels: e.g. Hansen (1999: 187).
2 Judges' loud reactions (*thorubos*): Bers (1985); Hall (2006: 364); Thomas (2011; 2016).
3 On this oath, see Harris (2013: 101–37).
4 As in, e.g., Aeschin. 3.200–1; on these boards, see Fischer (2003: 238–44); Todd (2020: 638–9). On the interaction between material texts and the democratic community's imagination, see Lazar (this volume).
5 For the relation between 'justice' in the abstract, educational models of justice, and just individuals, see Petraki (this volume) on Plato's *Republic*.
6 See also Huitink (this volume) on *enargeia* in Greek historiography.
7 These terms (and the associated terms *diatyposis*, *hypotyposis*, and *ecphrasis*) are used quite variously in later criticism: Lausberg (1998: 359–72, 495–6). On *enargeia*, see, e.g., Webb (2009a; 2009b: 132–4); O'Connell (2017a: 124–40; 2017b); Spatharas (2017); Huitink (2020).
8 O'Connell (2017a; 2017b).
9 Though both speeches have been subsequently revised, they probably represent the delivered content fairly accurately: Yunis (2001: 26–7); Hubbard (2008: 193–5); Westwood (2020: 284–6). All dates in this chapter are BCE unless obvious.
10 Duncan (2006: 75) coins the term 'auto-*ethopoeia*' to describe 18.169–80. For a study of the theatrical and ecphrastic qualities of 18.169–73, see Serafim (2015: 99–105).
11 On defining the imaginative experience, see especially Huitink (this volume) and the Introduction.
12 Cf. 3.239–40 (where Aeschines anticipates that Demosthenes will want to talk about 339/8 and not 335).
13 Demosthenes also uses this passage to upstage Aeschines' lively account of his activities at Delphi in Athens' interests in 340/39 (3.115–24): Westwood (2020: 287–301, esp. 287 and 307–8 for the multiple referentiality of such passages).
14 Especially as the Assembly may initially have voted to support Thebes: Diod. Sic. 17.8.6.
15 Filonik (2017) is a valuable case-study of metaphor in Lycurgus 1. For other treatments of metaphor to communicate abstraction, see the chapters by Sekita and Petraki (this volume), on death and justice, respectively.
16 All translations of speeches in the current chapter are taken from the relevant volumes of the University of Texas Press *Oratory of Classical Greece* series, edited by Michael Gagarin (1998–2018).
17 See recently Webb (2020); Wohl (2020). Ar. *Ecc*. 1055–6 may suggest that the expression was hackneyed.
18 Greek quotations in this chapter are taken from Dilts (1997) for Aeschines and from Dilts (2002; 2005; 2009) for the Demosthenic corpus.

19 See Rubinstein (2000: 154–8). This could happen at other points in speeches too: Aeschin. 2.147–52.
20 The speaker of *Against Olympiodorus* ([Dem.] 48) asks the judges to 'imagine' (νομίσατε) his wife and daughter as his supporters at this point (57). This must mean they are absent: Gagarin (1998: 46).
21 These include imagining that the dead could be aware of the current trial (e.g. Lys. 12.100).
22 Text: Dilts & Murphy (2018).
23 For (rather different) images of 'private' deliberation, as a deep dive or a voyage, see Buxton (this volume).
24 Dilts (2009: 334) applies braces to εἶναι Ἀπολλόδωρον.
25 See especially Dem. 21.72 and Spatharas (2017).
26 Andocides likewise emphasizes his childlessness and lack of close family in the *epilogos* of *On the Mysteries*, co-opting the judges as his 'father and brothers and children' (149).
27 Dobree (1831: 465) thought καὶ τὸν ὅρκον ὃν ὀμωμόκατε should be deleted, and is followed by Weil (1883: 192), MacDowell (1990: 401), and Daix & Fernandez (2017: 543–4); but none of them justifies the deletion convincingly. Dilts (2005: 225) applies braces to the phrase; Goodwin (1906: 106) retains it (with, e.g., Σ 630 Dilts). Plato, *Crito* 50a–54d is an important parallel (as Dobree himself indicated).
28 Goodwin (1906: 106).
29 Aeschines and visualization: Hobden (2007: 495–8); Webb (2009b: esp. 132–4, 143–7); O'Connell (2017a: 124–36, esp. 128–31); Westwood (2017; 2020: 301–23).
30 Aeschines as actor: Harris (1995: 30–2); Easterling (1999); Duncan (2006: 58–83); Hernández Muñoz (2006); Webb (2009b: 146); Hanink (2014: 134–5, 175–6); Westwood (2020: 57–8, 202–3, 301).
31 Easterling (1999); Gotteland (2006); Hall (2006: 372–3); Serafim (2017: 84–7); Westwood (2020: 202–3, 237); and more generally Worman (2008: 238–74).
32 Harris (1995: 29–30).
33 For example, the relationship between oratorical narrative and tragic monologues (especially messenger speeches) as an object of audience attention: see Budelmann & van Emde Boas (2020) and Buxton (this volume).
34 Isocrates is a more frequent user of *dianoia* in various senses (though never in his logographic lawcourt speeches). His fictive *Archidamus* features a lawcourt-style *prosopopoeia* in the *epilogos* (6.110), using *dianoia(i)* as Aeschines does. For *dianoia* in Aristotle's *Poetics* and elsewhere, see Buxton (this volume, pp. 271–2, 278–9).
35 Judges' *dianoia(i)* (beyond instances in the main text and omitting Isocrates' fictive works): Aeschin. 3.8; Lys. 24.21; Lycurg. 1.75, 146; Dem. 31.9 (and 23.143 by implication; cf. e.g. 15.32 for an Assembly audience).
36 Aeschin. 1.49; 3.153, 157, 186.
37 Discussions: Hobden (2007: 495–8); Webb (2009b: 138–45); Westwood (2020: 311–20).
38 Discussions: Webb (2009b: 144–5); Westwood (2017: 61–71; 2020: 301–11).
39 On Solon's iconic role in Athenian legal culture: Thomas (1994a); Mossé (2004); Carey (2015); see also Westwood (2020: 203–8) (on Aeschines' use of Solon's statue to make a moralizing point in *Against Timarchus*). Petraki (this volume, pp. 179–82) discusses the educational role of so-called portrait statues or *eikones* in Classical Athens, focused not on superficial likeness but rather the embodiment of certain civic virtues.
40 Aeschines therefore specifies the *speaker's* platform (cf. 3.55, 165) rather than the prosecution platform (there were three platforms for the litigants in total in this trial: cf. 3.207).
41 On the bodily movement of imagined figures, cf. Huitink (2020; this volume).
42 Christ (2006: 134–41); Cook (2012: 232–8, 248–51); Brock (2013: 161–3, 191).
43 On this theme, see Yunis (2000).

44 Discussions of Aeschines' charges: Gagarin (2012); Harris (2013: 225–33; 2017; 2019); Westwood (forthcoming).
45 Discussions of the passage: Webb (2009b: 141–4); Hanink (2014: 116–17, 121–2); O'Connell (2017a: 128–31; 2017b: 241–2); Serafim (2017: 101–2); Westwood (2020: 302–3); Bajnok (2023).
46 Hanink (2014: 116–17) notes the contrast in treatment with Isoc. 8.82. For the ceremony itself, see Goldhill (1987: 63–8).
47 ἀποβλέπω is consistently used by the orators of *serious* attention to a highly significant object: Aeschin. 1.141, 178; 2.74; Isoc. 15.130; Lycurg. 1.64, 100; Hyp. *Eux*. 36; Din. 1.110.
48 On the possible cognitive efforts imposed, cf. Phillips on the ecphrasis of a Euripides ode (this volume) and Budelmann & van Emde Boas (2020: esp. 77–9 – including discussion of Polvinen's concept of 'joint attention').
49 Thür (2005: 153); O'Connell (2017a: 87).
50 On heralds' functions: Lewis (1996: 51–4, 63–8).
51 Heralds not only symbolized *polis* well-being but were inviolable: Lewis (1996: 63 with n. 63, 148); Rhodes & Osborne (2003: 170, on no. 35).
52 *Progymnasmata* 62.21–5, 63.3–13 Patillon. *Iliad* 9.593–4: 'they kill the men, and the fire leaves the city in ashes/and strangers lead the children away and the deep-girdled women' (trans.: Lattimore).
53 Webb (2009b: 142, 144); cf. Webb (2009a: 114–15, 152–3); for scepticism see O'Connell (2017a: 131 and n. 40). It is admittedly important to keep Lycurgus 1.40–1 in mind too: see O'Connell (2017a: 136–9).
54 For deliberation via the emotive imagining of two alternative futures, see Buxton (this volume).
55 Braces added with Dilts (2002: 270).
56 For discussion of this aspect, see Westwood (2021).
57 See Guth (2014).
58 See further Lazar (this volume).
59 [Arist.] *Ath*. *Pol*. 65.2–3.

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6 Plato's Creative Imagination

Zacharoula Petraki

I. Introduction

Plato's *Timaeus* is unique in Greek Antiquity for presenting the creation of the world as the work of a divine demiurge. The word *dēmiourgos*, taken from the fields of art and craftsmanship, encompasses several artisanal actions. The maker, envisaged as a metal-worker, a builder, a painter, a potter, and a wax-modeller/sculptor,[1] bestows order and commensurability on sensible things and imitates the world of the intellect by using the Forms as models.[2] While the creation-myth of the *Timaeus* seems original and unparalleled, several chapters in this book demonstrate a wider cultural discourse of mind-world interdependence, in which art and imagination figure and facilitate communication between the two.[3] The *Timaeus*, then, is not so eccentric as sometimes supposed.[4]

This chapter is focused on Plato. I argue that the *Timaeus* is not the first of the dialogues to use language from the realm of the arts to articulate the complex relationship between the objects of the material world and the world of the intellect.[5] Although the *Republic*'s comparison of the ideal city to the 'statue of a man' (*andrias*, 420c5) in Book Four has been noted, less attention has been given to Socrates' comparison to a 'statue-maker' (*andriantopoios*, 540c34) at the end of Book Seven.[6] In what follows, I argue that in the *Republic* Plato has Socrates employ imagery from the field of bronze statuary in order to illustrate how the class of the guardians can be fashioned to resemble the Forms, which are conceived, similarly to in the *Timaeus*, as divine models or paradigms (*paradeigmata*).[7] The portrait statues of athletes and important men fed Plato's imagination about what it means to portray virtue in the *polis* in physical terms, while the lost-wax technique for cast bronze statues provided him with an ingenious way to articulate how humans might be moulded to 'embody' the immaterial Forms.

An important part of my argument is that Plato's use of artistic language rests on a positive model of *mimēsis*. Rather than rejecting *mimēsis* at large, the *Republic* invests in the representational power of Greek art, presenting a quasi-artisanal image of Socrates.[8] This interpretation suggests that, despite the severe criticism of *mimēsis* in *Republic* Books Three and Ten, Plato was in fact engaged in a constructive dialogue with material culture and that he found in the process and the cultural/religious semantics of sculpture in the round a valuable way to

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conceptualize complex ideas about humans' relation to the Forms, and to communicate those ideas in words.[9] Plato invests in a particular Classical vision of Greek sculptural art in order to feed the power of philosophical visualization and redirect the imagination of his readership from (and out of) the physical to the abstract, the disincarnate, and the divine.[10] His comparison of Socrates to a 'statue-maker' uses a conceptual metaphor to point towards the philosophical creation of a quasi-artistic world. This world is placed somewhere between (*metaxu*) the sensible and material realm and the abstract world of the intellect.[11]

II. Glaucon's Two 'Statues' of Just and Unjust Men

The use of sculptural imagery as an integral part of the discussion of justice appears early in the dialogue and is put into the mouth not of Socrates but of Glaucon. *Republic* Book One ends in deadlock, since the interlocutors reach no satisfactory definition of justice. In Book Two, however, Glaucon re-launches the discussion by asking Socrates not only to define justice but also to 'praise it in itself' and not for its consequences.[12] In formulating this challenge Glaucon describes the creation of two men, each of whom has a single ethical characteristic: the unjust person is wholly unjust and the just person is wholly just. He then complicates the distinction by making them both appear to society to be the opposite (namely the just man appears to be unjust).[13] At the end of this description, Socrates exclaims (361d4–6):

> 'Whew! Glaucon,' I said, 'how vigorously (ὡς ἐρρωμένως) you've scoured each of the men for our competition, just as you would a pair of statues for an art competition' (ἑκάτερον ὥσπερ ἀνδριάντα εἰς τὴν κρίσιν).[14]

The description of the two men teems with language that invites the statue metaphor. Glaucon treats the two men as though they were a sculptural group (such as free-standing statues or temple pedimental sculptures) displaying the qualities of justice and injustice:[15] the unjust man is 'set up' (θέντες, 361b6); the just man is 'set at his side' (παρ' αὐτὸν ἱστῶμεν, 361b6) and is made to 'stand opposite' his imagined counterpart (ἐναντίως διακείμενος τῷ προτέρῳ, 361c5). The positional directions are matched with quasi-technical instructions in the form of a string of verbal adjectives.[16] Glaucon takes on the role of a verbal statue-maker, a role he will resume in Book Nine, when under Socrates' instructions he is asked to fashion the verbal 'statue' (*eikōn*) of the tyrant's soul.[17]

Glaucon's initial request that Socrates should also praise justice leads to the creation of a just person and a just society in words, as a way of illustrating the abstract concept of justice.[18] Indeed, at the end of Book Nine, Socrates will praise justice and also 'crown' the just man by demonstrating that, in contrast to the unjust, the just person enjoys true tranquillity, harmony, and happiness (580b9–c5). Thus the sculptural vocabulary serves perfectly this philosophic aim because bronze statuary has a long shared history with literary encomia and praise poetry.[19] In this respect, Socrates undertakes a role comparable to that of the philosopher-king, who in Book Six is explicitly compared to a 'painter of constitutions' (501c6–7).[20]

Having as his model the Forms, which 'remain always the same, neither doing injustice to one another nor suffering it', and having himself inspected the Form of Good, the philosopher-ruler aims to erase evil and injustice from society and to transfer to human beings qualities of metaphysical origin.[21] Socrates' task as a city founder is similar: the guardians should also be created so as to partake as much as possible of the world of the intellect. This is achieved through the formative effect of a philosophically sanctioned education, which is also described as an artistic process. And yet, the statue imagery of moulding a human being is not a mere metaphor about education. The plasticity and malleability of bronze statuary is channelled in philosophical discourse which also produces an impression of three-dimensionality. Philosophical conversation, in other words, assumes a three-dimensional character. As the dialogue develops, the guardians gradually emerge before our eyes as though they were 'real people' and, indeed, a better version of humans.[22] But why does Plato orchestrate things in this way? This is what I will explore in this chapter.

III. Typos as 'Pattern' and 'Mould'

Two terms which dominate Socrates' prescriptions regarding the creation and the education of the city-guardians in Books Two and Three appear in theoretical discussions on sculpture: *typos* and *paradeigma* (juxtaposed with the verb *plattō*). Their Platonic usage, however, is connotative rather than descriptive. If, as I propose, Socrates exploits the lost-wax bronze-casting technique in order to envisage how the soul is moulded to assume the patterns of divine models, he does so in an inconspicuous manner.[23] Nevertheless, these subtle references culminate in the emphatic comparison of the city to an *andrias* in Book Four (420c5).[24] We may then map out Plato's adaptation of sculptural language, starting from Books Two and Three, which set the guidelines for the guardians, and then moving to Book Four, which presents the final product of this endeavour, the city as a statue. In this section, I demonstrate that when Plato employs the word *typos* in Books Two and Three, he does so in order to bring in artistic themes of physical moulding.

In Book Two, Socrates observes that there are many *typoi* in visual art and poetry that could be used as patterns for the guardians' education. He will choose those suitable for the type of character he wishes them to have. Books Two and Three present us with two different types of educational pattern. The first refers to the traditional myths and motifs that appear in all forms of art, poetry, sculpture, and painting (we might call these cultural *typoi*). The second involves the philosophic *typoi*, which will be substituted for the traditional ones. Although not explicitly asserted in the text, this second kind of *typos* appears to be linked to the Forms, which appear expressly later in the discussion. Patterns (*typoi*) and philosophical Forms and are implicitly brought together in a significant passage in Book Four, when Socrates observes that their investigation has let him hit upon the 'origin and pattern of justice', described as the harmonious and concordant state of the human soul.[25] His use of *typos* here should not be understood as referring to the Forms, for which Socrates saves among other words the term *paradeigma*, but it does

raise the question whether the two terms are somehow related in their philosophical adaptation.[26] In plastic art, *typos* refers to the mould or the cast taken from the model (*paradeigma*). Can we locate such a hierarchy in the Socratic usage? Let us examine *typos* first.

Typos appears for the first time in 377a2–383c7, in the context of Socrates' criticism of the poetic myths that misrepresent gods and heroes. Here it is combined with language that suggests moulding and the fashioning of form (377a11–b2):

> You know, don't you, that the beginning of any process is most important, especially for anything young and tender (ἁπαλῷ ὀτῳοῦν)? It's at that time that it is most malleable and takes on any pattern one wishes to impress on it (καὶ μάλιστα γὰρ δὴ τότε, καὶ ἐνδύεται τύπος ὃν ἄν τις βούληται ἐνσημήνασθαι ἑκάστῳ).

These lines introduce the image of a quasi-material or 'plastic' soul which is almost as mouldable as the human body, which can be moulded, as it were, in the gymnasium, an idea explicitly asserted again in 377c4–5. According to James Adam, Plato suggests that the soul resembles a sort of wax, which receives the various *typoi* as stamps, an image that he will employ in a more extended version in his *Theaetetus*.[27] This interpretation is based on the translation of *typos* as 'the effect of a blow', 'impression' or 'seal' (*sphragis*).[28] This is a valid interpretation, but not the only one.[29] The noun *typos* can also denote 'a hollow mould or matrix',[30] as well as 'a cast or replica made in a mould'.[31] It also bears the meaning of 'a figure worked in relief, whether made by moulding, modelling or sculpture'.[32] The common denominator in all these meanings is the notion of imprinting form and creating distinctive features on a malleable material (plaster or wax). As we will see, Socrates could well have used this cluster of metaphors to promote an image of the soul as a mould such as those created in the lost-wax casting technique to fashion the wax replica of a bronze statue. I will return to this interpretation of *typos* below. Let us first inspect the other occurrences of the word in the *Republic*.

A similar interpretation of *typos* may be ventured in the passage that immediately follows. Socrates opens his criticism of Homer and Hesiod by dividing myths into 'greater' and 'lesser' and suggesting that both share the same 'mould' or 'pattern' (377c8–10):

> We'll first look at the major stories, and by seeing how to deal with them, we'll see how to deal with the minor ones as well (Ἐν τοῖς μείζοσιν μύθοις ὀψόμεθα καὶ τοὺς ἐλάττους), for they exhibit the same pattern (τὸν αὐτὸν τύπον εἶναι) and have the same effects (καὶ ταὐτὸν δύνασθαι) whether they are major or not (τούς τε μείζους καὶ τοὺς ἐλάττους).

Again, the most prevalent interpretation of these lines favours a translation of the word as 'type' and proposes that, despite their differences in importance, poetic myths can convey (in abstraction) a similar ethical message. If, however, we take the sculptural semantics of the word into account, then the distinction can be

understood in a different way. Hollow moulds and reliefs can have the same form and features but differ in size and scope, as they can depict the same image in large sculptural groups as well as miniatures. Despite their difference in size, though, their message and impact on the viewer is the same.[33]

In 377b4–c5, Socrates states his intention to supervise the stories told by the myth-makers and the nurses to the young guardians. His use of the verb πλάττω in this context forms a remarkable semantic bridge between *mythoi*, gymnastics, and sculpture, and helps him illustrate the malleability of the otherwise invisible soul in quasi-material terms. As the material body is 'moulded' through gymnastics, so the 'soul is shaped by means of words' (πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τοῖς μύθοις πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σώματα ταῖς χερσίν, 377c 4–5). Hence, the image confers a quasi-materiality and plasticity to the soul in order to highlight the form or shape it can take depending on the 'pattern' (*typos*) used by the educators. Socrates can exercise this control on the myth-makers because he retains for himself and his interlocutors the role of the 'founders' of the city, who *know* the *patterns* according to which the poets must compose their poems (378e7–379a4):

> You and I, Adeimantus, aren't poets, but we are founding a city (ἀλλ' οἰκισταὶ πόλεως). And it's appropriate for the founders to know the patterns (οἰκισταῖς δὲ τοὺς μὲν τύπους προσήκει εἰδέναι) on which poets must base their stories (ἐν οἷς δεῖ μυθολογεῖν τοὺς ποιητάς) and from which they mustn't deviate (παρ' οὓς ἐὰν ποιῶσιν οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον). But we aren't actually going to compose their poems for them.

This statement launches the discussion of the portrayal of gods and heroes in poetry. In 379a5–6, the investigation of the poetic *typoi* at large gives way to the particular examination of the *typoi* of *theologia*. Book Two concludes with the announcement of the two 'patterns' for the portrayal of gods in the city. First, 'god is good' and the 'source of good'; second, god is 'simple and true in deed and word, and neither changes himself nor deceives others by visions or words or the sending of signs' (382e8–11). These two *typoi* are then laid down as laws of the city (380c8; 383a2; 383c6).

The beginning of Book Three marks the passage from gods to mortals and launches the discussion of the creation of the guardians. As Socrates enumerates all the frightening names that should be erased from the stories told to the young guardians, *typos* is again used in relation to poetry.[34] The state of the soul, visualized as molten metal or wax, is defined by the correctness of the types of education and nurture provided to it (τύποι παιδείας και τροφῆς, 412b3). The qualities of stability and simplicity characteristic of the divine are transferred to the representation of mortals, who should be brought up to be 'pure' and 'simple'.[35] The 'simplicity' of the guardians is the result of the harmonious psychological blend of bravery (*andreia*, 386a6) and moderation (*sōphrosynē*, 389d7). The attainment of fearlessness requires that depictions of death, of Hades, and of the dead as sources of dread and fear be completely eliminated, as they belong to the 'worse types' (κακίονες τύποι) (387b8–c9; cf. 396d8).

To sum up: a careful reading of the various contexts of Books Two and Three in which the word *typos* appears demonstrates that for Plato the term is broad enough to include different types of education (398b3), and, importantly, the very 'character' of the person moulded by each type of education (396e8).[36] The semantic breadth, however, is only apparent. *Typos* understood as a 'pattern' communicates the same idea in all three cases (in myths, melodies, and human souls alike), the transference of identical form and structure from one thing to another. In this way, the *Republic*'s iconography breaks new ground by showing that the soul acquires (almost literally) the shape of the stories it hears. In this early period of theorization, Plato draws on the material world – specifically the cultural world of the manmade artefact – to conceptualize and to communicate the process of education. Sculpture offers a shared point of reference for his audience so that these new ideas can be expressed and understood.

IV. Art as Formative Education

In what way is *typos* related to the concept of the guardian as an exemplum of civic virtue? In this section, I argue that Plato's philosophic imagination is mediated by the material world. Plato views art as a positive mode of education, useful as a method as well as a conceptual metaphor. The use of *typos* may be seen as part of a much broader network of art terms used in the dialogue to outline two different types of *mimēsis*. *Republic* 395b8–d3 explicitly differentiates between approved and rejected educational moulds (τὰ δὲ ἀνελεύθερα μήτε ποιεῖν μήτε… μιμήσασθαι) and proposes that, if the guardians are to be imitative at all, they *should* impersonate from childhood all the cardinal virtues (ἀνδρείους, σώφρονας, ὁσίους, ἐλευθέρους … δημιουργοὺς ἐλευθερίας τῆς πόλεως).

Lines 395b9–d3 can be read in parallel with 401a1–d7, in which such virtues are designated as different facets of *euschēmosynē*. Socrates' distinction between 'gracelessness' and 'gracefulness' is the culmination of his discussion of different musical *harmoniai* as mimetic representations of bad and good *ēthos*. In lines 401a1–8, Socrates associates gracelessness with bad rhythm and disharmony (ἀρρυθμία and ἀναρμοστία) and bad *logos* and *ēthos* (κακολογίας καὶ κακοηθείας ἀδελφά, 401a6–7), and gracefulness with good rhythm (εὐρυθμία, 400d10–e1), good harmony (εὐαρμοστία, 400d10), and moderate and good character (σώφρονός τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἤθους, 401a7–8).[37] This passage groups together the creations of all kinds of craftsmanship and pictorial and representational art (γραφικὴ, ὑφαντικὴ καὶ ποικιλία καὶ οἰκοδομία καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τῶν ἄλλων σκευῶν ἐργασία, 401a1–3) under these two categories, juxtaposing them in terms of grace and beauty with the bodies of the natural realm (ἡ τῶν σωμάτων φύσις καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων φυτῶν, 401a4). This classification has a twofold upshot: it places manufactured material products on the same level as physical bodies, thus suspending (at least momentarily) an ontological distinction between the two, and it extends the concept of *mimēsis* to include all material embodiments as manifestations of *ēthos* (ἀδελφά τε καὶ μιμήματα, 401a8). Socrates then enunciates his fundamental thesis on art and architecture. The guardians must be brought up in a regulated and controlled environment of balance,

harmony, gracefulness, and self-restraint that will allow them to internalize these qualities (401c2). Poets and other artists should be supervised to portray only the 'image of good ethos' (τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰκόνα ἤθους, 401b2–3) and be barred from depicting the ugly and the base (κακόηθες, ἀκόλαστον, ἀνελεύθερον, ἄσχημον, 401b4–5).

These prescriptions build on the previous amalgamation of nature with art by transplanting imagery from the natural (δρεπόμενοί τε καὶ νεμόμενοι, 401c1) to the created environment (ἐν εἰκόσι ζῴων… ἐν οἰκοδομήμασι… ἐν ἄλλῳ μηδενὶ δημιουργουμένῳ, 401b5–7), thus collapsing the clear-cut boundaries between the two. 'Images of badness' (ἐν κακίας εἰκόσι, 401b8) become a rejected 'food' (ὥσπερ ἐν κακῇ βοτάνῃ, 401b9) for the city-guardians; the capable craftsmen should transfuse into their creations the 'true nature of the beautiful, the good, and the graceful' (τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ εὐσχήμονος φύσιν, 401c4–5); and, finally, the youth of the city will automatically absorb with all their senses the beauty of the created environment (ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν ἔργων ἢ πρὸς ὄψιν ἢ πρὸς ἀκοήν, 401c6–7), 'like a breeze' (ὥσπερ αὔρα, 401c7) that comes from a 'healthy place' (ὥσπερ ἐν ὑγιεινῷ τόπῳ, 401c5) and guides them unconsciously (ἐκ παίδων λανθάνῃ 401c8) to 'likeness, to friendship, and to harmony with beautiful reason' (εἰς ὁμοιότητά τε καὶ φιλίαν καὶ συμφωνίαν τῷ καλῷ λόγῳ ἄγουσα, 401d1–2).[38] The unique blend of artistic and natural images evokes Socrates' description of life in the first 'healthy city of pigs' (372d5) and contradicts the deceptive and illusory presentation of art in the allegory of the Cave. All three contexts state in similar language the automatic shaping effect of the surrounding environment on humans, but in Books Three and Seven the creations of artists are treated differently. While in Book Seven, the allegory of the Cave differentiates *physis* from *technē* and, by associating the latter with poets and rhetoricians, relegates it to an inferior level, in Book Three Socrates suggests the opposite. He allows the possibility that human art, if controlled by the knowledgeable philosophers, might produce representations of genuine beauty and goodness. The point in Book Three is not that art, and *mimēsis*, are inherently bad. Instead, goodness and baseness pertain to human character.[39]

These remarks stand in the midst of Socrates' famous criticism of poetry. The long list of verses that must be erased from the epics throws light on the *kakiones typoi* that must be avoided in the education of the young guardians.[40] Socrates is a vocal critic of the poetry of his time, but as regards the approved type of *mimēsis*, such as the one referred to in the above passages, he reveals much less. Can we extract more information?

V. Men, Statues, and Ideas in Athens

In *Republic* 395b8–d3 and 401a–d, cited above, Plato commingles natural environment imagery with an artistic version of the world and of human bodies in terms of the combination's formative impact on the viewer.[41] This joint assessment can offer a glimpse of Plato's aesthetic experience in response to the works of art and architecture that adorned Athens in the latter part of the fifth century, during the years of Pericles' implementation of his architectural programme to rebuild and glorify

the city, and well beyond that period. During this period, the city is decorated with precious materials of all kinds.[42] A walk through late-fifth-century Athens was a walk among enfleshed humans and statues, all figures mingled together, bound up with bodies of different stuff.[43]

Quite apart from any judgements that Plato may or may not be thought to be making about the goodness, ethics, and value of art, the art terminology of Book Three (401a–d) can help us venture a hypothesis about his source of inspiration for the creation of the city-guardians. I propose that the word *eikōn*, if viewed in combination with *typos* and *paradeigma*, designates a statue of a man, for which Socrates in 420c5 also employs the term *andrias*.[44] Could then the references to τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰκόνα ἤθους and τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ εὐσχήμονος φύσιν ('images of good character' and 'nature of true beauty and grace') in 401b2–c5 offer us a glimpse into Plato's positive view of Greek figure statuary? If so, what does Plato find appealing in it? Socrates' requirement that craftsmen should imitate images of excellence conjures up sculptors' artistic concerns with exploring ways to display ethical qualities on the body of the statue.[45] These concerns are reflected in the adoption of craft imagery drawn from the lost-wax technique for the creation of the guardian nature. But Plato is original in his treatment of *mimēsis* when he makes the guardians pose as representations of the Forms.

VI. Likeness

How should we understand the concepts of likeness and imitation in the statue-model relation conveyed in the term *eikōn*? Terminological definitions are controversial in Plato's dialogues, which, although written in the fourth century, are situated in the fifth, and often contain various anachronisms. When the *Republic* was written, the word *eikōn* was used to designate likeness in anthropomorphic statues. And yet, when, at the beginning of Book Four, Socrates compares his creation of the *polis* to finishing the surface of a statue with paint, he uses the archaic term *andrias* (420c5).[46] In order to appreciate the artistic and cultural ramifications of *eikōn*, we should note that in the fifth and in the early part of the fourth century BCE the word was used to refer to the anthropomorphic statues of Olympic victors, renowned generals, and other important citizens.

The earliest use of the word *eikōn* in relation to a statue belongs to the early fifth century (c. 472 BCE) and is found in the sanctuary of Zeus in Olympia on the base of a statue honouring Euthymus of Lokroi, victorious in boxing three times.[47] According to Pausanias and Pliny, Olympia teemed with bronze portraits of victorious rulers, equestrian statues, and chariot groups. All explored to the maximum the representational potential of the bronze hollow-casting technique.[48] Pliny also designates Antenor's famous sculptural complex of the Tyrannicides, Harmodius and Aristogeiton, as the first 'portrait-statues'.[49] These were the first statues placed in the Athenian Agora next to the eponymous heroes of Kleisthenes' tribes. After their removal by the Persians in 480 BCE, the Athenians commissioned their replacement.[50]

After the *eikōn* of Euthymus, the earliest epigraphical occurrence of *eikōn* as 'anthropomorphic statue' is found almost a century later, in 394 BCE, in the decree

of Erythrai in honour of Konon.[51] Contemporaneous with this is an Athenian decree honouring the Cypriot King Euagoras of Salamis.[52] Both men are honoured by Athens for their naval victory over the Lacedaimonians at Knidos in 393 BCE. Konon was honoured with statues by Athens and several cities on the coast of Asia Minor, while Euagoras was honoured with an *eikōn* in the Athenian Agora. During this period in Athens, statues were also awarded to Konon's son Timotheos (c. 375/4 or 360 BCE), Iphikrates (389 BCE), and Chabrias (377/6 or 376/5 BCE).[53]

Recent scholarship has questioned the notion of likeness inherent in the word *eikōn* 'as the faithful record of a visual experience' and proposed instead its reconstrual as a 'faithful construction of a *relational* model'.[54] In the latter view, realism is not regarded as an objective and atemporal concept but is assigned the specificity of place and time.[55] Instead of investigating the *individuality* of statue-portraits, more recent literature focuses on 'an objective decoding of *a culturally specific iconography*'.[56] Sculptural representations of anthropomorphic and naturalistic statues of human bodies designated as *eikones* do not reveal the model's *true* character or distinctive features, but the way society perceived and classified the person against their cultural milieu and with regard to culturally specific roles and societal strata.

Statues placed in sacred and public places functioned as social *exempla* of *aretē* to be viewed and emulated by the entire *polis*.[57] Plastic representations of human bodies, stylized on the basis of specific theoretical, medical, and mathematical principles, embodied the virtues of *praotēs*, *kosmiotēs,* and *sōphrosynē*, materially instantiating 'the corporeal experiences of traditional civic *paideia*'.[58] Qualities such as *eutaxia*, *kosmiotēs*, *symmetria*, *orthotēs*, and *euschēmosynē* become normative patterns and aesthetic criteria for both the evaluation of sculptural representational styles and for the assessment of civic virtues such as self-control (σωφροσύνη) and manliness (ἀνδρεία). As Tanner puts it,

> the *euschēmosunē* – beauty of bodily form (*schēma*) – which such athletic exercise generates is at once a sign of military preparedness and an aesthetic phenomenon which draws the gaze of viewers sensitized by their own experiences and bodily training, evoking the admiration and pleasure of those who behold it.[59]

In the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, these qualities were promoted as distinctively democratic. Plutarch's first-century CE description of Pericles as the exemplar *par excellence* of *metriopatheia* and *kosmiotēs* in the fifth century is matched by fourth-century testimonies which celebrate 'gentleness' (πραότης) and 'intelligence' (φρονιμότης) as shared features of intellectuals and generals alike in their capacity as good citizens.[60] Hence, the 'measured' and 'well-ordered' man (ὁ μέτριος ἀνήρ), who is both gentle and intelligent, becomes the very epitome of democratic culture and education.[61] But we can probe even further the cultural reverberations of the artistic representation of political-cum-aesthetic *euschēmosunē.* The case of the Tyrannicides is particularly helpful from this point of view. While many statues represented 'a standardized iconographic image of the good citizen

and benefactor', this sculptural group does not merely commemorate real people who mythically become benefactors of Athens but gives cultural expression to an idea of Athenian democracy.[62] On this view, a sculptural *eikōn*, far from designating 'likeness' as mirror resemblance, becomes the representation, an embodiment indeed, of a concept that far outstrips individual character or portraiture. In fact, it is a 'portrait' that births a political-cultural idea.

VII. Philosophical Sculpture in Book Three

How do these facets of Greek bronze statuary relate to the guardians? In this section, I argue that Plato draws on art to construct a way of thinking about philosophical creative thought. The Forms become *paradeigmata* which can, as it were, be re-impressed to create repetitions and reproductions in the material world.

Plato adopts imagery from the lost-wax (*cire-perdue*) technique used for the creation of bronze statues in order to describe the formation of the guardian soul. The adaptation, however, is very selective, with Socrates referring only to specific phases of the sculptural process. In order to reconstruct this imagery, we need to blend together passages from various parts of the dialogue. Of the two words related to sculpture, *typos* and *paradeigma*, Plato uses the latter to designate the Forms' role as 'models' to be reproduced in the physical realm.[63] Outside philosophical prose, the word *paradeigma* designates the physical models made by artists and architects.[64] The majority of the epigraphical testimonia show that the word referred to constructed models in architecture. The creation of a *paradeigma* by an architect was an integral part of the procedure when planning a public building.[65] The appointed architect had to present a συγγραφή, a list of specifications and measurements for the building, and παράδειγματα.[66] Following Pollitt, the latter were of three sorts: (a) models usually but not always in wood or clay, for specific details (mouldings, column capitals), (b) models for whole buildings (for example, wooden models for a small temple), and (c) graphic models in the form of sketches or plans.[67] As Pollitt observes, in all these cases, the *paradeigmata* seem to have been physical objects rather than written instructions. In addition to architecture, *paradeigma* was also used in visual arts to refer to (a) 'a man-made physical copy' or (b) 'a *natural* physical model, most often the human body as copied in the representational arts'.[68] With regard to visual arts, Pollitt also observes that *paradeigma* can designate both 'an intellectual model' and 'a sensible ideal of beauty'.[69]

Plato appears to exploit the concrete semantics of the word in art and architecture. In the *Republic*, the word retains the meaning of model and is adapted to serve the new philosophical environment that eschews the constraints of physicality. The *kallipolis* is repeatedly called a divine *paradeigma*. In Book Five, it is referred to as a theoretical 'model of a good *city*' (472d9–10; cf. 472d5), and in Book Nine it is a city 'model in heaven'.[70] Similarly, the truly virtuous man is also a *paradeigma*. In 472b7-c2, the investigation of justice is linked to the search for the 'completely just man' who must 'approximate it as nearly as possible' (ἐγγύτατα) and 'partake of it' (ἐκείνης μετέχῃ). In 472c4–d2, justice is described

as a *paradeigma* against which the nature and the *eudaimonia* of the just and the unjust should be judged:

> Then it was in order to have a model (παραδείγματος ἕνεκα) that we were trying to discover what justice itself is like and what the completely just man would be like (ἄνδρα τὸν τελέως δίκαιον), if he came into being, and what kind of man he'd be if he did, and likewise with regard to injustice and the most unjust man. We thought that, by looking at (εἰς ἐκείνους ἀποβλέποντες) how their relationship to happiness and its opposite seemed to us, we'd also be compelled to agree about ourselves as well, that the one who was most like them (ὁμοιότατος ᾖ) would have a portion of happiness most like theirs.

In this scheme, the Forms assume the role of divine *paradeigmata* and the philosopher-kings are described as painters who use them as models. In this adaptation, *paradeigmata* have lost their concrete meaning and are employed metaphorically to refer to 'a model based on an intelligible (as opposed to a sensible) ideal'.[71] Although (admittedly) Plato refrains from importing any material concreteness to his conception of the Forms as paradigms, I propose that he adopts in his creation of the city-guardians the model-copy relationship which in the field of sculpture is found in the imitative relation of a model (*paradeigma*) to the reproduction of moulds (*typoi*) for the creation of *multiple* and *identical* portrait statues (*eikones*).[72] Although the word *eikōn* may seem *prima facie* absent from this network of art terminology, it is not. The word appears in crucial places throughout the dialogue. In lines 401a–d cited above, representations of good character (τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰκόνα ἤθους) and ugliness transpire in *poems, paintings, architecture,* and *other creations*. The word *eikōn* reappears in a significant passage, combined with *typos* and the bodily manifestations of virtues (402c1–7):

> Neither we nor the guardians that we have undertaken to educate shall ever be true musicians unless we are able to recognize the forms (τὰ εἰδη) of temperance, bravery, liberality, and magnificence (τῆς σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας) and all their kindred (ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφὰ) and their opposites (ἐναντία) too in all the combinations that contain and convey them (πανταχοῦ περιφερόμενα) and to apprehend them (γνωρίζωμεν καὶ ἐνόντα ἐν οἷς ἔνεστιν αἰσθανώμεθα) and their images (καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰκόνας αὐτῶν) wherever found (μήτε ἐν σμικροῖς μήτε ἐν μεγάλοις).[73]

These lines are the culmination of Socrates' thesis in this work that the most beautiful spectacle is the human being whose soul and body are matched in beauty and harmony. In this case, both soul and body share the same *typos* (τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοντα τύπου, 402d3).[74] The just person thus overcomes the deceptive discrepancy between the external facade and the internal psychic state described in the famous *eikōn* of the tyrannical soul in Book Nine.[75]

When Socrates concludes his description of the philosopher-kings in Book Seven, it is Glaucon's turn to exclaim: 'Like a sculptor (ὥσπερ ἀνδραντοποιὸς), Socrates, you've produced ruling men that are beautiful in every way (παγκάλους, 540c3–4)'.

VIII. The Statues of Men: Sculpture and Participation in the Platonic Forms

In this section, I discuss how Plato's visualization of the guardians parallels the way statues are formed. Let us turn again to the three key passages discussed above. We saw that in *Resp*. 377a11–b2, Plato promotes an image of the soul as a malleable material that can take whatever form one impresses on it. Contrary to Adam, I propose to interpret the word τύπος not as a seal but as a mould or cast such as those used by sculptors in the creation of bronze statues.[76] The *typos* would then be the *hollow container* that gives shape to the molten material inserted in it once this cools.[77] Hence, in this imagery, Plato conflates the different stages of hollow-cast bronzemaking and the various forms of *typoi* used in the casting procedure. Let me give an outline of the procedure. In the bronze-casting process, we have (stage one) the sculptor's initial model (*paradeigma*), usually made of wood or clay, (stage two) the hollow *negative* mould (*typos*) taken from the initial model, and (stage three) the cast (again *typos*), the visual reproduction of the original *paradeigma* in wax and clay, which will eventually produce (stage four) the bronze statue.

In my interpretation, Socrates refers to stages two and three of hollow-cast bronzemaking, that is, to the production of the cast from the mould.[78] To fully grasp the implications of the phrase τότε πλάττεται, καὶ ἐνδύεται τύπος ὃν... ἐνσημήνασθαι ἑκάστῳ ('it is at that time that it is most malleable and takes on any pattern one wishes to impress on it', 377b1–2), we must recall that τύπος is *both a negative mould* (a carved cavity) *and a cast*, the wax-and-clay exact duplicate produced from the negative mould. If we accept this construal, the phrase ἐνδύεται τύπος could describe that stage of the procedure in which the *duplicate* cast (the clay core with its wax lining), which has come out of the negative mould, is ready to be *invested with a jacket of clay* strong enough to withstand the heat of the liquid bronze metal.

This interpretation is corroborated by the use of *typos* in 396d–e. Here Socrates again employs subtle sculptural language to describe how the temperate person, after receiving the correct education, will refrain from 'imitating' and 'reproducing' the worse and unworthy *typoi* represented by the rejected music and poetry (396d3–8):

> When he comes upon a character unworthy of himself, however, he'll be unwilling to make himself seriously resemble that inferior character (ἀπεικάζειν ἑαυτὸν τῷ χείρονι) – except perhaps for a brief period in which he's doing something good. Rather he'll be ashamed to do something like that, both because he's unpractised in the imitation of such people (ἀγύμναστος ὢν τοῦ μιμεῖσθαι) and because he can't stand to shape and mould himself according

> to a worse pattern (αὐτὸν ἐκμάττειν τε καὶ ἐνιστάναι εἰς τοὺς τῶν κακιόνων τύπους).

The words used to convey this idea are αὐτὸν ἐκμάττειν and ἐνιστάναι εἰς τοὺς τύπους. The infinitive ἐκμάττειν (ἐκμάσσω) has the meaning of 'to mould (myself)'. Its combination with ἐνιστάναι (from ἐνίστημι 'to place in') produces an image not very different from the one reconstructed in the previous passage.[79] The word *typos* appears to denote a negative mould, a hollow container, which has a different form to the shape of the temperate man (who, stretching the metaphor further, stands for either the wax-and-clay cast or for the finished statue). The idea is that of an ill-fitting and improper match: the good man will have difficulty fitting himself into 'moulds of badness'.[80]

The conception of the soul as malleable goes hand in hand with its relation to music since in Plato music and soul are bound together in a cycle of mutual influence.[81] In effect, it is the swaying power of musical *harmoniai* that harmonizes the soul by making it resonate with the mathematical structures of the entire cosmos.[82] This influence is described in vivid imagery in 411a–b. The passage couples psychological and musical language with wording from the field of metallurgy, such as smelting, in order to show how the θυμοειδές can succumb to the power of the various musical *harmoniai* to such an extent that it may eventually totally 'dissolve' and make the person a coward (411a5–b4):

> Therefore, when someone gives music an opportunity to charm his soul with the flute (καταυλεῖν) and to pour those sweet, soft, and plaintive tunes (τὰς γλυκείας τε καὶ μαλακὰς καὶ θρηνώδεις ἁρμονίας) we mentioned through his ear (καταχεῖν τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ τῶν ὤτων), as through a funnel (ὥσπερ διὰ χώνης), when he spends his whole life humming them and delighting in them (καὶ γεγανωμένος ὑπὸ τῆς ᾠδῆς), then, at first, whatever spirit he has (εἴ τι θυμοειδὲς) is softened, just as iron is tempered (ὥσπερ σίδηρον ἐμάλαξεν), and from being hard and useless, it is made useful (καὶ χρήσιμον ἐξ ἀχρήστου καὶ σκληροῦ ἐποίησεν). But if he keeps at it unrelentingly and is beguiled (κηλῇ) by the music, after a time his spirit is melted and dissolved (τήκει καὶ λείβει) until it vanishes (ἕως ἂν ἐκτήξῃ τὸν θυμὸν), and the very sinews of his soul are cut out and he becomes a 'feeble warrior'.

I suggest that music and sculpture meet in the image-making of these lines.[83] Socrates combines the psychological effect of music with imagery from the final stages in the production of bronze statues. The key phrase in this interpretation is 'to pour into (καταχεῖν) his soul as it were through the funnel of his ears (διὰ τῶν ὤτων ὥσπερ διὰ χώνης, 411a6)'. Critics compare it with Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazousae* where Euripides uses a similar image of the ears as 'funnels'.[84] The interpretation of the metaphor, however, can be pushed further. The χοάνη is a technical word used in metallurgical processes including hollow-cast bronzemaking for the production of statues.[85] In the latter, smiths used clay funnels to pour the heated bronze into the mould, one of the final steps in the lost-wax technique. After the

wax-and-clay duplicate is placed inside a clay jacket, all three are secured together with metal pins. At this stage, the smith also attaches the wax gates and the funnels. He then places the invested duplicate in the casting pit to be baked. The wax lining melts out through the wax gates and is replaced by the molten metal poured into the space left in the cast through the funnels.[86]

The sculptural nuances hidden in the word χοάνη become more visible if we delve deeper into the double entendre of the participle γεγανωμένος ('having been polished under the glamour of song', 411a8). Socrates describes the effect of dirges and soft melodies on the auditor's external appearance by using the participle of the verb γανόω, thus alluding to the process of *ganōsis*, the polishing with oil and wax devised by the Greeks to protect statues against weathering and sun damage.[87]

If the proposed significance of sculptural imagery is endorsed, Plato has found in the lost-wax technique a most helpful imagery to describe the privileged relation of the invisible soul to the equally invisible musical sounds. In this thicket of metaphors from the field of Greek art, the human soul is visualized as a mould, a hollow cavity to be filled with certain ethical qualities conveyed through musical *harmoniai*, which assume the role of molten metal. This image gives way to a further statue image of the human being as a shining statue, and then yet another from metallurgy, of the spirited nature of the soul as iron. One thing to note in this network is that musical *harmoniai* and the thymoeidic psychic part share a common image: both are visualized as molten metals. This is certainly explicit in the case of the θυμοειδές, which is compared to iron, but if we interpret the phrase ὥσπερ διὰ χώνης as an allusion to the mould through which bronze is poured in the hollow matrix, then music too is implicitly visualized as a flowing liquid metal. Hence, music and the soul are almost fused together in this imagery. The shared imagery of soul and music indicates their common privileged association with the intelligible realm. In the *Timaeus*, Plato combines the musical/mathematical structure of the cosmic soul with the geometrical structure of the cosmic and human body and presents the divine demiurge as a master musician and sculptor *at the same time*. This fusion of the two arts in a single figure, the culmination of which we see in the *Timaeus*, has already started, *mutatis mutandis*, in the *Republic*, with Socrates undertaking a similar role as founder (*oikistēs*) of the *kallipolis* and a sculptor of the guardians.

The unspoken inference from Plato's use of technical language is that Socrates takes a negative mould (*typos*) from a single model (*paradeigma*) and creates reproductions of the same guardian form. As Mattusch observes, the importance of casting bronze statues in the negative, rather than in the positive, lies in the fact that the same mould can be used repeatedly and is not broken after the creation of a single statue.[88] The value of the lost-wax technique lies in the *reproduction* and *repetition* of exact replicas of the same model. Its appropriation in the dialogue suggests that the city-guardians will embody the same fundamental features, the same *aretai*. Hence, Plato adopts the sculptural technique in order to help us visualize the philosophical concept of participation. The guardian class embodies qualities that feature in contemporary discussions on the symbolism of bronze statues: Socrates aims to create the 'moderate' man (*metrios*, 396c6); the guardian

should imitate 'the reasonable, fair, and virtuous man' (τὸν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς μιμητὴν ἄκρατον, 397d4); at the end of Book Three, Socrates expressly calls the guardians 'athletes of war' (ἄνδρες ἀθληταὶ πολέμου, 416d9–e1) and assigns to them the two key virtues of *sōphrosynē* and *andreia*.[89]

The implications of this phrase are significantly enhanced when compared to the Socratic comments in 413e–414a. Socrates concludes (414a4–6):

> It seems to me Glaucon, that rulers and guardians must be selected and appointed in some such way as this, though we've provided only a general pattern (ὡς ἐν τύπῳ) and not the exact details (μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας).

If the guardian is proved 'gracious in everything' (εὐσχήμων ἐν πᾶσι, 413e2) and 'a good guardian of himself' (αὐτοῦ ὢν ἀγαθὸς, 413e2–3), he will be honoured in life and in death (τιμὰς δοτέον καὶ ζῶντι καὶ τελευτήσαντι, 414a2). Especially after death they will be offered the 'supreme honours of burial-rites and other monuments' (τάφων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μνημείων μέγιστα γέρα λαγχάνοντα, 414a2–3). This promise is reiterated even more forcefully in Books Five and Seven. Similar rewards are promised to the philosopher-rulers in Book Seven.[90] The philosophers should 'turn upwards the vision of their souls, fix their gaze on that which sheds light on all, and when they have seen the good itself they should use it as a pattern (παραδείγματι) for the correct ordering of the lives of the city and the citizens and themselves (καὶ πόλιν καὶ ἰδιώτας καὶ ἑαυτοὺς κοσμεῖν)' (540a6–b1).[91] Their duty is to govern the city and to educate the next generation to take their place as guardians of the state. After their death, they shall depart to the Islands of the Blessed and dwell there. The duty of the *polis*, on the other hand, is to offer them the supreme honours after their death (540c1–2):

> And, if Pythia agrees, the city will publicly establish memorials and sacrifices (μνημεῖα καὶ θυσίας τὴν πόλιν δημοσίᾳ ποιεῖν) to him as a *daimōn* (ὡς δαίμοσιν), but if not, then as a happy and divine human being (ὡς εὐδαίμοσί τε καὶ θείοις).

If we combine the Socratic prescriptions about the way the *kallipolis* should honour its guardians with *material memorials* after their death with the sculptural imagery discussed above and with their exalting characterization as 'brave and moderate athletes of war', we may infer that Plato has appropriated, in his theoretical creation of the guardians, not only the sculptural technique of hollow bronze-casting to describe how humans may embody and materialize abstract concepts but also the political, religious, and honorific connotations associated with the erection of a portrait-statue. Glaucon's reply to the Socratic prescriptions seems now entirely justified: 'Like a sculptor (ὥσπερ ἀνδριαντοποιός), Socrates, you've produced (ἀπείργασαι) ruling men that are completely fine (παγκάλους)' (540c3–4).

The guardians/philosopher-kings of the Platonic *kallipolis*, who have been shaped by (and in accordance with) the Forms, stand as living impersonations and embodiments of virtues, simultaneously victorious athletes and successful

politicians, and after their death they attain an ontologically elevated heroic status and are honoured with *timai* and *mnēmeia*, perhaps with bronze statues such as those that filled Olympia and Athens and that inspired Plato's artistic imagination. In Plato's ideology, however, the guardians' exceptional virtuousness and heroism do not represent the virtues of democratic Athens but stem from a world of a different order, the realm of the Forms.

IX. Conclusion

Plato adopts in the creation of the guardians language drawn from the cultural norms surrounding statues and their production because Greek statues convey not just 'resemblance' to an external prototype but also strong ethical connotations, and connotations of grandeur and ontological elevation. Greek art, and in particular sculpture, becomes a most appropriate way for conceptualizing the guardians of the ideal *polis*, firstly because for Plato both philosophical creative thought and representational art aim to create a concept in material and intelligible form and because statues in this period signify virtues, honour, and beauty. The *Republic*'s artistic imagery opens a window not into Plato's definition of 'imagination' but rather into the very process of imagining as a philosophical activity. Thus Greek sculpture, due to its reciprocal character, becomes the bridge that links the material with the intellectual and the metaphysical. Being created by man and absorbed by man, classical statues are ideal for inspiring inventive creation and stand between the sensible and intelligible realms, while their categorization into generic 'types' of men chimes well with Plato's philosophic interest in definition and abstraction. The material-artistic world thus becomes so much more than an explanatory metaphor; it articulates the process of philosophy.

Abbreviations

Abbreviations of ancient authors and texts, as well as scholarly reference works, generally follow those of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, fourth edition; abbreviations of journal titles follow those of *L'Année Philologique*. Exceptions are listed below.

Aëtius *Plac. Phil*. = Aëtius, *Placita philosophorum*
Callistratus *Descr*. = Callistratus, *Statuarum Descriptiones*
Philo *De op. mundi* = Philo Judaeus, *De opificio mundi*
[Plut.] *De lib. educ*. = Pseudo-Plutarch, *De liberis educandis* = *Moralia* 1a–14c
Plut. *An Viti*. = Plutarch, *An vitiositas ad infelicitatem sufficiat* = *Moralia* 498a–500a
[Plut.] *Plac. Phil*. = Pseudo-Plutarch *Placita philosophorum* = *Moralia* 874d–911c

Notes

1 Since the time of Nettleship (1955), scholars have observed that Plato criticizes poetry and poets but refrains from levelling equal criticism against sculptors: Adam (1963 – first

published in 1902); Andronikos (1986); O'Meara (2017: 35–9). On pictorial *mimēsis*, see Halliwell (2002) and nn. 8 and 9.

2 This famous myth is alluded to by Marx in his rejection of Hegelian ontology: see n. 37 of Clifford & Buxton's introduction (this volume).

3 See especially the treatments of Gorgianic rhetoric and Pelasgus' deliberation by Fearn (this volume) and Buxton (this volume), respectively.

4 On the philosophical status of the myth in the *Timaeus*, see Broadie (2012: 243–77), with bibliography; on its dating and relation to other Platonic dialogues, see Zeyl (2000: xvi–xx); on its relation to presocratic natural philosophy, see Naddaf (1997) and Sedley (2007).

5 On personifications in classical art, see, e.g., Smith (2011).

6 Scholarly remarks about the statue image of Book Four are less about the relation of Plato's philosophy to the art and aesthetics of his time and more about the dialogue's political proposals. See Brown (1998: 13–27); Morrison (2001: 1–24); Cantu (2011: 90–107).

7 See Pl. *Ti.* 28a5–b1. According to Onians (1991: 65–73), Plato's notion of an essential form (*eidos*) was inspired by his experience of the manufacture and trade of Greek ceramics.

8 The literature on Plato's criticism of *mimēsis* in the *Republic* is immense. See Annas (1981: 1–28); Belfiore (1983); Osborne (1987: 53–73); cf. Halliwell (2002) and n. 9.

9 The view I take on *mimēsis* accords with Halliwell (2002: 25). As regards Plato, Halliwell observes that 'the attitude to the visual arts is more exploratory and fluid than is usually realized' (126–8) and that the Athenian Stranger's praise of Egypt in the *Laws* 'implies the possibility of approval for at least some kinds of non-naturalistic and heavily stylized figural art' (127).

10 My work is in dialogue with Andrea Nightingale's approach to the moulding impact of Platonic Forms on the philosophic soul as a result of visuality. In her (2004) study, Nightingale has shown how Plato constructs his own conception of philosophical *theōria* from the institutions of civic and religious *theōria*. In her recent book on *Philosophy and Religion* (2021: 29–43), Nightingale rightly argues that Plato conceives the Forms as 'divine' and humans' relation to them in religious and 'epiphanic' terms (cf. also Nightingale [2018: 61–94]). In my own analysis of this aspect of Plato's thought, I argue that the 'moulding' relation of the sensible material particulars to the (divine) Intelligible realm is conceived in terms of representational art and sculpture. Hence, in several dialogues, Plato understands the philosophers' cognition of the Forms in terms of a religious encounter with cult statues and the creation of humans as their 'sculptural moulding' with the Forms posed as invisible and immaterial models. The religious rhetoric is utilized also in the *Symposium* where Plato uses traditional epiphanic language, drawn from salvific and erotic poetic epiphanies, to present the Socratic body in terms of an anthropomorphic deity: Petraki (2022; 2023 [forthcoming]). On the significance of visuality in the reception of classical art, see Elsner's influential article (2006: 68–95); Neer (2010); Vout (2018: 246–52).

11 On conceptual metaphor, see Lakoff & Johnson (1980), discussed by Buxton (this volume, p. 280).

12 See *Resp*. 358b6–7 and esp. 358d1–2: 'I want to hear it [justice] praised by itself (ἐγκωμιαζόμενον).' Cf. 580b4–c3 and 582e.

13 See *Resp*. 360e6–361b1.

14 All translations of the *Republic* are after Grube as revised by Reeve (1992).

15 The spatial instructions could also point in the direction of a dramatic representation: see Adeimantus' oblique reference to theatre in 365c3–4: 'I should create a façade of illusory virtue around me (σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς περὶ ἐμαυτὸν περιγραπτέον) to deceive [others]', with discussion in Petraki (2018: 1–33). In sculptural terms, what is envisaged here are, for example, personified themes and concepts put on display for everyone to

behold on temple pediments, or other sculptural groups, such as the eponymous heroes in the agora of Athens or the bronze statue of the Tyrannicides. See further discussion below. Similar figurative dispositions (of justice and the laws, no less) are common in Athenian oratory, as demonstrated by Westwood (this volume).

16 δοτέον, οὐκ ἀφαιρετέον ἀλλ' ἑατέον, ἀφαιρετέον, γυμνωτέος, ποιητέος. Cf. also *Resp*. 414c–415d. Against this background, the artistic connotations of the phrase 'having his love of justice put to the test' (βεβασανισμένος εἰς δικαιοσύνην) also stand out, since Socrates will pick it up at the end of Book Three to describe the guardians' resistance to fears. In 414a, this imagery is combined with the word ἀκήρατος ('unmixed') to designate the guardians who come out of the test as pure and unspoiled as gold.

17 In Book Nine, *Resp*. 588b10–589c3, Glaucon makes explicit reference to the lost-wax technique when he is invited to create the image of the tyrant's soul (πλάττε μίαν ἰδέαν... περίπλασον αὐτοῖς ἔξωθεν ἑνὸς εἰκόνα… περιπέπλασται, 558c7–e2). The beastly nature of the tyrannical soul is illustrated as a verbal statue (εἰκόνα τῆς ψυχῆς λόγῳ, 558b10), which consists of diverse images of ugliness. Hence, the *Republic* presents us with two kinds of sculptural patterns and of artistic *mimēsis*. The positive, philosophically approved *mimēsis* is linked with the guardians' embodiment of images of excellence. The rejected type of *mimēsis* involves sculptures of monstrosity, ugliness, and ethical baseness. In this chapter, I examine the philosophical significance of the former. I discuss the diverse directions of Plato's philosophical *mimēsis* at large in a forthcoming book (Petraki [2023]).

18 On the importance of statue location and the significance of honorific portrait statues in Greek city-states, see Ma (2013).

19 See, for example, Pind. *Nem*. 5.1–5, *Ol*. 7.50–3. Cf. Isoc. *Euagoras* 73–5.

20 The philosopher-craftsman 'mixes ways of life' and 'virtues' on a clear slate as a painter blends his colours, so as to produce a '(civic) male body' (an *andreikelon*) which is 'divine-like in character and form' (*theoeides* and *theoeikelon*). See Petraki (2011; 2013: 71–94).

21 On Socrates' resemblance to the philosopher-king as 'a painter of constitutions', see Petraki (2013: 71–94).

22 See Glaucon's remarks in 588d1–2: 'words are more malleable than wax' (εὐπλαστότερον κηροῦ).

23 See, however, De Vogel (1985: 14–15): For a Greek of the Classical period as well as later, the notions of εἰκών and μίμησις might be quite readily expressed by such words as τύπος or σφραγίς, and by verbs such as τυποῦν, τυποῦσθαι, or σφραγίζεσθαι. On *typos*, *sphragis,* and cognition, see Horky (2006: 383–98); Platt (2020: 53–76). On *typos* as statues of men, see Isoc. *Euagoras* 74: 'statues of men (τοὺς μὲν τύπους) must of necessity remain solely among those in whose cities they were set up'.

24 Hemingway & Hemingway (2000).

25 443b8–c2: τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζειν κατὰ θεόν τινα εἰς ἀρχήν τε καὶ τύπον τινὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης κινδυνεύομεν ἐμβεβηκέναι.

26 On Forms as paradigms, see Prior (1983: 33–42); Patterson (1985: 13–15); and Perl (1999: 339–62) .

27 Adam (1963: vol. 1, 111); *Theaet*. 191d. Cf. [Plut.] *De lib. educ*. 3. The same imagery is taken on by Philo (*De op. mundi* 17–19): see De Vogel (1985: 13–15).

28 See LSJ s.v. II. 1 and 2. See also Aristotle, *De memoria* 415b1, 415b16; Platt (2020: 72–4).

29 The noun has a double etymological derivation from τύπτω (to strike a blow) and τυπόω (to imprint).

30 LSJ s.v. II. 3.

31 LSJ s.v. III.

32 LSJ s.v. IV.

33 A similar point is made in 402c6–7: καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰκόνας αὐτῶν, καὶ μήτε ἐν σμικροῖς μήτε ἐν μεγάλοις ἀτιμάζωμεν.

34 *Resp*. 387b8–c5.
35 In Greek painting, *haplotēs* refers to the unmodulated colours. See Pollitt (1974).
36 The word *typoi* refers also to the three different forms/modes of poetic 'diction' (*lexis*) in 397c8–9, the mimetic mode (*mimēsis*), the diegetic mode (*haplē diēgēsis*), and the mixed mode. It is also broad enough to include the 'character' of the various musical *harmoniai* (398d5), as I discuss below.
37 See also Prauscello (2014: 30–2).
38 On this passage, see also Webster (1952: 11–12, n. 22).
39 Scholars have commented on Plato's hostility towards mimetic realism and his preference for idealism in representational art. The criticism of painting in Book Ten and the condemnation of *skiagraphia* are some instances in the dialogues where Plato expressly rejects certain pictorial trends and techniques: see Webster (1939). Steven (1933: 152) includes *Republic* 401b as another instance of rejection of such artistic style. In contrast, I argue that Plato's stance towards art is more complex, since he adopts artistic techniques in order to build his own philosophical argumentation. Thus, the severe condemnation of *mimēsis* in Book Ten should not be seen as the dominant Platonic view of art because it is a later development (Annas [1981: 335–44]). We can distinguish, instead, between an approved type of philosophical *mimēsis* and a condemned and rejected poetic *mimēsis*.
40 If *typoi* refer to sculptural *patterns* or *moulds* then perhaps Plato has Socrates make an anachronistic allusion to realistic 'sculptures of ugliness' such as those that sources of the Roman Imperial period ascribe to the sculptor Demetrius of Alopece in the early part of the fourth century BCE. See Quint. *Inst*. 12.10.9; Luc. *Philops*. 18–20.
41 The equation of living bodies with artefacts could allude to the experiments of statue-makers in the fifth century BCE to create figures which give the impression of life and the 'presence of a soul, or another animating force within': see Steiner (2001: 28–30). See further Tanner (2017: 525–33).
42 See Paus. 1.15.3; Plut. *Vit*. *Per*. 12 and 13.
43 Pliny (*HN* 34: 36) tells us that 3,000 bronze statues remained at his time in a city like Rhodes, and no smaller number are believed still to exist at Athens, Olympia, and Delphi. For the experience of 'living amidst a standing populace of bronze statues', see Stewart (1997); Babich (2006: 1–30); Chaniotis (2017: 91–112). On representations of individuals on Attic grave reliefs after 430 BCE, see Keesling (2017b: 37–8) with extra bibliography.
44 The noun *eikōn* is etymologically associated with the verbs εἴκω/ἔοικα. According to LSJ s.v. *eikōn, eikōn* is a likeness 'whether a picture or statue'. *Eikōn* explicitly bears the meaning of verbal 'statue' only in 588b10 (cf. 464b2). In Pl. *Crit.* 116c–d, Critias calls the cult statues *agalmata*, the votive statues *anathēmata*, and the portraits of the founding Kings of Atlantis and their wives *eikones*: εἰκόνες ἁπάντων ἕστασαν ἐκ χρυσοῦ …. Cf. *Phdr*. 235e: ὥσπερ οἱ ἐννέα ἄρχοντες, ὑπισχνοῦμαι χρυσῆν εἰκόνα ἰσομέτρητον εἰς Δελφοὺς ἀναθήσειν. On the use of *eikōn* in the *Republic,* see Petraki (2011) with extra bibliography. The word Ζῷον in ἐν εἰκόσι ζῴων can refer to human figures (Keesling [2017a: 851–52 with n. 42]).
45 Steiner (2001: 32). On the iconology of satyrs and its relation to images of Socrates, see Lissarrague (1990: 228–36); Henderson (1996: 327–52) on satyrs; Zanker (1996: 34); Charalabopoulos (2012: 159–78); Capra (2016: 437–43); Catoni & Giuliani (2019: 681–713).
46 The relationship between the two terms is a vexed issue. See Keesling (2017b: 837–61), 'On the rare occasions when Archaic Greeks needed a term to refer to a *kouros* statue, they chose *andrias*' (842). Herodotus' *Histories* is a valuable fifth-century source for anthropomorphic statuary. Herodotus uses the term *eikōn* to distinguish portraits of humans from images of gods (2.181–2). He also calls the archaic statues of Kleobis and Biton at Delphi *eikones* (1.31.5). Cf. 8.121.2; 6.118.3; 4.16. On terminology, see also Keesling (2017a: 56–66).

47 See *Inscriptiones Graecae in Bulgaria Repertae* 23 and Pliny *HN* 34.59–60; Barron (1999: 37–59).
48 Book Six of *Periegesis* offers detailed information about athletic portrait-statues at *Olympia*. See also Pliny *HN* 34.16–19 and 34.83. Stewart (1990: 244–6); Barron (1999: 47); Smith (2007: 83–139).
49 Pliny *HN* 34.9.
50 Dem. 23.196. Keesling (2017b: 47 n. 117).
51 RO 8, line 14. Until 393 BCE, when Konon's portrait was erected, there were no honorific statues in the Agora. On the epigraphical gap, see Keesling (2017b: 20–8 with n. 36).
52 See RO 8. The decree probably stood next to Euagoras' portrait statue in the Athenian Agora. See Isoc. *Euagoras* 57: […] ἡγοῦμαι καλὰ μὲν εἶναι μνημεῖα καὶ τὰς τῶν σωμάτων εἰκόνας.
53 Dem. 23.196–8.
54 See Tanner (2006: 98–9). See also Gombrich (1960: 78); Richter (1961–62; 1965); Metzler (1971: 157–60); Lazzarini (1984/85: 89–91); Tanner (1992: 167–90); Barron (1999).
55 See Tanner (2006: 106).
56 Tanner (2006: 103), emphasis added.
57 Tanner (2000: 200). The human body becomes 'the material means of the construction and transmission of central social values in the classical *polis*'.
58 Tanner (2015: 22) relates naturalistic sculptural representations and Plato's description of pyrrhic dance in the *Laws* (815a). See also Tanner (2017: 525–33).
59 Tanner (2000: 195).
60 On Pericles, see Plutarch (*Vit. Per.* 5); Isocrates (1.15); Demosthenes (37.55–6). Tanner (2015: 22–3 with nn. 44 and 45).
61 Ibid.
62 Osborne (2010); Shear (2012: 27–55); Azoulay (2014: 69–120); Vout (2018: 1–20).
63 On Forms as *paradeigmata* ('models'), see, for example, *Timaeus* 28a–b with discussion in Lee (1966: 341–68); Patterson (1985: 11–62); Perl (1999: 339–62). In the lost-wax technique, the initial model, usually made of wood or clay, is the 'model' (*paradeigma*). *Typos* is (a) the hollow *negative* mould taken from the model, and (b) the cast, the exact reproduction of the original model. See discussion further below.
64 So Pollitt (1974: 211–14).
65 See Plut. *An Viti*. 498e.
66 See Herodotus 5.62 on the Alcmaeonid temple at Delphi which seems to include all three stages of the building process. Pollitt (1974: 213).
67 Pollitt (1974: 212): a συγγραφή was a list of specifications which had to be approved by the financial authority in charge of the construction. They were often inscribed on stones. In relation to category (b), see *IDélos* 1417A 1.11. 32–33. In relation to category (c), see epigraphical testimonium 12 (IG, XI, 2.161A, b. lines 75–6) (cited by Pollitt on 207), which refers to the purchase of a *pinax* for the creation of a *paradeigma*.
68 So Pollitt (1974: 213). Callistratus *Descr.* 5.3, Plotinus *Enn*. 5.9.11 and Pseudo-Plutarch's (*Plac*. *Phil*. 879b2–3 = Aëtius *Plac. Phil.* 1.5.3 = Diels, *Dox. Graec*. 292: καὶ πολλὰ παραδείγματά ἐστιν, ὥσπερ ἐπ᾽ ἀνδριάντων καὶ οἰκιῶν καὶ ζωγραφιῶν) use of the term seems to fall under this category. Cp. Pl. *Soph*. 235d. See also O'Meara (2017: 41–65).
69 Pollitt (1974: 214). An example of the former is the 'Homeric conception of Zeus' which allegedly inspired Phidias' Zeus at Olympia; the latter could include the Canon of Polyclitus.
70 *Resp*. 592b1: 'But perhaps there is a model (παράδειγμα) of it in heaven'.
71 Pollitt (1974: 214), emphasis added.
72 On the process, see Mattusch (1980: 435–44; 1996); Haynes (1992).

73 The question whether the word εἴδη here makes reference to the transcendental Forms is contested. See Ross (1951: 229); Kahn (1993: 41); Nehamas (1999: 260); Herrmann (2007: 207–12); Petraki (2008: 14).
74 'Therefore, if someone's soul has a fine and beautiful character (καλὰ ἤθη ἐνόντα) and his *body matches it in beauty and is thus in harmony with it*, so that both share in the same pattern (τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχοντα τύπου), wouldn't that be the most beautiful sight for anyone who has eyes to see?' (402d1–4). See also Prauscello (2014: 39–40).
75 *Resp*. 588b–589a. This image of ugliness is executed by Glaucon and not Socrates.
76 See Isoc. *Euagoras* 74. Compare Adam (1963: vol. 1, 111).
77 See Pollitt (1974: 287–8).
78 On the technique, see Stewart (1997: 50–1).
79 See LSJ s.v. II**.** of an artist, *mould* or *model* in wax or plaster, '*to mould* and adapt oneself to'.
80 But cf. the use of *paradeigma* in 409b1 and c6.
81 See *Resp*. 410d and 411a–412a. Cf. *Tim*. 88b–c and *Lach*. 188d.
82 In a previous work (2008: 1–24), I have argued that for Plato in the *Republic* musical *harmoniai* and human souls share common linguistic descriptions, described in the dialogue as identical *ēthē* ('characters') or *typoi* ('patterns'), because they share common metaphysical structures.
83 See 410d6–411a4.
84 *Thesm*. 18: ἀκοῇ δὲ χοάνην ὦτα διετετρήνατο.
85 On χοάνη as a 'melting pot' for softening metals, see Hom. *Il.* 18.468–82 where Hephaestus fashions the shield of Achilles, with χοάνοισιν at line 470.
86 See the fragmentary clay funnels in the Athenian Agora with a detailed reconstruction of the founding technique: Mattusch (1982: esp. 11–13, with pictures 27 and 37).
87 On γανόω ('to polish'), see LSJ s.v.; Pliny *NH* 33.122; Vitr. *De Arch.* 7.9.3–4. Palagia (2006: 260–1; 2019: 705). On the impact of music here, see also Peponi (2012: 20–3).
88 Mattusch (1980: 435–44).
89 *Resp*. 416d–e.
90 Cf. the guardians' comparison to Olympic heroes in 465d5–e2.
91 See Fearn (this volume) on *kosmos*, order, and ornament. On the 'vision of the soul', see Buxton (this volume), pp. 280–2.

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Form Defines Imagination

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7 Imagining Death with Painted Pots

Emily Clifford

Death and the imagination have long been connected. As Benjamin Franklin wrote, death is 'certain'.[1] Indeed, it was probably more palpably certain for men, women, and children in ancient Athens than for some of us today. More visible, perhaps, and more proximate. But was it more knowable? There is obviously a difference between seeing someone else die and dying oneself, and while the former may provoke imaginative reflection upon the latter, the latter is, as far as we know, a dead end.[2] Death, the Great Unknown, is certainly an enigma.

This chapter is about the problem of knowing what dying is like, and the powers, processes, and limitations of human imagination in the face of that problem. Put another way, this chapter is about the tantalizing (im)possibility of accessing what it is like to die with either subjectivity or objectivity.[3] In the words of another early modern polymath, Sir Thomas Browne, in the epistolary preface to his seventeenth-century *Urne Buriall*: 'who knows the fate of his bones, or how often he is to be buried?'[4] Anxiety born of ignorance goes hand in hand with awareness of the fragile materiality of the body.[5] And worrying about material concerns such as bones and burials brings existential meditations in its wake. *What is this thing we call death anyway*?[6] *What is it like to die*? Bones are evidence, but evidence of what? How far can we extrapolate what death might be, or have been, like from material evidence?[7] Insofar as human perception of the material world contributes to mental experience (the formation of a concept, that is), what I am talking about is some version of *phantasia*, or imaginative experience.[8]

Compare Browne's written reflections on osseous remains found in some pots in England to, for example, Sir Derek Jacobi's performance as Hamlet, gazing upon a plastic skull (Figure 7.1), and to a sculpted image of an actor contemplating a mask on a Late Classical Attic gravestone (Figure 7.2). Similar sorts of imaginative experiences can be discerned, but now with greater reflexivity. The two latter representations are not just about sight, touch, and contemplation of the physical mementos of an absent body: they generate (for the viewer) *sight of* sight, touch, and contemplation. Both images capture a moment (one performed, the other sculpted) that makes the association between relations with the material world and reflections on death an object of cultural scrutiny (one by viewers at the theatre, the other at the grave, and both, in fact, by viewers of these photographic reproductions).[9]

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Figure 7.1 Derek Jacobi in *Hamlet* at the Old Vic in 1979, directed by Toby Robertson.
Photograph: © Donald Cooper/Photostage.

Figure 7.2 Attic marble grave stele of an actor or poet. Fourth century BCE. The Library, Lyme Park, England: 62196.
Photograph: © National Trust Images/Andreas von Einsiedel.

As explored by Karolina Sekita in Chapter 3, direct encounter with Death (or Hades) is elusive.[10] We look at death not in the face but through metaphor, images, and symbols. The images above also demonstrate the power of an artistic representation (plastic prop, theatrical mask) to signal a person (or an ex-person) and to generate an associative imaginative process. A plastic object represents a skull, and an actor (as Hamlet) holding it has come to represent a moment of reflection on mortality. Indeed, a Jacobi pose holding anything at all might draw upon and contribute to a cultural idea of death. Today we might call this a meme: 'the Yorick moment'. A skull, poor Yorick, a mask (removed); the process is reciprocal and recursive. In this sense, art and artefacts participate in more extensive cultural philosophy. By this, I do not mean that Shakespeare's or an Attic sculptor's insights (although the intentions may be relevant) construct death on a blank slate that is the social imagination. Rather, relations between and with objects (including their creation *and* reception) underpin cultural concept formation by adding to and changing shared ideas.[11]

For both these reasons (reflexivity and reciprocity), these opening quotes and images from different times, places, and contexts together compose the skeleton on which my chapter's meditations hang: the subjectivity and objectivity that frame and define imaginative experience of death.

In the previous chapter, Zacharoula Petraki explored Plato's use of language drawn from the world of statue making to articulate the creative nature of philosophical thought. This chapter turns towards the material artefacts themselves: I will probe the relationship between objects in a material world and concepts in a mental one by studying some painted pots made in Classical Athens. By looking closely at a case study, I will consider how the images and marks on the surface of a pot, its shape, and its compositions reflect and provoke reflections upon death as an imagined construct.[12] What I hope to demonstrate is that painted pots can operate as material counterparts to existential thought. Their crafted bodies express, mediate, and generate the imaginations with which the living sketch out the concept of death.

This chapter, then, participates in this volume on the imagination in Classical Athens by examining how pots stage processes of *phantasia avant la lettre*. But it also joins scholarship in the history of classical art that attends to formal meaning and reflexivity.[13] In particular, it builds on and pushes further more thanatological approaches to funerary art that link material objects with mental attitudes and experiences. These approaches have previously received more attention in the Roman funerary sphere,[14] but are being increasingly applied to Greek material.[15] In finding reflections 'on' as well as 'of' death on painted pots, this chapter pursues methods that treat material art not just as reflections of socio-political reality and ritual practice but also as an instantiation, mediation, and driver of thought.[16] Deep-set is an emphasis on how objects such as pots are enormously generative of ideas through their relations with humans and other objects but are not capable of being reduced to their core meaning or 'essence'.[17] In this respect, pots can operate as sophisticated models of the problem of death by virtue, simply, of being *objects*; like another person's body or bones, they are a suggestive, though ultimately inaccessible, enigma.

I will focus on drinking cups (*kylikes*), one popular pot type from fifth-century Athens, and I will consider how this sort of open vessel might offer a portal into visualizations of death in the symposium. Although the cups that I discuss, like many from this period, were mostly (or possibly all) found in Italy, it is reasonable to think that cups of this sort were used in Athens as well as overseas.[18] They offer some of our best evidence on Athenian sympotic experience. Nevertheless, it is important that painters and potters in Attica may not only have been influenced by the preferences of, for example, the Etruscan market but aware that the pots that they made and sold might end up in Etruscan graves.[19] Drinking cups are not obviously functionally related to death in an Athenian context, but thoughts of death may well have imbued multiple moments in their life history, from production in Attica to use at the symposium or beside an Athenian grave,[20] or else use in an Etruscan context, including eventual deposit in a tomb. Much of what I discuss here would, therefore, also be true in a funerary context (even intensified by increased emotional and physical proximity) though without contributions from elements such as drinking songs.

I open with the revelation and concealment of the dead. After looking at what is visible and not visible about death, I move on to some ways in which cups thematize visualization. I suggest that the temporality of the lived experience of death (death as something to be anticipated or remembered) pervades how cups work as visual experiences for their viewers and handlers. These two first sections, therefore, are concerned with the interface between an external world (material, perceptible, present in time) and an internal one (a mental landscape teeming with expectant fantasies and bittersweet memories). Finally, I look at how a cup's formal features provoke and participate in meditations upon death.[21] It is in this final section that the notion of the material world as a mediator of concept formation comes to the fore, because it is the crafted substance of the pot that makes it both a canvas for thought and a commentary on the materiality, but ultimately the enigma, of death. As an artefact, the pot stands as an aesthetic foil that simulates, or mirrors, for viewers the (im)possibility of extrapolating a subjective or objective experience from a position of outsider.[22]

I. Revelations

I begin with a red-figure cup held at the John Paul Getty Museum in Malibu (Figure 7.3).[23] Dated to the first half of the fifth century, approximately 490–470 BCE, it falls at the end of what is traditionally considered to be the Archaic stylistic period, on the cusp of transition to the Classical. Though in some ways exceptional, it sits within a tradition of black- and red-figure pot painting and stands as a multivalent point of reference for visualizations later in the century.

At the centre of its interior are two figures. On the horizontal axis lies the nude figure of a man: his body extends across the tondo's field, cutting its border with his feet. His body is prostrate, both uncomfortably bent and in unfolded abandonment; his head is thrown back, pupils rolled upwards, mouth gaping open.[24] He is manifestly dead: quelling any doubts, a sword protrudes from his torso, driven through from his back. At the top right of the tondo (on this orientation) is the sword's counterpart, its ornate but empty sheath. Above him, a female figure stands at a slight

Figure 7.3 Attic red-figure *kylix* (interior), attributed to the Brygos Painter. 490–470 BCE. Height 11.2 cm, Diameter 39.1 cm, Width 39.1 cm. Probably found in Italy (Etruscan inscription beneath the foot). The J. Paul Getty Museum, Villa Collection, Malibu: 86.AE.286.

Photograph: Getty Open Content.

angle that brings her body into a relationship with the corpse. She holds some bordered fabric, and this cloth is what the painter has depicted at the image's centre, in the middle of the circle of the cup's interior, midway between the figures. Stretched between their bodies, it disrupts a connection that was already broken by their divergent lines of sight. Below, two lines comprised of repeated arched strokes form ground-lines.[25] It has been suggested that these represent a sheepskin.[26] The scene is widely accepted as representing Tecmessa covering Ajax's corpse.[27]

Death is horrifyingly, captivatingly visible. The shock of the face-to-face encounter is quite literally a central concern. As Susanne Turner emphasizes in her chapter on sight and death in the ancient world, there was a powerful visibility to death that was heightened by the living's responses to it.[28] There is much to say on the striking *visibility* of Ajax's corpse here. His outstretched nude body is embedded in an iconographical tradition of the 'dead on display',[29] exemplifying a heroic-mythological trope of the beautiful dead,[30] like Sarpedon,[31] or Memnon,[32] and a social-artistic tradition of honouring the dead with ritual spectacle in scenes

of laying out the dead (the *prothesis*) and the funeral procession to the grave (the *ekphora*), which arrange the corpse and frame it with lamentation.[33] Moreover, and more specifically, the painter has apparently prioritized the frontal spectacle of Ajax's dead body on Tecmessa over a realistic depiction of his death.[34] The sword has been driven through his back, a remarkable feat for a suicide.[35]

The cup's composition maximizes this visual prominence. Unlike many other vessels, it has an interior site of display, the tondo.[36] The painted black surround forms a tenebrous circle against which the designs, reserved in red clay ground, shine like a target for the eye.[37] The surface of Ajax's corpse is a bright expanse, largely unmarked, bordered by the black outlines of his body. Add to this the border of rings and repetitive patterns, an ornamental window onto the image, and Tecmessa's open gesture as she stretches the veil, her arms a framing cradle for the corpse. Her posture, leaning towards Ajax, and her gaze direct our eyes onto his features: the visual pull of her lover's corpse upon her models the aesthetic draw of his bright, framed body upon us. The threefold gaze of painter, internal viewer, and external viewer upon the deceased sets his spectacle centre stage.

So there is much to say about visibility. But just as important is how the painter deals with death's *absence*, *invisibility*, and *unknowability*, a problem that attends and is intensified by what is visible.[38] The veil depicted in the tondo's centre both lifts to reveal the deceased and drops to conceal him from view (two coexistent potentialities).[39] Frame and fabric, envelopes that display and enclose, are in reciprocal complement, setting the mood for a play of revelation and concealment in viewing and visualizing a corpse and reflecting upon death.

On the one hand, concealment of Ajax's body has an obvious narrative imperative. His self-inflicted death is a cause for shame, a scandal to be covered up.[40] As such, Tecmessa's gesture is unambiguous: Ajax's suicide is 'absolutely not to be seen', οὔτοι θεατός (as in Sophocles' probably later rendition).[41] The natural interpretation is that she conceals. Indeed, the veil that might hide the corpse aligns internal and external viewers, but in mutual frustration: it is impossible to be sure whether Tecmessa's sight falls on her lover's face or shroud.[42] On the other hand, the empty sheath serves as a foil for the veil, a covering that has exposed the naked instrument of death.[43] The veil becomes a spatial and figurative epicentre of the tondo and the dead body, a painted analogue of the dark wine that fills and drains like blood, at one time exposing, at another hiding the painted corpse. But even the corpse belongs to death's aftermath rather than death itself and so, visible or not, points towards an invisible concept.[44] Contradictory impulses of revelation and concealment in the tondo's image thus help sketch a mental abstraction, the moment of death.[45] And in a symposium, where dead bodies and death are *both* visually absent, the conceptual link between what is seen and what is imagined is mediated instead by a cultural object. This object simulates, by artistic representation (pictorial and material), the double process of perceiving and creating inherent in concept formation.

II. Stop All the Clocks

With this shift from the result of death to its concept, I move on to the deathly visualities provoked by a cup's temporal games. Let us return to the veil at the tondo's

centre. Does it lift to display death as the awaited climax of a story, a life, and a drink? Or fall as a shroud, a signal that life and shame are over? What we see is a corpse and not the hero; no eidolon floats in the darkness above its sightless head but rather the lifeless shell of the scabbard, an artefact that acts as mirror image of the body that is only Ajax in so far as the living recreate and remember him in their minds.[46]

This is a sequential conflict that images on the pot's exterior anticipate and recall (Figure 7.4). Imagine that the cup is full and the tondo concealed. On one side is a voting scene with draped male figures holding staffs, a quintessential image of Athenian citizenship in action.[47] Though the pot is fragmented, it is possible to identify on the left the bottom half of a female figure wearing the *aegis*: Athena. A scene at home in fifth-century Athens is also part of a mythological narrative, a conclusion supported by the presence of the male spectator on the right, who clutches his forehead in a gesture, perhaps of horror, concern, despair, or mourning.[48]

Another clue to the narrative and mythological significances of this scene from contemporary life appears on the other side. Male figures are again present, and the repetition of a central figure with an identical sceptre suggests that these are the same men, but the block and voting pebbles are gone. Instead, weapons have

Figure 7.4 Attic red-figure *kylix* (exterior). See caption to Figure 7.3.
Photograph: Getty Open Content.

been drawn and some figures prevent others from fighting. The suspended sword and spear in the fight scene perhaps point to the quarrel's origin: the arms of Achilles. Both sides can be integrated as two moments in, or two versions of, the same story: resolution of competing claims by Odysseus (hence the presence of Athena) and Ajax for that armour.[49] The despairing, mourning, horrified figure in the voting scene looks *backward* (to Achilles' death, a narrative starting point) and *forward* (to Ajax's death, a narrative climax that cannot be unveiled until the wine is drunk). Provided the cup is full, the moment of death remains a wine-dark blank approached obliquely from two emotional viewpoints.[50] Reflections on the liquid surface send back the face of the living observer.[51]

Now imagine the cup is empty.[52] The exposed tondo offers respite from the temporalities of the exterior space and its imperatives to view in sequence, to compare and contrast (Figure 7.3). The magnetic absorption of the circular field accommodates a pause for reflection, offering Ajax's corpse as the cessation of life and change. But then the wine that fills and covers the body performs a figurative shrouding, a funerary rite in response to death. The exterior scenes (Figure 7.4) work once more but through the lens of memory, a past story of a death (or two) told by the living. Looking back on death, the realm of remembrance and mourning, is expressed in an intersection between the contemporary and mythological.[53] Though interpretations of scenes such as this one often emphasize the difference between the pot's sides (and the implicit narrative of socio-political development from resolution by violence to resolution by vote),[54] death, as motivation for and result of both scenes, complicates such demarcations. Ajax's death, like Achilles' death, is idiosyncratic. This is exemplified by the singular spectacle of the tondo, which holds one man's death within its enclosure; its circular plane is complete and separate from the cup's other planes. But his death is also one of many; it inherits and produces a tradition of deaths.[55] Ajax dies in his own way and like Achilles (and hundreds of others).[56] If the despairing figure mourns, he mourns Ajax and Achilles' death simultaneously. For a subject drinking at a symposium, this theme might chime with popular drinking songs in orbit, such as those to Ajax 'the best of the Greeks to come to Troy after Achilles':[57] to celebrate and remember Ajax in word or image is also to think of Achilles, two mighty warriors who died at Troy.[58] The mythological and temporal doubling effects graphically a similar conceptual link between, on the one hand, stories and images of death and corpses on a pot, and, on the other hand, the real existential problem of death as remembered and anticipated by a drinking subject for himself or his contemporary Athenians.[59] On a pot that focuses on seeing the dead in its tondo, visualization of death is a construct of realities and temporalities.

Consider another red-figure cup (Figures 7.5 and 7.6), also attributed to the Brygos Painter.[60] This provides an intriguing example of the existential implications of duplication. The Iliupersis scenes on its exterior are charged with duplications and inversions that provoke meditation upon death as an ineludible end.[61] On one side of the pot (Figure 7.5), the central figure of a vigorously victorious Greek warrior stands astride his prostrate enemy. This figure is paired with (on the pot's other side, Figure 7.6) the debilitated old man Priam,[62] his arms outstretched in

Figure 7.5 Attic red-figure *kylix* (obverse), attributed to the Brygos Painter by signature. c. 490 BCE. Height 13.8 cm, Diameter 33 cm, Width 42 cm. Found in Italy (Vulci, Etruria). Musée du Louvre, Paris: G152.

Photograph: © RMN-Grand Palais (Musée du Louvre)/Stéphane Maréchalle.

Figure 7.6 Attic red-figure *kylix* (reverse). See caption to Figure 7.5.

Photograph: © RMN-Grand Palais (Musée du Louvre)/Stéphane Maréchalle.

supplication towards the warrior's double that strides in from the right. The boy Astyanax twins himself, appearing on the far right of each side's scene (this double appearance is unusual):[63] on one side he is named and draped, his hair elegantly arranged and his body leaning out to the right in opposition to the oblique angle of his mother's body as she raises both arms bent back over her head, brandishing a pestle; on the other, he is unnamed and naked, his hair loosely outspread and his body dangling and inverted such that his arms meet at an acute angle the legs of the warrior who wields him, forming another triangle in reverse.[64] Visual switches of victor and vanquished are saturated with deaths anticipated or remembered in a

relentless cycle. The boy who might escape looks back towards the left from the palmette that might mark his narrative's end. He thus looks, ultimately, towards his own death on the other side of the pot, visually past, logically future.[65] The figure of Polyxena, as she leaves from the left towards, presumably, her sacrifice on Achilles' tomb, looks back to another sacrifice on another altar: the anticipated death of aged Priam framed by two departing descendants.[66] The pot's exterior uses visual correspondences to underwrite the narrative imperative that all men must die.[67]

As a result, the composition within the tondo (Figure 7.7) assumes a latent bitterness, imbued with the certainty of death to come that is visualized on the exterior. At first glance, the painter has depicted Briseis serving wine to Phoenix in or outside the tent of Achilles, whose armour is suspended above.[68] The old man sits, facing to the left and extending a cup. The young woman stands before him holding a jug. The image can stand as a memory, a prequel, a snapshot from the embassy to Achilles as told in *Iliad* 9.162–656 (though in the poem's version Briseis is not present to pour the wine, except insofar as her presence is promised by the speakers).[69] Though the embassy's mission to persuade Achilles to fight failed, the larger end it sought, the fall of Troy, was ultimately achieved, as the outside of the pot attests. The old man within demands, motivates, and anticipates the death of the one without.

Figure 7.7 Attic red-figure *kylix* (tondo). See caption to Figure 7.5.

Photograph: © RMN-Grand Palais (Musée du Louvre)/Stéphane Maréchalle.

Yet the seated figure of Phoenix with his white hair and beard also looks *backwards* to his wretched analogue, Priam, another old man stretching out his hand, not for wine, but life (Figure 7.6). Another double, Phoenix too confronts mortality. Indeed, in the visual climax to a symposiast's drink, his venerable image is unveiled as the culmination of a mortal life. The direction of his gaze is unclear, but just might fall into the bowl of the painted cup he holds. His aged contemplation is a *mise en abyme* of the drinking subject who stares into another tondo, seeing either his reflection on the wine's surface or his painted image in counterpart.[70] Briseis, a Helen-like woman defined by successive separations (from Troy, from Achilles), throws his age, his inexorable death, into sharper relief by presenting him with the fulfilments denied him: a failure to win a girl and an argument.[71] Though she is draped, the painter has shown her body's outline, her breasts, and buttocks, beneath the fabric. Perhaps she, like Anacreon's girl with the embroidered sandals, 'gapes after' another, repelled by his white hair.[72] The explicit association on the Getty cup between the world of myth and the real world of Athens is here drawn through the handling of the pot and the conceptual link between drinking subject and object. From contemplation of age to the frightening prospect of death is not so far a leap; the drinker that gazes into the dregs of his cup and hears another singing of graceful youth departed might well respond in his own verse with tearful dread of Tartarus.[73]

III. Forms of Thought

Let us return to the tondo of the Getty cup (Figure 7.3). Actual and possible layerings divide the pot's single surface into multiple imaginable surfaces of different depths and in different spatial relationships to one another. The association between surface and substance is something that painted pottery explores with especial force because it shares in both visual properties, a three-dimensional body and a two-dimensional canvas, in a manner unlike other three-dimensional or two-dimensional art such as freestanding and relief sculpture or wall-paintings.[74] This is still more interesting in red-figure painting, where vacillation between image and background is built into the technique: figures are reserved background and background is added in paint.[75]

Here, the veil talks to other surfaces that denote substance or its opposite and reveal interest in the human figure as a drawing and a person. Consider Ajax's nudity. The bare skin that covers his body's substance echoes the bodiless pelt beneath him, another corpse reduced to its surface. Moreover, though his rigid body is differentiated from the fabric that appears to fall into soft crescents above him, the triangular point of his right elbow and the gentle curve of his left arm and buttocks also reiterate the edges and folds of the veil that will cover him. The same lines and shapes represent objects of different ontology and disrupt their distinction, even their presence. There is a coincidence of three-dimensional presence of dead body upon ground beneath veil, and its absence: a reduction of similar-looking lines, edges, surfaces, and skins. Interest in representation and decoration fits within a trend in pottery from the late Archaic period onwards.[76] But it also hints at artistic triumph in the face of death: insofar as lines and paint show depth, they represent a

material corpse that will decay;[77] insofar as black perimeters surround blank space, they visualize an ex-person, an empty shell, a non-appearance.

Expressive manoeuvring of borders and space elsewhere on the pot corroborates this. At the bottom of the scene the red mass of the corpse's right arm and the red expanse of the sheepskin ground area trace the curvature of the inner red clay circle leaving a narrow gap of black paint. The effect is a mesmerizing lack of depth, where 'background' 'figure' and 'line' move backwards and forwards in a *trompe-l'œil* like Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit.[78] An edge that is natural for an arm is strange for a base, or a pelt, which is neither hidden by the red perimeter nor flows beyond it, but, rather, performs as frame *and* framed in its faithful tracing of the circular interior of the ornamental border.

Less faithful are the feet of the dead, which break through, or over, the inner red circle and the meandering border beyond.[79] The shift in visual category is confusing. The unusual lower edge of the woolly ground suggests this embellished circle was never a window frame. But what was otherwise a border, a decorated edge to the black canvas of the central tondo, is suddenly given substance. The artifice of the repeating motif shifts from back to foreground, taking on existential significance in the context of the scene.[80] Switching from within to over, the corpse appears to shift dimensions and float out into the black unseen of the painted perimeter. There is a similar optical glitch at the corpse's head. The circular border alternates three running meanders with a starburst square. But here there are four: the additional meander – a deliberate miscalculation?[81] – stretches the perimeter thin, the miniature labyrinths of its geometric motifs yawning wider before the rolling eyes of the corpse.[82] Transformation of visual space at the border visualizes ontological transformation, a transition out of life and out of the image. Indeed, if, as Nikolaus Dietrich's study of space in Greek painting suggests, the relevant location of these figures was never 'outside' or 'the natural environment' (or even 'backstage') but rather their material support (the pot), it is not just the ground-line that would 'implode' on Ajax's disappearance but the whole pictorial environment.[83] With these hints of structural, spatial dissolution, Ajax's pictorial relationship with and rupture of his environment instantiates the loss of *aisthēsis* that accompanies his body's death and, in turn, dissolves the material world in darkness.[84]

This ontological overlap of image and substance runs deeper: the feet that pierce the tondo's frame imitate the sword that transfixes the corpse, transposing two bodies, two vessels. The pot's perforated body acquires a cadaverous corporality, its interior laid bare in a shedding of blood-red wine, its lifeless shell carried in the subject's hands like the bodies of Sarpedon or Memnon.[85] Indeed, the relationship between pots and bodies is a long one: man's mythological origins are in earth (as in Hephaestus' formation of Pandora in Hesiod's *Theogony*, 571–2) and pots can serve for urn-burials, as in the case of the seventh-century BCE Eleusis *amphora*, which held the remains of a boy.[86] We see a similar implicit link on a red-figure Athenian *pelikē* (Figures 7.8 and 7.9):[87] on one side, Eos carries Memnon; on the other, a male Athenian citizen extends his arms towards a female figure struggling beneath the weight of a *hydria*. The reversal connects terracotta vessel and lifeless body, a relationship that would be enhanced if the *pelikē* were viewed in a



Figure 7.8 Athenian red-figure *pelikē* (obverse), attributed to the Syleus Painter. c. 480/470 BCE. Found in Italy (Chiusi). Musée du Louvre, Paris: G232.

Photograph: © RMN-Grand Palais (Musée du Louvre)/Hervé Lewandowski.

funerary context (a possibility, given its Italian provenance).[88] Just so, in the case of the Getty cup, the pot-turned-body disinters visually and materially the existential transformation effected by penetration of the person's frame, another body turned hollow vessel (in mirror image to the emptied sheath above).

'Nonsensical' inscriptions seem to respond to this visual strangeness, intimating death's mystery in meaningless lines of no representational significance except insofar as they lack import.[89] On the Getty cup, for example: γνοισνον. Like so many ciphers (untranslatable sounds such as αἰαῖ, ἒ ἔ; painted black miniatures of pots and souls) non-words can express the ineffable.[90] Indeed, the failure of inscriptions to operate as labels might articulate a loss of identity, akin to the conceptual interchangeability of Achilles and Ajax, or the visual substitutability of Priam and Phoenix,[91] where inscriptional differentiation of repeated figure types accentuates loss of identity in death. It is notable, in this respect, that Astyanax's dangling double on the Louvre cup goes unnamed, unlike his escaping twin (Figures 7.5 and 7.6).[92]

But forget sex, religion, and politics,[93] was death welcome at a party?[94] Not always, according to Anacreon, who prefers topics of art, love, and merriment to talk of 'strife and tearful war' at a symposium.[95] Anacreon's domain is a place for love and wine.[96] But even if thoughts of death were unpleasant, they were far from

Figure 7.9 Athenian red-figure *pelikē* (reverse). See caption to Figure 7.8.
Photograph: © RMN-Grand Palais (Musée du Louvre)/Hervé Lewandowski.

absent: death is pervasive on sympotic ware, enshrouding and buried within themes of desire, delight, and drink.[97] Indeed, reflections on death might have sprung from associations and interrelations between a drinking cup and other elements of the symposium. Consider how Anacreon sang of Cleobulus,[98] for some such song might have infused the sensuous synchronicity of seeing a pot such as the Getty cup's image and tasting its wine. Gazing and drinking operate as a material foil to an imaginative engagement with death. And this metaphor-like impact of the artefact mirrors the power of the mythological interface that prompts and filters real existential contemplation, whether the drinking subject be distant from the dead in a symposium or near them in a visit to the grave. The subject of Anacreon's poem loves, is mad for, gazes on Cleobulus. But is Cleobulus in the room, on the vase, or in the mind? Does Ajax in all the displayed beauty of his painted body, in the lunacy of confused visual categories (image and substance, warriors and sheep), recall Cleobulus or Cleobulus recall Ajax? And which Cleobulus, which Ajax? For another Cleobulus died at the hands of another Ajax (son of Oileus) in the *Iliad*[99] –

> Stopped in the tumult Cleobulus lies,
> Beneath Oïleus' arm, a living prize…[100]

At the intersection between mythology, humanity, song, and image, transposability of identity offers one way into reflection upon its loss.

IV. Conclusions

The symposium is not a space of death, but when its painted images make death their subject the tondo's circular field invites drinking subjects to introspection, absorption in a visual and conceptual profundity. For a man in his cups, sending his eye to the bottom of a wine-dark 'sea' like Xavier Buxton's more sober diver (Chapter 10), thoughts go deep. In the event-driven context of a drinking cup (the symposium, a delimited period of multi-sensory delight), a moment of encounter with the pot's painted interior becomes infused with the ephemerality of finite experience. But the combination of multiple visual fields, interior and exteriors, invites viewers and handlers to turn the object, to compare, connect, and concoct its images, to engage in a metaphorical viewing that chimes with the mythological subject matter.[101] Figures set in the distant past such as Ajax invite meditation on present mortality and future death: viewers see one (Phoenix) as another (Priam) and another (Phoenix) as the self, and transposability of identity reiterates a temporal condition all viewers have in common. So the imaginative thinking that Tom Phillips finds crystallized in lyric poetry (Chapter 9), attention to the circumstantial *and* transhistorical moment, gives here onto the transience of sensuous experience partnered with the inorganic materiality of the pot, and meditation on death as a temporal event and a timeless concept.

Does it matter whether the figure on the Getty cup is, in fact, Ajax?[102] He is, after all, not named: the nude, bearded figure could be any male corpse. The sword is in an odd (even impossible) position for suicide, and some scholars have been confident that the male figure is Agamemnon.[103] The quarrel and voting scenes on the cup's exterior, admittedly, point in favour of Ajax, but the tondo itself is more suggestive than prescriptive (and calls Achilles, at least, to mind as well as Ajax).

What 'Ajax' brings, in the context of death, are specific mythological, political, and religious connotations.[104] As an object of hero cult, his death is exceptional rather than ordinary, and there is a heightened significance to the materiality of his dead body, which will become a locus for continued influence and community attention. Moreover, as an eponymous hero, his name also stands for a distinct group identity, one of the ten Athenian tribes.[105] On the other hand, the image's lack of specificity and the reverberation of associations across the multiple fields of the pot and its symposium context (Ajax, Achilles, Cleobulus; Phoenix, Priam, Anacreon) enable conceptual movement from the exemplary to the general. This sort of associative process has also been noted in Sophocles' later play, where Ajax's character is reminiscent of the Homeric Achilles, Odysseus, and Hector, and inspires the Sophoclean Odysseus, at least, to introspection, 'contemplating [Ajax's] predicament no more than [his] own'.[106] The move from observation to vicarious experience, a sense of one's own subjectivity, and the formation of some sort of general concept fits with this volume's interest in the imagination as an interface between external and internal worlds.[107]

Athenian pot painters create a visual and material experience that not only mimics but instantiates, underpins, and compounds the mental experience of responding to death. Minds and material forms are reflective and generative; they are in constructive dialogue.[108] The link between visualizing death *on* pots and *through* pots unravels the imaginative nature of creating and responding to images and the process involved in building abstract thought from *aisthēsis*. What is interesting in the context of painted pots (as material human constructs) is that objects and their representations instantiate a process of conversion and reconversion from material construct to mental construct and vice versa in a reinforcing and regenerative loop. If the absence of a terminological framework has advantages as well as disadvantages, not least for the power this absence devolves to form, material art (like the material text) offers an alternative form of thought freed from such a framework, on which, as David Fearn suggests in the next chapter, rhetoricians such as Gorgias could build.

Indeed, the Getty cup does more than participate in the formation of a concept of death; it also prompts reflection on the imaginative nature of existential meditation, making thought itself an object of contemplation. The suggested equivalence between categories of material object (corpse, pot) turns a spotlight on the process of extrapolation from singular perceptible examples to the general concept of death. But the picture of death that results is fraught with uncertainty: the falling veil, the pattern that fragments, nonsensical language, identities that merge and so are lost. In fact, the impossibility of knowing what dying is like simply enacts an urgent and anxiety-laden example of the challenges that underpin imaginative extrapolation of another's subjectivity and any generalized concept of experience. Humans are pot-like enigmas even to themselves. And so I end, as I started, with the words of Sir Thomas Browne:[109]

> Time which antiquates Antiquities, and hath an art to make dust of all things, hath yet spared these *minor* Monuments. In vain we hope to be known by open and visible conservatories, when to be unknown was the means of their continuation and obscurity their protection … But the iniquity of oblivion blindely scattereth her poppy, and deals with the memory of men without distinction to merit of perpetuity.[110]

Abbreviations

Abbreviations of ancient authors and texts, as well as scholarly reference works, generally follow those of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, fourth edition; abbreviations of journal titles follow those of *L'Année Philologique*. Exceptions are listed below.

BAPD = Beazley Archive Pottery Database (https://www.beazley.ox.ac.uk/carc/pottery)

Notes

1 Letter to Jean Baptiste Le Roy (1789): Smyth (1907: 69).
2 Díez de Velasco (1995: 11): 'la muerte, realidad experiencial pero no experimentable'.

3 Nagel (2012 – first published in 1974) is relevant here. But 'what it is like to die' is a special example of the mystery of consciousness because all humans will have a subjective experience of dying (unlike being a bat) but cannot access in advance their own experience or anyone else's. Given this, it is also not possible to extrapolate an objective experience of dying (if any). Death is, therefore, a distinctive example of the interior/exterior interface explored in this volume.
4 Browne (1958: 3 – first published in 1658).
5 On human bodies as transient objects that return to dust (as part of an embodied approach to Classical Attic grave stelai), see Squire (2018a: 519). See further Turner (2016: 143). For new materialist and embodied approaches to death, see n. 7.
6 Pl. *Phd.* 64c: 'Do we think that death is *something*?' (my emphasis).
7 On this point, see especially Meskell (1996) on what embodiment and materiality can offer death archaeology, and Sofaer (2006) on what we might learn from thinking about bodies as objects. See further Hallam & Hockey (2001) on the relationships between death, memory, and material culture (ranging from medieval to contemporary Western societies); Newby & Toulson (2019) on the roles played by material objects in experience of grief and expression of mourning; n. 15.
8 On Aristotelian *phantasia* and 'off-line' experience, see Campeggiani's chapter and Clifford & Buxton's introduction in this volume. See further Cairns (2016) on embodied experience, metaphor, and concept formation.
9 This is an assertion as to what art does, but raises the question of what art *is*. On the controversial question of art's ontology, see the introduction to this volume, n. 2.
10 See further Sourvinou-Inwood (1981: 21; 1995: ch. 2) on the oblique treatment of Hades in Homer and its unseeable nature; n. 15.
11 Or, as Graham Harman puts it in his object-oriented discussion of Ortega's theory of metaphor, smashing ideas against one another to produce something new: Harman (2005: 101–24), discussing José Ortega y Gasset's 1914 work, 'An Essay in Esthetics by Way of a Preface'.
12 There was a close relationship between Greek pots and death. From the Geometric period, pots were decorated with images of death and served as funerary markers or containers for the corpse or ashes. In the late Archaic and Classical periods, the types closely associated with funerary contexts were *loutrophoroi* and the *aryballos*, *alabastron*, and *lekythos*. Depictions on vases from the funerary sphere through the Geometric, Archaic, and Classical periods: Kurtz (1984). See further: Osborne (1988: 5–6); Shapiro (1991); Lissarrague (2001: 112–22). Death's representational challenge: Stampolidēs (2014: 19); Jones (2015).
13 Frames: Platt & Squire (2017), especially the chapter by Clemente Marconi; earlier discussions in Hurwit (1977; 1992). Ornament: Dietrich & Squire (2018). Reflexivity in early vase painting: Neer (1995; 2002); Grethlein (2015; 2016); Jones (2015). See further n. 21.
14 For example: Huskinson (1998); Elsner & Huskinson (2011); Elsner & Wu (2012); Platt (2011: esp. 335–93; 2012); Birk (2013: 57–8); Vout (2014); Elsner (2018b); Trimble (2018).
15 Neer (2012); Arrington (2015; 2018); Jones (2015); Walter-Karydi (2015: pt. 4, esp. 331–4); Estrin (2016; 2018); Squire (2018a). From a literary perspective, see Bassi (2018); Wohl (2018). Though less recent, see further Frontisi-Ducroux (1986; 1988: 34–5; 1989: 160–1; 1995: 82–94); Osborne (1988). Also important is Vernant (2006: 305–20 – first published in 1965) on the *kolossos* as a cultural object that gives visible form to the invisible and so gives form to an idea, the life of the deceased in the beyond; Vernant (1991b: 167–8) on the *eidōlon*, another example of a double that simultaneously manifests presence and absence. In addition, on mirrors, invisibility, the frontal gaze, and the Gorgon, see: Vernant (1985: esp. 82; 1987); Frontisi-Ducroux (1988; 1989: 157–64; 1993; 1995: esp. 65–75). See further nn. 42, 45, 51, 70.

16 In this sense, pots are material counterparts to Gorgias' textual bodies or Plato's word-sculpted guardian class: see Fearn and Petraki (this volume). Greek vases as negotiating not incarnating ideologies: Neer (2002: 183–5). Moreover, on the continuum in ancient Greece between myth and reality, and on 'real life scenes' as themselves part of a cultural imaginary, see, for example: Bérard *et al.* (1989), especially the chapter by Claude Bérard and Jean-Louis Durand; Ferrari (2003).

17 For bibliography on object-oriented ontology, see the introduction to this volume, nn. 140, 145, and 151.

18 The initial purpose or surroundings of much Athenian pottery is uncertain. Many Attic pots were found in graves in Italy, and so were ultimately viewed by non-Athenian viewers. This includes two that I discuss here: the Louvre cup (from Vulci) and the *pelikē* (possibly from Chiusi). It probably also includes the Getty cup, which has an Etruscan inscription under the foot. Since I am interested in general pictures of how painters (and these were in Attica, if not necessarily Athenian) dealt with death and the nature of the visual experiences produced, it is acceptable to use these pots as evidence for Athenian visuality; the wider market and specific destination of any one example is not explored further here. A similar approach (but overconfident in dismissing influence from the 'omnivorous' Etruscan market): Osborne (2018: 40–8).

19 See Bundrick (2019: esp. chs. 1–3 and 7). Pots and trade: Gill (1988; 1991); Bresson & de Callataÿ (2013); Sapirstein (2013). Mannack (2014: 122) notes the possibility that some kalos-names may have been inspired by agents in trade: if true, this would support the idea that some painters adapted their work to suit purchasers. A related question is the evidence for a market in pottery and the question of value. Without raising painted pottery to anachronistically high levels of 'fine art' (though see Spivey [2018: 57] on this point), views at the other end of the spectrum (initially championed by Vickers [1985]) are also implausibly extreme. It is probable that painted pottery held value and that there were more and less expensive examples. Potter and patron: Webster (1972). Potters' wealth: Wagner (2000). Pots' aesthetic value: Porter (2012).

20 Though other varieties of pot were more closely associated with funerary contexts (see n. 12), there is visual evidence that cups were used at or deposited on Athenian graves: see *BAPD* 216333. (Throughout I reference Beazley Archive Pottery Database [*BAPD*] entries, which provide images and bibliographies.) Note further the white-ground cups deposited in the 'Sotades tomb' in Athens: see Burn (1985); Tsingarida (2012).

21 This approach builds on that in Neer (2002: esp. 1–8), and in recent volumes on frames and ornament: n. 13. I follow Neer (2002: 7–8) in believing that close readings, though inevitably selective, are most illuminative of meanings produced by pots as a whole. A close reading must pull together style and subject: Elsner (2018a: 386) (equally applicable to Greek art). Formalism and aesthetic experience: Grethlein (2017: esp. 37–8). Vases and illusionism: Martens (1992). Realism and formalism in the long Classical period: Webster (1939a). Opposing perspectives on the visual experience offered by Classical art: Elsner (2006) on imaginative, vicarious viewing; Osborne (2018: esp. 249–50) on Athenian pottery as a 'mirror' not a 'keyhole'. While sculpture may tell a different story from pots, 'efforts to fragment the picture-field' (Neer [2002: 5]) draw attention to the other-worldly site of the painted object, demanding some projection by viewers into the field.

22 This situation might be described as a position of voyeurism in that it is characterized by desire and phantasy: see Lacan's 1964 *Seminar XI*, discussed in Elsner (2004: 164–71). See further Fowler (2000: 193–217) on monuments, desire, and instability.

23 *BAPD* 275946; *ARV Para* 367.1 *bis*.; *ARV Add* 224. The Brygos Painter: Arias (1962: 336). A note on attribution: there has been much resistance to approaches that treat pots like Renaissance masterpieces. A historical overview of the study of Greek pots: Osborne (2018: 26–36). See further: Robertson (1992: 1–6); Sparkes (1996). Beazley versus Pottier: Rouet (2001). Classical images: Smith (2002). Though only one of a

pot's important aspects, style *is* important. Art history of style in the ancient world and the advantages of a more open method and approach: Elsner (1998). See further: Tanner (2006). At the least, attributions provide a shorthand reference for pot identities, chronology, and stylistic traits; they also reveal common visualities and networks of interaction.

24 Refraction of the eye in death: Geroulanos & Bridler (1994: 53). Compare: *BAPD* 202631.

25 The challenge of the ground line in a circular object: Squire (2018b: 6–7). Tondo compositions: Webster (1939b). Images and circularity: Lissarrague (2009).

26 *BAPD* 275946. *Pace CVA* Malibu 8, USA 33: 33, pls. 418–20 (M. B. Moore), proposing a 'pebbly beach'. Further discussion: Williams (1980: 140).

27 Despite the sword (visible even in the pot's fragmented state), the figures were previously interpreted as Clytemnestra and Agamemnon: *ARV Para* 367.1 *bis*; von Bothmer (1969: 234–5, caption 11). The misidentification probably arose on account of the rarity of stretched fabric in pot images (n. 39) by comparison with its prominence in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*. Dyfri Williams identified a similar scene on the exterior of some cup fragments in the Louvre: Williams (1980).

28 Turner (2016).

29 Death's visuality, the *prothesis*, and the spectacular: Turner (2016: esp. n. 1, 145–6). Fifth-century Athenian funerary ritual: Kurtz & Boardman (1971: ch. 7); Oakley (2004: 11–13).

30 *kalos thanatos*: Frel (1984: 13–16); Vernant (1991a); Loraux (1995: ch. 3 – first published in French in 1990). But note Neils (2009): is beauty in the eye of the beholder or, rather, the Western tradition as influenced by the pietà image in Christian art? Marred beauty may, however, still entrance. An epic link between death's horror and glory: Vernant (1996). Generic appeal of heroic death: Marconi (2004). Opposite interpretation: Osborne (2004). Greater artistic reflection on heroic death in the late sixth and early fifth centuries: Muth (2008: 435–6).

31 For example: *BAPD* 187. Thanatos in Greek art: Shapiro (1993: 132–65); Recke (2002: 60–4). There are a few other instances where Hypnos and/or Thanatos appear on cups: see, e.g., 200474, 201052, 46679 (possibly: the cup is fragmentary), and 331676 (all these are dated 525–475 BCE and none show the scene in the tondo). Comparing 187 and 7043: Stansbury-O'Donnell (1999: 103–6). Examples that turn Sarpedon's corpse outwards: 201052 (cup), 17489 (mug), 5133 (*lekythos*). Compare: 330735 (*lekythos*), 305529 (*amphora*), 202217 (*kratēr*), 7309 (*amphora*). Others play differently with the corpse as image: e.g. 7309 opposes it with the eidolon in miniature reflection (resulting in two *eidōla* of the deceased).

32 For example: *BAPD* 202501, 205119. In a cup's tondo: 46679, 205119. He is always nude (in the 11 Greek examples): De Puma (1983: 294). Eos and Memnon: Recke (2002: 64–7). Achilles and Penthesilea (another sort of longing for a departed beloved): 201987, 211565. In a cup's tondo: 3881, 211565. A similar theme: 205060. Distinct but connected is the association between marriage and death on *loutrophoroi*: Moesch (1988).

33 For example: *BAPD* 41079. Compare 201675 and 202188, where women lean forward to cradle the head of the deceased (corporeal framing that is equivalent to Tecmessa's open gesture on the Getty cup, but which more effectively succeeds in the face-to-face encounter that she misses). *Prothesis* in geometric art: Snodgrass (1987: 14); Walter-Karydi (2015: 30–48). In the Archaic period: Walter-Karydi (2015: 112–18). Iconography of mourning: Shapiro (1991). The ritual lament at the *prothesis*: Alexiou (2002: 4–7 and *passim* in 131–205 – first published in 1974). *Prothesis* and display: Lissarrague (2001: 116–17); Turner (2016: 145–6). Beauty and ornament of the dead in *prothesis*: Giudice (2015: 11). *Prothesis* on plaques: Boardman (1955); Mommsen (1984). Medical and legal reasons for displaying the deceased: Garland (1985: 30–1); Kurtz &

Boardman (1971: 143–4). Identification of specific family members: *CVA* Berlin 15, Germany 95: 52, pls. 48.1–52.2) (A. Schöne-Denkinger). Disruption by *lekythoi* of the popular *prothesis* scene: Allen (2018). Rarity of *prothesis* scenes on *lekythoi*: Haywood (1997). A histogram showing significant increase in preference for funerary scenes in the fifth century: Giudice & Giudice (2009).

34 But not his face: n. 33.

35 Compare: British Museum 1867,0508.1328; Louvre Collection Campana, 1861, E 635 (Eurytios *kratēr*). See further *LIMC* s.v. Aias I XXV, no. 6. One explanation: Hedreen (2001: 110).

36 This is revealed by its decoration and, sometimes, the presence of eyes on the exterior: the terracotta mask is a comic testament to the face behind that gazes into the pot's interior. Consider e.g.: *BAPD* 4507, 7886, 9765. Though multiple pictorial areas demand numerous viewpoints and active viewing (see Lorenz [2016: esp. 169–97] on a *hydria*), the tondo also offers visual repose.

37 Note early 'extramissionist' notions of vision and the active 'fiery eye', discussed in Rudolph (2016: 39).

38 See further Sekita (this volume, esp. pp. 104–11).

39 Based on a review of 500–400 BCE tondo images in the *BAPD*, I have found only one other example with a suspended veil: 217255. On this, display and concealment potentialities are teasingly erotic. The *himation* across the tondo's centre conceals the youth's nude body and the pot's only painting, and so is a double joke on viewers' expectations: draining the wine unveils a blank image.

40 Compare how faces are covered in shame: Eur. *HF* 1159–60.

41 Soph. *Aj.* 915.

42 Note Frontisi-Ducroux (1986; 1989: 160–1; 1993: 74–5; 1995: 82–94) on the existential significance of the frontal gaze: here, the missed connection 'diverts' (*détourne*) the dead from internal *and* external viewers. Perhaps this captures the aftermath, where the dead 'no longer sees, no longer is seen' by anyone (citations translated from Frontisi-Ducroux [1986: 208]). See further n. 15; Sekita (this volume).

43 In fact, like the veil, the scabbard has a double impact. It has exposed the weapon but also signals the possibility that it might be covered; this is enhanced by its position, hanging in mid-air as if the scene in the cup's interior takes place indoors or, at least, in private (in contrast to the scenes on the cup's exterior). For further discussion of indoor/outdoor space inside/outside another cup by the Brygos painter (discussed on pp. 206–9), see Hutchinson (2020: 115).

44 See Jones (2015: 818) on Sarpedon's corpse for a similar point.

45 Death, invisibility, and coverings: Frontisi-Ducroux (1995: 35–8); n. 15.

46 *eidōla*: Peifer (1989). Compare Turner (2016: 149) on the image of the dead as an 'appearance … not even skin-deep' (discussing Republican ancestral masks). Yet an image might perpetuate presence. See Schnapp (1988: 571) on *kolossoi*, citing Emile Benveniste. See further n. 15. Compare the exceptional preservation offered Homeric heroes whose *kalos thanatos* wins 'imperishable glory': Vernant (1991a). See further Bryson (1983: esp. xii) on the image as sign (rather than Gombrich's 'record of a perception'). On the grave monument as a *sēma* in Homeric and Archaic Greece, see Sourvinou-Inwood (1995: ch. 3). On the coincidence of two representational systems (Archaic/presentational and Classical/representational) on *lekythoi*, see Jones (2015). See further Vernant (1990).

47 Cleisthenic resonances here: Spivey (1994); Bocksberger (2022: 167–74). Sticks and citizen iconography: Hollein (1988: 11–49); Fehr (2011: 84–91, esp. n. 340).

48 This figure is identified as Ajax in *CVA* Malibu 8, USA 33: 34 (M. B. Moore). Compare the seer on the east pediment of the temple of Zeus at Olympia.

49 Davies (1973: 68) places Odysseus on the left, Ajax on the right. Compare: *BAPD* 203901, 205070. The vote/quarrel combination was popular on Attic cups, especially

on a late Archaic series that also makes Ajax and the arms of Achilles its subject: see esp. Williams (1980) (though he argues for inspiration from a lost literary source).

50 Though Garland (1985: 13–20) emphasized death as a process, dying might still be an instant. Late Archaic to early Classical interest in the suddenness ('Plötzlichkeit') of transition between two states: Wannagat (2003: esp. 61–4). The absence of a Greek agent of death: Vermeule (1979: 37). The pain of anticipating loss: Konstan (2018).

51 Wine as mirror: Frontisi-Ducroux (1997: 114–16).

52 Conceivably, the tondo image might emerge from the wine upside down. In this respect, the 'correct' way to hold the cup is with the voting scene facing the drinker and the fight scene facing outwards.

53 A similar idea of merged mythology and reality in the face of death: Carboni (2007: 33).

54 See, for example: Williams (1980); Spivey (1997: 180).

55 A similar composition on a scarab gem in the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston shows an outspread nude male being (un)covered by a winged deity: see *LIMC* s.v. Aias I, no. 141 and Odette Touchfeu's suggestion that this derives from a confusion with Eos and Memnon. The appeal of the image appears to facilitate permeability between stories and deaths.

56 On this point, see esp. Elsner (2006: 75–7) on the referential indeterminacy of *kouroi* (simultaneously personal-individual and epic-universal).

57 *Carm. conv*. 898 *PMG*. Aristophanes cites a song 'of Telamon' in *Lys.* 1236–8. *Skolia* of this sort were probably in circulation in the late sixth and early fifth centuries: Yatromanolakis (2009: 271–5).

58 Associations between Ajax and other characters in Sophocles' play: Swift (2019). Significant visual links between the voting and Ajax and Achilles' game: Hedreen (2001: 104–19).

59 Death of the other as mirror and prefiguration of the subject's self, mortality, and death (discussing, specifically, images of Charon with the dead on *lekythoi*): Sourvinou-Inwood (1987: 150–8).

60 *BAPD* 203900; Beazley (1925: 176.3); *ARV* 369.1, 398, 1649; *ARV Para* 365.1; *ARV Add* 224.

61 This cup, death's climax, and the 'Noch-nicht-und-doch-schon-Gestorben' (not-yet-but-already-died): Wannagat (2003: 63).

62 Though the composition resists fragmentation into 'sides': see Robertson (1992: 94) on the fallen warrior beneath one handle, who links the action that begins and ends with a palmette beneath the other. The continuous mode: Froning (1988: 194–5).

63 *Pace* Giuliani (2013: 185). This double appearance is unusual: Robertson (1992: 95). Suggesting that the painter has mistakenly named one child because he is next to Andromache: Arias (1962: 339).

64 Both are also shown from the back: Rühfel (1984: 54). Compare *BAPD* 16776, 7390, 13363, 200097 and 203229 for some other surviving cups (mostly fragmentary) featuring Astyanax. The Priam and Neoptolemus motif: Recke (2002: 41–50). Combinations of details and scenes: Hedreen (2001: esp. 64–90); Giuliani (2013: 171–2).

65 Nn. 62 and 63.

66 Compare *BAPD* 202641, where Priam's death combines two perspectives: the horror that anticipates his end in a climactic 'Harmodius blow' and the lament with which survivors will remember his life (the raised arms of the figures about him and the altar form a dreadful substitution for mourners at his *prothesis*). Hints of Kritios and Nesiotes' sculptural composition: Miller (1995: 453). The 'life history' of the victorious, but deceased, tyrannicides: Vout (2018: ch. 1).

67 This epic motif: Sourvinou-Inwood (1981: 20).

68 Briseis and Phoenix are named: see Attic Vase Inscriptions online 6490 (https://avi.unibas.ch/).

69 Robertson (1992: 95) also notes that the tondo scene forms a prologue.

70 Compare the interiors of *BAPD* 203905, 203907, 203912 (in this final one, figures present two reflective surfaces: wine and shield). Unusual and interesting is 217212 which features a symposium involving Hades and Persephone in the tondo, a ghostly reflection of the drinking subject's environment. Frontality, painted drinkers, and reflexivity: Frontisi-Ducroux (1995: 97–9).
71 Indeed, this scene takes on still more poignancy against the backdrop of Phoenix's words to Achilles in Hom. *Il*. 9.444–57: as a young man he slept with his father's concubine so that his old father would be hateful to her; his father then cursed him with childlessness. Other possible Briseis and Phoenix combinations: *BAPD* 203903, 204400. Desirable women denied: 204395. Old men excluded (perhaps): 204401 (outside a door); 209980 (tondo: old man; exterior: Dionysian revelry). Old age tears lovers apart: 217030 (Eos and Tithonus).
72 Anac. 358 *PMG*. Drinking, singing, and meditating upon age and mortality were familiar themes at the symposium. Old men feature on cups, such as *BAPD* 5361 (Pelias), though not so frequently as youths: n. 97. Implied visual parallels between age and departing for war (two imminent departures in death): 204336, 211334, 217284, 211641. Meditation on age is also prevalent in early Classical art: Holloway (1973: 100–1).
73 Anac. 395 *PMG*. Death and old age in Greek poetry: Budelmann (2018: 199–200). Art, death, and terror management: Spivey (2005: ch. 8). On how images of the fallen in the symposium 'worked upon the viewer to internalize and accept death': Arrington (2010: 124). Consider *BAPD* 203416 (tondo: old man singing to his lyre) and 211184 (old man facing a woman holding a wreath).
74 Perhaps the nearest analogies might be found in a sculpted sarcophagus or the box of Kypselos. On a larger scale, a temple's sculptural work might construct a similar interplay.
75 This may be connected to interest in fragmentation of the picture field in the late Archaic period (Neer [2002]), which coincides with the advent of the red-figure technique.
76 See the previous note on Neer (2002).
77 Though this triumph of paint and line can only imply and not enact decay.
78 Duck-rabbits: Wittgenstein (1953: 193–229, esp. 194 [II.xi]); Gombrich (1968: esp. 4–5 – first published in 1960). See further p. 8 and n. 57 of the introduction to this volume.
79 Figures, frames, and their scholarship: Squire (2018b: 7–8, esp. n. 17). Against special significance: Boardman (2001: 186).
80 Metaphorical (and existential) significance to breaking the frame: Marconi (2017: 139–43). See also Hurwit (1977: 9–14) for the 'interrupted frame' as an 'open mode'.
81 Observing another ornamental miscalculation: Squire (2018b: 7). Compare *BAPD* 205176, where Skiron's foot pierces excess meanders.
82 The composition appears similar at the feet: a stretch of six adjacent meanders.
83 See Dietrich (2010: 550–3). The association of pictorial space with the spatial qualities of different media (and different material supports): Dietrich (2017: esp. paras. 15–21). A different interpretation (in the context of *lekythoi*) that the fragility of objects contrasts with 'the stable presence of the deceased': Arrington (2014: 7).
84 For a similar idea, see Osborne (1988: 4). On the association between death and darkness, see Sekita (this volume, pp. 106–7).
85 Compare Elsner (2012: 179–80) on sarcophagi and mimesis of the body.
86 The Eleusis *amphora* has been extensively discussed: see, e.g., Osborne (1988); Grethlein (2015: 204–5; 2018: 77–85, esp. n. 14). See further Boardman (1988: 172) on Greek anthropomorphization of pottery.
87 *BAPD* 202501; Beazley (1925: 161.11); *ARV* 250.24; *ARV Add* 203. We attach the name *pelikē* to a pot with handles and a sagging belly. *Pelikai* probably held liquids.
88 Attic ware found in Italy was often found in a grave: n. 18. This has implications for the experience of a mourner carrying the *pelikē*. Tactility, mourning, and remembrance: Arrington (2018). Physicality of experiencing death: Turner (2016: 154). Suggesting that the pot contains Memnon's ashes: *CVA* Paris 6, France 9: 36, pl. 47.1–5 (E. Pottier).

89 But see Mannack (2014) on *kalos* inscriptions: inscriptions on pots exported overseas may suggest that inscriptions were aesthetically pleasing regardless of sense. The polyvalent significance of 'nonsense' inscriptions: Chiarini (2018).
90 *Lekythoi* (when painted on *lekythoi*) and eidola are often rendered as painted black miniatures. *Lekythoi* examples: *BAPD* 216332, 216329, 216331, 216332, 216333. Eidola examples: 209341, 1140, 305529. Eidola as 'marking a place where direct contact with the dead can be made': Oakley (2004: 213). Eidola on *lekythoi*: Pottier (1883: 75–9); Jones (2015: 825–6). The virtues of silence (being 'struck dumb' by the image) in the funerary sphere: Vout (2014: esp. 288–9). On the sounds associated with the dead (silence and inhuman screams), see Sekita (this volume, p. 111).
91 Or Astyanax and Troilus – on this borrowing: Henle (1973: 147–8).
92 Inscriptions and 'decoding': Squire (2018b: esp. 12). The ontological game escalates when inscribed names signify figures' actions and identities. Andromache's name: Giuliani (2013).
93 These are plentiful in sympotic images and song.
94 The polarity of death and the symposium: Murray (1988).
95 Anac. *fr. eleg*. 2 West.
96 On this view of Anacreon and intimations of something deeper: Budelmann (2009). Compare other cups attributed to the Brygos Painter that feature this sort of pleasant merriment: *BAPD* 203923, 203926. By other painters: 204623, 205046, 205096, 205099, 205103, 205186.
97 Even focusing on tondos, subjects are numerous. Though death seems less popular (at least in the fifth century) than, for example, symposium and athletics scenes, there are a reasonable number of deaths. See, for example: *BAPD* 203224 (Achilles kills Troilus); 205060, 217201 (Amazonomachy); 204442 (death of Orpheus); 204546, 220533 (Poseidon kills a giant); 203838, 205108, 204549 (fight with Persians/archers); 201755, 204507 (Theseus and the Minotaur); as well as deaths implied by subjects such as warrior departures, a popular tondo image (n. 72).
98 Anac. 359 *PMG*.
99 See Hom. *Il.* 16.330–4.
100 Translation by Alexander Pope: Pope (1909: 301 – first published in 1715–20).
101 Compare the metaphorical association of death and marriage, and its expression in and through the mythological abduction of Persephone: see Sekita (this volume, pp. 111–4).
102 This question is directed at a desire prevalent in the scholarship of classical art (and museum displays) to identify, label, and categorize. It is also unclear that the woman is 'Tecmessa': Finglass (2011).
103 See n. 27.
104 Themes in Archaic and Classical Athenian reception of Ajax: Bocksberger (2022: 139–210).
105 See, e.g., Williams (1980).
106 Soph. *Aj*. 124. Interchangeabilities and (im)possibilities of self-identification: Swift (2019); Roisman (2019).
107 See, for example, Fearn (this volume, esp. pp. 235–9) on Helen's exemplary body and synthetic power.
108 See further pp. 17–22 of the introduction to this volume.
109 Browne (1958: 43, 46).
110 I thank Felix Budelmann, Xavier Buxton, Jaś Elsner, David Fearn, Gregory Hutchinson, Leah Lazar, Robin Osborne, Tom Phillips, Michael Squire, and the audience at the *Phantasia before phantasia* 2019 seminar series, who have been generous with their thoughts on this chapter. I am also grateful to Donald Cooper at Photostage, Anne-Catherine Biedermann at the Louvre, and Rachel at the National Trust for help in procuring images and permissions.

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8 Imagining Bodies with Gorgias

David Fearn

> *Kosmos* inheres, for a city, in the excellence of its men; for a body, in beauty; for a soul, in wisdom; for action, in virtue; for speech, in truth.
>
> Gorgias, *Encomium of Helen*, opening sentence

Kosmos: imagining Helen, reading the *Helen*. This chapter is an investigation of the stakes of these terms of reference for an interpretation of the *Encomium of Helen*, taking its cue from the provocations of the text's opening sentence. I investigate the structures of expression at the heart of Gorgias' explorations of the imagination on the cusp of philosophical conceptualizations. I take the complexity of the style and form of Gorgianic writing very seriously.[1] Rather than being a superfluity of sophistic obfuscation that we must peel away to uncover what Gorgias is really saying, the style of the *Helen* is its point and its challenge.[2]

Within the history of scholarship, this is not how Gorgias' *Helen* has tended to be interpreted: with some exceptions, it is written off as all style and no substance,[3] or considered as a light-hearted performance piece (a defence of Helen intended to demonstrate an ability to defend anything in argument), or used as relatively unexamined context for tragedy or theorization of tragedy.[4]

Yet Gorgias is not, I think, interested in dazzling us with superficial surfaces alone. Indeed, there is more to his style than the eliciting of reactions of either outrage or mild bemusement in performance.[5] I am drawn instead, via my own commitment to comparative approaches to lyric *epideixis*,[6] to consider Gorgias' epideictic challenges as not so much performative as meta-critical, whereby the style of the text, as object for thinking with, raises larger conceptual questions about theoretical conceptualization and the nature of imagination. I thus confront Andrew Ford's view of the notorious close of the *Helen* (§21, 'I wanted to write … as a game for myself') as 'an apology for the rather earnest activity of producing a "publishable" text'.[7] I find it difficult to detect anything apologetic about the close of the *Helen*, and in the context of the circulation of literary texts at the end of the fifth century, and the obsessiveness of Plato's thinking with dialogue as a form of writing for philosophical communication, it makes good sense to turn Gorgias' attention to *logos* in the abstract (as 'reason' and 'speech') to bear on the nature of Gorgias' own work as a physical body. Indeed, I argue that the body of the text

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of the *Helen* is something that the text's attention to the body of Helen herself thematizes.

Gorgias sits nicely in relation to the arguments of this volume because of how both Helen embodies and the *Helen* enacts a conceptual struggle. The double game parades the nature of the problem of theorization through attention to the nature of the cultural resources that help to constitute both form and content. In the previous chapter, Emily Clifford explored how the material artefact of a painted pot might mediate reflection on the imaginative process of conceptualizing death. Here, I continue that theme, delving further into how form (here, the form of a text) can mediate meditation on how imaginative processes work and the artefactual frameworks on which they rely. I also anticipate in a number of relevant ways Tom Phillips' discussion of the exemplary complexity of aesthetic surfaces in Aeschylus and Euripides.

The question of what *kosmos* means extends across both surface and depth, form and content, and relates directly to bodies superficially, psychologically, and ontologically, in a text whose opening raises the very question and extent of its own superficiality as an embodiment of *logos*. The *Helen*'s textuality invites responses in a way that raises interesting theoretical questions: a questioning of the parameters of language and modes of expression; and a questioning of the terms upon which such parameters might be grounded, through the received wisdom of the mythological tradition.

I explore the following claims. (1) Gorgias was aware of, and interested in, the peculiar suitability of the *Helen* for exploring the relation between form and content. (2) Close attention to style has important repercussions for thinking about how writing works, the exemplary terms upon which human culture relies in order to articulate its ideas, and the nature of and stakes of rhetorical subjectivity. The *Helen* is little interested in functionalist questions, such as whether the speech persuades effectively in a specific historical context. Rather, it is interested in the preconditions of rhetoric: in exposing the cultural phenomena of forms of expression and exemplarity through which rhetoric might function as a mode of thought and communication. (3) Imagining and thinking with bodies – how they feel, perceive, and are perceived; what agency they possess – is fundamental to Gorgias' project.

The argument runs across five sections. First, I explore the relevance of lyric *epideixis*. I then attend to rhetorical figuration. Next, I consider the exemplary relation between Helen as body and *Helen* as text. I then extend discussion of the relation between lyric and rhetoric by considering rhetorical hermeticism and attention to thinking as process. Finally, I consider the rhetorical and theoretical aftermath: how thinking with both classical and more contemporary theoretical responses to rhetoric and culture may expose issues already raised by the *Helen*.

I. Lyric and Rhetoric

Here again, then, is the opening sentence of the *Helen*, and its dazzling array of claims:

> Κόσμος πόλει μὲν εὐανδρία, σώματι δὲ κάλλος, ψυχῇ δὲ σοφία, πράγματι δὲ ἀρετή, λόγῳ δὲ ἀλήθεια.[8]

> Adornment and/or structure inheres, for a city, in the excellence of its men; for a body, in beauty; for a soul, in wisdom; for action, in virtue; for speech, in truth.

Kosmos, the opening word, is both metaphysically and rhetorically suggestive. Robert Wardy makes the following observations, preserving well the interpretative duality of *kosmos*:

> The purpose of the opening sentence is evidently to enumerate across a wide range of cases what might properly be the subject of an encomium. But '*kosmos*' was … a key-word in Parmenides: although the core-meaning of the word is 'order' or 'harmony', it extends to cover *speciously* attractive, imposed arrangements, as in meretricious make-up, or, in later rhetorical jargon, the 'ornaments' of speech… If *kosmos* can regularly connote ornamentation and artifice, the danger is that a cosmetic *logos* may disguise rather than represent reality.[9]

Wardy reads the opening sentence as encomiastically programmatic, if hedgily so. I would preserve the hedginess, but push further. The purpose of the opening sentence is to articulate the *Helen*'s interest in what making an example of itself as an encomium might amount to, including in terms of its own expressive structures; to repeat but also critique the lexical and syntactical resources of earlier texts;[10] and, finally, to afford reflection upon the relation between the imaginative resources of tradition and the prospects for the emergence of meta-critical terminology for concept formation. I aim to demonstrate here that it is praise-poetry in particular that Gorgias borrows from and critiques. The *Helen*, I suggest, does not occupy a space vacated by lyric, but builds on and responds to lyric expression.[11]

The *Helen* reacts to how poets offered – as Jeffrey Walker puts it – 'memorably distinctive, eloquently presented ethical positions and value-schemes', and were thus preserved.[12] A self-consciously hyperbolic focus on the mechanisms of rhetorical expression appropriates lyric structures and then critiques them and the ends to which they are put within the cultural tradition of praise.

Kosmos is in part an acknowledgement of the way that presocratic natural philosophy had figured its subject-matter, the nature of the world/universe (Heraclitus is a strong presence, for instance – alongside Parmenides, discussed by both Wardy and more recently Jim Porter).[13] Yet *kosmos* is also the term that grounds the *Helen*'s critique, in the tension between deep world-structure and surface superficiality. So the very terms of the sentence parade in their various interpretative demands the potential modalities of conceptual thinking. They do this by provoking reflection on how the various meanings of *kosmos* might affect the relation between the pairing of the terms that is constructed by the dative syntax. This conceptual power, however implicit, invites speculation on the basis of the typically sophistic terms *nomos* and *phusis*: for instance, the extent to which beauty is innate (natural: *phusis*) or a social construct (*nomos*). It also has obvious consequences for the nature of Gorgias' *Helen* as itself an investigation of the imagination: the relation between

interior and exterior worlds, and between thought, motivation, and action, and how such thinking might be conveyed to others, is at the heart of Gorgias' obsessions with both style and imagination.[14]

The closest parallel for such expressive compression is Classical Greek lyric praise, where the interrelation between diction and syntax enacts encomiastic longevity. Consider, for example, Simonides' Thermopylae fragment (Simonides 531 *PMG*), and its closing emphasis on *kosmos* alongside *kleos*: ἀρετᾶς μέγαν λελοιπὼς | κόσμον ἀέναόν τε κλέος, [Leonidas, king of Sparta] 'who has left behind a great ornament of his excellence and ever-flowing fame'. *Kosmos* as 'ornament' operates as both memorializing self-reference (Leonidas' virtue comprises an enduring *kosmos*, including as enacted in the decorative praise of Simonides) and material-cultural cue (to the possibility of physical monumentality), thus fostering an ongoing link between poetic and material-cultural modes of commemoration.[15] More generally, the terms of city-praise with Gorgias' εὐανδρία, in relation to both ornamental and more deeply structural *kosmos*, also echo encomiastic lyric. In lyric, city-praise through epithets (Gorgias has now transformed them into an abstract noun) oscillates between exposing excellence to acclaim and constructing this excellence in the enactment of lyric form.[16] Pindaric praise beguiles us with the doubleness that the evaluative compression of epithets allows, and lyric praise is thus predicated on audiences' exposure to the circularity of the relation between dazzling poetic expression and acceptance of the actions of encomiastic subjects as praiseworthy.

This first sentence of the *Helen*, then, generates an appreciation that it is especially towards lyric form that the work must gesture. And thinking material-culturally with lyric *kosmos* adds contextual depth to the idea that Gorgianic *kosmos* combines form and content in its reaction to the world/*kosmos* and its creation of it as artifice/*kosmos*. Gorgias' text, as a manifestation of imagination, provokes reflections on the relation between world and artifice inherent in *kosmos* itself as, also, a manifestation of imagination.[17]

Helen §2 remarks upon the credulousness of earlier poets' audiences:

> τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς λέξαι τε τὸ δέον ὀρθῶς καὶ ἐλέγξαι τοὺς μεμφομένους Ἑλένην, γυναῖκα περὶ ἧς ὁμόφωνος καὶ ὁμόψυχος γέγονεν ἥ τε τῶν ποιητῶν ἀκουσάντων πίστις ἥ τε τοῦ ὀνόματος φήμη, ὃ τῶν συμφορῶν μνήμη γέγονεν.
>
> It is the part of one and the same man both to speak what is needed rightly and to refute those who blame Helen, a woman about whom univocal and unanimous has been the credulousness of poets' audiences, along with the ill omen of her name, which has become a memorial of misfortunes.

Helen §5 picks this up, and brings it to bear on this text's own rhetoric, paradoxically extending Pindar's self-limiting praise and also reconfiguring Pindaric exclusivity. The sentence ὅστις μὲν οὖν καὶ δι' ὅτι καὶ ὅπως ἀπέπλησε τὸν ἔρωτα τὴν Ἑλένην λαβών, οὐ λέξω· τὸ γὰρ τοῖς εἰδόσιν ἃ ἴσασι λέγειν πίστιν μὲν ἔχει, τέρψιν δὲ οὐ φέρει ('Yet who it was – and why, and how – who fulfilled his love in taking Helen, I will not say: for telling those in the know what they know bears

credibility but brings no delight') turns in on themselves familiar Pindaric passages on constraints and on encomiastic exclusivity, where Pindar enacts formal restraint by reference to the limits of audience commitment to praise in excess, and where he refers to knowledge not available outside the immediate encomiastic context. Here, first, Gorgias takes the familiar Pindaric self-limitation motif and turns it into a trope to govern limits on mythological storytelling – thus preventing the narration of the story of Helen's life with Menelaus.[18] Additionally, the *Helen*'s self-enactment is further pressurized by the austerity with which it engages here with the very idea of an audience for itself: only 'those in the know', an austerity even more stark than Pindar's perhaps most famous projection of exclusivity in *Olympian* 2, which relates to those with local West Greek knowledge of eschatological beliefs.[19] Pindar is now stretched. Gorgias' 'those in the know' implicates the entire reception of the Greek mythological tradition; Pindar is raised to a level of austere generality that strips lyric of any degree of encomiastic contextual specification. Where Pindar can be understood as specifying knowledge in relation to a given encomiastic context, Gorgias is extrapolating into thinking with the exemplarity of myth tout court.

The opposition in §5 between credibility and delight also uses Pindaric gnomic resources, to implicate vision within the *Helen*'s conceptual schemes before it has explicitly discussed sensory perception.[20] This is a sign of Gorgias' interest both in the history and prospects of concept formation and in discourses of the visual, as shown both in the *Helen*'s manipulation of visual art in §§17–18 (discussed later) and in the conceptualization-cum-figuration of imagination itself as 'the eyes of seeming', τοῖς τῆς δοξῆς ὄμμασιν, in §13 discussing the potential powers of astronomy.[21]

II. Figuration

Gorgianic figures emphasize both repetition and contrast, as Danielle Allen has observed.[22] They put our commitment to this text's claims under scrutiny; they articulate the prospects for and problems with rhetorical and conceptual development and self-consistency. The complexities of Gorgianic figuration have an immediate bearing on both the text's own ontology and the nature of its relation to its consumers. Gorgias' poetic devices 'constantly remind the reader that words figure and represent reality and so always make it; they do not transparently reflect what exists beyond language'.[23]

Consider again, first, the opening sentence of §2:

> τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς λέξαι τε τὸ δέον ὀρθῶς καὶ ἐλέγξαι τοὺς μεμφομένους Ἑλένην, γυναῖκα περὶ ἧς ὁμόφωνος καὶ ὁμόψυχος γέγονεν ἥ τε τῶν ποιητῶν ἀκουσάντων πίστις ἥ τε τοῦ ὀνόματος φήμη, ὃ τῶν συμφορῶν μνήμη γέγονεν.
>
> It is the part of one and the same man both to speak what is needed rightly and to refute those who blame Helen, a woman about whom univocal and unanimous has been the credulousness of poets' audiences, along with the ill omen of her name, which has become a memorial of misfortunes.

The text highlights Helen's nominative determinism in lyric form as in the chorus of Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 681–9, τίς ποτ' ὠνόμαζεν ὧδ'| ἐς τὸ πᾶν ἐτητύμως, … ἑλέναος ἕλανδρος ἑλέ- | πτολις ('who was it who once named her thus, accurately for all time … ship-destroyer, man-slayer, city-sacker'). Yet, additionally, it cannot help offering its own jingling response in kind with the paronomasia of ὁμόφωνος καὶ ὁμόψυχος ('univocal and unanimous'). The *Helen*'s seeming helplessness in echoing this tradition is itself a response to the aetiological force of the Aeschylean ἐς τὸ πᾶν ('for all time'). The implicit reference to Aeschylus and his deterministic framing thus raises the question of the rhetorical suitability of reusing the technique of those who used language against Helen as part of an argument supposedly in favour of her exoneration – repetition and contrast expose the workings of fifth-century mythological exemplification.

The *Helen* also problematizes the relation between the mythological imaginary and the credibility and truthfulness of a rhetoric whose functionality appears determined primarily through sound effect caused by the form of the text's own *kosmos*, that is, its own – ordered, disordered, orienting, disorienting, and disorderly – structure and surface.[24] The ostensible reason for Gorgias' choice of topic is generic, namely to ensure that the praiseworthy are praised and to free the unfairly blamed from censure (§1) – though this claim is itself generic in a more specific sense, as a stock theme of encomiastic lyric.[25]

III. Helen's Exemplary Body

Experiencing the *Helen*, judging Helen, and imagining Helen's body come together in reading as a critical process of the imagination. The text offers itself as an analogous body to Helen's because it invites us to objectify it (by studying it as a cultural artefact), in parallel to how it makes Helen's body an object of study.[26] The text also invites us to contemplate the very processes of relation between imagination and the objects of culture that foster and sustain it. This is achieved in part through its own thematization of bodies having things done to them, and attitudes formed about them, by external agents, as set against the idea in §8 that *logos*, as analogous both to Helen herself as a famous name and the *Helen* itself, has a special body with an uncanny ability: λόγος δυνάστης μέγας ἐστίν, ὃς σμικροτάτῳ σώματι καὶ ἀφανεστάτῳ θειότατα ἔργα ἀποτελεῖ, 'speech is a great power, which with the smallest and most invisible body achieves the most divine works'.[27] In exposing its own rhetorical claims, this text invites scrutiny of its own textuality as a kind of non-human machine. It appears as the embodiment of the bewildering vicissitudes that constitute the entire histories of critical scrutiny – the paradigms they depend upon, the resources they use, the discourses and disagreements they promote.

One important aspect is the detail of the *Helen*'s quasi-art-historical and aesthetic thinking about vision and bodies in its account of Helen's psychology. Some scholars have rightly focused on the thematization of Helen's body.[28] However, the tendency is to read out the *Helen*'s claims onto structures of exposition that are separate from the forms in which the *Helen* makes them, an approach that risks underappreciating the fact that formal exemplarity is itself at issue. If, guided by our

preconceptions about rhetoric, we focus exclusively on finding coherent argument in the *Helen*, then we risk missing the challenges presented by its formal detail.[29] The challenge of the *Helen* seems located precisely in the imaginative resources of conceptual exposition, whereby extreme formal stylization is used to critique in advance the prospects for rhetorical and argumentative coherence.[30] The *Helen*'s self-problematizing form mediates the speculative exemplarity that inheres in making imaginative leaps from argumentative and conceptual exposition to their subjects, across writing, reading, and listening.[31]

The *Helen* is the vehicle for recording the imaginative transformation of Helen-as-a-human-body both into Helen as an idea and into the *Helen* as name or language or textual body. This is felt through the conceptualization of the body beautiful via *kosmos* in §1. It is felt in §2 through the focus on the resonant naming of Helen (as previously discussed). And it is raised again in §4, where conceptualization of beauty (κάλλος) from §1 is mythologically embodied in Helen as the cause of the Trojan War.

Here is §4 in full:

> ἐκ τοιούτων δὲ γενομένη ἔσχε τὸ ἰσόθεον κάλλος, ὃ λαβοῦσα καὶ οὐ λαθοῦσα ἔσχε· πλείστας δὲ πλείστοις ἐπιθυμίας ἔρωτος ἐνειργάσατο, ἑνὶ δὲ σώματι πολλὰ σώματα συνήγαγεν ἀνδρῶν ἐπὶ μεγάλοις μέγα φρονούντων, ὧν οἱ μὲν πλούτου μεγέθη, οἱ δὲ εὐγενείας παλαιᾶς εὐδοξίαν, οἱ δὲ ἀλκῆς οἰκείας εὐεξίαν, οἱ δὲ σοφίας ἐπικτήτου δύναμιν ἔσχον· καὶ ἦκον ἅπαντες ὑπ' ἔρωτός τε φιλονίκου φιλοτιμίας τε ἀνικήτου.
>
> Born of such stock, she possessed godlike beauty, which, taking hold of and not lying hidden, she kept; in the greatest number of men did she work the greatest desire for her love, and with her one body she brought together many bodies of men thinking great thoughts for great goals, of whom some had greatness of wealth, some the glory of ancient nobility, some the vigour of personal agility, some command of acquired knowledge; and all came because of a passion which loved to conquer and a love of honour which was unconquered.

The terms in which Gorgias conceptualizes Helen expansively articulate the idea of conceptual unification through the power of one body. Instead of it being the Trojan War that enacted this coming together of bodies, this text has Helen as body enact a systematization of abstracts, thus rhetorically mythologizing the work that a piece of meta-critical theorization might itself perform. The *Helen* offers up Helen as the example of Gorgianic *kosmos* in action. The attractiveness of her body enacts a bodily power to create, and then bring together, a diverse conceptual array, in an erotics configured as social and competitive and paraded as textually embodied.[32] Moreover, the beautiful body of Helen brings together not just bodies but bodies with abstract, and indeed *kosmos*-related, attributes – the great and the good familiar from lyric encomia. We have the full array of great thoughts, great ambitions, 'greatness' of wealth: various kinds of assertions of 'excellence' – ἀνδρῶν ἐπὶ μεγάλοις μέγα φρονούντων, ὧν οἱ μὲν πλούτου μεγέθη, οἱ δὲ εὐγενείας παλαιᾶς

εὐδοξίαν, οἱ δὲ ἀλκῆς οἰκείας εὐεξίαν, οἱ δὲ σοφίας ἐπικτήτου δύναμιν ἔσχον.[33] The fact that the body of Helen organises (puts into a *kosmos*) an array of *kosmos*-related things further thematizes the *Helen*'s systematic interest in the conceptual issues that this term raises for imaginative thinking with textuality and culture, both with regard to the exemplarity of mythological and encomiastic language, and in relation to the very idea of concept formation through textual self-enactment.[34]

The mythologization of the work of a body raises the question of how mythological exemplification even works – what, specifically, are we supposed to think about the relation between §8 and §4?[35] Specifically, what is the relation between the embodied godlike *kosmos* of Helen's beauty, and the textually embodied *kosmos* of the *Helen*'s *logos*? The manipulation of ideas about what bodies do also raises, in the mythological context of the Trojan War, the question of the extent to which anyone should think that 'the most divine works' that *logos* can accomplish with its own body (§8) should be admirable or positive. In quite an obvious sense, then, this is a text about exemplarity, inasmuch as the text invites readers to imagine bodies in hypertrophically rhetorical terms.[36] Moreover, as an encomium of Helen, this text has turned inside-out the paradigmatic power of myth as a constituent of the lyric tradition of praise for mortals.

The imagistic games come to a head in §§17–18:

> οὕτως εἰκόνας τῶν ὁρωμένων πραγμάτων ἡ ὄψις ἐνέγραψεν ἐν τῷ φρονήματι. καὶ τὰ μὲν δειματοῦντα πολλὰ μὲν παραλείπεται, ὅμοια δ' ἐστὶ τὰ παραλειπόμενα οἷάπερ ⟨τὰ⟩ λεγόμενα. [18] ἀλλὰ μὴν οἱ γραφεῖς ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν χρωμάτων καὶ σωμάτων ἓν σῶμα καὶ σχῆμα τελείως ἀπεργάσωνται, τέρπουσι τὴν ὄψιν· ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀνδριάντων ποίησις καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀγαλμάτων ἐργασία ⟨ν⟩όσον ἡδεῖαν παρέσχετο τοῖς ὄμμασιν. οὕτω τὰ μὲν λυπεῖν, τὰ δὲ ποθεῖν πέφυκε τὴν ὄψιν. πολλὰ δὲ πολλοῖς πολλῶν ἔρωτα καὶ πόθον ἐνεργάζεται πραγμάτων καὶ σωμάτων.
>
> In this way images of seen things are inscribed by sight onto the mind. And many frightening impressions are left behind, and what is left behind is very similar to what is said. [18] For indeed in the case of painters, whenever from many colours and bodies one body and form is worked out, they delight the sight; it is the case that the creation of statues and the production of artworks provides a pleasant sickness to the eyes. Thus for some things to bring pain to vision, and for other things to cause longing in vision, is natural; and many things work into many people desire and longing for many matters and bodies.

Here it is useful to consider for a moment the *Helen* as an art-historical resource, helping us to think about how the Greeks conceptualized their responses to their sculpted images in terms of the work that they perform on people's minds, with, as is claimed here, effects that are similar to the impressions left by words on the mind (as already articulated in the better-known §9 on the psychology of listening). Appropriation of the resources of visual culture for its own concerns means that the *Helen* can be deemed relevant for the development of aesthetic theory.[37] The

Helen draws attention to *poiēsis*, the work of creativity, and invites recognition of the complex relation between real-world sense perception, aesthetic contemplation of art, the nature of poetry and rhetoric, including in our contemplation of Gorgias' own work, and ethics too, in that visual reflection involves emotional responses not just to bodies and objects but also to actions.[38]

The idea of the psychic power of visual experience and imagination as a kind of writing and/or drawing in the mind (ἐνέγραψεν, §17) not only picks up previously well-known figurations of cognition – again, from lyric[39] – but also focuses on the epideictic power of literary artifice as itself an aesthetic and cognitive issue, one that the relation between form and content in the *Helen* enacts.[40] Moreover, cognitive questions are raised about the nature of any engagement with the *Helen* as a text/verbal work of art through the focus in §§17–18 on vision. This matters because the relation between art-historical and readerly *phantasia* is already at issue elsewhere in Greek aesthetic experience in the practice of ecphrasis.[41] Thus we might be able to identify some steps towards an analytic account of a range of cognitive phenomena in Gorgias' speech. But, if so, these are early steps and might not even be what Gorgias is interested in developing (thus not offering any clear art-historical theory, as some would have it),[42] because attention to literary stylization and enactment still seems paramount.

The claim that the power of artists lies in their ability to synthesize (by working out one body and form from many colours and bodies) takes us back to the mythologically synthetic power of Helen's own body in §4 which formed the basis of the claims made in §8 for the nature of *logos* itself (a speech as a body/the textual body) in advance of the conception of the relation between *logos* and *poiēsis* in §9 (the psychology of listening). The upshot is that it is our responsibility to try to come to terms, by imaginative realization, with the ways that the *Helen* works on our own minds. The arguments sometimes, as in §§17–18, operate on typically sophistic grounds of appeals to plausibility, drawn from ideas we will seemingly accept because of the nature of our own experiences – whether of art, or desire, fear, or repulsion – beyond the experience of this text. But by now we are so aware of the games of conceptualization versus form being played that we surely know that the text's claims are contrived. As such, we are invited to focus our minds on the balance between, on the one hand, the things we find plausible and, on the other, Gorgianic stylization, and what this balance means for our own readerly and conceptual commitments. The *Helen* is not interested in sustaining our support for or rejection of its perspectives on the basis of anything ulterior to its own structures; it is thus challenging, rather than deferring to, cultural foundations. Again, this is what this text's *kosmos* both consists in and is about.[43]

The *Helen* is about our responses to surfaces as well as to ideas and their very conceptualization, whether natural or not. It invites assessment of the superficiality of the bases of Archaic and Classical Greek cultural claims, by replicating in its own bewildering array some of the methods through which such assertions were made. Proposing analogies between different types of body, in their imagination, affects, and effects is one way in which Gorgias reveals the range of his cultural interests. Moreover, analogization of bodies is, ultimately, the way in which Gorgias

turns our minds to the scrutiny of his text as a body, like and unlike that of Helen's, which we have been made to imagine throughout via assessment of what we think we already know about her in the tradition, and how. Throughout, Gorgias is exemplifying these bodies and also allowing critique of them itself to be recognized as an imaginative process. The exemplification of Helen thus rebounds onto the *Helen* itself, making the point that cultural artefactuality mediates thought, and enables Gorgias to make thought itself the object of scrutiny.

IV. Hermeticism and Process

Also relevant is the strange sense of cultural hermeticism that emerges out of the stylized structures.[44] Whereas encomiastic lyric texts are frequently characterized by hyperbolic willingness to assert connections with people, places, and things through apostrophe, as epitomized most obviously in Pindar, in the *Helen* there is no relation between authorial voice and transhistorical addressee.[45] The text generates a sense of its context only in linguistic, literary terms, reproducing in prose the logical end result of lyric's desire to extend beyond its settings.[46] There is a lack of authorial presence in the opening sections of the *Helen*. Not until §2 is there any sense of an authorial voice, and it is one that is already absorbed into and seemingly controlled by the text's propensity towards ornate figuration of repetition and contrast: τοῦ δ' αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς λέξαι ('It is the part of the same man … [both to speak the needful rightly and to refute…]').[47] This prefigures how the *Helen* continues in subsequent sections – notably §§12 and 13 – to figure *logos* as an independent ulterior force beyond the control of individuals' bodies or souls, through the exemplarity of Helen and the impact of external forces upon her body. The forces of external agency that the *Helen* uses to attempt to exonerate Helen thus also rebound for the question of the agency of the *Helen* as a rhetorical discourse.[48]

If imagination is conceptualized in relation both to its responses to imagined objects and to the creation of the objects of its own imagination, what the *Helen* seems to be doing is affording us the recognition that cultural artefacts (in terms of mythology and all reliant trappings of culture) are fundamentally about imagination embedded in language. In a sense, then, Gorgias may be proposing that culture *qua nomos* is a partnership between human cultural activity and the mind (viz. νομίζω, understood in terms of the agency of both cultural practice and of thought itself), and exposing this to critique within the text's own self-constructed hermeticism of *logos*: 'all poetry I conceptualize (νομίζω) and name (ὀνομάζω) as language (λόγον) possessing measure' (§8).

Right up to its notorious close, where the whole is considered the author's private joke – ἐβουλήθην γράψαι τὸν λόγον Ἑλένης μὲν ἐγκώμιον, ἐμὸν δὲ παίγνιον ('I wanted to write the speech as an encomium of Helen, and as a game for myself', §21) – the *Helen* courts the risk that a hermetics of ornamentation might strand this text in estranged objecthood, in a realm beyond even lyric, where it becomes a text that is wholly form and so devoid of significance (or persuasive force) beyond its own presence.[49] The imagination that is implicit in the *Helen* is ultimately a literary one, a febrile affordance of attention to the parameters of literary communication.

It is the rhetorical superfluity, and the consequences manifested textually in the problematic final words, that form the site of the *Helen*'s ultimate demonstration of Gorgias' imagination: about itself – its own textuality, its own embodiment and exemplarity of and for criticism and theoretical engagement with the claims of culture. This is important irrespective of how we feel about this text's inability or unwillingness to offer a full theorization of its terms of reference beyond its own formal properties.[50]

The stakes were already at least in part set up by Heraclitus, who not only criticized poets and men's beliefs in them (D10 LM = B 104 DK – relevant for *Helen* §2) but also figured human opinions as παίδων ἀθύρματα, 'children's toys' (D6 LM < B 70 DK): material objects which symbolize Heraclitus' view of the undeveloped state of human thinking. The *Helen* responds in kind, and from within, with quasi-poetic inchoateness, by questioning the preconditions for our rhetorical complicity in ways that cast doubts on the efficacy of the project. Again, though, the close feels far from apologetic,[51] but conceptually challenging in terms of the nature of response to it that it imagines and exemplifies in the language of play. Yet Gorgias also offers up an empowering understanding of the materiality of writing itself as a specific cultural and intellectual intervention: empowering in both enacting and drawing attention to the interrelation of vision, reading and writing, critical thinking, and imagining as processual.

On one side, we have the lack of a fully developed conceptual meta-language to enable the analysis of the complexities at stake. On the other, we have a sense of a self-conscious recognition that what matters are readerly and writerly attitudes – a critical dynamic – and that textuality, in terms of the experience of reading and writing, analogizes the process of thought, is thus constitutive of imagination, and is being emblematized as cultural insight.[52] Gorgianic prose seems deliberately to invite reflection on the ramifications when the form and the content of both prose and poetry collide.

The *Helen*, as a quintessentially sophistic text, makes its object of study the process of not just arguing but thinking. Passages such as §5 – τὸν χρόνον δὲ τῷ λόγῳ τὸν τότε νῦν ὑπερβὰς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ μέλλοντος λόγου προβήσομαι καὶ προθήσομαι τὰς αἰτίας, δι' ἃς εἰκὸς ἦν γενέσθαι τὸν τῆς Ἑλένης εἰς τὴν Τροίαν στόλον ('Having passed over the time then in my speech now, I shall go on to the beginning of my future speech and I shall set forth the causes which made it likely that Helen's voyage to Troy should have taken place') – are not simply rhetorical attention-seeking. They also thematize the process of thought. See also §9, φέρε δὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ἀπ' ἄλλου μεταστῶ λόγον ('but come, I shall change from one argument to another'), where highlighting argumentational transformation appears, retrospectively at least, to have been motivated by the psychologically quasi-poetic, self-enacting witchcraft identified and theorized in §10 as part of the allegation of the power of words on souls: συγγινομένη γὰρ τῇ δόξῃ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἐπῳδῆς ἔθελξε καὶ ἔπεισε καὶ μετέστησεν αὐτὴν γοητείᾳ ('for, merging with opinion in the soul, the power of the incantation beguiles it and persuades it and *changes* it by witchcraft'). Rhetorical, textual, dynamics draw attention to potential cognitive change as shaped by the effects of language. My view of such rhetorical foregrounding is thus a step

beyond the usual understanding of Gorgias' rhetorical self-reflexivity, because what this amounts to goes beyond the recognition of the hyper-stylization of sophistic writing as characteristic of a distinctive cultural moment.[53]

A passage from Diodorus identifies both the immediately stunning effects of Gorgianic style at the moment of his first introduction at Athens, and their subsequent fall from favour, laboured and ridiculous when employed too frequently and tediously (Diodorus 12.53.3–4). However, irrespective of Diodorus' historiographical aims, or the extent to which a teleology of tedium, as it were, might be a natural reaction for some, Diodorus perhaps unwittingly narrativizes as transtemporal process that which the *Helen* already enacts, because of the insistence of its negotiations with readers' commitments to its claims.

Diodorus' implicit commitment to an Aristotelian view of rhetorical style and function also provides a nice segue into my final section, which considers the wider ramifications of Gorgianic provocation through reception, including in Platonic and Aristotelian rhetorical theory.

V. Communities of Reading, Thinking, and Imagining: Conclusions

Edward Schiappa's siting of Gorgias in the pre-disciplinary pre-history of rhetoric has been critiqued by others.[54] But in one sense, Schiappa is obviously correct: Gorgias is simply not offering a clear or systematic or even coherent articulation of a rhetorical let alone metaphysical world-view. There is, however, more scope to credit Gorgias for his provocations.

It is thus not quite the case that, according to Robert Wardy, 'more than any other text, the *Encomium* invites us to confront the terrifying, exhilarating possibility that persuasion is just power, and that no human contact is innocent of its manipulative presence', that the *Helen* offers a clear sight of how *logos* manipulates the world.[55] Rather, we are drawn structurally to assess the prospects of terminological and meta-critical conceptualization via a self-problematizing *kosmos* – the *Helen*'s programmatic watchword. Stylistic and conceptual games of anachronism also raise questions about the methodological stakes of the imaginative interface between form and content.

Plato, in the *Phaedrus* as well as the *Gorgias*, responds to the challenges of Gorgianic textuality.[56] Gorgias' games with anachronistic juxtapositioning become the subject of critique, notably at *Phaedrus* 267a5–b2 – 'And Tisias and Gorgias? … they who express new-fangled ideas in ancient style, and ancient ones in new-fangled style', καινά τε ἀρχαίως τά' τ' ἐναντία καινῶς – where Gorgianic chiasmus also represents a clash between form and content.[57]

Critique of Gorgianic provocations is also more generally implicit, I feel, in the different attitudes, enacted through the form of Platonic dialogue, to the fostering of intellectual communities. Striving to come to terms with Gorgias' epideictic insistence highlights the problems of enacting philosophical thinking in writing.[58] Recent findings have suggested that the paradoxical lack of philosophical authority articulated in the form of the Platonic dialogue lays out opportunities for

internalization of the revelation of shock at former complacency and ignorance.[59] It may be that such a lack of authority is the Platonic reaction to the very different way in which Gorgianic style already drew attention to the problematic grounding of supposed authority in exemplary modes of expression.[60]

The *Helen*'s exemplificatory critiques of the epistemic conditions of traditional authority in culture constitute an aggregate state of authority compromised. Moreover, readers can only attune themselves to the recognition of this by throwing themselves headlong into the vertiginous paradoxology of form that the *Helen* exposes them to. What then emerges, at least potentially, is an appreciation of the systematic point at issue: that contemplation of the critical act and cultural force that is reading itself is (newly) culturally constitutive; and that thinking theoretically with writing may, at least embryonically, provide a start for broader theorizations, including in terms of the nature of imagination.

A specific conceptual framework is not necessarily an essential, or even useful, background against which to judge rhetoric. Rhetoric *can* hold meaning in and of itself – as a 'cultural artifact' of the sort discussed by Richard Rorty in his conceptualization of 'poeticized culture'.[61] According to Rorty, 'a poeticized culture would be one which would not insist we find the real wall behind the painted ones, the real touchstones of truth as opposed to touchstones which are merely cultural artefacts. It would be a culture which, precisely by appreciating that *all* touchstones are such artefacts, would take as its goal the creation of ever more various and multicoloured artefacts.'[62] This pragmatist conceptualization seems more closely aligned with Gorgias' aims.

Aristotle assessed style according to the appropriateness of modes of persuasion to contexts understood as given, within the aim of rhetoric to find a standpoint to communicate persuasively to the external world.[63] He then critiqued Gorgianic rhetorical language as too frigidly poetic, too flamboyantly self-aware, too noisy, too decorative.[64] The rhetorical tradition has tended to follow suit.[65] Gorgias, by contrast, assessed the preconditions for contextually grounded cultural positions, and manifested that assessment in a kind of proto-Rortyian dazzle: manifestation as culture, not passive reliance upon ulterior givens.[66]

The divide between the grounding of truth in representational specificity that Rorty critiques and poeticized expansionist thinking takes us right back to the ancient history of rhetorical theory and the gaps already inherent within Aristotle. Gorgias uses rhetorical discourse of a very un-Aristotelian kind to project a sense both of the problems inherent in language-world relations and to offer up textuality itself as an indispensable guardrail for interpretation, while using textuality and thus the seeming superficialities of form to interest us in the mediating powers of reading and writing for understanding or at least articulating, self-consciously, the nature and powers of imagination. A deconstructive reading of Gorgias is appropriate, then, both to the spirit in which the *Helen* seems to be asking to be read and because Derrida found an ally in Gorgias.[67] Gorgias seems interested in exposing the processes through which, and the terms on which, sense-making happens.

We may agree, then, with Aristotle that epideictic rhetoric is 'most writerly: its function is to be read' (*Rhetoric* 3.12 1414a18–19: ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιδεικτικὴ λέξις

γραφικωτάτη· τὸ γὰρ ἔργον αὐτῆς ἀνάγνωσις). That this most writerly quality then exposes us to a textuality that extends beyond the limitations of an Aristotelian definition is not a fault we should easily be able to level at Gorgias himself, nor even, perhaps, at Aristotle. Nor should it surprise if some of the best parallels for thinking with Gorgias are provided by much more contemporary critical theory. Aside from Jacques Derrida, Roland Barthes seems particularly important.[68] Let us close with Barthes' view of literary form in a discussion of the genesis of modernist French literature:

> Literary form develops a second-order power …; it fascinates the reader, it strikes him as exotic, it enthralls him, it acquires a weight. Literature is no longer felt as a socially privileged mode of transaction, but as a language having body and hidden depths, existing both as dream and menace.[69]

What would seem thus to link Gorgias' sophistic moment with both the emergence of modernism and subsequent postmodern theory – in the face of obvious anachronisms or prioritizations of literary periodization – is the sense of alienation from both language and form. Such are the consequences, for Gorgias, of the artefactuality and objectification of *kosmos*. The *Helen* investigates processes of mind-moulding, for psychology, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and metaphysics.[70] Yet this text also invites us to ponder – in its problematic formal oscillations between depth and superficiality – the nature and stakes of literary imagination.[71]

Abbreviations

Abbreviations of ancient authors and texts, as well as scholarly reference works, follow those of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, fourth edition; abbreviations of journal titles follow those of *L'Année Philologique*.

Notes

1 Thus building on Porter (1993); Wardy (1996); Gagarin (2001); Ford (2002); Porter (2010); Halliwell (2011). The discussions by Consigny (1993; 2001) and McComiskey (1997; 2002) are stimulating but let down by lack of engagement with the Greek text. More generally, see Kerferd (1981); Tell (2011). The account of epideictic rhetoric in Pernot (2015) is severely hampered by lack of attention to exigencies of style and form.

2 I discuss the *Helen* alone. It is likely that similar complexities were at issue in Gorgias' *On What Is Not/On Nature*: cf. Porter (1993; 2010: 275–307); Wardy (1996: 6–24). Yet the indirect transmission of that work through two independent summaries alone (D26 LM) makes a combined stylistic and conceptual analysis impossible; indeed the knots that scholars have tied for themselves in attempting to analyse it (cf. Osborne [2000: 662–3]) may be attributable to this problem.

3 So, notoriously, Denniston (1952: 12): 'Starting with the initial advantage of having nothing in particular to say, he was able to concentrate all his energies upon saying it.'

4 Carey (2007: 247) subsumes interpretation within normative parameters of entertaining performance-culture; also Ford (2002: 185–6). Context for tragedy: Croally (1994) (more stimulating); Conacher (1998). Aristotelian theorization of tragedy: Halliwell (2002: 218–19; 2011: 274 n. 19) on *Helen* §9, according to which Gorgias is simply a

manifestation of 'the general currency' of theatrical pity and fear as 'an uncontentious psychological datum' (2002: 219); cf. Ford (2002: 186–7).

5 At stake in the latter is the rhetorically functionalist approach of Cole (1991: 78–9), followed by Ford (2002: 185–6): epideictic rhetoric as amusing intellectual diversion for the specifics of a given context. Yet reverse engineering an Aristotelian normative perspective will fall short; I discuss the consequences of thinking through the Platonic and Aristotelian reception in the final section.

6 E.g. Payne (2006; 2007); Culler (2015); Fearn (2017); cf. Consigny (1993: 45).

7 Ford (2002: 185).

8 Greek text: Donadi (2016).

9 Wardy (1996: 29–30, cf. 11 for Parmenides fr. 8 and with 153 n. 8). Halliwell's (2011) reading of *kosmos* seems less attractive. He initially offers (267) 'the most beautiful condition … a state both internally ordered and externally attractive' (where the 'both … and' as opposed to either/or is not explained, and with 267 n. 4 not explaining why he thinks MacDowell is right to reject 'adornment' as a translation), and thus 'a "beautiful", ordered condition of discourse' (283). MacDowell (1982: 28 *ad loc*.), 'not "ornament" here, because it is the good order of the thing itself, not an extraneous addition', is a statement heavily foreclosing interpretation: cf. Goldhill (2002: 54–9). For *kosmos* as material-culturally associated with the formalism of lyric praise, see Simon. fr. 531 *PMG*, discussed shortly; Pind. *Ol*. 11.13–1, and fr. 194.2, itself part of an encomiastic proem; also Fearn (2020b: 211) for Timotheus fr. 788 with Simon. fr. 11.23 West^2. For the ornamentalism of *kosmos* see also Sappho fr. 98a.3; Bacchyl. 17.60–2; Aesch. *Sept*. 397–8 (cf. 479); Hdt. 5.92η3.

10 I thus push further the observation by Worman (1997: 173) that 'the opening of the Encomium resembles a how-to for epideictic speech'.

11 Contrast Carey (2007: 246–7).

12 Walker (2000: 159; also 23–6). Cf. Halliwell (2011: 266–84); Sansone (2012).

13 Wardy (1996: 29–30); Porter (2010: 287–96). *Kosmos* in Heraclitus: D85 LM = B 30 DK. *Kosmos* and cognates also forensic in late fifth-century Athens: Lys. 1.26 with Todd (2007: 120 *ad loc*.) – potential extensions of presocratic conceptualizations of the universe in terms of emerging political and legal principles: cf. Lloyd (1966); Atack (2019) after Farrar (1988: 77–98).

14 The ethical and political stakes of some of these questions, especially for a late fifth-century Athenian nominally democratic context, are significant, but not the focus of my attention in this piece.

15 Carson (1999: 53–4); Fearn (2020a: 56–60).

16 Cf. Pind. *Ol*. 5.20, αἰτήσων πόλιν εὐανορίαισι τάνδε κλυταῖς δαιδάλλειν, where δαιδάλλειν emphasizes the craft of adornment prominent in Gorgias' *kosmos*. In the case of *Pyth*. 1.40, εὔανδρον … χώραν forms part of a prayer to Apollo to confirm Hieron's Aetna – itself a new construction, of course – as an excellent populace.

17 Nice parallels from Archaic Greek architecture are also provided by Marconi (2004: esp. 211–12), according to which architectural decoration *qua kosmos* builds both material things and ideas; Neer (2013: 458) for thinking with 'orderly architecture' as modelling the world, from Anaximander on. There has also been a range of important work, especially in recent times, on ornamentation in classical art: on ornament and framing, see esp. Hurwit (1977; 1992); Platt & Squire (2017); Dietrich & Squire (2018) with Squire (2018); on *kosmos* specifically, see also Hölsher (2009).

18 Cf. esp. Pind. *Pyth*. 1.81–3; also, e.g., *Ol*. 13.47–8; cf. κατακόρως at Diod. Sic. 12.53.4 (referred to later in §4).

19 Esp. Pind. *Ol*. 2.83–6, πολλά μοι ὑπ' | ἀγκῶνος ὠκέα βέλη | ἔνδον ἐντὶ φαρέτρας | φωνάεντα συνετοῖσιν· ἐς δὲ τὸ πὰν ἑρμανέων | χατίζει.

20 Pind. *Nem*. 8.43–4, μαστεύει δὲ καὶ τέρψις ἐν ὄμμασι θέσθαι | πιστόν.

21 τοὺς τῶν μετεωρολόγων λόγους, οἵτινες δόξαν ἀντὶ δόξης τὴν μὲν ἀφελόμενοι τὴν δ' ἐνεργασάμενοι τὰ ἄπιστα καὶ ἄδηλα φαίνεσθαι τοῖς τῆς δόξης ὄμμασιν ἐποίησαν. Noted

in Squire (2016: 13 with n. 8), but within a focus on the conceptualization rather than the relation between conceptualization and figured realization. See also Buxton's discussion, in this volume, of the 'eye' (ὄμμα) of thought in Aeschylus and Plato, pp. 280–2 with n. 94.

22 Allen (2001). The Gorgianic figures are *antithesis* (juxtaposition of clauses or phrases containing contrasting thought or subject-matter), *paronomasia* (wordplay, often involving parallelism, assonance, and puns), *anadiplōsis* (repetition of words), *parēchēsis* (repetition of sounds in neighbouring words), *homoioteleuton* (a specific form of *parēchēsis* at the ends of words) and *parisōsis* and *isocōla* (forms of parallelism, where clauses or phrases have the same number of syllables). Cf. Dion. Hal. *Dem*. 5, 25, *Thuc*. 24; Cic. *Orat*. 175; Suda s.v. Γοργίας; Diod. Sic. 12.53.2–4, discussed later.

23 Allen (2001: 322), with de Man (1979; 1983).

24 Puns thematize expository risk: Bates (1999: 436). Puns also seem to emblematize exploration: almost a 'research strategy': so Culler (1988: 15).

25 A mainstay of traditional sociological readings of praise-poetry epitomized by Gentili (1988: 107–54). Gorgias also implicates a tradition of objectification of female bodies for male sympotic lyric pleasure, as discussed with reference to Anacreon, for instance, by Yatromanolakis (2007: 174–83, esp. 176–7, 181).

26 This also parallels Emily Clifford's exploration of how pot-body resemblances prompt aesthetic and mortal reflection through material culture, as discussed at pp. 210–11 in this volume.

27 Porter (2010: 276–84) links this section with contemporary materialist thinking in the atomists; cf. Ford (2002: 177).

28 Notably Worman (1997).

29 A problem I find with Worman (1997: esp. 171, 179–80) following Segal (1962).

30 I would thus critique, e.g., the art-theoretical reading of Tanner (2006: 176–7), citing *Helen* §18 as an example of 'this theory of the persuasive, psychagogic character of visual art', but missing how Gorgias' language enacts the very question of the status of the writing as theory.

31 In contrast to Worman (1997), my readings much more insistently explore the embodied ornamentation through which this text's claims are made.

32 Cf. also Clifford (this volume, pp. 212–13**)** for discussion of Cleobulus/Ajax, according to which exemplary figures of various kinds enable associations and analogies and thus reflection on general conceptualizations.

33 And for this kind of encomiastic array cf., e.g., Pind. *Ol*. 14.5–7, σὺν γὰρ ὑμῖν τά ⟨τε⟩ τερπνὰ καί | τὰ γλυκέ' ἄνεται πάντα βροτοῖς, | εἰ σοφός, εἰ καλός, εἴ τις ἀγλαὸς ἀνήρ: it is as if Helen's divine body has replaced the encomiastic power of, e.g., Pindar's Graces. Her body has also replaced the power of fame that attracts warriors to Troy in the *Iliad* – cf. the phrase μετὰ κλέος, 11.227, etc.

34 Compare Phillips (this volume) for scrutiny of tragic lyric's pre-theoretical focus on imagination, via the broader challenges of ecphrasis, and the exploration of aesthetic surfaces as prompts for intellectual self-examination.

35 An issue which brings the status of all classical exemplification into question, in the applicability of a given case study: Goldhill (2017); renewed differently in Güthenke (2020).

36 Also a lyric theme which, despite §2, is being re-invoked: cf. the exemplarity of Helen in Sappho fr. 16 with Budelmann (2018: 127–8). Also Worman (1997: 169).

37 Thus, to slot into discussion of Greek cultures of viewing in Goldhill (1994); Zeitlin (1994); Tanner (2006); Platt (2011); Grethlein (2015); Squire (2016); Fearn (2017).

38 Hence 'matters' for πραγμάτων in my translation: πραγμάτων in the sense of 'doings'/'actions' (MacDowell's translation) as well as 'things' (the translation of both Dillon & Gergel and LM): the jingle πραγμάτων καὶ σωμάτων can be read both conjunctively (implying the objectification of bodies as things) and disjunctively (attitudes to both bodies and actions).

39 Pind. *Ol*. 10.1–3: Τὸν Ὀλυμπιονίκαν ἀνάγνωτέ μοι | Ἀρχεστράτου παῖδα, πόθι φρενός | ἐμᾶς γέγραπται·

40 Here again I am mindful of the affordances of lyric *epideixis* as theorized by Culler (2015: esp. 128): 'lyrics … make claims (quite possibly figurative ones) about our world'. Compare also §13 where the relation between writing, persuasion, and truth is thematized in self-reflexively writerly terms: τοὺς ἀναγκαίους διὰ λόγων ἀγῶνας, ἐν οἷς εἷς λόγος πολὺν ὄχλον ἔτερψε καὶ ἔπεισε τέχνῃ γραφείς, οὐκ ἀληθείᾳ λεχθείς.

41 An issue central to Platt (2011), for instance.

42 Tanner (2016: 108):

> Rhetoricians, like Gorgias, lauded this *psychagogic* or "soul- transporting" capacity – the potential of the visual arts to create a second reality parallel to that of everyday experience, and thereby to transport viewers, both cognitively and emotionally, into new fictional worlds.
>
> (Citing *Helen* §§13–14)

43 Again, this is why I would take issue with Ford (2002: 177–82) who speaks in terms of Gorgias' scientific attitude, a reading which may seem to corral the anti-foundationalist streak in Gorgias. Contrast Holmes (2010: 211–16), recognizing that 'likeness', and thus analogization and exemplarity, is systematically at issue in Gorgias' contribution to late fifth-century medical somatic discourse.

44 Aspects of the later classical reception of Gorgias articulating his alleged explanations for his long life pick up the *Helen*'s thematization of embodied hermeticism alongside pleasure: see Ath. *Deipnosophistae* 12.548cd for 'I have never done anything for the sake of pleasure' and 'I have never done anything for the sake of anyone else'; [Luc.] *Macr*. 23 for 'he had never lowered himself to joining other men's festivities' (= Gorg. P28 LM).

45 Contrast Payne (2006: 182) on Pindar.

46 As theorized most recently by Payne (2018) on lyric farewell: see specifically Payne (2018: 272–4) with Culler (2015: 111) for the consequences of this view as problematizing any easy reliance upon persona theory for lyric communication.

47 Contrast most obviously the opening of Herodotus' *Histories*.

48 Cf. Macleod (1983 – first published in 1979) on agency in Thucydides; also compare and contrast Heraclitus D46 LM < B 50 DK on the separation between authorial agency and *logos*.

49 Cf. Payne (2007: 12) with Pindar and Paul Celan. The problem of communication that Gorgias is raising is akin to the stakes of the debate about the possibility of lyric communication in the response to Payne (2007) by Bourbon (2007).

50 Thus, contrast Wardy (1996: 50) on seduction. Nor does the complex sceptical view of Gorgianic complicitous illusion in Porter (2010: 297–8) quite capture the creative potential of the *Helen*'s expositions. My reading may also be more productive than the traditional view of sophistic eristics set against Platonic dialectic by, e.g., Kerferd (1981: ch. 6).

51 Cf. my introduction, with n. 7.

52 This is 'poetry's knowing': Leighton (2018: 269) with Lamarque (2009: 50); further Leighton (2018: 251–72); cf. Payne (2007: 19) on poetry's non-instrumental vocabulary.

53 Cf. e.g. Goldhill (2002: 58).

54 Schiappa (1999), cf. Schiappa (1995; 1996); Hesk (2001).

55 Wardy (1996: 2); cf. Osborne (2000: 661) for critique.

56 See Wardy (1996: ch. 3) on Plato's *Gorgias*. There appears to be no detailed analytic investigation of the relation between Gorgias and the *Phaedrus*. On the relation between Plato's *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus*, see most recently Irani (2017), where coverage of Gorgias' *Helen* is simplistic.

57 Tisias is not contemporary with Gorgias or Socrates: Plato's own anachronism appears, therefore, to be a deliberate playing-back against Gorgias of Gorgias' own self-conscious anachronisms.

58 This would, therefore, add nuance and context to readings of Platonic hermeneutics. According to Szlezák (1999: 5–6), 'with no other thinker is the form of the representation so directly relevant to the subject-matter as with [Plato]'. I see Szlezák's claim as polemical because Plato's is too, prompted by the challenge that Gorgias' lyrically inflected and paradoxical rhetorical hermeticism presented.
59 Denyer (2018). Cf. McCabe (2000: ch. 9) discussing the Platonic dynamics of dialectic and analytical method.
60 And here it is also worth comparing Gorgias with the arguments made by Petraki (this volume), according to which Plato adopts sculptural language not simply as metaphor to assist shared understanding but as part of a fundamental investigation of ethics and metaphysics, and of the nature of philosophical enquiry itself.
61 Rorty (1989: 12–69); taken up for Pindaric lyric truth-claims by Payne (2006, esp. 161–2); cf. Payne (2007: 18–19); also Consigny (1993).
62 Rorty (1989: 53–4).
63 Arist. *Rh*. 1.1–2 1355b8–34.
64 Esp. Arist. *Rh.* 3.1–2 1404a24–b8: exotic diction as a hallmark of ornamentation – ἐκόσμουν (1404a34) – in drama and allegedly no longer in fashion and to be used sparingly in prose; cf. 1406b5–19 on bathetic lapses ('*psuchra*') in prose-style, associated with Gorgias, Alcidamas, and dithyrambic poets.
65 The view of Denniston cited at n. 3 rewrites Dionysius' complaint about Platonic style at *Dem*. 25; cf. *Dem*. 26 on Pindar; also, e.g., *Pomp*. 2. Elsewhere modern scholars' views of Dionysius' post-Aristotelian critiques of Classical Greek prose-style have been scrutinized powerfully: esp. Macleod (1983) versus Dion. Hal. *Thuc*. 29 on Thuc. 3.82–3.
66 Thus, pushing harder both Gagarin's (2001: 286) view of the cognitive stimulation of the *Helen* and Segal's (1962: 127) view of its poetics.
67 'Indispensible guardrail': Derrida (2016a: 172 – first published in French in 1967); Gorgias in 'Plato's pharmacy': Derrida (2016b: 114–16 – first published in French in 1972). Even as Derrida on Plato and Gorgias is brusquely dismissed out of hand by Younis (2011: 30), one important aspect of Derrida's provocations that aligns nicely with Gorgias is the sense in which upsetting strict chronological approaches to literary history and reception plays off against historical exemplarity within the exposition/analysis of historical consciousness: see Leonard (2006).
68 Compare, e.g., Barthes (1974) on the slippage between classic readable writing and avant-garde writerly texts constituted through reading: though it may ironically emerge that the *Helen* is exploring its own signifying procedures in ways that raise doubts about the extent to which even an appreciative classical reading of it is possible (an issue in Diod. Sic. 12.53.3–4 discussed earlier), thus further emphasizing the *Helen*'s self-awareness of the potential ironies of exemplarity.
69 Barthes (2012: 3 – first published in French in 1953). The exoticism of Gorgianic writing is of course a feature of its figuration, as articulated, again, by Diod. Sic. 12.53.4.
70 Again, cf. Petraki (this volume).
71 Many thanks to the editors, to audiences in Oxford, Warwick, and Manchester, and to Mark Payne, Tom Phillips, and Victoria Rimell for discussion and clarification of ideas in this chapter.

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Form Becomes Imagination

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9 Vigilance to the Point of Magic

Tom Phillips

This chapter pursues the editors' invitation to reconsider the critical possibilities afforded by the concept of 'imagination'. The texts on which I focus, in common with much other early Greek poetry, elicit from readers a mode of response in which faculties of visualization, association, prediction, inference, and judgement are exercised.[1] Impelled variously by different textual workings, these faculties overlap, interact, and combine to produce a cognitive assemblage for which the term 'imagination' is heuristically apt. The term captures an openness to poetry's projection of mental worlds which are separated from, or at least stand at an angle to, the world as it is habitually felt and known. Yet in common with later conceptions of φαντασία, the responsiveness named by 'imagination' is in part intellective, a medium through which claims and implications about reality can surface.[2] In common, too, with the imagination as understood in the influential accounts of Kant, Coleridge, and others,[3] its components are both transhistorical and historically specific, its processes arising from fundamental capabilities of the human mind, yet also influenced by particular cultural environments and modified by attunement to poetry's distinctive means of advancing thought.[4]

My subject is a crystallization of a particular imaginative capability in two choral odes by Aeschylus and Euripides. In both, incitement to imaginative visualization opens out into layered demands on readers. By tracing the thinking that these passages both reflect and engender, my readings demonstrate that they enact a sophisticated pre-theoretical understanding of the 'imagination' which foreshadows the more systematic reflections of Gorgias, Aristotle, and later literary critics, and give rise to conceptual implications not pursued by those thinkers.[5] Addressing the literary texture of these passages as imaginative affordances,[6] as spurs to reflect on the 'inner worlds' created in reading,[7] helpfully gives prominence to forms of cognition that are often alluded to, presupposed, or discussed incidentally in contemporary treatments of tragic poetics.[8] My emphasis also differs from that which predominates among ancient critics who, when treating literature's capacity to stimulate the imagination, often envisage an intense visualization which produces correspondingly intense emotions as a culminating poetic or rhetorical achievement.[9] My concern here, by contrast, is with moments and sequences at which the breakdown of visualization, or the need to look beyond it, are offered to readers as sources of epistemic possibility.

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In order to begin to consider how such possibilities make their claims on us, I turn first to the title poem of Lavinia Greenlaw's collection *The Built Moment*:[10]

> We gather great stones and put our years into moving them.
> Do we think of them as landmarks or as an extension
> of vision?
> Do they prove the existence of time?
> The poor humans. Vigilance to the point of magic:
> a hand reaching out to catch something we have yet
> to see fall.
> Let there be ground and places where ground gives shape
> to where it's missing. Think of crossing a room
> and finding at its centre a small but infinite ravine:
> pressure finding its way through weakness
> as in machines or weather or time.
> Time is not place. We cannot build on it
> but still we think the process good for us and seek it out.

Figured in the poem's title is a preoccupation with the relationship between transience and what endures. If a 'moment' is 'built', it would seem to be robbed of the instantaneousness that defines it. Becoming momentary, the 'built' object or state exchanges perdurance for intensely circumscribed perceptions. In responding to the contradictions implied by its title, the poem combines apparently confident assertions ('We gather great stones …') with an exploratory, open-ended attempt to imagine the 'process' from which human building emerges.

The almost prayer-like 'Let there be ground …' leads out into instability. Any suggestion that 'ground' might, echoing philosophical terminology, be formed into a proposition and consistent argument is displaced by the speaker's positing a domain in which 'ground gives shape | to where it's missing'. Here, that to which 'shape' is granted is not disclosed as a location or object, but as a kind of vector ('to where'), a negative space that can only be registered as a folding of directions. The crisp imaginative impulsion of 'Think of crossing a room' gives way to the almost stumblingly awkward, assertively speech-like shape and rhythm of the poem's final line, in which the half-rhyme of 'out' with 'on it' almost clinches what is almost a couplet. Here, lyric's recuperative project is authenticated as much by tonal hesitation as by a secure claim about what such a project might achieve. Such hesitation reverses the otherworldly disinterestedness with which the poem countenances 'The poor humans', briefly laying claim to a combination of separation and sympathy that it cannot sustain. The negations with which the poem ends expand on Greenlaw's characterization of human building as 'Vigilance to the point of magic', an intense attentiveness that might be salvific ('magic' as the power to create new or newly meaningful worlds of experience), or topple into futility ('magic' as fruitless superstition). Implicit here is an attentiveness which is not entirely free from implication in the constraints that encompass embodied life ('vigilance' as the threatened animal's guarded gaze into a constitutively hostile world), and which

seems permanently poised in expectation of a bestowal of transformative presence that it cannot guarantee ('a hand reaching out …').

In pursuing these tentative definitions, moving from a claim about material monumentalization ('We gather great stones …') to a claim about an intransitive 'process', the poem does not perform its own 'extension of vision' by giving its readers access to clearly visualized figure or emblem in which its claims might be comprehended. Instead, traversing the imagined scenario of 'finding at its centre a small but infinite ravine', readers move from apparently simple discovery to an apprehension of what resists it, a singular reality configured by the poem's imaginative means which defeats the impulse to visualize. But what might be a point at which the unthinkable erupts into reading is given a power to impel thought by its syntactical relations, as the 'infinite ravine' comes to figure the ubiquitous yet diffusely ungraspable workings of 'pressure' that would otherwise elude the poem's reckoning. The unobtrusive colon, dividing and linking at once, marks the transposable, mutually illuminating relation between worlds imagined and real. The thinking that opens up here is inseparable from the subjective encounter in which the poem involves its readers. Movements beyond what can be expressed in visual figures correlate with the staging of an insistently idiomatic speaking voice whose irregular forms and rhythms and hesitations separate it from the supports which established forms or rhetorical gestures might provide. Simultaneously frail in the face of 'pressure finding its way through weakness' and thrillingly autonomous in its balancing of a vulnerable personality against human finitude, the poem's vocal comportment is a template for what might occur as we live out the poem's reflective workings for ourselves.

Greenlaw's poem, then, performs its own 'extension of vision' by questioning whether such an 'extension' is actually enacted in the world that the poem describes. In doing so, it attunes readers to the ways in which poetic language, through its fluctuations of tone and densities of expression, adumbrates subjectivity and enables the projection of worlds that both transfigure and illuminate the worlds of real experience. The means by which it impels the readerly imagination, the capacity to sustain the poem's various demands and to relate them to each other, are distant heirs to the poetic facture with which the rest of this chapter will be concerned. Before examining the first stasimon of Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*, I consider the first choral ode from Euripides' *Electra*, in which the chorus recall and describe Achilles' armour. Both passages, like Greenlaw's 'vigilance', aspire to extend the ambits of their listeners' thinking. Both carry their listeners to points where their openness to being influenced can be understood as a type of vulnerability, whether to deception, to misprision, or to finding themselves becoming unsettlingly porous to the experiences figured in the texts. Yet like Greenlaw's poem, the passages I examine are also moments at which the 'vigilance' of poetic attending might become the 'magic' of deepened insight or unexpected revelation.

I. Landmarks

Previous interpretations of the first choral ode from Euripides *Electra* have addressed the ode's thematic links with the rest of the play, its metapoetics, and its

performative dimension;[11] my focus falls on the ecphrasis as an event in the chorus' mental life. My argument is that the ecphrasis reflects the chorus' narrowly focused and selective understanding of a set of objects that are, as the language of the ode hints, susceptible of other interpretations. The ecphrasis thereby calls attention to the allure of the aesthetic, and the dazzlingly compelling yet tendentious imaginative workings to which aesthetic objects can give rise.

The rhetorical point of the ecphrasis becomes clear in the final lines of the ode, when the chorus turn to address the absent Clytemnestra: τοιῶνδ' ἄνακτα δοριπόνων | ἔκανεν ἀνδρῶν, Τυνδαρί, | σὰ λέχεα ('the lord of such great spear-bearers did your adulteries, Tyndaris, slay', 479–81). As Pantelis Michelakis has pointed out, these words frame the ode as a lopsided epinician in which the rhetoric of praising by association is exaggerated to the point of distortion.[12] The flourish culminates an ode in which the psychological mechanisms at work in encomiastic lyric are persistently troped and held up as a subject to reflect on. This process can be illustrated with reference to David Fearn's reading of the means by which Pindar's epinicians hold their listeners' attention:

> By constantly pausing with gnomic interjections to assert claims about the world and how it might be perceived, Pindaric lyric asserts itself on the imagination and attitudes of its consumers. Memorialization becomes then not so much a straight reconstruction of a given encomiastic moment, time, or space, but a mechanism by which audiences and readers are allowed to project their desires. They are allowed in, to create for themselves their own sense of those moments and their inhabitants so artfully gestured towards. They respond to, and experience for themselves, the attitudes so evoked by the lyric voice.[13]

With a few adjustments, this description also aptly characterizes what both Euripides' listeners and chorus undergo. When hearing the chorus' account of the departure for Troy (432–41), the making and transport of Achilles' arms (442–51), and their contents (455–78), we listen to the results of the chorus having been 'allowed in, to create for themselves their own sense of th[e] moments' they describe, and having 'project[ed] their desires' in doing so. In the case of the armour, this process has been occasioned by an aesthetic object that functions, in the chorus' configuration of it, in a manner akin to Pindaric epinician. The armour is both a celebration of the past and a paradigm that might shape action in the present. Audiences likewise 'create for themselves' the significance and ramifications of the chorus' 'attitudes'. The ode, in other words, doubles the process that Fearn describes in Pindar, showing 'attitudes' being shaped and projected in the world of the text, and allowing us to reflect on what occurs as we 'respond to and experience' such attitudes for ourselves.

It is worth noting at the outset two differences between the 'mechanisms' of imaginative participation that Pindar and Euripides create. Whereas Pindar's 'attitudes' are 'evoked by the lyric voice' and displayed on the textual surface in the form of 'gnomic interjections' that 'assert claims about the world', the 'attitudes' of

the chorus are largely implicit in the language that they use to describe the armour, and the exemplary use to which they turn these imaginings in the present. And whereas Pindar's gnomic statements are 'oriented towards the future' as incitements to ethical reflection,[14] both the larger context of the ecphrasis and the lines with which the chorus describe first 'hearing' about the armour (452–6) bring to the fore subjective mediations that have taken place in the past, inviting listeners to attend to the ecphrasis as a product of the speakers' lives.

Before describing the armour, the chorus leap backwards in time to the departure of the fleet for Troy (432–4), then further back still, to the making of the arms and their transportation by the Nereids (442–8). These layerings of temporal distance correlate with movements into territories beyond the reach of their experience. Beginning from the 'famous ships', which they could have seen, the chorus picture the Nereids 'leaving Euboea's shores' (442) and 'searching' to find Achilles (445–8), before imagining Chiron nurturing Achilles as 'a light for Greece' (449) and a 'swiftly running foot for the Atreidae' (451). The metonymic tension of these lines, in which Achilles is pulled simultaneously towards disembodied manifestation (φῶς) and bodily assertion (ταχύπορον πόδ'), traces the chorus' projection of themselves into an alien world that they can only imagine in segments of figurative intensity.

The distance between their experience and the world to which Achilles and his armour belong is reinforced by a scenario that creates a gap, unusually pronounced even by the standards of ecphrastic discourse, between the chorus' mental picturing (which later critics and philosophers would call a φαντασία) and the object to which it pertains. The armour itself has been translated through direct perception into an image in the mind of an anonymous 'someone'; he then translates that image into a speech that the chorus 'hears', from which it is reshaped in their minds, before being recollected, and mediated through the ecphrasis (452–6):[15]

> Ἰλιόθεν δ' ἔκλυόν τινος ἐν λιμέσιν
> Ναυπλίοις βεβῶτος
> τᾶς σᾶς, ὦ Θέτιδος παῖ,
> κλεινᾶς ἀσπίδος ἐν κύκλῳ 455
> τοιάδε σήματα, δείματα <γᾶ> Φρυγίᾳ, τετύχθαι·
>
> I heard from someone, who had come from Troy into Nauplia's harbour, about such symbols, O child of Thetis, forged in the round of your famous shield as terrors for the Phrygian land.

Distantiation gathers further force from the man's ambiguous identity. The clause can be understood as 'someone from Troy came', namely a Trojan, or 'someone who came from Troy', namely a Greek returning from the war. While the word order of Ἰλιόθεν … τινος … βεβῶτος more naturally suggests the former,[16] the latter is (perhaps slightly more) situationally plausible. As well as being an unobtrusive reminder of the memory's tendency to focus on some details to the exclusion of others, the ambiguity invites the recognition that the δείματα will (have) resonate(d) differently for Greeks and Trojans. Whichever reading is preferred,

reflecting on who lies behind τινος accentuates the origin of the chorus' version of the armour in individual experience. Both the narrative that leads to the ecphrasis, therefore, and its status as a product of recollections, prime listeners to attend to it as the product of group speaking at a particular moment about a remote reality, with all the situational limitations entailed by that scenario.

When describing the armour as 'forged' as a set of 'signs' and then attributing to them a local purpose (δείματα <γᾷ> Φρυγίᾳ), the chorus conceptualize a meaningful entity (σήματα) exclusively in terms of its affective force (δείματα). Several features of the ode and its interaction with its literary predecessors, however, imply that the armour's images and Hephaestus' intentional designs might open up avenues of significance different from those which the chorus' recollections emphasise. First, the fact that the armour is presented to Achilles during his upbringing by Chiron (ἔνθα πατὴρ | ἱππότας τρέφεν, 448–9) suggests that Hephaestus might have shaped the armour as an assemblage to be contemplated, at least in part, for its didactic significance. When the chorus qualify the image of 'heavenly choruses of stars, Pleaides, Hyades' (ἄστρων τ' αἰθέριοι χοροί, | Πλειάδες, Ὑάδες, 468–9) as 'turning Hector's eyes to flight' (ὄμμασιν Ἑκτορέοις τροπαῖοι, 469) they imagine the shield deployed to a particular purpose, if not at a particular moment in the battle.[17] Yet the very bounded, personal intensity of this focalization invites listeners to consider how differently the images might have resonated in the god's transtemporal, and perhaps more disinterested, perspective. Seen from this angle, the constellations could as readily be understood as figures for cosmic order manifest in seasonal repetition as δείματα targeted exclusively at the Trojans.

The ecphrasis' content, tightly focused on myths and stars, also hints that the chorus' recollections might leave out other elements that enriched and complicated its picture of human life. This possibility is strengthened by listeners' memories of the much more capacious shield given to Achilles in the *Iliad*,[18] which pictured almost the full range of social interactions, and by the scenario of the chorus recalling the armour at a temporal remove that might occasion imperfectly slanted recollection. Finally, the chorus connect the armour's images with the 'judgement' that they long to see visited on Clytemnestra (τοιγάρ σοί ποτ' οὐρανίδαι | πέμψουσιν θανάτου δίκαν, 'for this [sc. killing Agamemnon] one day will the gods send on you the judgement of death', 483–4) in a manner that calls attention to a gap between the emphasis that emerges in their interpretative recollection of the images and the content on which their recollections focus. Neither Medusa nor the Chimera are wrongdoers in the same sense as Clytemnestra. Both, together with the Sphinx, as beings ungoverned by the ethical regulations by which Clytemnesta's actions are evaluated,[19] belong to a domain to which the 'judgement' at issue here does not apply. The difference between her situation and those depicted on the armour intimates that significance can be inferred from the σήματα in other, equally plausible ways.

Behind the chorus' ecphrasis, then, we can sense (at least the possibility of) alternative viewpoints and interpretations. Implicit oppositions between meaning and affect, transtemporal and local perspectives, hints at the possible selectiveness of the chorus' presentation, and the suggestion that the significance lent by the chorus to the armour might not do full justice to its implications, all combine

to suggest that other, potentially more complex ways of understanding the armour were intended by Hephaestus, available to Achilles at different stages of his career, and available to listeners and readers in the wider context of the drama. Particularly important in this respect is the relationship between the chorus' presentation of Perseus and Bellerophon and the alternative exemplary significance that they create when read in combination.

The image of Perseus with Medusa's head appears to instantiate an uncomplicated account of heroic achievement supported by divine favour (457–62):

> περιδρόμῳ μὲν ἴτυος ἕδρᾳ
> Περσέα λαιμοτόμαν ὑπὲρ ἅλμας
> ποτανοῖσι πεδίλοις κορυφὰν Γοργόνος ἴσχειν,
> Διὸς ἀγγέλῳ σὺν Ἑρμᾷ,
> τῷ Μαίας ἀγροτῆρι κούρῳ.
>
> On the round rim of the armour Perseus, above the sea in winged sandals, holds the Gorgon's severed head, with Hermes, Zeus's messenger, the rustic son of Maia.

If Perseus, accompanied by Hermes,[20] is captured at the point of supreme exaltation that follows his victory, the image presented in the corresponding lines in the antistrophe, of Bellerophon in the act of defeating the Chimera, is more ambiguous (470–5):

> ἐπὶ δὲ χρυσοτύπῳ κράνει
> Σφίγγες ὄνυξιν ἀοίδιμον ἄγραν
> φέρουσαι· περιπλεύρῳ δὲ κύτει πύρπνοος ἔσπευ-
> δε δρόμῳ λέαινα χαλαῖς
> Πειρηναῖον ὁρῶσα πῶλον.
>
> On his helmet of beaten gold, Sphinxes bear in their talons the prey their song has won. On the breastplate that encircled his flanks the fire-breathing lioness hurries away on her paws in swift flight as she spies Peirene's colt.

The chorus focus on the captivatingly strange πύρπνοος … λέαινα in the moment of her defeat. Their fascination with a monstrously compound female is readily understood as figuring their anger at Clytemnestra, who is implicitly figured here as a monster to be overcome.[21] But the concluding mention of Pegasus bearing Bellerophon towards combat suggests that the breastplate, like the shield, is susceptible of a differently focused reading. Recalling Pegasus' supernatural creation of the spring at Peirene, Πειρηναῖον ὁρῶσα πῶλον is a reminder that Pegasus affords Bellerophon the intoxicating possibility of a more-than-human agency, which he will attempt to realize in his flight towards Olympus.[22] Juxtaposing the culmination of an heroic career with the mid-point of one that will end very differently, the account of the divine support offered to Perseus frames the image of Pegasus in the corresponding line in the antistrophe, and in doing so suggests the parameters by which heroic striving should be governed.

When read together, then, these images can be understood as comprising a compound exemplarity in which the urge to self-assertion is balanced by an implicit injunction to attend to the limits that circumscribe the achievements of even the most glorious mortals. Yet specific interpretations of the relations between the component parts of the armour are less important for my reading here than that the ecphrasis alludes to a set of objects that can be variously understood. When stanzaic responsion intimates coherence between the shield, helmet, and breastplate, the chorus inadvertently create a formal structure that correlates with, and invites, a process of reading the images in relation to each other, which they themselves do not elaborate. Pondering this coherence, and reflecting that the armour might (have) resonate(d) for Hephaestus or Achilles very differently than it does in the chorus' recollection, allows us to take the measure of the extent to which the chorus have 'create[d] for themselves their own sense of those moments'. The points of intense imaginative absorption manifest in the ecphrasis, when their attention is drawn towards bodily surfaces to the exclusion of narrative, trace the limitations of their reading. Homing in on λαιμοτόμαν … κορυφὰν Γοργόνος and the dazzling ποτανοῖσι πεδίλοις, for instance, they accentuate elements of Perseus' story that separate it from the domain of normative human experience. In doing so, they abstract these details from the wider story in which they could take on different implications.

These myths involve violence occurring beyond the sphere of human relations, and the chorus' recollections, elaborating the textures of momentary images rather than attempting to contextualize these moments in narrative, accentuate this non-human, asocial dimension of the pictures. The result is an exemplary discourse that cannot account for the unsettling specificities that will unfold in the rest of the play.[23] That Perseus cannot model the socially and interpersonally fraught vengeance enjoined upon Orestes, and that the ecphrasis cannot model a response to the psychic trauma that Clytemnestra's killing will occasion, are evident when Orestes approximates Perseus in 'thrusting my sword through my mother's neck' and 'casts a veil on [his] eyes' (*El.* 1221–3).[24] What Orestes cannot bear to look at is what the ecphrasis could not have displayed. The chorus' focus on bodily uncanniness is likewise a foil for the disturbing intensity with which Clytemnestra will be recalled, immediately after the killing, as a socialized body, her hands a vehicle for supplicatory gestures (*El.* 1214–15) and her breast exposed to Orestes in the midst of the 'murder' (*El.* 1207).[25] The ecphrasis' attention to hyperhuman and monstrous embodiment cannot prepare us for the sight of a body made terrifying by its changed familiarity.

The ecphrasis, therefore, invites scrutiny as the product of a provisional, context-bound, and emotionally coloured understanding, its vision of heroic conduct unproductively untimely. Imagining divinely ordained justice (483–4) simply enacted appears outmoded when put into confrontation with the psychological horrors and unsettling moral debates, couched in the language of contemporary philosophical display, for which the play is conspicuous.[26] But the ecphrasis, on my reading, does more than elaborate a flawed thinking that listeners are asked to move beyond by grasping that exempla can become outdated and can illuminate as much with their shortcomings as with enlightening correspondences. The ecphrasis

also demonstrates the dangerous allure of aesthetic surfaces, their capacity to arrest reflection as well as to prompt it. It shows the imagination creating a domain that becomes intellectually generative by drawing listeners into a consideration of the mechanisms and attitudes through which exemplary significance is constructed.[27]

Nor does the ode, for all that it prompts self-consciousness about our interpretative response, position audiences and readers as straightforwardly superior to the chorus. However alert we might be to its limitations, we cannot but be carried along with the chorus' version of the armour, such that their memories become ours and our reading of the rest of the play is coloured by their perspectives. To recognize the propensities of the chorus' reading is to recognize that we too (in all likelihood) have a tendency to read in similarly flawed, vulnerable, over-invested ways. So to the extent that we take the measure of the chorus' idiomatic construction of what they remember by allowing their imaginative trajectories to impel us, we recognize the situational nature of our own thinking. In proportion to the depth of access it grants us to the chorus' disposition and misreadings, the ode opens up a space for us to question the constitutively unstable nature of our own self-understanding.

II. An Extension of Vision

In the second stasimon of Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*, the chorus of Argive elders, having given an account of the causes of the Trojan war (385–402), proceed to imagine the 'lament' (408) voiced by the 'elders of the palace' (δόμων προφῆται) in the aftermath of Helen's abduction.[28] Here too, incitement to visualization draws listeners into an intense encounter with the imaginative worlds of others, that of the performing chorus, the προφῆται, and of Menelaus.[29]

After apostrophizing the royal palace and its lords, the προφῆται imagine the suffering that Menelaus will undergo as a result of Helen's desertion, focusing first on the marriage bed and the ambiguous traces of her presence (ἰὼ λέχος καὶ στίβοι φιλάνορες, 'O bed and man-loving footprints', 411),[30] then on the statues which Menelaus can no longer see without anguish (416–19).[31] The next stanza treats the specific longing that Menelaus will feel for Helen as an instance of a general phenomenon (420–6):

ὀνειρόφαντοι δὲ πενθήμονες
πάρεισι δόξαι φέρου-
σαι χάριν ματαίαν·
μάταν γάρ, εὖτ᾽ ἂν ἐσθλά τις δοκοῦνθ᾽ ὁρᾷ,
παραλλάξασα διὰ
χερῶν βέβακεν ὄψις, οὐ μεθύστερον 425
πτεροῖς ὀπαδοῦσ᾽ ὕπνου κελεύθοις.

Appearing in dreams, mournful imaginings are present, bringing a vain delight; for vainly, whenever someone sees what appears good, is the vision gone, having slipped aside through the hands, not thereafter attending on wings sleep's paths.

Different stages of 'visualization' unfold, affording readers an opportunity to reflect on the dangers and possibilities of imaginative life.

The first stage of this process can be traced in the claim πόθῳ δ' ὑπερποντίας | φάσμα δόξει δόμων ἀνάσσειν ('through longing for the woman over the sea, a phantom will seem to rule in the palace', 414–15). The φάσμα manifests itself visually, but the phenomenon is as significant for prompting a complex mental process as for its appearance. Menelaus' conduct, the lines imply, will be dictated by yearning for Helen to such an extent that a φάσμα of her will appear to hold sway over the house. For all that the φάσμα can be imagined as an image in Menelaus' mind that replicates Helen's real-life allure, it also (appears to) assert(s) itself in continual action (ἀνάσσειν), and engenders an ongoing response in his mental life, which is revealed to the speakers through his behaviour.[32] This account of the interactions between imagination and world is developed in the description at 420–2, which adumbrates a conception of δόξαι as involved in a compound intellection. These 'imaginings' disclose themselves autonomously to the dreaming mind (ὀνειρόφαντοι … πάρεισι), but their appearance reflects the dreamer's memories and longing (πενθήμονες).[33] They bring about an affective state (χάριν ματαίαν), but the retrospective gloss of ἐσθλά … δοκοῦνθ' suggests that they are also subject to at least the beginnings of deliberative reflection.

The shift into gnomic discourse in 423 (εὖτ' ἂν … τις) occasions an aptly generic description of the qualities manifest in such encounters (ἐσθλά … δοκοῦνθ'), but also prepares for another shift in terminology. With ὄψις, attention is drawn to a phenomenon the visual aspect of which is more prominent than that of the δόξαι. Part of the point of this language is to pull our attention back from the generalizing procedure of the previous line and make us feel Menelaus' acutely specific state, the return to the language of vision reminding us that the ὄψις that he sees of Helen will, because of her unique beauty and the particularly painful situation in which the vision reveals itself, be different from the δόξαι apparent to others in comparable mental states (εὖτ' ἂν … τις). But the concluding term in the progression from φάσμα to δόξαι to ὄψις also grasps a distinct occurrence in imaginative life. Moving from a φάσμα felt as exerting an autonomous pressure on disposition, to δόξαι as states compounded of affect, memory, and incipient evaluation, to ὄψις as a shimmering surface no sooner apparent than lost, the passage figures the mind as a medium in which varying intensities are disclosed, each composed of subtly distinguished properties, affective forces, and the relations between them.

The effects of the last state can be further elaborated by taking a closer look at the phrasing of παραλλάξασα διὰ | χερῶν βέβακεν ὄψις (424–5). This is the earliest extant instance of παραλλάσσειν, and while the absence of earlier uses makes its force difficult to gauge, later usage suggests that it might well have been felt as unusual. The sense of 'slip past' is relatively rare in Classical Greek, and it is not often used with persons as subject.[34] The unusual expression catches at the experience of the familiar movements of the body translated into not-quite-human movement. Used here in a climactic position as the subject of an action, ὄψις stands out against the patterns of its use in earlier poetry, where 'appearances' tend to be perceived.[35] The absence of qualification underlines the term's dematerialized quality,[36] which

is also stressed by word order, the ὄψις emerging with hollowed-out clarity only when its elusiveness has been realized (βέβακεν). The abstract register of ὄψις is apposite to gnomic generalization, but its usage and placement also incisively render what Menelaus is imagined as experiencing, the reduction of longed-for body to a visual surface and the unsettlingly depersonalized agency with which the figure 'slips aside'. At stake in these considerations is more than appreciation of the expressive qualities of Aeschylus' style. Rather, the intensity with which words collide, arrest attention, and depart from the familiar, enact the process by which a heightened, almost alien mode of existence enters and inflects consciousness. The grain of sense warps in proportion to the strangeness of the experience that the chorus attempt to account for.

Similar interaction occurs in πτεροῖς ὀπαδοῦσ' ὕπνου κελεύθοις (426), where defamiliarized usage again cleaves to the unfamiliar. For the people or solidly apprehensible qualities that normally 'accompany' or 'attend',[37] Aeschylus substitutes a scenario, simultaneously imagined and negated, in which both elements of πτεροῖς ὀπαδοῦσ' take on heightened meaning. Separation is accentuated by the only physical feature of the 'vision' mentioned being that which carries it away. More subtly, by being the vehicle of 'attending', the 'wings' intimate a moment of contact that their otherworldly movement, the very feature that separates the 'vision' from habitual embodied experience, would animate and make extraordinary. Apprehended only in the imagination, the 'wings' are more than 'wings', and the 'attending' they would accomplish is the more affecting for being illusory.

The final word in the sentence reinforces this combination of negated encounter and expanded meaning. The plural κελεύθοις shifts back into the generalizing idiom, expressing a common, recurrent experience, but it also has twofold sense, both temporal and spatial, that pertains specifically to Menelaus. The former extends the shock of absence into Menelaus' future by suggesting that there will be many distinct occasions on which the vision will not 'accompany' his sleep. The latter unsettles by showing the human interior unregulated, the spaces of the dreaming mind as alternative, untraceable 'paths'[38] into which the vision can 'slip aside'.[39] Combining reference to the future (οὐ μεθύστερον) with an aspectual emphasis on the momentary (παραλλάξασα), the syntax allows the extension in time created by the former to resonate in the instant denoted by the latter. What is (not) 'accompanied' in this instant is precisely the fraying into vagueness that characterizes the dreamer's experience of loss.

I have dwelt at length on these lines because they show the chorus enacting their own 'vigilance to the point of magic'. Defamiliarization of language correlates with the strangeness of what can be imagined. Intensity of suggestion measures a world in which the otherworldly can touch and transfigure the known, and from which otherwise unavailable insights can visit us and extend the range of phenomena that our thinking can cleave to.[40] If this is not precisely analogous to the notional world in which Greenlaw's 'small but infinite ravine' opens up unexpectedly in the 'centre' of an otherwise ordinary 'room', it is certainly a domain in which experience and language are carried beyond their wonted remits.

The passage's implications can be situated more fully in the history of the Greek imagination by comparing them to a passage from Sappho fr. 22, where Sappho addresses a woman (probably Abanthis) and describes her longing for Gongula (11–14):

> ἃς σε δηὖτε πόθος ṭ.[
> ἀμφιπόταται
> τὰν κάλαν· ἀ γὰρ κατάγωγις αὔτα [
> ἐπτόαισ' ἴδοισαν, ἔγω δὲ χαίρω …
>
> For whom again longing […] flutters around [you], the fair one. For that dress set [you] on wings when you saw it, and I rejoice …

As in Aeschylus, where πόθῳ δ' ὑπερπoντίας prompts Menelaus' anguished recollections, dreaming, and the chorus' sympathetic imaginings, πόθος here occasions a heightening of responsiveness to the world.[41] Rather than claiming a close intertextual relationship between the passages, I suggest that Sappho's is an especially telling instance of the imaginative sensitivity that early Greek poetry engenders, and to which Aeschylus' lines appeal.

Sappho observes a πόθος that flutters in fragile but sustained urging. Inner and outer mingle: πόθος occurs in and through the body but is also an atmosphere that surrounds and moves. Sappho's language charts this interpenetration; as Gongula's 'dress' feathers the eye into excitement (ἐπτόαισ'), sensation gathers to itself something of the wing-light insistence (ἀμφιπόταται) to which it is opened. Beside involving a πόθος that intensifies response to the world and occasions attention to others,[42] Sappho's to Abanthis' and the chorus' to Menelaus, the two passages share a concern with the metonymic charging of imagination by environment. Momentarily arrested by the vision's oblique, lightly propulsive movement (παραλλάξασα … πτεροῖς), the sensing body is shown exposed to effects akin to Sappho's πόθος … ἀμφιπόταται, even as separation produces the latter's affective inverse, and as imaginative perturbation is made more insistently evident in the contortions of language. But whereas Sappho turns the mind outward to the world, Aeschylus' lines direct attention inward to a realm with an ontic register peculiarly its own. Sappho's attention chances on the incidental detail of Gongula's dress lit up with significance. Aeschylus explores a mental register that makes possible a specific kind of experience, a register constituted by the combination of sensation and reflection, heightening and negation, the familiar and the strange, that characterizes both the dream and the attempt to imagine it.

To this difference of attention correspond wider ontic and pragmatic distinctions. In Sappho's scenario, the distinction between the concrete world and the persons that populate it is the condition for the mind being transformed by what it encounters, while Aeschylus' dream vision shows distinctions between the substantial and the illusory destabilized. Not apparent to the dreamer, what makes 'delight … vain' is only grasped in gnomic retrospection. Whereas Sappho speaks faithfully about a world that she shares with others,[43] the Aeschylean chorus project themselves imaginatively into the contents of a consciousness that they invent on

the basis of empathy, plausibility, and shared parameters of experience. That their speech is shadowed by the possibility of misleading or exaggerating, and has no anchor outside its own projections, implicitly asserts the stabilizing importance of the more normative perceptions against which it is juxtaposed.

If Sappho attunes us more longingly to 'the real earth' on which we live by showing how the movement of a dress might enter and change us,[44] the chorus, with μάταν γάρ, ensure that we attend to the dangers of absorption in illusory experiences. And yet the imaginative event opened up by the chorus' empathetic lament, and the verbal textures that answer and configure it, are not merely 'vain', in that they reconfigure and expand our understanding of the mind's constitution and capabilities. By inviting us to distinguish the substantial and the illusory within the world opened up by the text, and to contemplate the states of thinking into which they impel us, Aeschylus' lines anticipate Gorgias' commentary on tragic spectatorship as entailing a knowing entrance into self-deception ('he who is deceived is wiser than he who is not', B23 DK). They urge on us the task of knowing the world more keenly through the tendency to be invaded by πόθος and the imaginative scenarios, simultaneously disordering and generative, that follow in its train.[45]

In the course of this sequence, then, from the initial mention of Helen's φάσμα to that of her elusive ὄψις, different terms for mental activity take on amplified significance through interaction with their context, and present an intricate picture of a variegated, compound intellection that we might name 'imagination', which anticipates the conceptualizations of later thinkers. Something close to Longinian ἐνθουσιασμός is legible in both chorus and listeners being drawn out of themselves into Menelaus' world.[46] Helen's winged attendance can be understood as a φαντασία in which the challenge to visualization traces the limits of our understanding. The ὀνειρόφαντοι … δόξαι, illusory and yet prompting fine-grained attention to word and referent, foreshadow later debate over the epistemic status of δόξα. Yet while seeing the ode as anticipatory is useful for illustrating its workings, what it enacts should not be understood as a stage in a developmental process significant primarily for leading to the greater clarity of subsequent thinking. Rather, the ode makes available a distinctively capacious intellectual mode through which we hold in juxtaposition the various transformations that the text opens up. These occur in the text world, as Helen becomes ὄψις, in the traffic between that world and language, as diction traces events and relations, and in ourselves, as we find our thinking and language altered and extended.

III. Conclusions

In each of the texts I have considered, the aspiration to bring images before the mind's eye mutates into a more subtle mode of thought. In each, visualization leads to 'an extension of vision' that broadens the range of what can be experienced. Greenlaw's poem builds towards a claim in which reluctance to define ('Time is not place') is balanced by clarified perceptions; Euripides lets us look beyond the imaginings of his chorus into the attitudes that shape them and the alternative understandings of Achilles' armour which we might articulate for ourselves;

Aeschylus explores the dream as an alternative ontic domain by which our grasp of the world can be inflected.

When these texts are aligned with each other, numerous suggestive connections manifest themselves. The 'ravine' at the heart of Greenlaw's poem and the ὄψις that eludes Menelaus both transform and heighten attention in proportion to their recalcitrant strangeness. Greenlaw's 'built moment' illuminatingly analogizes Euripides' ecphrasis as a psychological event. The images on the armour offer themselves to our attention as moments made permanent, but the provisionality of choral recollection reminds us that 'Time is not place'. Built in and through time, in moments and imaginative affinities rather than on secure 'ground', the ecphrasis intimates the processes that shaped it. Reflecting on these and other parallels allow us to examine the benefits of allowing the forms of attention with which we address one text to be modelled and inflected by those afforded by another. What comes to the fore through pursuing them are facets of poetry's thinking not contingent upon specific historical situations, but on the largely transcontextual processes by which worlds of the imagination are unfolded, and our access to them shaped.

Connections such as those I have suggested, and the larger juxtapositions of which they form part, enact the unpredictable conglomerations by which individual subjectivities are constituted. They instance the unruly relays and coincidences and collisions out of which we abstract normative, socially mediated, and institutionally validated methods of reading. They model, and help us to gain purchase on, the blend of ineluctable subordination and voluntaristic determinations that characterizes our navigation of our position as historical readers. Attending to them does not, needless to say, licence the claim that all juxtapositions are equally valid or illuminating. Instead, it prompts us to attend to the potential of such juxtapositions to lead us to points at which formal features enact or correlate most intensely with imaginative recomposition of the phenomenal world, and make their most telling demands. It prompts us to question the extent to which the worlds opened up by Aeschylus or Euripides are also worlds that might become our own, insofar as they are moulded from experiences that we might share, and insofar as they disclose commitments that might change us.

Abbreviations

Abbreviations of ancient authors and texts, as well as scholarly reference works, follow those of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, fourth edition; abbreviations of journal titles follow those of *L'Année Philologique*.

Notes

1 Because the effects that I describe are at work in scenarios of reading as well as performance, I refer throughout to both 'listeners' and 'readers'. 'Text' functions similarly.

2 φαντασία as part of intellective processes: Pl. *Sph.* 264b2; Arist. *De an.* 3.3.427b15–24, 428a5–18. For discussion and further references, see Webb (2016: 207–8); Phillips (2020: 258–66); and Campeggiani (this volume, p. 86).

3 Particularly important for Kant's theorization of imagination is §49 of the *Critique of Judgement* (2007: 142–7 – first published in 1790). For Coleridge's celebrated distinction between fancy and imagination, see *Biographia Literaria* (1983: vol. I, 304–6 – first published 1817), with editorial discussion at ibid. xcvii–civ.
4 This formal attunement of the mental resonates with several chapters across this volume, but speaks most particularly to the one that follows this. Buxton demonstrates how the intense deliberation of Aeschylus' Pelasgus does not mark a new phase of Greek intellectual evolution, as Snell would have it, but rather a translation of the mind into dramatic form; the mode of thinking adopted by the hero is shaped by the medium in which it is presented.
5 Nor were they the first poets to explore imaginative seeing in this way: for a similar process already at work in Homer, see Phillips (2020: 264–6).
6 My phrasing here reworks the 'experiential affordances' of Payne (2018: 272): for a similar emphasis on poetry's capacity to potentiate, see, e.g., Fearn (2020: 36–7) on Anacreon's poetics as models of experience.
7 See Peponi (2012: 6) on relations between 'inner and outer worlds' as a source for 'the act of apprehending beauty'. While I am focused here on 'texts' (see n. 1), images may inspire a comparable reflexive approach: see Clifford (this volume).
8 'Imagination' plays a crucial role in the encounter with Virginia Woolf's glasses which at Telò & Mueller (2018: 1–3) is exemplary for an approach to tragic poetics strongly inflected by new materialism: the 'sensory and affective encounter acts on our imagination, prompting us to assemble the traces of subjectivity impressed on the object into narratives': the role of the imagination in mediating the inner worlds that tragedies open up is implicit in several subsequent discussions, as when Wohl (2018: 25) treats 'language as the conduit or blockage between the human subject and the material world' as 'the paradox of vibrant materialism': see also the role of feeling, sensing, and foreshadowing in the reading of Eur. *Hec.* 925 at Shirazi (2018: 106–7).
9 *Loci classici*: [Longinus] *Subl.* 15, Quint. *Inst.* 6.2.29–31; this emphasis is often picked up in modern discussions of ἐνάργεια, for which see, e.g., Otto (2009).
10 Greenlaw (2019: 38).
11 Walsh (1977) and King (1980) discuss thematic structure; Csapo (2009) connects the ode's imagery to contemporary Athenian culture, finding links between Achilles' armour and Pheidias sculpture of Athena Parthenos; Torrance (2013: 76–82) elaborates a metapoetic reading; Wohl (2015: 82) situates the ecphrasis in the play's larger move from 'reality … [to] an illusion explicitly recognized as such' (64); Weiss (2018: 75–91) focuses on performative elements.
12 Michelakis (2002: 160–1), with further discussion at Torrance (2013: 77).
13 Fearn (2017: 155).
14 Quotation from Payne (2006: 161); discussion and bibliography at Phillips (2017: 143–6).
15 I give the text as printed by Kovacs. All translations are my own.
16 The sentence is read thus by, e.g., King (1980: 201–2); Torrance (2013: 80) comments that 'the ecphrasis is focalized [by] a Trojan traveller'; Gellie (1981: 3) preserves the ambiguity with 'a man who had fought at Troy'.
17 King (1980: 204) connects this phrase with Hector's flight from Achilles at Hom. *Il.* 22.132–7.
18 Hom. *Il.* 18.468–608. And perhaps other texts: the possibility that Euripides is alluding to a now lost description of the armour in Aeschylus' *Nereids* is discussed by Torrance (2013: 78).
19 See especially her attempted self-exculpation at *El.* 1011–50.
20 Torrance (2013: 80–1) connects Hermes with the play's rustic setting.
21 See King (1980: 209–10).
22 A paradigmatic moment of mortal over-reaching: see, e.g., Pind. *Isth.* 7.43–8.

23 King (1980: 209–10) treats the contrast between the world of the ecphrasis and the world of the play in similar terms; see also Walsh (1977: 288), Gellie (1981: 8). Weiss (2018: 90–1) reads the ode as inciting the dramatic action that follows.
24 The parallel between the two figures is made explicit at 855–7, where the messenger reports that Orestes is 'displaying not a Gorgon's head but Aegisthus', and discussed briefly by Torrance (2013: 79).
25 Cf. King (1980: 211). For hands as agents of violence in the play, see Worman (2018: 194–8).
26 See, e.g., Wohl (2015: 70–2).
27 For a similarly reflexive exemplarity, see Fearn's treatment of Gorgias' *Helen* in this volume.
28 For discussion of these speakers' identity see Athanassaki (1993/4); Raeburn & Thomas (2011: 114); Nooter (2017: 163 n. 102).
29 In common with most recent editors, I take the 'quotation' from the προφῆται as ending at 426: for argument in favour of this position, see Fraenkel (1950: vol. ii, 223); further discussion at Fletcher (1999: 38–42), who argues that 420–8 are 'double-voiced' ('the dream sequence (420–426) can apply both to the past grief of Menelaus and the present grief of the Argives, and thus issues both from the προφῆται who speak in the past and the chorus-narrator who speak in the present', 39); Grethlein (2013: 87–8); Nooter (2017: 164).
30 Raeburn & Thomas (2011: 115) discuss the ambiguity: the phrase can refer either to the impress of Helen's body on the bed or to the 'footsteps' with which she followed Paris.
31 Discussed in detail by Steiner (1995).
32 This follows from the fact that δόξει without an object can mean both 'to him' and 'to others', as well as from the nature of the claim itself.
33 As Denniston & Page (1957: 104) put it, 'Helen appears … as Menelaus would have her, sorrowful, returning in tears to her lost husband and home'.
34 The verb means 'change' at, e.g., Eur. *Hipp.* 935, Soph. *Ant.* 298; for the sense 'slip past', cf. Hdt. 2.11.12 of tunnels 'missing' each other. This is the only instance of the meaning 'slip aside or away' cited by LSJ s.v. II.6; παρέρχομαι, which it approximates in meaning, is by contrast much more common: see LSJ s.v. A II.1.
35 And are often linked to strongly expressive focalization or the extraordinariness of what appears: see, e.g., Hom. *Il.* 6.468, 24.632. The noun's first extant occurrences in poetry in the nominative are found in Aeschylus: see, e.g., *Supp.* 711, *Pers.* 518.
36 And again is a conspicuous departure from patterns of use in earlier poetry: see the previous note.
37 Person: e.g. κῆρυξ Εὐρυβάτης Ἰθακήσιος ὅς οἱ ὀπήδει (Hom. *Il.* 2.184); physical event: οὐδέ ποτ' ἰθυδίκῃσι μετ' ἀνδράσι λιμὸς ὀπηδεῖ (Hes. *Op.* 230); clearly manifest qualities: παύροισ' ἀνθρώπων ἀρετὴ καὶ κάλλος ὀπηδεῖ (Thgn. 932).
38 For other untraceable mental 'paths' in Aeschylus, see *Sup*p. 93–5 (δαυλοὶ γὰρ πραπίδων | δάσκιοί τε τείνου- | σιν πόροι κατιδεῖν ἄφραστοι), discussed by Buxton (this volume, pp. 283–4 with n. 109).
39 The syntax of 'attending sleep's paths' drives the point home: as Denniston & Page (1957: 108) comment in response to Fraenkel, this is an 'extension of usage' that departs from the 'regular practice' in which the verb 'govern[s] the thing or practice accompanied'. Such 'extension' appositely makes us feel the absence of the person; it is the contours of Menelaus' absorbed dreaming, rather than a consciously responsive subject, that the 'wings accompany' (or rather 'would', were the event to occur).
40 Recent cognitive scholarship on the connection between imaginative visualization and embodiment throws the demands of these lines into relief: Aeschylus makes us imagine at the limits of embodied understanding. See Huitink (2019: 193–4) for the argument that 'to imagine something … is to simulate an embodied exploration of what one imagines'.

41 A capacity brilliantly treated by Carson (1986: 62–9).
42 Matlock (2020: 42) insightfully identifies the evental 'disclosure of a situational impossibility [which] inaugurates a procedure of fidelity that seeks to reshape the world in its own image' as a crucial component of Sappho's poetry (with particular reference to fr. 96). A similar evental pressure on established modes of relation may be detected in fr. 22.
43 See Budelmann (2018: 238–9, 241–2) for trust in the speaker's veracity as a condition of engagement with Sappho's world-making.
44 For the 'earth' as experiential site in Sappho, see Payne (2018: 263) with the further discussion of Fearn (2020: 11–12).
45 For the 'entanglement of aesthetics and ethics' in the Greek word ἀπάτη, see Grethlein (2021).
46 For ἐνθουσιασμός as ecstatic experience, see, e.g., [Longinus] *Subl.* 15.1.

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10 Performing the Mind

Aeschylus' *Suppliants* and the Theatre of 'Deep Thought'

Xavier Buxton

> … The play's the thing
> Wherein I'll catch the conscience of the King.
>
> Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, Act II, scene 2

I. Introduction: The Theatre and the Mind

The 'theatre of the mind' is an ancient edifice, dating back to Plato, and it remains in regular use.[1] Most famous is the articulation of David Hume, in his inquiry into the experience of self:

> … the mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations.[2]

Though they vary on the details, philosophers regularly characterize mental experience in this way – as, in some sense, *theatrical*. In this chapter, I want to approach this phenomenological tradition through a kind of inversion, considering not the metaphorical 'theatre of the mind', so much as the mind of the *actual* theatre. How does drama negotiate the enigma of mental experience? How is the imagination articulated? How, indeed, does theatre 'think'?

Such questions are especially pertinent to Greek tragedy, the earliest surviving dramatic form in Europe, and one whose emergence is roughly contemporaneous with the first Greek philosophies of cognition. But whereas scholars have connected Shakespeare's dramas (especially the tragic soliloquies) with the development of a new kind of interiority,[3] Greek tragedy has often been considered uninterested in the 'inner workings' of the mind.[4] Aristotle, for example, observes that the etymology of *drama* – from *draō*, 'I do' – reflects the mode of *mimēsis* shared by tragedy and comedy (and satyr drama): they both represent people as 'actually doing things'.[5] Defining tragedy as the 'imitation of action', he includes 'character' (*ēthos*) and 'thought' (*dianoia*) with 'plot' (*mythos*) among its component parts.[6] *Ēthos*, however, remains strictly secondary to *mythos*,[7] while *dianoia* comes in a distant third.[8] In any case, Aristotle makes clear that this *mimēsis* of thought is concerned not with the theoretical deliberation and internal dialogue that

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dianoia sometimes denotes,[9] but rather 'those parts where [the dramatic agents] put forward an argument or deliver a maxim'; such rhetorical *dianoia* is later limited to 'the ability to say what the situation admits and requires'.[10] This is 'thought' as a cognitive product, rather than as a cognitive process. Romantic critics, with their sensibilities shaped by Shakespeare, were more willing to indulge the subjectivity and intellect of the 'tragic hero'.[11] Post-war scholars, however, rejecting the psychological speculations of their predecessors, reaffirmed Aristotle's subordination of character;[12] at most, the 'persons of the drama' were allowed to be 'humanly intelligible', in Patricia Easterling's famous phrase.[13] If character has made something of a comeback in recent years,[14] thought – at least in the personal, processual, deliberative sense[15] – remains a surprisingly neglected aspect of Greek tragedy in modern scholarship.[16]

There are, of course, exceptions. Perhaps most significant is the work of Ruth Padel, especially *In and Out of the Mind*, which demonstrates not just the embodiment but the fundamental permeability of the tragic self.[17] Padel is also acutely aware of the spatial dynamics of tragedy, mapping the inside and outside of the mind onto the visible and invisible elements of the theatre, including the *skēnē* and the *eisodoi*;[18] the psychological 'space' of the theatre has since been explored by many others.[19] More recently, the so-called cognitive turn in the humanities has wholeheartedly embraced theatre and performance,[20] and classicists have begun to apply the insights of experimental science to the surviving texts of Greek tragedy,[21] and even to contemporary productions.[22] As Felix Budelmann and Patricia Easterling point out, what philosophers and scientists call 'Theory of Mind' (the human capacity for making inferences about other people's feelings, beliefs, intentions, and so on) is fundamental both to an audience's experience of drama and to the interactions depicted within the drama: 'Greek tragedy compresses and intensifies the kind of mind-reading that takes place in real life'.[23] For Budelmann and Easterling, such 'real life' spans ancient and modern experience, since mind-reading seems a human universal. Other critics, however, drawing on 'cultural neuroscience' and 'cognitive archaeology', have emphasized historical variation in our mental activity. So Peter Meineck declares that 'a culture's theatre is *a kind of mimetic mind*, an artificial construct that mirrors, amplifies, and projects the cognitive regime of the people who have come to experience it'.[24] This cognitive historicism resonates with the work of Edith Hall and Jon Hesk, whose essays on deliberation in Sophocles and Euripides partly inspired this paper.[25] Both connect the prominence of *boul-* compounds and decision-scenes in tragedy to the importance of public consultation in fifth-century Athenian democracy; tragic protagonists and choruses either articulate, or more often illustrate, 'epistemic or cognitive vulnerabilities', and thus provide to their audiences a sort of 'training' in political deliberation.

In this chapter, I hope to combine some of these ideas, but also to develop them further. I will examine a scene from the *Suppliants* of Aeschylus – a playwright largely untouched by recent studies of tragic deliberation – which offers a sustained and sophisticated depiction of the 'inner workings' of the hero's mind. Pelasgus, King of Argos, is represented in a moral crisis, forced to choose between two terrible courses of action. My core argument is that the nature of his deliberations may

be characterized as in various ways *theatrical*.[26] By this, I mean that the essential features of Pelasgus' thought are defined not so much by a new philosophy of subjectivity, or a new politics of deliberation, but by the very form in which they are presented. The mind in the theatre is itself a theatre.

I will start by revisiting Bruno Snell's provocative arguments in *The Discovery of the Mind*, where Pelasgus' deliberations, contrasted with those of his Homeric predecessors, are said to inaugurate a 'European' sense of self. While subsequent critics have generally rejected Snell's evolutionary thesis, and affirmed a continuity of 'decision-making' between Homer and Aeschylus, I will highlight a number of developments, as Homeric cognitive ideas are translated into the psychological idiom of the tragic stage. It is not, as Snell would have it, that the mind is 'discovered' as a source of action, but rather that the mind finds new forms of expression. Moreover, these new forms accord not with Snell's Enlightenment programme but with the properties of the Classical Athenian 'imagination' explored elsewhere in this volume: the mind of Pelasgus is socially embedded, emotionally embodied, and spatially extended.[27] At the same time, it is specifically 'dramatic', in the fullest sense of the word, depending for its articulation upon the special features of theatrical *mimēsis*: chorus, spectacle, and performance space.

II. Breaking the Spell of Snell

In Bruno Snell's *Die Entdeckung des Geistes* (1946, tr. 1953), Aeschylus' *Suppliants* holds a special place.[28] Snell's book is most famous for its treatment of Homeric psychology, in which the author claims that the epic poet 'does not know genuine personal decisions'; his heroes, ruled by contrary impulses of the *thumos*, *phrenes*, etc., lack 'any vital centre which controls the organic system'. This Homeric void is contrasted with the 'unitary self' of Plato and Aristotle, where the *nous* and *psychē* are superior to and separable from the body. Between Homer and these philosophers lie the innovations of lyric and tragedy. In the Snell schema, the first offers a development of private, individual experience, the conscious distress of obstructed desire, but this inner life is limited to sensation and reaction.[29] Only with tragedy, Snell suggests, does the 'mind' become a locus of will, and a source of action. The *Suppliants*, then dated to the 490s and believed to be the earliest extant drama, is said to exhibit this 'discovery'.

Snell focuses on Pelasgus, the King of Argos, who is confronted by a chorus of Danaids demanding protection from their Egyptian pursuers. Fearful of the war that acquiescence will entail, Pelasgus declares (407–9):

> δεῖ τοι βαθείας φροντίδος σωτηρίου,
> δίκην κολυμβητῆρος, ἐς βυθὸν μολεῖν
> δεδορκὸς ὄμμα, μηδ' ἄγαν ὠνωμένον …
>
> Deep thought is certainly needed to save us: the eye, like that of a diver, must scan right to the bottom – a clear-sighted eye, not one unduly fogged by wine …[30]

Pelasgus is 'for a moment sunk in thought', as Snell puts it; eventually, his 'soul-searching' ends with a resolution to consult the Argive assembly. But it is the self-consultation which is important to Snell:

> Nowhere in early poetry does a man go through a similar struggle to arrive at a decision, nowhere does he, as in this scene, reflect "downward into the depth" of his soul in order to make up his mind.[31]

Snell celebrates other developments, including the emergence of a moral conscience – 'for the first time in literature someone toils hard for the sake of responsibility and justice'. His emphasis, however, is on the evolution of the decision-making process:

> The Homeric scenes in which a man deliberates what he ought to do are deficient in one distinctive feature which makes the decision of Pelasgus what it is: a wholly independent and private act. In Aeschylus, the hero's choice becomes a problem whose solution is contingent on nothing but his own insight. Homer's scenes of reflection and resolution are usually cast in a stereotype form. A man speculates whether he ought to do this or that; finally, when he decides, the resolution may be described in one of two ways: either Homer says that it seemed better to the man to choose such and such a course, or we learn that a god intervened and directed the hero's decision … Evidently this has little to do with subjective choice, not to speak of an internal struggle.[32]

Snell's treatment of Homeric psychology, though influential, met with immediate resistance, and has been refuted many times. Scholars have repeatedly demonstrated that each of Homer's psychic faculties may stand as a locus of will;[33] indeed, these faculties are largely interchangeable.[34] Perhaps more significant than this direct philological challenge is a larger paradigm shift in contemporary philosophy, well explained by Christopher Gill: Snell's expectations of the modern, individual subject – a subject defined by self-consciousness, rationality, intentionality, and autonomy – were premised on Cartesian and Kantian norms; recent philosophy and psychology has pivoted towards an objectivist-participant approach, where the mind is 'composite' or 'embodied', and ethics defined by engagement in interpersonal and communal relationships.[35] In such a light, Homer's psychology, with its plurality of psychic organs, may be seen as more 'modern' than that of his Classical successors.[36]

In this general condemnation of Snell's Homer, less attention has been paid to his Aeschylus. The famous scholar's enthusiasm for the *Suppliants* goes unmentioned in all five recent commentaries on the play.[37] Where contemporary critics do mention Snell, it is normally to reject his 'absurd idea [of mental progression]', and to deny any significant change in the representation of decision-making between epic and tragedy.[38] This new orthodoxy is accompanied by a curious neglect of the Pelasgus-scene. Indeed, surveys of Aeschylus regularly seem to forget about him altogether. Thus Justina Gregory writes that, although Aeschylus' Orestes and Sophocles' Creon 'hesitate and waver', these older playwrights 'pass rapidly over such

moments of indecision'.[39] Suzanne Saïd claims that Aeschylus 'shows the direct and constant involvement of divine forces in human action'.[40] Yet Pelasgus' indecision is extended over 140 lines, and there is no hint of divine influence at any point. The return of 'character' to tragic scholarship has not favoured the Argive King either. One editor remarks that he lacks 'individual traits': contrasted with Danaus, he is 'more obtrusive, less complicated'.[41] His dilemma, contrasted with Agamemnon's, is 'less memorable'; contrasted with Eteocles', it is merely an 'abstract conflict between duties'.[42] Rarely the main event, Snell's 'prize exhibit'[43] is now most often brought in as an illustrative foil to these more celebrated decision-scenes, if included at all.[44]

Is there some leftover embarrassment about the 1950s downdating of the *Suppliants*, and the subjectivity of literary judgement that it revealed?[45] Or about Snell himself, and the whole tradition of *Geistesgeschichte* that he embodies? Is Pelasgus carrying the can for our discipline's long attachment to 'Eurocentric [and] … triumphalist narratives of enlightenment'?[46] Whatever its cause, the neglect is unfortunate, because Pelasgus offers something very different from Eteocles and Agamemnon – indeed from any other Aeschylean hero.[47] Eteocles presents the fateful decision to confront his brother as a *fait accompli*:[48] the chorus-leader, trying in vain to dissuade him in the exchange that follows, can only speculate about the decision-making process. Agamemnon's crisis at Aulis, meanwhile, is narrated by the chorus: despite their ventriloquy of both Calchas and the King, the decision remains fundamentally mediated, even monologic.[49] On the Aeschylean stage, as Snell observes, only Orestes endures a similarly *live* anguish of indecision, crying out to Pylades, τί δράσω – 'What should I do?' – but his hesitation and consultation last only a moment (*Cho.* 899–903).[50] Pelasgus' deliberation is perhaps better compared with the chorus-consultations of Atossa and Electra regarding their dreams and libations, respectively (*Pers*. 159–230; *Cho*. 84–123): both present their problem in a short *rhēsis*,[51] then accept the friendly guidance offered by the chorus-leader, either in *rhēsis* (Atossa), or *stichomythia*[52] (Electra); their resolutions, like that of Pelasgus, are secondary to the main movement of the plot.[53] Yet the Pelasgus-scene is distinguished from these both by its duration (*Supp*. 340–479), and by the formal and emotional variety of the hero's exchange with the chorus. The King's problem is first established in *stichomythia* (340–7), and then developed through a long and mostly oppositional *epirrhēma*;[54] a longer *rhēsis* from the King (407–17) – beginning with the diver image cited above – expresses uncertainty, and is answered by a four-strophe song of warning and encouragement (418–37); a second *rhēsis* from the King (439–54), resolving non-intervention, is followed by a second passage of *stichomythia* (455–67), in which the Danaids threaten suicide; only now, in a third *rhēsis* (468–89), is Pelasgus' dilemma finally concluded. This complex exchange merits more attention that it has received.

III. Sociality: Thinking in Dialogue

It is here, however, that I want to mark a first divergence from Snell's celebration of the scene. There is no question here of an 'independent' decision, let alone a 'private' one. Snell's favoured lines of supposed introspection are spoken not only in the presence of a dozen – or perhaps even 50[55] – Danaid *choreutai*, but in

dialogue with that group. The very speech highlighted by Snell ends with a line that reframes as a question the statement that he regards as so revolutionary: 'Does it not indeed seem', Pelasgus asks the Danaids, 'that thought is needed to save us?' (μῶν οὐ δοκεῖ δεῖν φροντίδος σωτηρίου; 417; cf. 407). In response, the chorus not only affirm the need to deliberate (φρόντισον, 418) but shape that deliberation in a short song brimming with further cognitive instruction: μηδ' ἴδῃς (423), γνῶθι (426), μή τλᾷς εἰσιδεῖν (428), ἴσθι (434), φράσαι (437). Each of these imperatives gives the King 'material for thought' (418–27):[56]

φρόντισον καὶ γενοῦ πανδίκως
εὐσεβὴς πρόξενος
τὰν φυγάδα μὴ προδῷς,
τὰν ἑκάθεν ἐκβολαῖς
δυσθέοις ὀρομέναν

μηδ' ἴδῃς μ' ἐξ ἑδρᾶν πολυθεῶν
ῥυσιασθεῖσαν, ὦ
πᾶν κράτος ἔχων χθονός
γνῶθι δ' ὕβριν ἀνέρων
καὶ φύλαξαι κότον.

Think, and become wholeheartedly our pious sponsor: do not betray the fugitive who comes from afar, set in motion by an impious expulsion,

and do not look on while I am seized as plunder from this abode of so many gods, you who hold all power in this land! Recognize the men's outrageous behaviour, and guard against wrath.

Pelasgus' response suggests that he has heard them (καὶ δὴ πέφρασμαι, 438). In any case, this passage marks only one stage in his deliberation: the King's 'soul-searching' here, such as it is, does not produce the 'solution' of the dilemma, but rather a temporary determination to disengage from the crisis and leave the suppliants to their fate (452–4). Snell would have Pelasgus immune to external pressure,[57] but it is only after the Danaids threaten to pollute the shrine with their suicide that the King changes his decision. He himself is careful to credit their influence: 'If I do not perform this thing *for you* (ὑμῖν)*, you have spoken* (ἔλεξας) of a pollution terrible beyond compare' (472–3, my emphasis; cf. 466). In the final decision, the hero's subjectivity is in fact occluded altogether, with a pair of impersonal *gnōmai* (478–9):

ὅμως δ' ἀνάγκη Ζηνὸς αἰδεῖσθαι κότον
ἱκτῆρος· ὕψιστος γὰρ ἐν βροτοῖς φόβος.

All the same, there is no alternative but to respect the wrath of Zeus, god of suppliants; the fear of him is the greatest fear a mortal can have.

There is no reference here to any 'private', or 'independent' thinking, no self highlighted as the locus of will or source of action.[58] Instead, we have the confirmation

of a socio-cultural norm, a pre-existing hierarchy of values which places Zeus above other gods, and religious obligations above all others – including, in this case, the safety of the *polis*.[59] Snell's 'free decision' (106) is in fact a recognition of necessity (ἀνάγκη).

Crucially, however, this ἀνάγκη does not absolve Pelasgus of responsibility, or deny his agency. The decision may not be private, but it is, nevertheless, a decision. Pelasgus, like Agamemnon, *chooses* the least awful, the least fearful course.[60] This point must be stressed in the context of contemporary scholarship, which, perhaps in reaction to Snell, has erred in the opposite direction. Recent work has variously discounted Pelasgus' responsibility for the decision, and made much of the Danaids' 'coercion'. In an extreme example, Mark Griffith suggests that the 'incantational' rhythms of the short choral song quoted above exert a 'quasi-magical' power over the king.[61] More commonly, critics adduce Pelasgus' articulations of fear as evidence that he is being 'manipulated' or 'bullied';[62] several have suggested that the apparently defenceless suppliants are 'the real wielders of power'.[63] At the moment of crisis, Pelasgus is subjected to 'psychological blackmail',[64] or some species of 'violence',[65] so that, 'utterly helpless', he is 'left with no choice' and simply 'accepts the inevitable'.[66] In sum, 'against his better judgment',[67] he is 'forced'[68] into a 'completely irrational … decision dictated by fear'.[69]

This misunderstands both the relations between Pelasgus and the chorus, and the emotional nature of Pelagus' thought. With regard to the former, it is necessary first to note that neither King nor chorus use the language of 'force' (e.g. βία); nor does the King complain at any point about the tactics of the chorus. Next, we should observe the intense verbal engagement of both parties. To take the 'quasi-magical' song quoted above as an example: not only φρόντισον but προδῷς, ἑδρᾶν πολυθεῶν, and ῥυσιασθεῖσαν (420–3) are all citations from Pelasgus' forerunning *rhēsis* (412–4); the emphasis on what Pelasgus should not 'see' or 'watch' (μηδ' ἴδῃς, 423; μή τι τλᾷς ... εἰσιδεῖν, 428) is assuredly a response to the King's image of the eye of deliberation, plunging like a diver into the future (I discuss this further below). Other parts of the song look further back: the discussion began with the King asking, 'How can I act piously (εὐσεβής) towards you?' (340); now the chorus tell him to 'become wholeheartedly our pious (εὐσεβής) sponsor' (418–9). Their assertion that he 'holds all the power in the land' (πᾶν κράτος ἔχων χθονός, 425) alludes to Pelasgus' own admission of his authority at 399 (οὐδέ περ κρατῶν).[70] Here, as elsewhere, the chorus are participating in a verbal *agōn* with the King, not a magical or violent one; the argument is literally 'on his terms'.[71]

What does this tell us about the decision in this scene? Perhaps that it is no more entirely the chorus' than it is entirely the King's. Consider the final words of the quoted excerpt, φύλαξαι κότον: 'guard against wrath'. This cryptic warning harks back to the first laying out of the dilemma: Pelasgus initially complains that their request is 'a heavy (βαρέα) thing – to provoke an outbreak of war' (342); however, pressed to 'respect' (αἰδοῦ) the suppliants (345), he quickly acknowledges that, on the other hand, 'the wrath of Zeus god of suppliants is certainly

heavy', too (βαρύς γε μέντοι Ζηνὸς ἱκεσίου κότος, 347). The two 'heavinesses' anticipate the famous weighing-up at Aulis in *Agamemnon*: βαρεῖα μὲν κὴρ τὸ μὴ πιθέσθαι, | βαρεῖα δ' εἰ | τέκνον δαΐξω (206–8). Yet, in the *Suppliants*, Aeschylus develops the opposition differently. The last three words of 347, Ζηνὸς ἱκεσίου κότος, are seized upon by the chorus as the nub of their argument. Thus they repeat the phrase almost word-for-word at 385 (μένει τοι Ζηνὸς ἱκταίου κότος), and tirelessly articulate its component parts (350, 360, 362, 402, 427, 429). At the same time, they appeal continuously to Pelasgus' sense of αἰδώς (345, 362, 455). The King, on the other hand, studiously avoids this language. Throughout the debate, he never mentions αἰδώς or ἱκετεία. In his first longer *rhēsis* (407–17), he worries about the βαρὺν ξύνοικον … ἀλάστορα (415; cf. βαρύς, 347), but does not credit it with κότος. In his second *rhēsis* (438–54), he will mention Zeus, but only a beneficent Zeus Ktesios (448). It is only in his third and final *rhēsis* (468–89), as quoted above, that he adopts the language of divine anger, supplication, and respect: ὅμως δ' ἀνάγκη Ζηνὸς αἰδεῖσθαι κότον | ἱκτῆρος (478–9, cited above).

Thus after initially framing the dilemma in the single voice of the protagonist weighing his options (342, 347), Aeschylus divides the uncertainty into two voices, with protagonist pitched against chorus. This distinguishes Pelasgus' deliberations not only from the monologic reflections of Agamemnon at Aulis but also from those of his Homeric progenitors – the 'stereotype' to which Snell alluded above. Indeed, Pelasgus himself seems to invite a comparison to Homer's Hector when he worries 'lest people may end by saying, "By giving privileges to foreigners you destroyed our city (ἀπώλεσας πόλιν)"' (400–1). In his deliberation before the advancing Achilles, the Trojan hero imagines a similar rebuke, in similar language, that 'Hector … destroyed the people (ὤλεσε λαόν)' (*Il.* 22.105–7).[72] Their situations, in fact, have much in common, as do their deliberations: alternative outcomes are vividly imagined, and a calculation is made as to which is more attractive.[73] Such choices well illustrate Aristotle's theory of *phantasia bouleutikē* ('deliberative imagination'): 'the soul never thinks without an image', and the reasoning soul organizes and chooses between a variety of prospects before initiating motion.[74] Indeed, Aristotle would hardly have been surprised by the similarity between Hector and Pelasgus, since deliberative imagination of this kind is, in his view, a *universal* capacity of the rational, human soul.[75]

Yet there is a crucial difference in the medium of these thoughts. Hector 'speaks to his own great-hearted spirit' (εἶπε πρὸς ὃν μεγαλήτορα θυμόν, 98); as in other Homeric deliberations, the private nature of the debate is highlighted by the break-off formula, 'But why does my heart thus dialogue with me?' (ἀλλὰ τί ἤ μοι ταῦτα φίλος διελέξατο θυμός, 122).[76] This interior dialogue of epic, a sequence of competing voices within the hero, is subject in the *Suppliants* to a dramatic analysis, into two distinct voices – an exterior, social dialogue. Such interpersonal decision-making may reflect a 'democratic' commitment to open deliberation, as Hall suggests; however, the identities of King and foreign woman are hardly appropriate for such a discourse. Indeed, consultation across Aeschylus' plays is marked by an asymmetry of power.[77] A simpler explanation is available: that the *dianoia* of epic

narrative is here adapted to the medium of tragedy, where the mind has found new form.

IV. Embodiment: Thinking with Bodies

Voices, of course, emerge from bodies, and vary accordingly. This variation, obscured by the regular flow of hexameter verse, might be suggested by a skilful rhapsode, but the fundamental singularity of his body is unquestionable. Drama changes this: each voice is attached to a particular body, or a group of bodies; in performance, these bodies have a spatial relation, as well as vocal and visual distinction.[78] In the case of the *Suppliants* scene, contrasts abound: the singular, spoken voice of the King Pelasgus, mounted in a chariot, and dressed in 'Greek' costume with a 'Greek' complexion, converses with a chorus of Egyptian Danaids, gathered round an altar-mound, singing in dochmiacs, and perhaps dancing too.[79] It is within and between these performing bodies that the deliberation takes place.

The text draws attention to the Danaid bodies at the start of this scene: first, we have Danaus' careful instructions, composing a suppliant tableau around the altar (188–9, 222–4), then Pelasgus' immediate curiosity about the incongruence of their 'un-Greek' clothing (234–7; cf. 277–90) and 'Greek' suppliant posture (241–5). Pelasgus' own body only comes into textual focus with the dilemma itself, when the King '*shudders* (πέφρικα) to see this divine abode in shadow' (346).[80] The physical emotionality of this response resonates through the scene; later, the King declares that he is 'at a loss [while] fear grips [his] mind, whether to act or not to act and to take [his] chances' (ἀμηχανῶ δὲ καὶ φόβος μ' ἔχει φρένας | δρᾶσαί τε μὴ δρᾶσαί τε καὶ τυχὴν ἑλεῖν, 379–80). Such fear might seem to incapacitate the deliberator, but we should note its location in the rational φρένες, and the immediate focus on the available options;[81] so Rosenmeyer translates, 'fear grips me *as I think* / To act or not to act …' (my emphasis).[82] The same fearful expressions are correlated with comprehension in the *Agamemnon*: ξυνῆκα καὶ πέφρικα, καὶ φόβος μ' ἔχει | κλύοντ' ('I understand and shudder, and fear grips me, hearing [these things] …', 1243–4).[83] It should not surprise us, then, that the upshot of Pelasgus' long deliberation is not a conquest of fear but an embracing of it: ὕψιστος γὰρ ἐν βροτοῖς φόβος (479). Fear is not only the stimulus of his thought but also its medium and its final product.

The conclusion would certainly not have surprised Aristotle, who recognized that emotions comprised situational judgements as well as physiological phenomena (*De an.* 1.1 403a2–b19*)*.[84] As he saw it, these 'enmattered accounts' (λόγοι ἔνυλοί, 403a25) of the world were also essential to action (*De mot. an.* 702a18–20). *Phobos*, in particular, is said to be *bouleutikos*, 'deliberative', since it considers the means of escape (*Rh.* 1383a4–7). The association of deliberation and fear may in fact have been traditional: Herodotus has Artabanus praise as *aristos* 'the man who is timid (ἀρρωδέοι) while making plans (βουλευόμενος) because he takes into account all that may happen to him, but is bold in action' (7.49.5), and fear is often connected with effective planning in Thucydides' *History*.[85] It is, however, particularly Aeschylean. At the climax of the *Oresteia*, Athena will establish 'fear and

reverence' (σέβας … φόβος τε) in the βουλευτήριον on the Areopagus (*Eum.* 690–1). The *Persians* presents a worried chorus, whose 'mind is torn with fear' (φρὴν ἀμύσσεται φόβῳ, 115), settling down for 'deep-counselling thought' (φροντίδα … βαθύβουλον, 142). To reinforce the association of fear, thought, and counsel, the two phrases are combined, moments later, by Atossa: 'my heart is *torn* by *thought*' (καί με καρδίαν ἀμύσσει φροντίς, 161),[86] she says, before introducing her fears (φόβος, 168; cf. 162, 165), and seeking 'trusty counsel' (κέδν' ... βουλεύματα, 172). This φροντίς, etymologically derived from the φρήν, cannot be separated from it, or from the body as a whole; here in *Persians*, it seems to connect multiple bodies in a process of emotional deliberation.[87]

This same word for anxious thought, φροντίς, is the one chosen by Pelasgus to describe the necessary, fearful deliberation that will save the city and himself. Its embodiment in the *Suppliants*, however, takes a rather different form. This is the diving-eye image, highlighted by Snell. I quote again for convenience (407–9):

> δεῖ τοι βαθείας φροντίδος σωτηρίου
> δίκην κολυμβητῆρος ἐς βυθὸν μολεῖν
> δεδορκὸς ὄμμα μηδ' ἄγαν ὠνωμένον
>
> Deep thought is certainly needed to save us: the eye, like that of a diver, must scan right to the bottom – a clear-sighted eye, not one unduly fogged by wine …

The saving thought is lent substance by this remarkable image, and its evolving syntax. The audience is invited to see φροντίς first as a diver, incarnate in his plunging form; the infinitive that follows (μολεῖν) may be taken as 'epexegetic', a loose elaboration of the diver comparison. With the third line however, the infinitive is granted a subject, δεδορκὸς ὄμμα; the accusative construction perhaps depends on δεῖ. While common sense suggests that it must be the diver that 'goes right to the bottom', or at least the diver's eye, the final syntax forbids both: as David Sansone points out, 'in terms of the metaphor, the eye *is* the diver'. Sansone connects this image with other Aeschylean passages in which a 'personified' φρήν 'is explicitly said to "see" that which is not available to the corporeal eye' (*PV* 842–3; *Cho*. 854; *Eum*. 103–4, 275).[88] Here we have an emphasis on the special efficiency of this vision – the eye is a 'seeing' one – while the final phrase returns us to the 'tenor' of the image, the φρένες (cf. φροντίς) that is conventionally afflicted by wine. If deliberation is thus represented as a kind of 'sixth sense' (Sansone), the organ of that sense remains firmly located in the body.

How seriously should we take this embodiment?[89] Understanding Is Seeing is a conceptual metaphor shared across many languages, common enough to feature in Lakoff and Johnson's classic account of 'metaphors we live by'; their theory is that all such expressions have their root in embodied experience, and remain 'alive', however conventional.[90] There is nothing conventional, in any case, about the thinking eye of Pelasgus, which not only sees but moves *like a diver* through space and time (see below); the involvement of this third idea, this human figure, between the thinking and the seeing, emphatically and literally re-embodies the metaphor, and makes it new.

Metaphor may be the wrong framework, in fact, to consider such cognitive expressions in ancient Greece, where boundaries between the psychical and the physiological are not generally well defined.[91] When Aristotle reports that 'the ancients' (he quotes Homer and Empedocles for illustration) believed that 'understanding and perceiving were the same' (οἵ γε ἀρχαῖοι τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταὐτὸν εἶναί φασιν), he did not mean merely that they drew an analogy between the two; rather, he complains that they extend their materialist theory of perception – namely, the recognition of external substance by a matching internal substance – to the higher cognitive processes of understanding (τὸ φρονεῖν) and even thinking (τὸ νοεῖν).[92] Although Aristotle critiques these accounts, his own explanations of thought rely heavily on perceptual analogy; as Pia Campeggiani explains in this volume, the *phantasmata* on which 'thought' relies are experientially identical to *aisthēmata*.[93] Even Plato, whose ontology depends on an opposition between appearance and truth, emphasizes that the 'eyes of the soul' (τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα, *Resp*. 533d1–2; cf. 519b2, τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὄψιν) are not implanted by philosophical education but rather redirected from baser, visible objects to higher, intangible forms of the good (518b7–519b5).[94] There is thus in Classical thought a fundamental continuity of sight and insight, perception and conception. In these lines of Pelasgus, we see that philosophical continuity expressed in the 'thought' that becomes a diver's body that becomes an eye, tumbling out of its syntactic frame – yet still affected by the body, still dependent on its sobriety.[95]

The *Suppliants* is not philosophy, however, and Pelasgus' lines must be understood in their dramatic context, among the varieties of vision suggested by the text. It was the 'sight' of the Danaids that first 'freaked' Pelasgus (πέφρικα λεύσσων …, 346); however, at the start of the *epirrhēma*, he rejects their invitation to 'see [them] as a heifer chased by a wolf …', preferring to 'see', more literally, a 'company supplicating the assembled gods' (350–1, 354–5). These two different modes of seeing having been established (cf. 381), Pelasgus' diving eye seems to mark a third kind of vision – not seeing, or seeing *as*, but speculation which, however embodied, is 'abstract' insofar as it is unattached to any object onstage. The King presents this speculation as occasional rather than constant, and, in his next speech, as a distinctly *voluntary* activity, which he now declines: 'I declare I have completely stepped aside from this dispute; I would rather be ignorant than knowledgeable about these troubles' (ἦ κάρτα νείκους τοῦδ' ἐγὼ παροίχομαι | θέλω δ' ἄιδρις μᾶλλον ἢ σοφὸς κακῶν | εἶναι, 452–4). While before Pelasgus had required a 'seeing eye', now he wants to turn a blind one.[96]

Against his will, however, deliberative vision returns in the stichomythia that follows; it comes in a new and mediated form. The Danaids draw the King's (and the audience's) attention to their bodies – by way of their girdles, belts, and robes (457). These bodies are then grotesquely transformed into visual artefacts, as the Danaids threaten to 'adorn these images with votive tablets of a new kind' (νέοις πίναξιν βρέτεα κοσμῆσαι τάδε, 463). Once again, Pelasgus is asked to see the Danaids *as* something else; after initial resistance to their 'riddling' language (464), Pelasgus is soon made to *feel* it: 'I hear words that flay my heart' (ἤκουσα μαστικτῆρα καρδίας λόγον, 466). His embodied understanding of the threat is

recognized by the chorus-leader but reformulated as a kind of vision: ξυνῆκας· ὠμμάτωσα γὰρ σαφέστερον (467). This strange expression ('I have given you clearer sight')[97] obviously recalls Pelasgus' call for a δεδορκὸς ὄμμα back at 408. This time, however, the 'eye' is directed *by* and *at* the Danaids, who have 'clarified' the gruesome consequences of refusing their request through a vivid presentation of the future. The requested 'eye' has not emerged from 'inside' the King, as Snell would like it, but been granted by the Danaids; and where the protagonist invoked a subjective faculty of perception, ὄμμα as organ, they have provided a new object of perception, ὄμμα as spectacle. This spectacle remains 'imaginary', to the extent that it is prospective, but it is no longer abstract: Pelasgus is made to see, and feel, the bodies adorning the statues. With this enforced and mediated vision comes decision.[98]

V. Extension: Thinking through Space and Time

I have suggested above that the φροντίς of Pelasgus is not a private activity, but rather socially *embedded*, in his dialogue with the chorus; moreover, it is emotionally *embodied*, and experienced as a kind of perception. What, though, can we make of its famous 'depth' (407)? Surely this speaks to some kind of private interiority, some abstraction from the sensory world? So Snell implies. In fact, however, this invocation of depth is part of a complex psychological choreography in the play, whereby the mind is imagined to exist in a landscape of exploration. This landscape develops through the scene, climaxing in a true 'change of mind', with a new and intriguing understanding of its situation in time and space.

First, though, it is necessary to examine the archaic roots of this spatial conception of the mind, to show what is particular to Aeschylus' dramatic imagination. As Snell observes, depth is not a regular feature of the φρήν in the *Iliad*, although 'pain' once 'strikes Zeus deep in his φρήν'.[99] In the *Odyssey*, however, characters often 'build in the depths' (βυσσοδομεύω) when they are plotting evils in secret; these deep ponderings are sometimes explicitly located in the φρένες.[100] In elegy and lyric, deep thinking is no longer malevolent, and may suggest some knowledge of the future: so Pindar's Fates are βαθύφρονες (*Nem*. 7.1), and his Chiron is βαθυμῆτα (*Nem*. 3.53), while the tongue of the inspired poet 'draws song from his deep φρήν' (*Nem*. 4.8).[101] A patron's wealth, intriguingly, seems to 'support deeply-held ambitious thoughts' (*Ol*. 2.54).[102] Less ambiguous is the injunction of Theognis: 'Never make a mistake through haste, but plan in the depths of your heart (βαθείῃ | σῇ φρενὶ βούλευσαι) and with your good sense. The heart and mind of madmen are flighty (πέτεται), but planning (βουλή) leads to benefit and to good sense' (1051–4, tr. Gerber). This explicit association of depth, φρήν, and counsel is found also in Solon's 'deep-thinking (βαθύφρων) and deliberate (βουλήεις) man' (fr. 33.1 West). By the fourth century, the identification is so conventional that Plato can have Socrates say simply that Parmenides 'possesses some noble depth' (βάθος τι ἔχειν … γενναῖον, *Tht*. 184a2), and a deep *mind* is understood. Indeed, we may be dealing here with an ironic cliché.

At first glance, Aeschylus fits easily into this tradition. His Fury, like Pindar's Fates, is 'deep-thinking' (βυσσόφρων, *Cho*. 651), and the φροντίς βαθύβουλος of the *Persians* (142) would surely meet the approval of Theognis – although we should not forget the quite un-Theognidean sociality of that choral council. If good thinking is deep, then bad thinking is 'flighty' (ὑπόπτερος φροντίσιν, *Cho*. 603–4), as in Theognis (1051, cited above). Then there is the famous praise of Amphiaraus in the *Seven*, 'harvesting a deep (βαθεῖαν) furrow in his φρήν from which good counsels (βουλεύματα) grow' (593–4). Here all the conventional elements are present, together with a kind of fulsome provision, as suggested by Pindar's *Nemean* 4, above. The deep φροντίς of Pelasgus is usually read as another iteration in this tradition.

Yet none of these passages quite match the richness of the diver image: it is not only φροντίς that is βαθεῖα, but its objective – the ὄμμα must 'go to the bottom' (ἐς βυθὸν μολεῖν). Where archaic plans emerged *from* the depths, here the eye dives into them, searching for an answer. This kind of mental exploration is not found in Homer, Solon, or Theognis, although there is perhaps a hint of it in a Pindar fragment.[103] For the practice, we must look instead to Heraclitus, who seems the first to make the depth of the soul itself an area of exploration; indeed, the biographical tradition suggests a direct association of Heraclitus with intellectual *diving*. Diogenes Laertius quotes two sources: one says that 'the … work of Heraclitus was first brought into Greece by one Crates, who further said it required a Delian diver (Δηλίου τινὸς δεῖσθαι κολυμβητοῦ) not to be drowned in it'; another source attributes the same assessment of Heraclitus to Socrates.[104] Tempting though it is to connect these stories with the Aeschylus passage, both are more likely derived from the famous fragment with which Diogenes introduces his account of Heraclitus' doctrine (D98 LM = B 45 DK):

> ψυχῆς πείρατα ἰὼν οὐκ ἂν ἐξεύροι ὁ πᾶσαν ἐπιπορευόμενος ὁδόν· οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει.
>
> He who travels on every road would not find out the limits of the soul in the course of walking: so deep is its account.

Here depth is associated with the ψυχή, rather than the φρήν, and the two should not be confused – as they are by Snell's language of 'soul-searching'. Still, Heraclitus, like Pelasgus, presents intellectual inquiry as an exploration of profundity; and he conjures a landscape for this adventure, albeit a world without limits.[105] This world, as commentators have pointed out, is not simply metaphorical: 'the denial of limits involves an allusion to the supreme principle of cosmic structure'. Thus Heraclitus 'searching (within) himself' (ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν, D36 LM = B 101 DK) seeks the meaning of the universe, since 'the *logos* of the soul goes so deep that it coincides with the *logos* that structures everything in the world'.[106]

Such extended conceptions of the mind are common in Aeschylus, and thematized in the *Suppliants*.[107] Thus thinking is sometimes a matter of 'herding' thoughts,[108] but more often a 'road' or a 'track', leading to wisdom – a correct understanding of the world – or speech, or action.[109] These same tracks of thought

and intention are the means by which we understand the minds of others. Two passages, from the beginning and end of the *Suppliants*, offer a vivid illustration of this conception, as the Danaids reflect upon the mind of Zeus himself. First, in the *parodos*, the Danaids sing (87, 93–5):[110]

> Διὸς ἵμερος οὐκ εὐθήρατος ἐτύχθη·
> δαυλοὶ γὰρ πραπίδων
> δάσκιοί τε τείνου-
> σιν πόροι κατιδεῖν ἄφραστοι.
>
> The desire of Zeus is not easy to hunt out:
> the paths of his mind
> stretch tangled and shadowy,
> impossible to perceive or see clearly.

Although the inscrutability of Zeus' will is a 'well-established axiom' of archaic literature,[111] the mapping of his mind is not. Commentators suggest that 'the paths provide passage for [Zeus'] ἵμερος', or for his 'thought' more generally;[112] the antistrophe (91–2, 88–90) reports the conspicuous accomplishment of all his purposes, and the song goes on to marvel at how his φρόνημα is achieved without him lifting a finger (96–103). Yet implicit in οὐκ εὐθήρατος is a different journey, attempted not by Zeus but by the inquiry of mortals: δαυλοί and δάσκιοι continue this image of a hunt; the paths are κατιδεῖν ἄφραστοι not for Zeus, but for us.

This tracking down of Zeus' thinking is sometimes compared with the comments of the *Agamemnon* chorus on the news from Troy: '[The Trojans] can speak of the blow struck by Zeus; *that* [blow] can readily be traced (ἐξιχνεῦσαι) to its source' (367–8). Yet there is no 'mind' here, and the Elders are interpreting a *completed* act of Zeus – what the Danaids would call a πρᾶγμα τέλειον, a conspicuous act which 'blazes in all directions' (παντᾶι … φλεγέθει, 88). The obscure purposes of Zeus in the *Suppliants* belong not to the past but to the future: the Danaids are concerned with the exploration of this uncertainty. So, at the end of the play, the fearful Argives urge caution in this perilous venture (1047–9):

> ὅ τί τοι μόρσιμόν ἐστιν, τὸ γένοιτ' ἄν·
> Διὸς οὐ παρβατός ἐστιν
> μεγάλα φρὴν ἀπέρατος.
>
> Whatever is fated, you know, that will happen—
> the great, unfathomable mind of Zeus
> cannot be crossed.

Again, there is a doubleness. Zeus' will (φρήν≈φρόνημα) cannot be 'transgressed', in the normal, moral sense of παραβαίνω; at the same time, his mind is an ἀπέρατος expanse that, like the ψυχή of Heraclitus, literally cannot be traversed. Like the πράπιδες of the *parodos*, the divine φρήν is simultaneously a source of intention and a zone of exploration. The image is developed in the exchange that follows.

The Argives warn the Danaids that they 'do not know the future (τὸ μέλλον)' (1056), but the Danaids retort (1057–8):

> τί δὲ μέλλω φρένα Δίαν
> καθορᾶν, ὄψιν ἄβυσσον;
>
> How can I be expected to see into the mind
> of Zeus, gazing into its bottomless depths?

Punning on personal and impersonal constructions of probability (μέλλον/μέλλω), the Danaids add a note of subjectivity to the Argives' gnomic map of the μόρσιμον ('whatever is fated', 1047). At the same time, they reframe the horizontal infinity of Zeus' mind as a vertical abyss, emphasizing that it cannot be plumbed by human eyes. As in the *parodos*, this psychic region, defined by its obscurity, is extended through space into the future.

These passages help us to understand the spatial negotiations of Pelasgus in the course of his dilemma. First, in the diver image: Snell and Sansone suggest that the φρήν has not only an eye that sees but also a depth into which that eye descends. Richard Gaskin disagrees, arguing that the answer to his inquiry is not to be found in his 'soul'; instead, he would have Pelasgus dive deep 'into the *issue*', since, in Aeschylus as in Homer, 'a moral dilemma is a difficulty in the world and not in the self'.[113] My argument is that we need not choose between them. We have already seen that the 'clearer sight' offered by the Danaids is simultaneously a more perceptive eye and a more vivid image. Similarly, here, the world and the mind may be coextensive: diving into the one means diving into the other.

The dive, however, does not produce a solution, and in his following speech, Pelasgus appears to abort his marine explorations. Still the landscape develops. 'I have pondered,' he says, 'and this is where my thoughts have run aground' (438).[114] The nautical description that follows (440–1) is obscurely technical, but the King describes a ship on shore, 'bolted' and ready for sailing; yet he will not sail, 'since nowhere can [the ship] be directed without distress' (442).[115] It is not merely the 'boat of action' that remains unlaunched;[116] the boat of thought, too, is beached. Thus the refusal of vision, discussed above, is also a refusal of movement: his denial of the intellect is an intentional standing aside, a withdrawal from potential expeditions.

Both speeches represent the world of the mind as a marine one, into which one must plunge, and over which one might (not) sail. Just as the diver seeks for the bottom, the captain seeks for safe harbour. As for the origin of these excursions: the diver, we can assume, starts above the surface; the captain stands upon the shore. Thought, then, seems to comprise not just a departure from normal life but a change of element, too; the present, or actual experience, is definitively separated from the simulations of the mind.[117] Pelasgus' final speech, however, reflects a new topography, and, with it, a new phenomenology. The Danaids have 'opened his eyes', and now he says (468–71):

> †καὶ μὴν πολλαχῇ† γε δυσπάλαιστα πράγματα,
> κακῶν δὲ πλῆθος ποταμὸς ὡς ἐπέρχεται·

> ἄτης δ᾽ ἄβυσσον πέλαγος οὐ μάλ᾽ εὔπορον
> τόδ᾽ εἰσβέβηκα, κοὐδαμοῦ λιμὴν κακῶν.
>
> Truly this business is hard to wrestle with, in all sorts of ways; a host of troubles is coming at me like a river in spate. This is a bottomless sea of ruin, certainly not easily crossable, that I have stepped into, and nowhere is there a safe haven from trouble.

In a wrench of imagery, the dry land on which the captain stood is transformed by a flood. The world of dangerous mental simulation, from which he thought he could retire, overwhelms the present and the actual. This river of experience is a startling image, though it perhaps owes something to Heraclitus' doctrine of infinite flux:[118] the human mind surfs or sails upon a torrent of change. The river soon becomes a sea, πέλαγος, that is 'bottomless' and 'uncrossable', just like the φρήν of Zeus (1058, 1048–9); yet there is no question here of 'gazing' into it, like the Danaids, from the safety of the shore. Instead, Pelasgus is already embarked upon a sea that is both thought and action, as the future surges towards him.

This is a particularly tragic representation of the mind. Padel notes that the marine 'flux of feeling' is already present in the *Iliad*, with Nestor's indecision compared to a storm on the sea; the hearts of Homeric heroes sometimes 'swell up' like troubled water.[119] Then there is Semonides' stereotype of the unstable woman who is 'of the sea', and consequently 'thinks with twofold φρένες' (fr. 7.27 West). It is Aeschylus, however, who first makes the mind not a sea but a ship, navigating internal and external storms. The image is there in the *Persians*, when Cyrus is praised for 'turning the tiller of his φρένες' (767); and again in *Agamemnon* where the chorus confess their former criticism of the King, 'not managing well the tiller of his wits (πραπίδες)' (802).[120] The latter is particularly apt, since it is Agamemnon's naval expedition to Troy that is under review: as with Pelasgus, boats of thought and action are hardly distinguishable. In the *Libation Bearers*, 'a thought … hovering within the φρήν' becomes a 'harsh wind of anger … blow[ing] ahead of the prow of [the] heart' (389–93). Elsewhere the ship is more implicit, as when Electra is 'assailed by a surge of bile' against her καρδία, then pours forth a 'flood' of tears, as she is 'tossed about in two minds (δίφροντις)' (183–5, 196), or Agamemnon at Aulis 'blow[s] together with the blasts of fortune' and his 'mental (φρενός) wind veer[s] in a direction that [is] impious' (*Ag*. 187, 219; cf. *Sept*. 705–8). Similar imagery can be found in Sophocles and Euripides.[121]

Such images form part of a larger network of nautical images in Aeschylus, and in Greek tragedy, often linked to the fortunes of the *polis*. This imagery has been tied to social and historical developments in fifth-century Athens, as an increasingly democratic naval superpower. While it would be unwise to deny the relevance of this context, it should be noted that the 'ship of state' motif is not exclusive to tragedy, or to Athens. The mind embarked upon the sea, however, does not appear in epic or elegy, and is largely absent from lyric.[122] This fact should make us consider whether there might be something peculiarly dramatic about this representation, something essential to the enactment of thought within a theatre. The protagonist 'thinks' in a world that is changing around them. In their moment

of crisis, time does not stand still as it does in epic; news and events roll in from the *eisodoi*, from the *skēnē*, even from the orchestra itself. They speak in an environment that responds to their words even as they utter them. There is no place of mental stillness, no 'harbour from evils', as Pelasgus puts it; the stage itself is the sea of ruin on which they have embarked.

VI. Conclusion: The Mind of the Theatre

I began this chapter by considering the historical occlusion of the mind in the theatre, an occlusion that I traced to Aristotle. Drama shows people πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντας, 'actually doing things': this is a mode of *mimēsis* that seems to leave little room for 'thought'. Yet one of the most important things that people 'do' on the tragic stage is 'think', and they do so in a particularly dramatic way.

Re-examining Snell's opposition of Aeschylus to Homer, my argument has shown that what distinguishes Aeschylus' Pelasgus is not the emergence of a private and abstract sense of self, but precisely the opposite: deliberation becomes both a social and an intensely embodied activity; the mind has a depth defined by external as well as internal investigation, and a dynamic interrelation with time and space. All of these features are *theatrical*, in the sense that they reflect certain conditions of dramatic performance: the presence of a chorus, the body of the actor, the observation of spectators, and the immediate unfolding of the plot.

This may seem to lead to a tautological conclusion: as Aeschylus brings the mind into the theatre, the mind becomes theatrical. Yet this tautology is both necessary and radical. It is necessary as a corrective to Snell's crude progressivism: the Greek mind is not evolving towards a pre-defined Enlightenment, but finding new modes of expression, adapting to new forms of culture. Indeed, we should recognize not only that the mind is embodied and that 'reason' is an activity that exists in common, as Heraclitus says,[123] but also – and this is the radical proposition – that the mind has no existence apart from the cultural forms that it takes. There is no substrate of mental experience, no residue of self that escapes the machine of culture; the private faculty of imagination is an invention of the community, contingent upon the very forms that it is supposed to generate.[124]

Abbreviations

Abbreviations of ancient authors and texts, as well as scholarly reference works, generally follow those of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, fourth edition; abbreviations of journal titles follow those of *L'Année Philologique*. Exceptions are listed below.

FJW = Friis Johansen, H. and E. W. Whittle (eds) 1980. *Aeschylus: The Suppliants*. København: Gyldendalske Boghandel.

Notes

1 Plato's puppet-theatre: *Resp.* 514a–519a. cf. Berkeley (1998: 126, §64 – first published in 1710). For a critique of this 'Cartesian Theatre', see Dennett (1991); for the

absence of such a theatre in Aristotle, see Caston (2021) and Campeggiani (this volume, pp. 94–6). For an enactive 'Heideggerian Theatre' of the embodied mind, see Clark & Eilan (2006: 62–4), cited by Meineck (2017: 22–3). See also Clark (2008: 216–7).

2 Hume (2007: 165, I.4.6.4 – first published in 1739/40). On the importance of this theatre within Hume's *Treatise*, see Johnson (1995: 285–310) and Stradella (2011).

3 As well as more recent 'cognitive' work such as Davis (2007) and Lyne (2011), see Grazia's (1989) critical history of 'interiority' in Shakespearean scholarship.

4 So, e.g., Griffith in his introduction to *Antigone* (1999: 38), cited by Budelmann & Easterling (2010: 290).

5 μιμεῖσθαι … πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντας … πράττοντας γὰρ μιμοῦνται καὶ δρῶντας, Arist. *Poet.* 3.1448a23–8. Aristotle attributes the etymology to 'some people', but without contradiction; for modern linguists (e.g. Chantraine [1968–80] and Beekes [2010] s.v. δράω), it is uncontroversial.

6 μίμησις πράξεως, 6.1449b24.

7 6.1450a15–38.

8 6.1450b4: τρίτον δὲ ἡ διάνοια. *Ethos* is later given a short chapter of its own (15.1454a15–b18), while *dianoia* gets a single paragraph (19.1456a33–b8).

9 See n. 10 and LSJ s.v. διάνοια, II and III, including Pl. *Soph.* 263e3–5: ὁ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὑτὴν διάλογος ... ἐπωνομάσθη διάνοια.

10 6.1450a6–7; 1450b4–5. This is a political or rhetorician's art, he says, and accordingly directs his students to the *Rhetoric* for a fuller treatment (1456a34–6). On the relationship between ethical and rhetorical *dianoia* in the *Poetics*, see Dale (1959); Halliwell (1998: 154–6); and esp. Blundell (1992).

11 See n. 3, and Gill (1996a: 107–13) on the essays of A. C. Bradley.

12 See especially Jones (1962). Gould (1978) and Heath (1987: ch. 4) emphasize the formal constraints of tragic characterization.

13 Easterling (1973: 10).

14 For a defence of the approach, see esp. Gill (1996a) and Seidensticker (2008; 2009). See also the chapters on tragedy in Pelling (1990), and by van Emde Boas (2017a; 2017b) and Lloyd (2017) in Temmerman & Emde Boas (2017).

15 The relations between tragedy and public oratory, on the other hand, are well covered by recent scholarship: see e.g. Bers (1994); Pelling (2005); Sansone (2012).

16 As pointed out by Hall (2009: 75, 79; 2012: 314), though see Lawrence (2013), discussed below. I leave aside here the interesting but rather different inquiry of, e.g., Billings (2021) into Greek tragedy as a vehicle for philosophical speculation; I am interested in the representation of 'thought' *within* the drama.

17 Padel (1992); see also Padel (1995). On the significance of these books, see Gill (1996b). On Aeschylus, see also Sansone (1975) (metaphors); Thalmann (1986); and Sullivan (1997) (terminology).

18 See esp. Padel (1990).

19 E.g. Wiles (1997: 76–7, 167–8), who prefers a centre-periphery polarity (focused on the putative *thymelē*) to Padel's inside/outside opposition (focused on the *skēnē*); Rehm (2002), who is 'wary of [such] overly dualistic schemes' and prefers a more 'interactive' and 'transformative notion of space' (21–2), deals with spaces of time and memory in ch. 5; cf. Kampourelli (2016).

20 McConachie & Hart (2006); Rokotnitz (2018).

21 E.g. Budelmann & Easterling (2010); Scodel (2017).

22 Budelmann, Teasdale & Maguire (2013).

23 Budelmann & Easterling (2010: 292).

24 Meineck (2017: 5). Meineck is not a full social constructionist but advocates for a 'biocultural' mind.

25 Hall (2009; 2012); Hesk (2011; 2017). There is also a substantial bibliography on Medea's 'divided self' speech (*Med*. 1021–79), including a passage in Snell's *Discovery*

(1953: 123–7; cf. 1964: 47–56); see esp. Foley (1989); Gill (1996a: 216–26); Lawrence (2013: 210–30), with the criticism of Marinis (2013: 240–3).

26 My investigation thus complements that of Phillips in the following chapter, which addresses the 'formal attunement' of the imagination in tragic lyric. While Phillips is concerned with the multiplicity of available perspectives, however, I am focused on the single (though supersized) deliberative process attributed to the protagonist.

27 I adapt these terms from recent work in cognitive psychology, emphasizing the role played by the body and its material and social environment in cognitive processes. Such processes are held to be *embodied*, *embedded*, *enactive*, and *extended*. The boundaries between 'embedded' and 'extended' are often disputed, but 'embedded' usually refers to a 'dependent' relationship, while 'extended' describes a 'constitutive' one. For a recent survey, see Newen, De Bruin & Gallagher (2018). Here, though I argue that the social component of Pelasgus' deliberation is constitutive, I call it 'embedded', to avoid confusion with the spatial 'extension' that I discuss later on. On the socially extended mind, see Gallagher (2013). For the 'enactive' nature of Aristotelian *phantasia*, see Campeggiani (this volume).

28 Snell's arguments for Aeschylus' originality are first made in his 1928 dissertation, *Aischylos und das Handeln im Drama* (52–65 on *Suppliants*); see also Snell (1964: 1–22).

29 Snell's narrow conception of lyric experience is to be contrasted with Phillips' (this volume) expansive account of the multiplying subjectivities available to the audience.

30 All Aeschylean text and translation is quoted from Sommerstein's (2008) Loeb edition.

31 Snell (1953: 101–2).

32 Snell (1953: 103).

33 Wolff (1929); Lloyd-Jones (1967); Gaskin (1990); Cairns (2019).

34 Jahn (1987).

35 Gill (1996a: 11–41). See also Williams (1993: esp. 21–74). For a recent account of 'psychosomatic identity' in Homer, see Long (2015: 15–50).

36 See e.g. Williams (1993); Clarke (1999).

37 Friis Johansen & Whittle (1980) (hereafter FJW); Conacher (1996); Bowen (2013); Sommerstein (2019); Miralles, Citti & Lomiento (2019). There is no mention of Snell in Sommerstein's 2010 survey of Aeschylus, nor in two recent volumes on his reception (Constantinidis [2016]; Kennedy [2017]).

38 Lawrence (2013: 8). Cf. Lloyd-Jones (1971); Lesky (1961), cited by Gagarin (1976: 24); Gaskin (1990: esp. 14–15); Thumiger (2007: 30–8); Judet de la Combe (2009: 294–5).

39 Gregory (2005: 260).

40 Saïd (2005: 223). Cf. Thumiger (2007: 48) and Hall (2009: 76), who suggests, 'Aeschylean characters deliberate less than those in the other two tragedians, since his characters are more "embedded" in the actions represented in his dramas, and their fates more "externally" determined'.

41 Bowen (2013: 23).

42 Rutherford (2012: 316); Seidensticker (2009: 220–1 – 'abstrakt Konflikt zweier Pflichten'). For bibliography on the character of Eteocles, see Lawrence (2007). For Agamemnon, see Easterling (1973); Lawrence (2013). For a good recent overview, with a narratological slant, of the problems of characterization in Aeschylus, see van Emde Boas (2017a) (Pelasgus discussed at 327).

43 So Gill (1996a: 31).

44 Main event: Tarkow (1970); Susanetti (2018); Carroll (forthcoming). Foil: Lesky (1966); Edwards (1977: 22); Sewell-Rutter (2007: 162 – where Pelasgus is merely 'the king in the *Supplices*'); Lawrence (2013: 44). Nussbaum's influential 1985 article, 'Aeschylus and Practical Conflict', finds no room for Pelasgus at all.

45 The relevant document (*P. Oxy* 2256, fr. 3), a didaskalic notice of Aeschylus' victory with a Danaid play *in competition with Sophocles* – dictating a production date no

earlier than c. 470 BCE – was published in 1952. Yet scholars, convinced by their literary judgement of the *Suppliants*' archaic features, continued for some time to argue for an earlier date; even now, some (e.g. Scullion [2002]) are sceptical. On the controversy, see Garvie (1969: 1–28), who laments in a recent review that, despite the widely accepted downdating, the *Suppliants* is still regarded as 'primitive[,] … simple and inferior' (2020: 321).

46 Holmes (2020: 365). Holmes makes an interesting case for *Discovery* as an 'Undead Text', not because it is much studied now, but because it combines the two 'Undead Narratives' of our discipline: the Greeks as progenitors of 'Western Civ', and the Greeks as a primitive Other. For the intellectual and political context of Snell's work, see Lohse (1997). For cuneiform ('oriental') antecedents to Snell's Greek enlightenment, and other critical observations, see Burkert (2004).

47 See discussion in Edwards (1977). Xerxes' fateful decision (to invade Greece) is in the past of the *Persians*, while the jurors of the *Eumenides* deliberate in silence. Athena's final vote is announced without any suggestion of deliberation.

48 As with his selection of other Theban champions, Eteocles presents his decision and his reasons at the same time: *Sept.* 672–3.

49 On the embedded speech in this passage, see Uhlig (2019: 66–80).

50 The frantic deliberation of the *Agamemnon* chorus (1346–71) is slightly longer. Though sometimes seen as an organizational failure, the chorus' fragmentation into separate voices reflects a general truth in tragedy – and perhaps in Classical Athens – that decisions are made in dialogue. See Budelmann (2018).

51 *Rhēsis*: speech in iambic metre, without musical accompaniment.

52 *Stichomythia*: rapid iambic exchange, in which interlocutors speak alternate lines.

53 The consequential decision is made by the Argive assembly. Burian (2006 – first published 1974), after reviewing other explanations given for the decision scene's inclusion, argues compellingly that it is intended to draw out the tragedy's definition of 'Greekness'.

54 *Epirrhēma* (in tragedy): exchange between chorus and actor, involving both speech and song.

55 So Podlecki (2013: 132), cited (and rejected) by Sommerstein (2019: 39 n. 130).

56 Bowen (2013) *ad* 418. Cf. Rosenmeyer (1982: 305): 'The materials that must go into [Pelasgus'] pondering are given in a brief chorus song that is delivered while the king is silent…'.

57 Snell (1953: 106): 'Pelasgus, Achilles, Eteocles, Orestes, all the Aeschylean heroes cannot be made to swerve from their course of action, however powerful the motives operating against it may be.'

58 Even in the lines that follow, Pelasgus gives no indication of his personal intentions, but simply distributes instructions to others; his plan to summon an assembly is only revealed at 517.

59 ὕψιστος is an epithet of Zeus at *Eum*. 28 (cf. Soph. *Trach*. 1191, Ζηνὸς ὕψιστον πάγον) and Pausanias has him worshipped under this name at Thebes and Olympia; there was a shrine to Zeus Hupatos on the Athenian Acropolis (Paus. 1.26.5). Whether Pelasgus' elevation of the *fear* of Zeus is in fact conventional cannot be known, but compare Soph. *Phil*. 1289, ἀπώμοσ' ἀγνοῦ Ζηνὸς ὑψίστου σέβας.

60 Cf. *Ag*. 218–9, ἀνάγκας ἔδυ λέπαδνον, with the excellent reading of Judet de La Combe (2009: 291–8), who demonstrates that 'le roi ne sacrifice aucune liberté[;] il analyse, et décide'. Lesky (1966: 79–81) suggests that a combination of freedom and compulsion is implied by *Supp*. 478–9; Cairns (1993: 192 n. 44) rightly cautions that this ἀνάγκη should not be seen as a divine or 'external' force, but a 'virtual compulsion … imposed by the recognition [of the] consequences'. For the formula, ὅμως δ' ἀνάγκη, cf. Aesch. *Pers*. 254, 293; Eur. *Hipp*. 990, *Supp*. 167, *Hec*. 1241.

61 Griffith (2009: 25, with n. 130).

62 Papadopoulou (2011: 43); Bowen (2013: 24).
63 Burian (2006: 204); cf. Turner (2001: 35–6).
64 Papadopoulou (2011: 42). Cf. Parker (2009: 136): 'moral blackmail'; Susanetti (2018: 190): 'aggravated blackmail'; Hose (2014: 44): 'Erpressung'.
65 Conacher (1996: 91): 'incipient violence'; Bowen (2013 *ad* 455–79): 'the paradoxical violence of the weaker party'. For a sophisticated, structuralist discussion of violence in the play, see Brill (2009).
66 Sommerstein (2010: 97–8).
67 Rosenmeyer (1982: 305).
68 Turner (2001: 46); Bowen (2013: 3).
69 Susanetti (2018: 191–2).
70 οὐκ ἄνευ δήμου τάδε| πράξαιμ' ἄν, οὐδέ περ κρατῶν. Consensus now holds this participle to be concessive (Sommerstein (2008): 'I am not prepared to do these things without the people's approval, even though I have the power'), though there are holdouts for a conditional sense ('even if I did have the power'). Either way, the chorus are engaging the King on a lexical level.
71 For further verbal correspondences, see FJW *ad* 348–437.
72 Sommerstein (2019) *ad loc.*; cf. FJW: 'an almost certain reminiscence'. Without noting the allusion, Thumiger (2007: 31–2) briefly compares the two scenes, concluding that the 'decision-making process is developed in a similar way', depending on the 'felt presence of a *stable* [external] world'. She neglects the dynamic role of the chorus.
73 For the integration of 'moral' concerns in these practical deliberations, see Lawrence (2003); unfortunately, he ignores Hector's subsequent flight (on which, see Hutchinson [2020: 73–6]).
74 *De an.* 3.7 431a17; 3.11 434a7–10. For the compatibility of Homeric deliberation with Aristotelian 'practical reasoning', see Gill (1996a: 41–93), and especially 55 n. 88 on deliberative *phantasia*. For the enactive quality of imaginative experience in Aristotle, see Campeggiani (this volume).
75 Cf. Gill (1996a: 55): 'Homeric monologues can be seen as exemplifying – or prefiguring – Aristotle's specifications for the types of rationality that are characteristic of developed human beings.'
76 Hector's deliberations are preceded by the appeals of his father and mother from the walls (38–89), but they are not persuasive (οὐδ' Ἕκτορι θυμὸν ἔπειθον, 91, cf. 78); he does not respond to their arguments.
77 Fartzoff (2017).
78 Cf. Aristotle's intriguing comparison of embodied performance in tragedy and epic (*Poet*. 26.1461b–1462a18).
79 Taplin (1977) rightly challenges the 'crowd ballet' interpretation of the play, while admitting a powerful spectacular element.
80 For the physiological significance of φρίκη, see Cairns (2015).
81 Cf. FJW *ad loc.*: 'it is the outcome of a reflection'; Snell (1928: 60): 'der *phobos*, der schon aus der Reflexion entstanden ist, treibt zu immer neuem Nachdenken'. For the specific role of the φρένες in Aeschylus, see esp. Thalmann (1986), as well as Sansone (1975); Sullivan (1997).
82 Rosenmeyer (1982: 304). Compare Danaus' advice to his terrified daughters: 'since you are afraid, take thought …' (σὺ δὲ | φρόνει μὲν ὡς ταρβοῦσα …, 772–3).
83 On these lines, Budelmann & Easterling (2010: 297) note that 'dread … do[es] not so much detract from rational understanding as support it'.
84 The *De anima* advances a holistic approach to the emotions, embracing both the 'dialectician's' account, and the 'physician's' account. The *Rhetoric*, for obvious reasons, favours the dialectician's; *De motu animalium* favours the physician's.
85 See Romilly (1956); Desmond (2006).

86 Recent translators (Hall [1996]; Sommerstein [2008]; Collard [2008]) obscure the resonance of the two phrases by rendering the chorus' φροντίς as 'thought', but Atossa's as 'anxiety'.
87 On emotions, feelings, and reason, see Damasio (1994).
88 Sansone (1975: 22; cf. 16–18). For the complex logic of this metaphor, see also Silk (1974: 96).
89 For Sansone, for instance, this is '*pure* noetic activity', altogether distinct from 'cognition' (i.e. sense-perception).
90 Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 48); for the relationship between this metaphor and the 'depth' of an argument, see 103–5.
91 A controversial topic: for the anti-metaphorical view of the psychic organs, see Thalmann (1986); Padel (1992: 44 – 'imagery is not a vehicle of explanation but embodies it').
92 *De an*. 3.3 427a21–9.
93 pp. 91–3.
94 For the same image, see 540a6–9, discussed by Petraki in this volume, p. 187. On the importance of the body's eye for the mind's eye in Plato, see Frede (1999). Nightingale (2004), who prefers a two-world understanding of Plato's metaphysics, suggests that metaphysical 'sight' is merely a 'literary analogy' in the *Republic*, but emphasizes the attributes that it shares with worldly sight (107–13). Cf. Gorg. *Hel.* §13, τοῖς τῆς δοξῆς ὄμμασιν, discussed by Fearn in this volume (p. 234).
95 In Aristotle's terms, this is still 'affective thought'/'passive intellect' (ὁ παθητικὸς νοῦς, *De an.* 3.5 430a24–5), rather than the separable, immortal, 'productive intellect' (ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν [νοῦς], 430a16); see Miller (2018: xl–xlii).
96 For the association of ἄιδρις with sight, cf. Soph. *Aj*. 911, where it is partnered with κωφός.
97 Bowen (2013): 'I have given you clear sight'; Sommerstein (2008): 'I have opened your eyes to see more clearly'; Collard (2008): 'I have opened your eyes quite clearly'. For the verb, cf. *Cho*. 854.
98 On the simultaneity of cognition and volition in ancient Greek decisions from Homer to Aristotle, see Gaskin (1990: 5–6).
99 Snell (1953: 17–18); *Il.* 19.125: τὸν δ' ἄχος ὀξὺ κατὰ φρένα τύψε βαθεῖαν. The depth here may be a transferred attribute of the wound caused by the strike – see Edwards (1991) *ad loc.*; Sullivan (1988: 74–5, 135–6). For Zeus' φρήν as a seat of deliberation, see *Il.* 2.3 (μερμηρίζω), 16.435 (ὁρμαίνω) and *Od*. 3.132 (μήδομαι); as Sullivan (1994: 109–10) points out, other φρένες are involved in similar intellectual activities, but only Zeus' is 'deep'.
100 *Od.* 4.476, 17.66, 8.273. Cf. [Hes.] *Scu*. 30. Snell (see the previous note) ignores these passages, crediting the invention of depth to the lyric poets and to Heraclitus. For discussion of these images within the framework of conceptual metaphor theory, see Horn (2016).
101 ῥῆμα … ὅ τι κε … | γλῶσσα φρενὸς ἐξέλοι βαθείας. Cf. Pind. fr. 52h.18–20 (discussed in n. 103 below) and Eup. fr. 336 μουσικὴ πρᾶγμ' ἐστὶ βαθύ τι.
102 βαθεῖαν ὑπέχων μέριμναν ἀγροτέραν. Interpretation uncertain: my translation is Willcock's (1995: *ad loc*.).
103 Pi. fr. 52h.18–20 τ]υφλᾳ[ὶ γὰ]ρ ἀνδρῶν φρένες, | ὅ]στις ἄνευθ' Ἑλικωνιάδων | βαθεῖαν ε..[..].ων ἐρευνᾷ σοφίας ὁδόν. This is probably the 'path of song' rather than of thought: cf. *Ol.* 9.104–7. On road metaphors in Pindar, see Steiner (1986: 76–86); across Greek literature, see Becker (1937) (Aeschylus on 151–94).
104 Diog. Laert. 9.12, 2.12. The parallel with the *Suppliants* passage is noted by FJW, *ad loc.*, and Kahn (1979: 312 n. 117).
105 Padel (1992: 41–2) compares Heraclitus' ventures ('by "every path," he seems to suggest paths both outside in the world and within the soul itself') with the πόροι νοήσαι of Empedocles.

106 Kahn (1979: 128, 130). Kahn compares Democritus ἐν βυθῷ γὰρ ἡ ἀλήθεια (ATOM. D24 LM = 68 B 117 DK). For a different interpretation of Heraclitus' deep *logos*, see Burkert (2004: 179).
107 For the influence of Heraclitus on Aeschylus, see Gladigow (1962), as well as Seaford (2003) and Scapin (2020: 51–75) (all focused on *Oresteia*).
108 *Supp*. 929, *Ag*. 669; see Sansone (1975: 27–8).
109 Wisdom: *Ag*. 176, 367–8; *PV* 497–8. Speech: *Eum*. 988–9. Action: *Supp*. 1017. See Sansone (1975: 29–31). For other tragic iterations of intellectual iteration, see Soph. *Ant*. 225–6 and *OT* 67–9, with Finglass (2018) *ad loc.*
110 I adopt Westphal's universally accepted transposition of 88–90 and 93–5.
111 FJW *ad loc*. See e.g. Hes. *Op*. 483.
112 FJW and Sommerstein (2019) *ad loc*. Cf. Hom. *Il*. 24.514 καί οἱ ἀπὸ πραπίδων ἦλθ' ἵμερος ἠδ' ἀπὸ γυίων.
113 Gaskin (1990: 14), emphasis original.
114 καὶ δὴ πέφρασμαι, δεῦρο δ' ἐξοκέλλεται. The subject is unexpressed, but see FJW and Sommerstein (2019) *ad loc*.
115 ἄνευ δὲ λύπης οὐδαμοῦ καταστροφή. FJW, whose rendering I borrow, highlight the local emphasis of οὐδαμοῦ, and justify a directional sense for καταστροφή, via καταστρέφειν (LSJ s.v. IV).
116 So Carroll (forthcoming), to whose argument for 'cognitive metaphor' I am indebted. He does not, however, attend to the wider context of the episode, or the role of the Danaids.
117 On the distinction between online and off-line experience, see Campeggiani (this volume).
118 Though the form of Heraclitus' famous expression is hard to pin down, the essential ingredients are manifest in Pl. *Crat*. 402a8–10: λέγει που Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει καὶ ποταμοῦ ῥοῇ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα λέγει ὡς δὶς ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης.
119 Nestor: Hom. *Il.* 14.16–20; Swelling hearts: 21.551, *Od.* 4.427, etc. See Padel (1992: 81–8), who draws connections also with Hippocrates, Empedocles, Plato, and Aristotle.
120 I translate more literally than Sommerstein (2008) here.
121 See e.g. Soph. *Ant*. 137, 929–30, *Aj*. 206–7. Euripides has a character bailing out one wave of troubles from the φρήν, only to be struck by another at the stern (*Ion* 927–8); see also Hecuba's nautical toils in *Tro.* 102–37, discussed by Barlow (2008: 52–4). On Aristophanic imagery, see Taillardat (1962) (e.g. 'l'ouragon de la colère', 180–6); in comedy, emphasis is given to the effect of such mindstorms upon others, rather than to their subjective experience.
122 For Pindar's maritime imagery, see Steiner (1986: 66–75). Among the various ships of state and of song, there are occasional suggestions of a ship of thought; most relevant are *Pyth*. 9.32 (φόβῳ δ' οὐ κεχείμανται φρένες) and *Nem*. 3.26–7 (θυμέ, τίνα πρὸς ἀλλοδαπὰν | ἄκραν ἐμὸν πλόον παραμείβεαι;).
123 HER. D2 LM = 22 B 2 DK τοῦ λόγου δ' ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν.
124 I would like to thank Felix Budelmann for suggestive comments on an earlier version of this piece, an audience at Corpus Christi, Oxford, for some helpful interventions, and Emily Clifford for guiding it to its final form.

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Epilogue

The Ancient Imagination in Retrospect

Jaś Elsner and Michael Squire

> And as imagination bodies forth
> The forms of things unknown…
>
> Shakespeare, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act V, scene 1

'Imagination' is one of the defining concepts of European thought.[1] Since the Hellenistic and Roman periods, under the distinct but related rubric of *phantasia*,[2] it has been the nexus for understanding relationships between human subjectivity and the objects it creates – whether conceptual, musical, artistic, spoken, or written, whether materially instantiated (not least through the visual arts), or else (like dreams and trains of thought) situated in the realm of fancy.[3] In the wake of the Enlightenment in particular, and with the rise of aesthetics as a self-standing branch of philosophy, imagination has been championed as a – arguably *the* – defining characteristic of human subjectivity. The imaginative is the space and the energy between a given object or thing and the individual mind – comprising the multiple and individual but to a certain extent potentially shared subjectivities of creators, performers, audiences, and beholders. In the individual mind, imagination synthesizes the sensorial inputs of our experience in the context of memory, desire, and aversion to create our characteristic personal range of responses to, and fantasies about, the world. Among a number of minds in a given environment, it triangulates the objects on which it focuses between the variety of subjects on whom those objects impinge. Imagination mediates between self and the world out there – between ourselves and the worlds we create in our own minds.

Questions of how much imaginative experience can in fact be communicated from one person to another, or is fully collective between individual subjectivities, are moot. So too are questions about the extent to which neural hard-wiring and cognitive functions determine or are influenced by the vast range of personal conditioning and cultural experience that each individual brings to her or his imaginative instincts.[4] Anyone who has watched a dog sleeping and reacting to dreams, for example, will know that on some level the imaginary extends beyond the human into the animal world: for all its associations with human ingenuity, imagination is not the sole prerogative of *Homo sapiens*. The puzzles about the imagination remain in active and vibrant play as much today as they have done for thousands of

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years. Indeed, it might be said that without imagination, much of human creativity, achievement, and activity is unimaginable.

It is well known that the complex of concepts that established the Western notion of the imagination was developed in ancient Greek philosophical, scientific, and cultural thought in the centuries after Plato and Aristotle.[5] By the golden age of Greek letters in the Roman empire, during the second and third centuries CE, a time of acute theoretical reflection on all kinds of art and creativity, the great Athenian intellectual and cultural historian Philostratus had formulated a model of *phantasia* that has come to underpin so much thinking ever since (despite the conspicuous differences between modern ideas of the creative imagination and ancient ideas of *phantasia*). These are the words Philostratus placed in the mouth of his wise holy man, Apollonius of Tyana, in the great biography of him written in the second decade of the third century CE (*VA* 6.19.2):[6]

> Φαντασία, ἔφη, ταῦτα εἰργάσατο σοφωτέρα μιμήσεως δημιουργός: μίμησις μὲν γὰρ δημιουργήσει, ὃ εἶδεν, φαντασία δὲ καὶ ὃ μὴ εἶδεν, ὑποθήσεται γὰρ αὐτὸ πρὸς τὴν ἀναφορὰν τοῦ ὄντος, καὶ μίμησιν μὲν πολλάκις ἐκκρούει ἔκπληξις, φαντασίαν δὲ οὐδέν, χωρεῖ γὰρ ἀνέκπληκτος πρὸς ὃ αὐτὴ ὑπέθετο.
>
> *Phantasia*, he said, made these things that are wiser (*sophōtera)* than imitation (*mimēsis*). Imitation will create what it knows. But *phantasia* can also create what it does not know, conceiving it with reference to the real. Imitation is often frustrated by shock. But nothing will frustrate *phantasia* as it goes on imperturbably towards the purpose it has conceived.

Here already we have a conceptual resonance with our epigraph from *A Midsummer Night's Dream*: the possibility of bodying forth the forms of things unknown. Fundamentally, however we value *mimēsis* and verisimilitude in any area of the arts (extending in the modern world to virtual reality),[7] the claim is that imagination as a faculty of the human mind can deliver still more – whether a divine world not normally accessible to humans (as is implied by Philostratus in the larger context of the quotation just cited), or any other world we might imagine.

***

The roots of the thinking that gave rise to this major conceptual innovation in the European tradition go back further: they lie in Archaic and Classical Greek thought. While there has been some attempt to trace the intellectual history of that trajectory,[8] notably in the study of ancient philosophical reflection, a larger cultural account of imagination in earlier antiquity has never been fully accomplished.

The volume published here is mainly the work of younger scholars dissatisfied with a number of traditional disciplinary assumptions and keen to push the envelope of the study of the imagination beyond philosophical inquiry *per se.* Its immense significance is that it opens a large and marvellous trajectory for exploring

the genesis of European self-reflection on the sources of imaginative creativity from within what was already by the end of the fourth century BCE a canonical series of creative contributions in literature and the visual arts. One of the principal things the book does is to put the study of ancient philosophy – far too often conducted in isolationist terms or in dialogue with later Western philosophy rather than with contemporary ancient thinking – in conversation with cultural history. It shows how developments in theorizing the world themselves have a historical context – and are the product of the cultural-historical parameters that gave rise to them.

At the core of this volume is also an intellectual-historical thesis: namely, that the interface between the mind and the external world came to be radically rethought in fifth-century BCE Classical Athens. More than that, contributors have demonstrated how cultural artefacts themselves mediated that interface and made it known. They have done so through an impressive range of extant media – not only texts (in different genres, from drama to lyric poetry, rhetorical treatises to lawcourt speeches), but also objects and images (including free-standing sculpture, vase painting, and state-decree reliefs). The authors consequently look across different subdisciplines in order to point to intersections in intellectual and cultural history. The book advances an open or 'pluralistic' approach to the great theme of Classical Athenian mentalization. Wherever chapters have looked, their concern has been not only with how the mind came to be conceptualized – implicitly or explicitly – in Classical Athens, but also with the ways in which cultural artefacts themselves mediated such conceptualizations: they have championed the need to investigate the treatment of imagination in contexts in which its workings are seen 'in action' rather than as explicitly theorized, and in the absence of critical terminology.

As the editors and contributors are quick to remind us, however, 'imagination' is an inherently slippery term. One way of characterizing the intellectual shifts treated in the book would be in terms of cultural practices of thinking, and not least a self-reflexivity about the processes involved. At the same time, there is space for exploring the origins of such self-reflection in the cultural epiphenomena of the world before democratic Athens – notably in Archaic art and literature, for example. At the core of the essays in the volume is the problem of how to label the concept of the imagination – given not only all its modern cultural baggage (associated above all with the Romantics of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries), but also the development of ancient critical terminology. Here the emic critical category of *phantasia* and the nominalist problem of how to characterize the intellectual history of the concept before the formation of an associated technical vocabulary are key. As a critical term, *phantasia* goes back to Plato,[9] but it is developed profoundly by Aristotle;[10] it would become the core of later philosophical thinking in striking a balance between the empirical and the cognitive (not least in the Stoic idea of *phantasia katalēptikē* or 'cognitive impression').[11]

Yet the history of 'imagining' goes back before use of the word. Long before *phantasia* was coined, the ancient Greek world not only imagined, but displayed an intense interest in describing and analysing the imaginative process. Hence, as the editors explain, there is a pressing need to examine models and processes of

phantasia avant la lettre. It is not only thinking, but also thinking about thinking, that can take place in the absence of a technical terminology or formal theory. It follows that to understand the genesis of the imagination not only in Greek and Greco-Roman but in all Western culture, we need to recover imaginative processes and the reflection on them by examining extant cultural artefacts, from material objects to poetic texts to speeches delivered in the lawcourts and assembly or imagined as having been delivered (in the famous formulation of the historian Thucydides). In all this, extant cultural artefacts do not just reflect shifting ideas about the imagination but are also constitutive within shaping processes of imagination. They are in their own right sensory worlds constructed in the mind that blend mind and matter.

***

Where has this book left us? One thing that strikes us about the essays collected here is that, despite their many intersections, authors end up with rather different conceptions of imagination. To put the point more strongly, not least with a view to this series' medial interests of 'Image, Text, and Culture in Classical Antiquity', we wonder how different sorts of cultural artefacts end up constructing and reflecting different sorts of models for thinking about the mind-matter interface. So it is, for instance, that Leah Lazar's focus on epigraphy champions a more socially minded framework (bound up with the changing history of Athenian democracy), whereas Xavier Buxton's turn to tragedy takes us to something more dialogic and embodied. The point seems particularly pertinent to our own primary interests – namely, in material and visual culture. One has to wonder, for example, whether different classes of objects and images – expensive carved marble statuary or reliefs largely used in public spaces, in sanctuaries or in funerary contexts, cheap painted pottery largely used in the household, figurines from bronze to terracotta, mirrors, and so forth – figure the imagination and themselves as products of the imagination in different ways.

For us, as historians of ancient art first and foremost, such issues of media lead to questions about historicization, especially with a view to the stories told about the development of Greek visual culture (and of figurative art in particular). On the one hand, we are left pondering how to situate the intellectual history of Classical 'forms of thought' against a literary and visual-cultural backdrop that reaches back to Homer and the origins of Greek figurative art. On the other hand, there remains a pressing question about how to historicize the slow but sure emergence, above all in the late sixth and early fifth centuries, of new forms of stylistic artistic expression and response. Perhaps inevitably, we find ourselves returning here to what Ernst Gombrich famously called the 'Greek Revolution': that is, in Gombrich's framework, the supposed paradigm shift not just in what images looked like (the development between the Archaic and Classical from supposedly more 'schematic' to more 'naturalistic' or 'lifelike' modes), but also, and by extension, a supposed transformation in how viewers engaged with them. For Gombrich, this change in

artistic form went hand in hand with a transformation in Western viewing subjectivity: the emergence of a new sort of viewing subject that would in turn define the parameters of Western image-making.[12]

These are big themes – too big, to be sure, for so short an epilogue. But in the book's spirit of interdisciplinary dialogue, we round off our contribution by returning to these two topics in turn. Our aim here is not to challenge the arguments developed in this book, but rather to push them a little further, above all in approaching the history of imagination from the perspective of Greek visual culture.

***

Our first mode of enquiry takes us squarely to chronology – and to the 'Classical' heralded in the book's title. Simply put, there seems to us a residual dilemma in how far we should push the chronological parameters of any defining 'Classical' moment, and about how the 'emergence' (if that is what it should be called) of new imaginative processes should be historically situated against a longer intellectual and cultural trajectory. In their introduction, the editors explain how their project relates not just to the work of Bruno Snell (in his landmark 1946 book on *Die Entdeckung des Geistes: Studien zur Entstehung des europäischen Denkens bei den Griechen*), but also to a longer German Idealist tradition, one that ultimately stretches back to Hegel, not least Hegel's *Vorlesung über die Ästhetik* in the first quarter of the nineteenth century.[13] Fundamental to Snell's own narrative, in turn forged after Hegel's, the editors have reminded us, is a supposed teleological development within Greek antiquity – an emergence, literally a 'dis-closing', from a deeply 'primitive' concept of the imagination to something much more recognizably 'modern' and 'European'. At stake within this framework is nothing less than the reformulation of subjectivity and the rise of the subject, something said to be rooted first and foremost in the Classical period of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE.

For good reasons, perhaps, this book has tried to steer clear of such narratives.[14] In their introduction, the editors make the case for the Classical as a 'climactic period' (p. 5) for imagining the imagination. The emphasis of the book, as they put it, is 'upon the proliferation (rather than evolution) of "forms of thought" in the classical period, forms that anticipate the development of philosophical vocabulary'; 'in this period … the mind is not discovered, or invented, or revealed, but intensely "imagined"' (p. 5). The editors explicitly eschew talk of 'evolution'. Yet already in their packaging of the Classical as 'climactic', and not least their talk of 'proliferation', something of Snell's teleological narrative remains; indeed, for anyone approaching the book with a view to history, one core historicizing take-home has been to shift attention away from the likes of Plato and Aristotle in the fourth century (as to a large extent in Snell's account) to a range of earlier cultural phenomena and media in the fifth. Just occasionally in the chapters that follow, issues of historical evolution resurface – as with Leah Lazar's emphasis on differences between the fifth and fourth centuries, for example.[15] Yet a fundamental

question remains: namely, about how to situate a 'Classical' concern with imagination within a longer intellectual-historical archaeology. Is this 'proliferation… of "forms of thought"' something new and different – a cardinal change from what preceded the Classical fifth and fourth centuries? Or does it continue patterns that appear something earlier? Just how far back might we trace the 'prehistory' of the imagination, before the emergence of rationalizing discourses in the fourth century BCE? Indeed, might a diverse range of pre-Classical artefacts be understood 'to have mediated efforts to grasp and articulate how imaginative processes work' (p. 1), in the same way that contributors claim of the fifth- and fourth-century materials that they discuss?

Homer provides one lens for addressing these questions. For Snell, Homer by necessity stood at the 'primitive' end within his developmental history of the ancient mind – an argument with which various contributions to this volume have already taken issue.[16] But to problematize such a linear historical *Entstehung* must surely have historical consequences in turn. For already in the *Iliad*, we suggest, can be found not just reflections on what the imagination is or might be, but also deliberations about how cultural artefacts (not least the medium of epic poetry itself) might mediate such imaginative processes.

A key demonstration of the point comes in the Homeric description of manufactured objects – foremost among them Homer's landmark evocation of the shield of Achilles (*Il*. 18.478–608). A great deal has been written about this passage, not least about its role, right at the very beginnings of the Greek literary tradition, in establishing the parameters of set-piece description or ecphrasis.[17] For our purposes here, the importance of the passage lies in its reflective appeal to the mind's eye of the audience, no less than its commentary (framed within a verbal evocation of a visual artefact) on the relationship between mediating form and imagined response. On the one hand, the very evocation of the material object that Hephaestus forges, forged in turn from the verbal fabric of the epic poet, points to a concern with how different sorts of cultural media might relate similarly or differently to one another in their imaginative appeal.[18] On the other, particularly remarkable about the passage are the numerous moments when the poet steps back, drawing attention to the disjuncture between what we are told might be seen and what we are told might be imagined: already in Homer we find initial reflections on the relationship (and indeed fundamental tension) between what Richard Wollheim famously called 'seeing as' and 'seeing in'.[19] Consider the following lines, taken from the first 'landscape' vignette that succeeds the evocation of the cities at peace and war, describing the appearance of a field as it is ploughed (18.548–9):[20]

> ἡ δὲ μελαίνετ᾽ ὄπισθεν, ἀρηρομένῃ δὲ ἐώκει,
> χρυσείη περ ἐοῦσα· τὸ δὴ περὶ θαῦμα τέτυκτο.
>
> And the field was growing dark behind them and it looked like earth that had been ploughed, even though it was of gold: such was the outstanding marvel that was forged.

Here the poet moves from a description of an animated appearance (how the field represented on the shield was 'growing dark'), to a commentary on its imagined likeness (what that field 'looked like' – namely, newly ploughed earth). Crucially, the passage also proceeds to draw out a disjuncture between that imagined impression (of dark, freshly-tilled soil) and the medium that forges it (the gold matter of the shield): the wonder – the much-heralded *thauma* of the shield's manufacture – is here equated to the essential dissonance between on the one hand the descriptive details of metallic gold (in the present: χρυσείη περ ἐοῦσα), and on the other the idea of darkening ploughed earth (a detail that the narrative telling already dispatches to the imperfect: ἣ δὲ μελαίνετ᾽ ὄπισθεν).

James Heffernan has talked of such reflections as paradigmatic examples of the 'representational friction' at the core of Western ecphrastic traditions: the promise and/or failure of one medium (the gold matter that constitutes the shield) metamorphosing into another (the impression of darkening earth, furrowed by the plough) here figures the promise and/or failure of poetry to mediate the visual subjects verbally evoked.[21] From the perspective of this book, however, the significance of the passage lies in probing how a cultural artefact – whether tangible imagery, embossed on a shield, or else a poetic description like this one, mediated by words – might in turn forge a wondrous impression in the imagination; its importance rests in drawing out, even while celebrating the artefact's wonder, the disconnect between imaginary response and the stimulus that mediates it (whether the verbal evocation describing the visual representations forged onto the shield, or the glistening metallic medium said to evoke an idea of darkening earthly soil). Our point is that, already in Homer – long before not only explicit Greek theories of *phantasia* and other concepts, but also the Classical literary and material case studies studied in this book – we find passages mediating efforts at once to grasp and articulate how imaginative processes work; indeed, passages that point simultaneously to both the proximity and distance between physical sight and imaginary insight, themselves already embroiled in the forged fabrication of ecphrastic evocation.

The fact that this Homeric passage forges its impression of an imaginative process by means of a description of a physical object might give us additional pause for thought, too. However 'imaginary' we might understand the imagery described as being forged on the shield, after all, this description takes its cue from actual objects, no less than the modes of viewing to which they catered. There is a question here, in other words, about how to make historical sense not just of 'forms of thought' mediated in texts, but also their relation to the sorts of objects that they describe and imagine. Might the actual objects that survive in the archaeological record – more or less contemporary with Homer – play with interrelationships between seeing and imagining, between 'seeing in' and 'seeing as', in similarly knowing or experimental ways?

Whatever else we make of the imagery of Late Geometric vase painting, it surely appeals to a viewer to make imaginative sense of proto-figurative forms – their relation to the meandering shapes and patterns that surround them, but no less importantly also their juxtapositions, connections, and potential narrative associations.

Figure E.1 'Euphorbus Plate'. Probably dated to the last quarter of the seventh century BCE. Found in Kamiros, Rhodes. Diameter 39.37cm. British Museum, London: 1860,0404.1.

Photograph: © Trustees of the British Museum.

By the seventh century, at least, there seems to us to be little doubt that objects toyed with such imaginative appeal in deeply self-knowing ways.

Among the most spectacular examples is the so-called 'Euphorbus Plate' (Figure E.1), with its scene of Menelaus and Hector fighting over the body of the eponymous fallen hero (all of their names are inscribed).[22] On the one hand, the very shape of the object suggests an analogy between the ceramic plate and the three metallic shields visualized within it – two attached to the forearm and hence seen from the inside, the third, seen from the outside (with emblematic bird-motif emblazoned within its perimeter rim, featured alongside patterns of dots that echo those free-floating within the plate's own circumscribed pictorial field). On the other hand, the emblazoned imagery invites viewers to reconceptualize both the object and the subjects it depicts anew. Crucial is the issue of how to reconcile an

external view onto the scene, with its two symmetrical warriors facing one another, with an alternative viewpoint that emerges in the pictorial space stretching between them. In this case, the very act of looking at the two central protagonists (both shown in profile) might be thought to invite a viewer to imagine him- or herself into the scene, this time from the frontal perspective of its depicted combatants: at the upper centre of the framed inner scene, at precisely the point to which the spears of the two protagonists are pointing (albeit not yet touching), there emerges a frontal face – a pair of eyes, framed around a series of patterns suggestive of a helmet and/or plume, related to the ones worn by the two heroes. To look upon the imagery of these two en-face warriors, in short, now becomes an occasion to project oneself into the visualized story – to face battle through the eyes of the protagonists that face one another.[23] The plate emerges as a portal for imagining an alternative view into its mytho-pictorial landscape – or else, perhaps, as a shield that reflects the frontal view of the onlooker who stares into it…

***

Much more could be said about the materials introduced in the previous paragraphs – about the ways in which Homeric poetry at once constructs and appeals to imaginative processes, no less than about modes of responding to various configurations of (more or less) contemporary visual imagery. But our point in adducing these examples lies in problematizing residual linear histories of Classical 'forms of thought' in relation to earlier materials, whether literary or visual cultural. To put the point more strongly, there seem to us strong grounds for resisting the idea that, in intellectual-historical terms, the fifth or fourth centuries mark a significant break with earlier traditions – and not least for questioning the ideological assumptions that colour such accounts. Quite how we historicize within a longer intellectual tradition the 'Classical' developments discussed in this book – indeed, whether we tell a story of 'development', 'evolution', 'emergence', 'proliferation', and so on – seems to us a question yet fully to be resolved.

The point takes us to a second, albeit related, consideration: namely, the issue of how to reconcile Classical 'forms of thought' (whatever their archaeology) with the emergence, between the sixth and fifth centuries, of new stylistic visual forms and associated models of object-subject response. Despite some passing nods in the editors' introduction (e.g. pp. 8, 24), in the contributions that follow there is surprisingly little engagement with debates about the 'Greek Revolution'.[24] For that, some readers will no doubt be grateful. But what are we to make of the history of Greek image-making within a history of the imagination? This is not ultimately a question that exercised Snell, who framed his intellectual-historical project firmly around literary materials. But the theme seems to us absolutely critical for thinking both conceptually and historically about the cultural history of the imagination in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE.

To explain what we mean here, it is necessary to say something about how Greek image-making changes during the long sixth century and into the fifth, and in a

variety of artistic forms (including both sculpture and painting). This is not the place to reprise Gombrich's arguments – about a movement in sculpture from surface pattern to a three-dimensional concern with volume, for example, or a new supposedly naturalistic interest in depicting the human body (in turn explained with reference to what Gombrich called 'making and matching'). However we characterize such changes in artistic form, they seem to go hand in hand with a transformation in relationships between viewed objects and viewing subject. In the sixth century, the frontal stance of Archaic *kouroi* and *korai* was premised on a mirrored exchange of gazes between onlooker and statue. By contrast, already by the early fifth, statues interact with viewers in very different ways: gone is the direct exchange of looks, which makes both statue and viewer each direct participants in the world of the other; instead, the viewer is now constructed as observer – as voyeur, invited to peer into the existential world that statuary makes known. Historians of Late Archaic and early Classical (so-called 'Severe') Greek sculpture have developed their own vocabulary to describe the phenomenon: they have talked of a newfound interest in 'identification', as indeed of 'characterization', 'ethos', 'private contemplation', 'emotional state', and 'self-absorption'.[25] Yet the key point lies in the steadfast denial of the onlooker's gaze: a new economy of looking empowered viewers to determine the relationship (at once spatial and conceptual) between their own existential world and that made manifest by the manufactured object. Some (including one of the duo penning this epilogue!) have gone even further, in a line of argument that in turn echoes aspects of both Snell's narrative and its German Idealist forebears. If the history of Greek art points to a new configuration of subject-object relationships, after all, might it be tempting to relate this to a transformation both of the subject and of the collective subjectivity – to suggest that the re-orientation of the subject made manifest by Greek art is also played out in other arenas of cultural, social, civic, intellectual, and political life (philosophy, theatre, law, and so on)?[26]

Rather than get sidetracked by such debates, our point in raising them is simply to suggest that much work remains to be done in understanding what such shifts in artistic form might mean for the histories told of the Greek imagination. More specifically, there seems to us to be an open question as to how we should understand 'naturalism' – the whole framework of mimetic art – as a 'form of thought' in its own right. Modes of interpretation reach in two contradictory ways. In a tradition that in fact stretches back to Plato, one response has been to approach mimetic art as ultimately compromising the contributory role of the subject: for Plato, naturalistic imitations of objects or people must ultimately trap us in the material realm – hence the need to excise them from the ideal Republic.[27] It is an argument repeated by modern art historians, too: according to John Onians, in an influential article discussing the effective 'reversing' of the 'Greek Revolution' in late Roman art, the demise of naturalism in later antiquity went hand in hand with the rise of new forms of subjective imagination: the gradual championing of abstract and schematic over mimetic forms enabled subjects to make more creative and imaginative recourse of less naturalistic detail.[28]

But this is by no means the only way to approach the rise of naturalistic modes. In the wake of the present edited collection, there seems to us to be a more compelling

framework in which to understand the visual stylistic developments of the 'Greek Revolution', and relate them to a history of the creative imagination. For fundamental to the workings of Classical art – and almost any fifth-century free-standing or relief sculpture could be mentioned here – is an appeal for the viewer to embroider imaginatively the sight with which she or he was confronted: to narrativize and relate a stimulus to a story, for example; to engage with the contemplative world that a statue itself imagines; to empathize with or otherwise emotionally relate to its depicted subject, which now so powerfully interacts with the lived space of the viewer. We might go still further. Understandably enough, perhaps, classical archaeologists have placed an emphasis on the mimetic verisimilitude of (especially Athenian) fifth-century art – the anatomically correct detailing of musculature, for instance, the pulsing veins, the true-to-life posture embodied in the *contrapposto* pose. But they have arguably downplayed all manner of formal features that fly in the face of the anatomically accurate, thereby resisting the pattern of 'making and matching' that Gombrich so powerfully advocated. Among myriad other examples, one might think of the rendering of the so-called Iliac crest or 'Adonis belt' – continued around the back of the body in a way that is perhaps conceptually understandable but never in physical actuality realizable (e.g. Figure E.2); or else how something as 'Classically' iconic as Myron's *Discobolos* synoptically combines different moments of physical exertion and anatomical movement in a single pose, albeit in a way that could never be replicated by an athlete (Figure E.3). What such examples present us with is less a regime of naturalism than a sort of hypernaturalism that goes beyond simple replication – going 'beyond the real', as Quintilian later described the style of Polyclitus (*supra uerum*: *Inst. Or.* 12.10.8). Perhaps better, echoing the phrase Emmanuel Loewy used to describe modes of Archaic Greek response, physical images here serve in turn to spark mental images – so-called *Gedächtnisbilder* in the mind of the viewer.[29]

What might all this mean for the book at hand? It seems to us that one way of approaching the stylistic and representational shifts associated with the rise of Classical art is in terms of precisely a mind-matter interface – an active and experimental interrogation not just of the limits of what can be mimetically represented, but also what might be imagined. The stories usually told of fifth-century art – always retrospectively, whether through the lens of much later Hellenistic and Roman writers, or by modern writers via an (all too often unacknowledged) analogy with the Italian Renaissance – is of representational images standing in for the things that they mediate. From the perspective of this book, though, naturalism might itself be considered a 'form of thought' – at once mediating and reflecting upon attempts to grasp imaginative processes. The intellectual fervour with which images came, during the course of the later sixth and early fifth centuries, to explore the limits of mimetic representation could be understood in similar light: a painted vase like the 'Foundry Cup' (Figure E.4), delighting in the interplay between sculpturally manufactured bodies and the real bodies of the men who forge them (albeit both mediated by the imagery painted onto the body of this red-figure drinking cup), toys precisely with the manipulative power of mimetic make-believe – indeed, with the viewer's capacity to differentiate, or not, between reality and artifice.[30] Put simply, the story of the 'Greek Revolution' might here be spun as a story not of 'making and



Figure E.2 Riace Bronze 'Warrior A' (viewed from two angles): bronze statue cast between c. 470–430 BCE. Height 189 cm. Museo Nazionale della Magna Grecia, Reggio Calabria, Italy: 12801.

Photograph: Reproduced by kind permission of the Archiv, Institut für Klassische Archäologie und Museum für Abgüsse Klassischer Bildwerke, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich.



Figure E.3 'Lancellotti Discobolos': second-century CE marble version of Myron's fifth-century BCE bronze statue. Height 155 cm (without base). Museo Nazionale Romano, Palazzo Massimo alle Terme, Rome: 126371.

Photograph: Reproduced by kind permission of the Archiv, Institut für Klassische Archäologie und Museum für Abgüsse Klassischer Bildwerke, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich.

Figure E.4 Attic red-figure *kylix* (both sides), attributed to the Foundry Painter. c. 480 BCE. Height 12 cm, Diameter 30.5 cm. Found in Italy (Vulci, Etruria). Antikensammlung, Berlin: F2294.

Photograph: bpk – Bildarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin: Bildagentur für Kunst, Kultur und Geschichte.

matching', but of interrogating, by pushing mimetic art to the limits, the boundaries of what can and cannot be seen – both physically and imaginatively.[31]

Nowhere is the point more conspicuous than when it comes to Classical attempts to visualize and imagine entities that defy physical embodiment – and by extension mimetic representation. Here the very limits of representation serve as a means for inquisitive reflection on what the mind might imagine in relation to what the material world can and cannot make known: on the one hand, the pressing issue of how to imagine the dead – the empty mirage emblazoned on the oblique mirror, itself overlapping with the frame, held by the figure of the deceased on the Attic grave stele of Pausimache, for instance (Figure E.5);[32] on the other, the dilemma of how to imagine the gods, as at once embodied and disembodied entities, paradoxically revealed and occluded by their material manifestation in turn. Enshrined in a fourth-century votive relief like Figure E.6, we would argue, is not only a dilemma about how to conceptualize a divine presence (in this case, the intervention of the goddess Hecate, incised in faint outline and apparently unseen by the human worshippers who approach her), but also questions about how every such material manifestation, including the one at hand, might at once facilitate and occlude such divine revelation.[33]

***

Material case studies like the Pausimache stele or our votive relief, both made in or around Athens during precisely the period upon which this book has focussed, provide a fitting note on which to end. All too often it is assumed that art mirrors historical shifts that are external to it – key changes in philosophical thinking, for example, or in social and political life. By contrast, one take-home of this volume lies in reversing that assumption. The history of aesthetics – that is of artistic forms, as well as of the sorts of relationships with viewing subjects that such forms construct – is itself an integral and integrated part of intellectual history *tout court*: objects, and the forms of response that they prompt, mediate and make known not only ways of thinking, but also of approaching the interface between the material world and the concept-forming subject. To put the point more strongly, we might say that so many of the key intellectual-historical developments of the fourth century BCE – the innovations of Plato and Aristotle, and not least the coinage of terms and models for imagining the imaginative process – themselves emerge from modes of responding to contemporary art: the intellectual history of the imagination is itself unimaginable except against the backdrop of fifth- and fourth-century visual culture.

Figure E.5 Attic marble grave stele of Pausimache holding a mirror [CAT, 1.283]. c. 380 BCE. Height 129 cm. National Archaeological Museum, Athens: 3964.

Photograph: Vanni Archive/Art Resource, NY.

Figure E.6 Marble votive relief of worshippers approaching altar (of Hecate or Artemis). Late fifth or early fourth century BCE. Found at Palaiochora, Aegina. National Archaeological Museum, Athens: 1950.

Photograph: Hellenic Ministry of Culture/Archaeological Receipts Fund.

Abbreviations

Abbreviations of ancient authors and texts, as well as scholarly reference works, generally follow those of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, fourth edition; abbreviations of journal titles follow those of *L'Année Philologique*.

CAT = Clairmont, C. W. 1993. *Classical Attic Tombstones*, 7 vols. Kilchberg: Akanthus.

Notes

1 For some approaches, see Sartre (1948); Barnes (1960); Furlong (1961) (with discussion of uses of the term at 19–26); Warnock (1976); Kearney (1988); Sallis (2000); Holmes (2014). For some different orientations to the philosophy of imagination, see, e.g., Huppauf & Wulf (2009); Sepper (2013); and Kind (2016).

2 On the intellectual-historical development of *phantasia*, see the editors' introduction at pp. 2–9 with esp. n. 18. See further below, n. 5.
3 See e.g. Fattori & Bianchi (1988); Watson (1988: 134–61); Lories & Rizzerio (2003).
4 See the editors' introduction to this volume, esp. pp. 6–8 and 11–12, and also the chapter by Huitink, which attends to both contemporary cognitive theories and cultural-historical forms of thought. We find ourselves characteristically sceptical of the essentialist underpinnings behind so many cognitive and neuroscientific approaches.
5 For a basic introduction to the intellectual-historical backdrop, see Watson (1988; 1994); Sheppard (2014). On the relation to post-Enlightenment ideas of 'imagination', see Rosenmeyer (1986). See further above, n. 2.
6 Cf. Birmelin (1933: esp. 392–414) on Philostr. *V A* 6.19; for the general epistemological framework, together with further parallels, see Watson (1988: 60–95; 1994: 4767–9); Zeitlin (2001: 219); Platt (2009: esp. 149–54; developed in 2011: 320–9); Squire (2013a: 101–5; 2016: 8–19); Sheppard (2014: 80–1); Miles (2018: 59–62).
7 See, e.g., Grimshaw (2014).
8 Notably the monographs of Watson (1988) and Sheppard (2014), as well as the collected volumes of Fattori & Bianchi (1988) and Lories & Rizzerio (2003), although all these really begin with Plato in the fourth century BCE.
9 Plato: Watson (1988: 1–13); Silverman (1991); Barnouw (2002); Follon (2003).
10 Aristotle: Watson (1988: 14–37); Labarrière (2003); Lefebre (2003); Moss (2012: 48–66); Sheppard (2014: 1–18).
11 The Stoics and their context: Frede (1983); Rouveret (1989: 384–405); Annas (1992: 71–85); Zagdoun (2000); Reed (2002); Männlein-Robert (2003); Labarrière (2004); Tanner (2006: 283–7); Bartsch (2007); Webb (2009: 107–30).
12 See Gombrich (1950: 49–64; 1959: 99–124). The bibliography is vast: see, e.g., Beard (1985); Spivey (1996: 17–53); Neer (2002: 27–86, esp. 28–32); Tanner (2006: esp. 31–96); Elsner (2006); Squire (2011: 32–68); Vout (2014). The most scintillating discussion on the 'emergence of the Classical style' remains Neer (2010); cf. Osborne (2018) in the context of Athenian vase-painting. On Gombrich's own historiography (including his debt to both Pliny and Vasari), see Bryson (1984: 7–19).
13 See the introduction (this volume, pp. 4–5), with reference to Snell (1953). The bibliography on Hegelian aesthetics is immense: the essays in Kottman & Squire (2018) offer an introductory guide and further bibliography.
14 On the (residual) postmodern resistance to such historical *grands récits*, cf. Lyotard (1979).
15 For some closely related arguments about the social and political developments of the late fifth and fourth centuries, based again on visual materials (albeit vase-painting rather than state reliefs), see Osborne (2018), with response in Squire (2019: 143–7).
16 Cf. the editors' introduction (this volume, pp. 4–5 with n. 25) (comparing, e.g., Long (2007: 165–6) and (2015: 29–30)); Buxton (this volume, 273–9).
17 For bibliography, see Squire (2013b: 183, n. 1). See further Lynn-George (1987: 174–200); Heffernan (1993: 10–22); Becker (1995); Francis (2009); Purves (2010: 46–55); Koopman (2018: 68–128); Rutherford (2019: 21–34); Thein (2021: esp. 55–96). On the significance of the passage for establishing the conceptual parameters of ecphrasis in Graeco-Roman literature, see, e.g., Elsner (2002); Squire (2013b; 2015) – and above all now Thein (2021).
18 Right from the outset, the manufactured shield is set up as a sight for looking upon and marvelling, despite the narrative thrust of the verbal description of manufacture that follows. Cf. *Il*. 18.466–7: 'such that anyone among the multitude of men will marvel, whoever looks upon it' (οἷά τις αὖτε | ἀνθρώπων πολέων θαυμάσσεται, ὅς κεν ἴδηται).
19 See in particular Wollheim (1980: 137–51; 1998: 221–2; 2003); cf. e.g. Grethlein (2017: esp. 18–34). For discussion, see the editors' introduction (this volume, esp. 19, with n. 57).

20 For analysis of the passage and other examples, see Heffernan (1993: esp. 3); Becker (1995: 128–30); Squire (2013b: 159–60). More generally on ancient ecphrasis and imagination, see now the seminal study of Thein (2021: esp. 333–50).

21 Cf. e.g. Heffernan (1993: 20), on how the 'subtle and ambiguous instances of representational friction suggest that the mind of Homer – or at any rate the mind of the text – is continuously engaged in meditating, sometimes playfully, on the complexities of representation itself: on the startling oppositions and equally startling convergences between the media of visual representation and the referents'. Cf. Heffernan (1993: 4): 'By explicitly noting the difference between the medium of visual representation (gold) and its referent (earth), Homer implicitly draws our attention to the *friction* between the fixed forms of visual art and the narrative thrust of his words.'

22 London, British Museum: inv. A749. The plate probably dates from the last quarter of the seventh century, and was found in Kamiros on the island of Rhodes: for discussion, see Squire (2018a: 3–16). For a recent overview of scholarship, see Giuliani (2013: 99–102 – first published in German in 2003), with further bibliography at 285, n. 35. The best formalist analysis of the plate is Simon (1976: 54–5, no. 31); on the history of the supposed workshop, see Schiering (1957: esp. 11–12). Scholarly discussion has typically tended to focus on debates about the influence of Iliadic poetic narrative: e.g. Friis Johansen (1967: 77–80); Snodgrass (1998: 105–9); Burgess (2001: 77–81); Wachter (2001: 221, no. DOH 1, 310–11).

23 Allow us to forestall one frequent riposte here: our talk of a 'viewer' by no means ignores the diversity of potential viewing subjects. For instance, if the frontal view from the centre is that of a free male subject, then the plate might promote imaginative identification with the heroes – war-like men as the beholder might be, whose glory might be the triumphs of Menelaus or Hector, or the tragedy of Euphorbus (as depicted), or for that matter eventually that of Hector. If the viewer were a male slave – participant of an entirely different group and experience from that glorified on the plate – then the possibilities for askance thinking against its epic resonances, or for intense identification outside the beholder's social context, are great. If the viewer were female (as we may or may not assume half the potential spectators of this object were), an entirely different imaginative scenario is implicitly scripted – for the frisson of fear in the defeat of one's protectors, the terror of defeat, abduction, and rape haunts the epic fates of mythical women, free and slave alike.

24 For the Gombrichian term, see above, n. 12.

25 For more detailed discussion, see Elsner (2006) and Squire (2011: 32–68).

26 This is the argument of Elsner (2006) – namely, that sculpture and painting 'created a fundamental new naturalism in artistic forms and … a new kind of visuality and viewer-subjectivity, which would be adopted over the course of the fifth and fourth centuries in numerous other artistic forms from comedy to history to philosophy, and beyond these to the politics of the assembly and the performative rhetoric of the law courts in Athens' (93).

27 The bibliography is vast: cf. e.g. Lodge (1953) (with Halliwell (1988)); Huber-Abrahamowicz (1954); Moravcsik & Temko (1982); Janaway (1995); Burnyeat (1999: esp. 263–305); Halliwell (2002).

28 Cf. Onians (1980: 12), on the rise in late antiquity of a 'visual sensibility which enabled the late antique spectator to make more and more out of the same or less information'; see further n. 84 of the editors' introduction (this volume). Cf. Onians (1990; 1999: 217–78), arguing that 'not only was it inherent in this visual imagination that it did not need to be limited by the reality of what was presented to the eyes, it was actually desirable for one to be able to imagine the exaggerated and the false… As art becomes less and less descriptive, the accounts of art become more so' (261). Compare also Vernant (1991: 164–92).

29 Cf. Loewy (1907), with, e.g., Rose (2001: 64–73). These and other examples are discussed further in Squire (2011: 53–62).

30 The decisive discussion is Neer (2002: 77–85): 'In good sympotic fashion, the Foundry Cup expressly thematizes the slips, swerves, and disruptions that characterize both pictorial and graphic metamorphoses' (85). Compare Neer (1995) on the mimetic games of Pioneer vase painting more generally.

31 One thinks here in particular of the famous succession of discussions between Socrates and a painter (Parrhasius), sculptor (Cleiton), and armourer (Pistias) reported at Xen. *Mem.* 3.10. Particularly pertinent is the exchange with Parrhasius. Socrates begins with a deceptively straightforward question: does painting represent things that are actually seen (*ta horōmena*), or does it reproduce through artificial means (above all through colours – *chrōmata*)? After establishing that the painter necessarily combines the physical features of numerous models, Parrhasius is made to concede the impossibility of replicating the character of the soul ('that character which is the most captivating, the most delightful, the most familiar, the most fascinating, and the most desirable'): 'for how', as Parrhasius puts it, 'could one replicate something which has neither shape nor colour nor any of the other qualities you just mentioned – something which we are not even wholly able to *see*?' For discussions, see e.g. Rouveret (1989: 14–15); Goldhill (1998); Steiner (2001: 33–5); Neer (2010: 155–7); Stavru (2010); Zuckerman (2021).

32 Athens, National Archaeological Museum, inv. 3964 (= *CAT*, 1.283). For a list of Attic grave stelai with images of a figure holding a mirror (most often at an oblique angle), see Younger (2002: 204, n. 71). For discussions, cf. Leader (1997: 693); Younger (2002: 183–5); Bectarte (2006); Turner (2009: esp. 150–9); Neer (2010: 197–9); Platt (2014: 195–7); Squire (2018b: 533–4). On the thorny issue of imagining death, see above all Clifford's chapter in this volume (from the perspective of Classical vase painting), along more generally with the chapter by Sekita.

33 Athens, National Archaeological Museum, inv. 1950 (found at Palaiochora, Aegina): for discussion, see Platt (2011: 31–50, esp. 39–42). More generally on the analogous challenges of imagining the dead in the Greek imagination, the foundational contribution is Vernant (1991: esp. 141–92); for discussion, see also Neer (2010b). On the materialist theological stakes of Greek votive reliefs, with wide-ranging bibliography, see now Hedreen (2021).

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